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ABSTRACT 
This thesis studies the relations between media image, online news design, and the 
framing of identity. It scrutinizes CUITent images of Arab identity and their representation 
in Aljazeera Net in order to examine how Aljazeera Net constructs the 'reality' of Arabs. 
The dissertation begins by defining Arabness in terms of ethnie, cultural and postcolonial 
identities. It proposes and assesses the sources of Arab identity and examines Arab 
identity as a source of meanings for Arabs. Likewise, it evaluates the sources of Arab 
identity in the Arab diaspora. Through the lens of a remediation approach, the study 
explores newly emerging practices in the representation of news, and investigates how 
the design of Aljazeera Net alters the construction of meaning in news representation. 
The frames that go vern the representation of Arab identity determine the complexity of 
the image of Arabness, and reveal the differences between the acknow ledged 
perspectives and evolving identity of Aljazeera. The study conceives Aljazeera Net as a 
space for the reciprocal relationship between Aljazeera and Arabs in diaspora, and as a 
site for the overlapping between the local and the global in media representations. 
Finally, it considers how Arabs in the North American diaspora, particularly Arab media 
experts, academics and community leaders, perceive their identity, and how they evaluate 
Aljazeera as a Pan Arab media. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Cette thèse est une étude des relations entre l'image des médias, la conception des 
informations en ligne et l'encadrement d'une identité. Elle sonde les images actuelles de 
l'identité arabe ainsi que leur représentation dans Aljazeera Net afin d'examiner la façon 
dont Aljazeera net construit la «réalité» des Arabes. La dissertation commence par une 
définition de l'arabité relativement à l'identité ethnique, culturelle et postcoloniale. Elle 
propose et évalue les sources de l'identité arabe en tant que source de sens pour les 
Arabes. De plus, elle évalue les sources de l'identité arabe dans la diaspora arabe. Selon 
l'approche de représentation, l'étude explore les plus récentes pratiques apparues dans la 
représentation des informations et enquête sur la façon dont la conception d'Aljazeera 
Net altère la construction du sens dans la représentation des informations. Le cadre qui 
gouverne la représentation de l'identité arabe définit la complexité de l'image de 
l'arabité, et révèle les différences entre les perspectives reconnues et l'identité en 
développement d'Aljazeera. L'étude concoit Aljazeera Net en tant qu'espace aux 
relations réciproques entre Aljazeera et les arabes de la diaspora, et en tant que lieu de 
chevauchement entre le local et le global dans les représentations médiatiques. 
Finalement, elle examine comment les Arabes de la diaspora nord-américaine, en 
particulier les experts en médias arabes, les académiciens et les leaders communautaires, 
perçoivent leur identité et comment ils évaluent Aljazeera en tant que médias panarabe. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Any significant examination of Arabs as a collective ethnie entity cannot fail to take 
into account the exceptionable contribution of Edward Said. His work has consistently 
sought to examine the misrepresentation of Arabs through media images, and it offers a 
succinct account of how derogatory images against Arabs are: "enforced every day by the 
media, which - whether constitutively or out of ignorance or laziness - perpetuate these 
images" (Said, 2003, p. 83). Certain images perpetrated against Arabs are not merely 
encountered in Western media coverage, but also in the travel books targeted at both 
adults and children. The more persistent stereotypes depict Arabs as ignorant, 
superstitious, silly, lazy and dirty, irrational, cruel, and violent; moreover, they are, 
according to the more overt kinds of caricature, inc1ined to hate Christians, mistreat 
women, and even to engage in the slave trade (Little, 1998, pp. 264: 266). 
In the wake of the events of September 11 th, the recent analysis of three news 
networks in the Untied States - NBC, ABC, and CBS - indicates that these networks have 
sought to establish a 'frame of hate' in portraying the dominant media image of Arabs. 
One of these frames, which are ostensibly constructed to identify and describe the roots 
and causes of terrorism, bluntly states: "they hate us because we're great" (Ibrahim, 2003, 
p. 208). Additionally, Western media often describe Arabs as "a group of people who are 
backward, uncivilized, ruthless, cunning, untrustworthy, dogmatic, and fanatic Muslims, 
and are either terrorists or support terrorism" (Madani, 1999, p.3). The impact of 
derogatory images against Arabs would appear to be formidably damaging, since it has 
proven difficult to create a positive impression of Arabs, Muslims and Islam in such a 
hostile media environment (AIKathani, 2002, p.152). 
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Furthermore, Arabs themselves are often responsible for portraying negative images 
targeting Arabs, and it is often as a by-product of denouncing the actions of others that 
the weaknesses of the Arab world are described. For instance, sharing the same view as 
many Arab intellectuals, Edward Said portrays an unconstructive and debilitating image 
of the assumed condition of Arab nation. For instance, following the invasion of Iraq in 
March 2003, Said wrote: 
The result today, after the invasion of Iraq, is an Arab 
nation that is badly demoralised, cru shed and beaten down, 
less able to do any thing except acquiesce in announced 
American plans to redraw the Middle East map to suit 
American and obviously Israeli interests (Said, 2003, May). 
Clearly, negative images portrayed by Western media, or by Arabs themselves, can 
impinge on the do main of Arab identity. While there have been adequate examinations of 
the contexts that produce disheartening images of Arabs, there have been no critical 
investigations of the images Arab media produce about Arab identity, its sources, and its 
construction in the postcolonial period. 
Theoretically, the postcolonial condition began with the upsurge of liberation 
movements across the Arab World in the early 1950s, but most ofthe decisive initiatives 
were taken as long ago as the beginning of the twentieth century. This has contributed to 
the emergence of new phenomena. Of the post-colonial phenomena that surfaced in 
mounting a challenge to imperialism, and attempted to resist the endeavours of colonial 
powers to regain their hegemony in the Arab World, the rise of Arab Nationalism was 
foremost in this struggle, since it addressed Arabs at large. The postcolonial condition of 
the Arab World has been conducive to the growth of a further phenomenon, namely, the 
proliferation of Arab Diasporas. Colonialism, Arab war initiatives, and the continuation 
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of the Israeli occupation of Palestine, as weIl as the occupations of Lebanon, and 
recently, of Iraq, have brought about unstable conditions, which have noticeably 
increased the pressure on Arabs to leave the Arab World. Though not intended as a 
means of escaping from the pressures of occupation, the Arab Diasporas have 
nonetheless been significantly augmented through the attempt to find more stable places, 
where Arabs can enjoy better economic and political situations. 
The dramatic events Arabs went through in the early 1990s led to the creation of 
new powers in the Arab region, however, they did not exert a significant influence on 
Arab media, which continued to operate as a mouthpiece for Arab governments. The 
radical transformation of communication technologies during the 1990s has not merely 
helped Arab media reach Arabs on a Pan-Arab or global scale, but it has also transformed 
Arab media into public spaces, and has opened new frontiers for freedom of expression in 
the Arab World. 
Of all the emerging Pan Arab global media, AIjazeera and its network, Aljazeera 
Net, have entered the sphere of Arab media with a distinctively different agenda, radical 
new strategies, and the courage and vision to debate the emerging experience and status 
quo of Arabs. Aljazeera Net has recently enjoyed a peak of half a million visitors per day 
(Half, 2005, September), and not only has it become a space for Arab users to express 
their views, but it has additionally proven to be an out standing source for online news. In 
adopting the same motto as its sister television channel, 'The opinion and the other 
opinion', Aljazeera Net seems to have a much more identifiable 'multi-voiced' profile 
than other websites of Pan Arab online news, and compared with Western online news 
networks that target Arabs around the globe. The distinctiveness of Aljazeera Net is not 
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due to the increasing number of its visitors, but rather to its sustained attentiveness to 
ongoing events, its content that draws on its sister Aljazeera television network, and its 
strategies of news representation. 
The graduaI escalation in the significance of online news media, including Aljazeera 
Net, has created a web of networks between the Arabs in the Arab World, and Arabs in 
the Diasporas. These networks "make it possible for communication and information to 
flow among global actors in real time" (Harrison, 2002, p.251). One of the results of the 
burgeoning developments in electronic global communication and the receptiveness of 
Arabs in the Diaspora to this form of communication has been the blurring of the 
borderlines between the local and the global, and consequently, the momentous increase 
in the influence of Arab global media. The blurring of boundaries between the local and 
the global affects the way in which Arabs in the Diasporas "make sense of their 
relationship with 'place' and the other, and how they define themselves" 
(Tsagarousianou, 2002, pp. 211-212). 
This study examines the image of Arabness as it appears in Aljazeera Net. It 
formulates a proposal for defining Arab identity, based on the sources that underpin the 
development of Arab identity in the last fifty years that followed the long colonial period. 
The study proposes to undertake the study of the sources that characterize Arabs in terms 
of their ethnic, cultural, and postcolonial identities, and more particularly, the sources that 
continue to shape Arab identity, such as Pan Arabism, ongoing Arab conflicts, the Arabic 
language, religion, Arab women, media, and Arab cultural traits. This, together with an 
examination of the strategies used in the remediation of the news and an investigation of 
the construction of meaning in Aljazeera Net, will provide the 
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prerequisites for the investigation of Aljazeera's representation of Arab identity that is to 
follow. The study additionally explores the contexts and sources of Arab identity in the 
Diaspora, particularly in North America, and examines the reciprocal relationship 
between Aljazeera and Arabs in Diaspora. Finally, it considers how Arabs in the North 
American Diaspora, particularly Arab media experts, academics, and community leaders, 
perceive their identity, and how they evaluate Aljazeera as a Pan Arab media. 
Literature Review 
This review will undertake a reinterpretation of prior studies in the field, and it aims 
to capitalize on the main directions of research in online journalism, Arab Nationalism, 
the Arab Diaspora, and Arab media. The intricate dovetailing of issues concerning Arab 
identity dictate that the literature review, in order to avoid needless repetition, will avoid 
discussion about each individu al source proposed for Arab identity, especially as the first 
chapter serves as the main context through which the sources of Arab identity are 
examined. 
a) Mapping the studies of online news and online journalism 
Most studies of this nature continue to explore basic issues concerning online 
journalism, such as the agenda of online journalism, and the framing of on li ne news 
content (Sung, 2000, & Althaus and Tewksbury, 2002, & El Tuhami, 2003). The issue of 
interactivity has been another area of major concern among those who have studied 
online journalism. Hyun Ban (1999) and Terry Wimmer (2000) examine the change in 
the concept of interactivity and its impact on public confidence and trust. A third group of 
studies looks at the phenomenon of online news media, their reporting styles on the 
Internet, and the differences between traditional media and online media (Tsai, 1998, & 
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Wu, 2001, & Mensing, 2001, & Yoo, 2003). The consumption and perception of online 
news provides the focus for a fourth major set of studies (Sethuraman, 1995, & Swamy, 
1997). 
These studies are undoubtedly useful and instructive and will be taken into account 
in this study of Aljazeera Net. In its principal orientation, the literature review of online 
news suggests that it is: (1) a hybrid product of traditional and online media, a new genre 
or merely a temporal stage in the evolution of a new medium for news dissemination 
(Wu, 2001, p.l), (2) it reduces the number of prominent stories conveyed to the reader 
and limits the common perception of what is traditionally considered important for 
readers. Thus, it could reduce the potential for more adventurous agenda setting, (3) it 
gives more space and attention to opinion and commentary than did newspapers, and 
provides more mediated content, such as the quotations from government candidates 
(Mensing, 200 1, p.164), and finally, (4) it offers more interpretative and thematic views 
than those propagated in the tradition al news (Mensing, 2001, p.165). 
b) The literature of Arab nationalism: Arab history through narration 
This section will pay greater attention to how Arab nationalism is investigated and 
viewed. Investigations of Arab nationalism have generally centered on three prime areas: 
firstly, in narrating the history of Arab nationalism and its evolution both as an idea and 
as a movement (Marlow, 1961, & Ismael, 1967, & Gogoi, 1994, & Yaqub, 1999, & 
Dawisha, 2003). Secondly, these investigations have developed a critical assessment of 
the idea of Arab nationalism and its emerging issues, such as the study of Arab unit y and 
Arab identity (Ibrahim, 1980, & Tibi, 1990, & Hopkins, 1997, & Kramer, 1993, & Said, 
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2003, May). Finally, they have offered a scrutiny of the charismatic vision of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser (Stephens, 1971, & Nutting, 1972). 
Studies of Arab Nationalism have undergone a transition from being focused on a 
reality that can be narrated to constituting an aspect of the imaginary. In other words, if 
one were to borrow Benedict Anderson's conception of 'imagined communities', Arab 
Nationalism has bec orne a notional image that lives only in the minds of the Arabs that 
entertain it (Anderson, 1983, p.6). In accordance with Benedict Anderson's view, Edward 
Said tends to believe that Arab nationalism is ubiquitous, even though it is not present as 
a political reality (Said, 2003, May). Additionally, this bias often shapes ongoing 
evaluations of Arab nationalism, wherein Arab nationalism is seen either as victimized 
and abused, (Said, 2003, May), or as a mistaken identity, due to its manifest failure to 
achieve power for Arabs (Kramer, 1993). 
c) Studies of Arabness in the Diaspora: Retaining and experiencing diasporic 
identity 
Studies about Arab identity in the Diaspora focus on the ethnic, religious, and 
cultural identities of Arabs. Most of these studies look at the attributes that signal the 
retention of identity, and the degree of the assimilation of this identity through successive 
Arab generations in the Diaspora. For instance, the studies conducted by Ajrouch (2001) 
and Eid (2002) indicate that a second generation of Arab immigrants has retained most of 
the attributes of Arab identity. Among the cultural traits that contribute to the retention of 
Arab identity are popular cultural forms such as dance and music, which are significant 
manifestations of a collective identity (Hay, 2000, p. 107). 
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Other studies conducted by Arab scholars highlight the relationships between ethnie 
and cultural identities on one hand, and the self-esteem of Arab American Muslim 
adolescents (Mansour, 2000), or the academic achievements of Arab-Ameriean students, 
(Shalabi, 2001) on the other hand. These studies indicate that there is a significant 
correlation between the affirmation of belonging and self-esteem (Mansour, 2000, p. 41), 
and a pronounced relationship between the level of interest of Arab-Ameriean students in 
retaining their distinctive Arabie cultural identity and their academic achievements 
(Shalabi, 2001, p. 142). 
Issues relating to the connection between identity and diasporic experiences (Hay, 
2000), and aspects of integration into the host society (Nagel, 1998), have been among 
the chief concems of a third group of scholars, who have generally explored these issues 
from a variety of organizational, societal and subjective perspectives. From an 
organizational perspective, the production and maintenance of identity appears as one of 
the Arab organization's paramount goals (Hay, 2000, p. 20). The maintenance of identity 
was one of the key objectives of the Canadian Arab Federation (CAF) study, which was 
carried out as recently as 2002, and aimed to address the needs of Canadian Arabs by 
developing a comprehensive understanding of the Arab community. The study conducted 
by the CAF conc1udes that despite being proud as Arabs and Canadians, and despite their 
successful efforts to become successfully integrated within the dominant currents of 
Canadian life, "the rosy pieture of a proud and integrated community contrasts 
disturbingly with the dark reality of the racism and discrimination it faces" (The 
Knowledge, 2002, pA3). 
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From a more socio-cultural view of the diasporic experience, Jenny Wannas-Jones 
(2003) scrutinizes the dissonant and hybrid identities of Arab Canadian youths, and 
explores the process of identity formation "in the light of the socialization forces of the 
home, the school, and globalized mass media" (p. 2). She finds that reducing 
exclusionary practices among youths "could be avoided through greater societal and 
education al awareness of the Middle East in general" (Wannas-Jones, 2003, p. 6). 
The subjective experience of Arab women in the Diaspora reveals that exiled Arab 
women writers have shared similarly horrific experiences in their collective unconscious 
(AI-Samman, 2000, p. 240). The study conducted by Hanadi AI-Samman (2000) finds 
that the diasporic narrations of Arab women perform more functions than solely that of 
identifying and retrieving personal spaces in which Arab women can prosper. "Rather, 
they reclaim the nation for all citizens by calling for an immediate restructuring of 
individu al Arab identity, tradition, and national politics, and for overall advancement of 
the universal Arab self' (AI-Samman, 2000, p. 250). 
d) Studies concerning the development of Arab media and Aljazeera 
The development of Arab media is perceived by most postcolonial scholars as a 
response to the penetration of cultural imperialism that, in turn, has led to the 
overwhelming of Arab countries by Westernized cultural products. Ali Mohammadi's 
study (1998) defined the Arab electronic empires as being rooted in the "the legacy of 
colonialism and the continuing response to the incursion of Western modernity" (p.257). 
Of the studies that discuss the rise of the new generation, and the latest trends in Arab 
life, one of the most interesting is that undertaken by Leo Gher and Hussein Amin 
(1999), which charts the development of Arab national media, and traces the multiple 
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perspectives pertaining to the development of the infrastructure of cyberspace and the 
technologies that support the information superhighway in the Arab region (Gher, 1999, 
p.60). Gher and Amin conc1ude that the new technologies have already affected Arabie 
peoples in new and compelling ways (p.86). 
Although Aljazeera appears as a stimulating and challenging media, and has 
consequently enticed many scholars to write about it, the available studies about 
Aljazeera are comparatively few in number, set against the unprecedented fame of the 
network. The studies focused on Aljazeera have examined the content of Aljazeera 
television through empirieal investigation (Mazid, 2002), evaluated its role in public 
discourse and media diplomacy (EI-Nawawy, 2003), and studied the demographics of its 
audience (Auter, 2004), as weIl as its political influence among Kuwaitis (Jamal, 2004). 
Adel Iskandar and Mohammed EI-Nawawy (2003), and Hugh Miles (2005), have 
conducted a more strictly critical analysis of Aljazeera. Those scholars who have studied 
Aljazeera intensively note the fame of Aljazeera Television among the various Arab 
publics, but they have not paid anything like adequate attention to Aljazeera Net. 
Theoretical approaches 
This study utilizes three key theoretical approaches, examining Aljazeera Net 
through the methodologicallens of an agenda setting theory, and through employing the 
postcolonial and remediation approaches. 
a) The agenda setting theory 
Apart from using agenda setting theory as an alternative way to look for individu al 
levels of response and appreciation and directional media effects, whieh formed the first 
major trend in Agenda setting studies, the agenda framework is employed to focus on the 
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issue of the framing of Arab identity. The legacy of agenda setting studies can be traced 
back to the original study of McCombs and Shaw, and suggests that, "at a given point, or 
over a certain period of time, different media place a similar salience on a set of issues" 
(Dearing, 1996, p.90). The similarity in prioritization does not necessarily mean that aIl 
media are saying exactly the same thing at the same time. Agenda setting theory does not 
focus on what media say, so much as on what they have to say about a particular issue. 
However, it does not aim at influencing the reader through news content. Rather, it is a 
social process of construction "through which individu aIs interpret cIues from the media 
and from their environment to determine the salience of an issue" (Dearing, 1996, p.91). 
In other words, media may refer to what individu aIs think about it. However, recent 
trends in agenda setting focus on how to think about an issue, and not merely what to 
think about it, thereby linking the notion of agenda setting to the notion of media 
frarning. As Werner Severin (1997) puts it, setting the features that "represent how an 
event or issue is presented in the news medium, is very similar to the notion of media 
frarning" (p.269). 
Based on the literature reviewed above, two major assumptions are seen to underlie 
the most recent research in agenda setting: "( 1) the press and the media do not reflect 
reality; they filter and shape it; (2) media concentration on a few issues and subjects leads 
the public to perceive certain issues as more important than others" (Agenda). The 
Agenda setting operates in this study to ascertain whether or not Aljazeera Net shapes 
and filters Arab identity, and to evaluate how Aljazeera Net constructs the reality of 
Arabs. 
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b) Postcolonial approach 
It is hardly possible not to entertain doubts as to the viability of the postcolonial 
approach, at least insofar as it is used to explain the significance and sc ope of the study of 
identity. Skeptical scholars point to the ambiguous, and even contradictory nature of the 
term 'postcolonialism'. The question as to 'where' and how to situate the postcolonial, 
and the validity of daims as to the universality of the postcolonial approach, make it 
difficult to locate the postcolonial on a global map (Dirlik, 1997, p. 7). Likewise, the 
question as to when the era of postcolonialism began, as weIl its problematic nature as an 
indicator of temporality, means that it lacks chronological specificity. This means that the 
definition of the postcolonial remains radically uncertain, at least in terms of its semantic 
and historical connotations. As Ella Shohat (1997) points out, the postcolonial equates the 
early independence achieved by the settlers of colonial states with those states whose 
populations struggled to achieve independence from Europe (p. 325). 
In a general sense, the postcolonial approach works to make the relations between 
the colonizer and the colonized more visible, with the ultimate goal of undermining them 
(Schwarz, 2000, p. 4). As such, the postcolonial approach entails a sustained engagement 
with the experience of colonialism and its past and present effects, both at the local level 
of ex-colonial societies, as weIl as at the level of more general global developments. 
Although post-colonialism was gradually introduced as a term to replace the designation 
'Third World' in the early 1980s, scholars use the term to encompass the cultural affects 
of the imperial process from the moment of colonization to the present moment 
(Ashcroft, 1989, p.2). In a more strictly theoretical sense, the postcolonial approach 
intervenes "in those ideological discourses of modemity that attempt to give a hegemonic 
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'normality' to the uneven development and the differential, often disadvantaged, histories 
of nations, races, communities, peoples" (Bhabha, 1992, p.171). Postcolonial engagement 
provides a theoretical framework to understand the way in which cultures are constituted 
and contested (Shome, 2002, p.262). As Ella Shohat puts it, the term postcolonial would 
be more precise if it were to go "beyond a relatively binaristic, fixed, and stable mapping 
of power relations between 'colonizer/colonized' and 'center/periphery'" (Shohat, 1997, 
p.329). 
Despite the doubts about the definition of the term postcolonial and the overriding 
vagueness of the concept in grappling with the issues it purports to address, the guiding 
premise of the postcolonial approach is nonetheless useful in the study of the 
representation of Arab identity. In what follows, 1 seek to specify the unique contribution 
of the postcolonial approach to my study: First, it is necessary to take stock of the 
monumental work of Edward Said, especially in Orientalism, which has had a seminal 
influence in the field of post-colonialism and continues to be influential in the study of 
theories of representation. Likewise, the study of representation concems the constitutive 
power of images, and especially those that question or determine the reproduction of 
depictions of the 'Other', and it seeks to account for the cumulative effect and power of 
the se images (Shome, 2002, p. 265). 
Secondly, the postcolonial approach can offer, if not the requisite historical depth of 
understanding of cultural power in the Arab World, then, at least an adequate 
contextualization of the issue of Arab identity within the configuration of geopolitical 
arrangements in which it is implicated (Shome, 2002, p.252). It also enables us to 
deconstruct and to account for the interconnections between power, experience, language 
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and culture (Shome, 2002, p.263). The postcolonial approach facilitates the 
"authentication of histories of exploitation and the evolution of strategies of resistance" 
(Bhabha, 1992, p. 6), and permits enquiries into: "how the West and Other are 
constitutive of one another in ways that are both complicitous and resistant" (Shome, 
2002, p. 264). 
Thirdly, research conducted under the auspices of the postcolonial approach has 
catalyzed an extended discussion of the experience of various kinds of Arab migration, 
marginalization and resistance. Likewise, these discussions reflect the growing concem 
with Third World diasporic circumstances in postcoIoniai states, especially as they exist 
in the United States and Canada (Shohat, 1997, p.323). The postcolonial refers to the 
actual contradictions, ambiguities, and ambivalences prevalent among the numerous Arab 
Diasporas. 
c) Remediation approach 
In 1999, Jay BoIter and Richard Grusin identified new concepts to study the news 
media. In their work, "Remediation: Understanding New Media," Boiter and Grusin state 
that remediation concems the representation of one medium through another. They argue 
that it is a definition characteristic of the new digital media, thereby displaying specific 
features, su ch as (1) the refashioning and borrowing of the content of oider media, (2) the 
transparency of new media at the expense of the content of oider media, or rather, the 
transitory sense of the hypermediacy of new media in order not to abandon the oIder 
media aitogether, and (3) the aggressive and thorough absorption of oider media (BoIter, 
1999, pp. 45:49). 
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The scope of the study: Reconsidering the postcolonial approach and 
identifying the Arab Diaspora 
The study of the image of Arab identity and its representations at Aljazeera Net can 
be seen as an examination of how the 'postcolonial' project produces images conceming 
Arabs, Arabness and othemess. Since postcoloniality is a sort of helpful "reminder of the 
persistence of 'neo-colonial' relations within the 'new' world order," (Bhabha, 1992, p.9) 
this study explores how aspects of 'neo-colonialism' influence the representation of Arab 
identity in Aljazeera Net, and subsequently, how certain features of resistance are framed 
at Aljazeera Net. 
While aiming to examine how Aljazeera Net represents Arab identity as a collective 
identity, and critically examining the daims made on behalf of what has been termed the 
'one true self' that reflects common historical experience and shared cultural codes (Hall, 
1997, pp. 110-111), this study will seek to go beyond what is 'true' of Arab identity to 
identify the ambivalences and contradictions that productively shape its meanings 
(Bhabha, 1992, p. 22). Therefore, the study debates the 'essential' discourses that govem 
Arab identity, and identifies the tensions and conditions that colonialism created in the 
Arab World. The sources of Arab identity in this sense appear as spaces regulating the 
proliferation of meanings in the postcolonial condition. The study rejects essentialist, 
notions of Arabness, choosing rather, to evaluate the sources that strengthen and Arab 
identity through its historical contextualization, and additionally, it examines those 
aspects germane to a study of its fragmentation. 
The notion of the Diaspora is as problematic as the term postcolonialism. While 
referring to the situation of any body of people living outside their traditional homeland, 
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beyond this basic definition, the terrn 'Diaspora', at least as understood in the context of 
the Arab Diaspora, tends to be interpreted in two contrasting ways: Arif Dirlik and 
William Safran may be taken to give representative definitions. Thus Arif Dirlik (1997) 
defines 'Diaspora' as: 
A complex range of social groups, from political 
refugees to those driven to emigration out of 
economic necessity to highly educated and wealthy 
professionals who are cosmopolitan by education, 
outlook, and their ability to function across cultural 
spaces (p. 8). 
In a different vein, William Safran's model suggests specifie conditions through 
which Diasporas can be produced, beginning with: 
Expatriate communities: (1) that are dispersed from 
an original center to at least two peripheral places; (2) 
that maintain a memory, vision or myth about their 
original homeland; (3) that believe they are not and 
perhaps cannot be fully accepted by their ho st 
country; (4) that see the ancestral home as a place of 
eventual retum wh en the time is right; (5) that are 
committed to the maintenance or restoration of this 
homeland; and (6) whose consciousness and 
solidarity as a group are importantly defined by this 
continuing relationship with the homeland. (Safran, 
1991, pp. 83-84; quoted in Hay, Kellie, 2000, pp.9-
10) 
While offering a surprisingly wide range of definitions of Diaspora, so that we are 
left to wonder what or who falls outside its parameters, Arif Dirlik's definition at least 
recognizes Diaspora as a phenomenon that continues to occur beyond the settled notions 
of place, displacement and forced departure. Safran' s model is particularly helpful in the 
study of specifie Arab Diasporas, such as those of the Palestinians and Lebanese. 
However, the model is problematic since it deals with the related notions of home/host in 
an unduly reductive binary structure (Hay, 2000, p. 10). The model refers to another 
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characteristic of Diaspora, the feeling of exile and the notion of enforced departure from 
the country of origin (Hay, 2000, p. 10). 
This study considers that colonialism is among the factors that have created Arab 
Diasporas. However, since the question of what creates su ch Diasporas requires intensive 
critical interrogation, the study recognizes that Arab Diasporas are created through 
multifaceted migrations, undertaken for a variety of different reasons. Arabs in the 
Diaspora are forced to leave their countries of origin because of the ongoing effects of 
colonialism, or due to despotism, and the realities of economic pressure. They are not 
totally removed from the countries they come from, nor do they seek to be entirely 
assimilated into the countries where they migrate (Hay, 2000, p. 14). This study aims to 
explore the Arab Diaspora in North America in light of the nationalist consciousness of 
Arabs, claiming that the Arabs in the Diaspora still retain the imaginary state of the one 
true collective self. Since Arabs in the various Diasporas identify themselves as 'host-
Arabs', regardless of the country they come from, then their hybrid identification is more 
likely to be related to the domain of Arab identity than to the country they fled from. 
The key questions posed by the study 
The different questions posed by this study, while articulated at a number of 
different levels in terms of a wide range of theories and methodologies, are centered 
around two main questions: How is Arab identity represented in Aljazeera Net? And how 
does the representation of Arabness at Aljazeera Net contribute to the construction of the 
'reality' of Arabs? 
Briefly, my study raises seven related sub-questions: 
What are the appropriate current contexts for an examination of the image of Arab 
identity in the postcolonial history of Arab countries and in the Arab Diaspora? 
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How does Aljazeera Net alter the construction of meaning through its design, and 
how does Aljazeera remediate the production of news? 
What are the key strategies of news remediation at AIjazeera Net? 
Do the main features of the remediation approach influence the representation 
of online news, thereby affecting the context of representation of Arab identity? 
How do representation, perspective, and framing intersect in Aljazeera Net? 
Does Aljazeera Net shape and filter media images portraying Arab identity? If 
yes, in what contexts are Arabs, Arab identity and the "Western Other" framed? 
How do Arab academics, media experts, and community leaders perceive Arab 
identity in the Diaspora, and how do they evaluate Aljazeera as a Pan Arab 
media? 
Approaches and methodologies for examining identity 
The study employs two key approaches for understanding Arab identity, and four 
principal methodologies. It utilizes the approaches Gust Yeb (2004) off ers in an attempt 
to understand collective identity: namely, 'the critical approach' and 'the interpretative 
approach'. These approaches have proven useful in the analysis of the representation of 
Arab identity, since, through the light of the lens of the critical approach, Arab identity is 
created, produced, reproduced and debated in a variety of symbolic, political, 
socioeconomic and historical contexts (Yeb, 2004, pp. 75, 76). In this sense, Arab 
identity is marked by what distinguishes it from other deeply rooted relationships that are 
more contingent in origin, for instance, the structure of family relations. Nonetheless, 
ideological dimensions are at the core of the structures that govem our relations with 
others (Yeb, 2004, pp. 75, 76). In addition to the critical approach used here, a more 
purely interpretative approach has proven significant for the study of Arab identity at 
Aljazeerea Net, as weIl as in the Arab Diaspora, since it looks at identity as the core of 
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symbols that work through the communication of messages that can be co-created, 
exchanged, contested, and negotiated (Yeb, 2004, pp. 74, 75). In this context, Arabs in 
Arab countries and those who live in the Diaspora - whether they are visitors, viewers, or 
guests at Aljazeera - negotiate their local and global identities through the exchange of 
messages conducted over the Aljazeera website, or through the exchange of roles 
mediating the local and global. 
To tum now to the methods employed to analyze the representation of Arab identity 
and the construction of meaning at Aljazeera Net, the analysis of the image of Arab 
identity occurs at three different levels. The first level adopts the web-design criteria so 
as to understand the strategies of remediation of news representation in Aljazeera Net in 
relation to the most basic 'formai' constructions of meaning, as implicated in the design 
of the news site. A comparative approach is used here to highlight the differences 
between the design of Aljazeera Net pages and the design of other websites of Pan-Arab 
online news that target Arabs, such as Middle East Online, or other Western online news 
networks that aim to reach Arabs through the Arabic language, su ch as 'BBC Arabic', 
and the Arabic version of CNN. 
The second level of analysis examines the image of Arab identity through the 
identification of perspective and through framing. Perspectival analysis looks at the 
image of Arab identity at the surface of representation, thereby highlighting the point of 
view of Aljazeera Net through the analysis of the tone and style of the content and 
through the various lexical terms employed (Ensink, 2003, p. 10). By contrast, frames 
operate to shape and inform the content. Framing analysis, accordingly, explores the 
relationship between content, ideological structure and institutional context (Ibrahim, 
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2003, p. 55). Since it articulates the relations between power and ideology, framing 
"in volves the construction of meaning through structured discourse" (Ibrahim, 2003, p. 
55). Framing analysis, in this sense, does not deal with the surface of images of Arab 
identity; rather, it goes beyond the surface of images to inspect depth representations, and 
to examine the issue of delegation and ideology in representation. 
This study does not merely consider framing as a central idea that contextualizes 
news content and suggests what is at stake in a given issue through selection, emphasis 
and elaboration (Severin, 1997, p.320), nor is it satisfied by using frames to identify the 
dynamic storyline and the unfolding narrative (Gamson, 1992, p. 385); rather, the study 
looks at frames as a tool for media analysis in order to represent the struggle between 
different collective identities, and as a site through which these identities become 
different components of the constructed reality of Arabs (Gamson, 1992, p. 385). 
At a third level, the study uses both telephone interviews, and face-to-face 
interviews to represent the views of Arabs in the Diaspora - particularly Arab media 
experts, Arab academics, and Arab community leaders - conceming Arab identity and 
Aljazeera. The comments of Arabs in the Diaspora aim to offer a context through which 
Arab identity can be seen to fluctuate from a state of relative cohesion to utter 
fragmentation and dispersal and, more particularly, this context plays a crucial role in 
examining diasporic identity both, in itself, and as mediated by Aljazeera. 
Research design: measurement, gathering data and sampling 
Distinct from the quantitative approach, this study undertakes a textual and visual 
analysis in both framing and perspective based on a qualitative approach. As indicated 
above, lexical choices, together with the style and tone of the content, provide two useful 
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measurements for the analysis of Aljazeera's perspective. Frames are analyzed through 
an examination of the ideas that form the basis of the arguments in Aljazeera. Likewise, 
pictorial images, su ch as pictures and cartoons are just as useful as language and rhetoric 
in examining identity, in that they aid the researcher in tracing the iconographie and 
imagistic elements in the construction of Arab identity, thereby helping to determine 
what might be termed a less official, or unreconstructed, image of Arab identity. 
AdditionalIy, there are five contexts of observation that might help to determine what is 
at stake in the dynamic interplay of each frame: (l) Introductory statements, and the 
questions and comments of Aljazeera's news anchors and reporters, (2) the responses of 
Aljazeera's guests, (3) cartoon animations, (4) the interaction between words and 
drawings in Aljazeera cartoons, and (5) Aljazeera polIs. 
The data gathered for framing analysis originated from the Aljazeera Net archive, 
and through a daily scrutin y of the content to be found at Aljazeera Net. The most 
efficient method of assessing the content proved to be that of conducting a 'keyword l , 
search over the archive at Aljazeera Net. Through identifying every keyword that might 
bear sorne relation to Arab identity, 1 make extensive use of all the responses that emerge 
from the multiple keyword searches conducted on the archive of Aljazeera Net. 
A number of criteria were used for selecting the interviewees from among Arab 
academics, media experts, and community leaders, and they were brought into dialogue 
1 Among the multitude of keywords 1 use for this analysis are the following: Arab, Arabs, Arabie, Arabi, 
Alarabi, Alourobah (Arabism), Nation, Nationalism, identity, Umma, Arab leaders, conflict, demonstration, 
strike, the United States, America (Ameriki), Israeli, Israel, Intifada, resistance, war, Islam, religion, 
Muslim(een), Muslim(oun), Christianity (Maseeheyah), Christians (AI-Masseehyoon - AI-Masseehyeen), 
language, rhetoric, media, Aljazeera Net, Aljazeera, women, honour (Sharf, ird) values, traditions, 
immigrants (Almohajeeroun, Almohajereen), Diasporas, culture, imperialism, colonialism, resistance, 
despotism, publics, reform, referendums, polIs, Sheikh Yousef Alqaradawi, Islamic, Arab league of States, 
the Arab League, Art, food, McDonalds, Hamburger, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, 
songs and music (Tarab). 
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through face-to-face interviews or telephone interviews. Sorne of them were weIl known 
because of their published studies, others were nominated by previous interviewees, and a 
third group was chosen through a random search over the Internet concerning Arab 
scholars in the United States and Canada. 
This study seeks to assess Arab identity both in itself, and in relation to the 
remediation of this identity at Aljazeera Net. In so doing, it has drawn on approaches that 
have proven to be almost as challenging as the concept of identity itself. Whereas the 
retention of Arab identity in the Diaspora is often examined in studies that deal with 
Arabs as if their identity had already been weIl defined, this study offers an investigation 
of Arab identity in the light of the respective definitions offered in light of the various 
ethnie, cultural, postcolonial, and communication approaches. Distinct from studies of 
online news that focus on issues of interactivity, and the difference between traditional 
media and new media, 1 suggest a model for 'constructing' an online news narrative 
based on a reconsideration of hypertexuality as it relates to the structure of the news 
story. The framing analysis adopted in this study goes further in relating frames to the 
construction of the reality of Arabs, and in this manner, it purports to examine 
Aljazeera's identity. 
1 was notably constrained by the challenge of getting responses for the study 
questions within a reasonable degree of time. During an entire year and more of 
attempting to establish a footing of correspondence with Aljazeera, despite its promises 
to address sorne of the issues 1 raised concerning news production values and media 
representations, the team at Aljazeera Net has not, as yet, show any serious willingness to 
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answer my enquiries and to cooperate with this research. The change of managers at 
Aljazeera means that their longstanding promise to communicate stands even less chance 
of being fulfilled in the foreseeable future. Secondly, and in a similar vein, Arab 
academics in the Arab world and in North America initially expressed a great deal of 
interest in registering their responses to my first introductory emails, however the bus y 
schedules of sorne of those 1 chose to target did not permit them to answer any of my 
enquiries. Others promised me a response, but beyond this initial interest in my queries, 
no further communication transpired. 
Chapter outlines 
Three long chapters constitute the body of this dissertation. The first chapter offers a 
historical context for the exarnination of the representation of Arab identity, whose first 
manifestations on the world stage could be observed even before the national liberation 
movements had become effectively rooted in Arab countries during the early 1950s. As 
stated above, the first chapter identifies and assesses the sources of Arab identity, and 
examines Arab identity as a source of meanings for Arabs. Likewise, it evaluates the 
sources of Arab identity in the Arab Diaspora. Moving in a parallel direction, the second 
chapter begins with a discussion about the social construction of Aljazeera and how it has 
refashioned sorne of the key issues in news production. It additionally explores newly 
emerging practices in the representation of news, and investigates how the design of 
Aljazeera Net alters the construction of meaning in news representation. Finally, the third 
chapter begins with an exarnination of the relationship between representation, 
perspectives and frarning. The groundwork for an investigation into the frames goveming 
the sources of Arab identity is then set out. The chapter goes on to consider how Arabs in 
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the North American Diaspora, particularly Arab media experts, academics and 
community leaders, perceive their identity, and how they evaluate Aljazeera as a Pan 
Arab news media. 
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CHAPTER1 
Communicating with Arabness: 
Definitions and Frames of Reference 
1.1 Introduction 
Any study of collective identity will seek, ultimately, to define the sense by which 
certain groups of people strive to identify themselves, and conversely, how they identify 
other groups. Likewise, the study of Arab identity is the attempt to identify what it 
means to be an Arab2, which is inextricably linked with the question of how Arabs have 
been identified. Many scholars define Arabs in terrns of linguistic and geographical 
factors. They describe Arabs as "people who speak the Arabie language, identify 
themselves as Arabs, and are nationals or residents of member countries of the league of 
Arab States" (Hopkins, 1997, p. 1). For other scholars, place and geography are not 
inclusive principles for identifying Arabs, and therefore, they extend their definitions to 
include those people who speak Arabie but live outside the Arab World. 
In addition to geography, identification through religion, particularly Islam, is 
perceived to be a perennial factor in labeling Arab identity, and it accounts for the 
enduring sense of Arab identity, as understood down through the ages (Dawisha, 2003, p. 
16). When characterized in terrns of Islam, Arabs are aIl those "for whom the central fact 
of history is the mission of Muhammad and the memory of Arab empire" (Rejwan, 1998, 
p. 79). However, there is a ready consensus that being an Arab does not essentially 
connote being a member of a specifie religion (Hopkins, 1997, p. 1), since there are 
2 Scholars distinguish between an Arab, and an Arabian, wherein the latter is invariably an ethnie term. 
Many Arabs are of Semitic origin, but cannot be defined as Arabian (Nydell, 2004). The term Arab refers 
to the people who inhabited the Arabian Peninsula and Syrian Desert in Pre-Islamic times (Patai, 2002, 
p.I2). However, modem conceptions of Arabs do not necessariIy refer to their distant origins. 
25 
hundreds of thousands of Christians who are as intensely Arab in their feelings as any 
Muslim Arab (Patai *, 2002, p. 13- See page p. 87). 
Because geography and religion do not offer a comprehensive definition as to the 
identity of Arabs, sorne scholars are content to describe Arabs as those who speak the 
Arabie language. For example, an American Christian in Cairo who grew up speaking 
Arabie is an Arab whether he chooses to be or not (Nydell, 2004). Yet, with the increase 
in Arab migration to foreign countries, scholars are less likely to rely on the Arabie 
language as the sole criterion, since sorne members of the second generation of Arab 
immigrants may not speak Arabie, however, they still have the sense of being Arabs. 
Thus, it is more accurate to define Arabs as those who have, or come from Arab origins, 
and have developed a sense of belonging that identifies them as Arabs. 
Obviously, the attempt to describe what it means to be an Arab constitutes an 
essential part of our understanding of Arab identity. However, our understanding of 
Arabness also warrants precise differentiation between the terms (Pan) Arabism and 
Arabness. Terminologically, there is an overlap between Arabness and Arabism, wherein 
both terms are perceived to be semantically symmetric. Though Arabness and Arabism 
are seen to be innate, Arabism (Alorubba) "is a movement for unification among the 
Arab peoples" (Pan Arabism). The key meanings ascribed to Arabism are derived from 
such issues as Arab cooperation (Alta' awon Alarabi), Arab unit y (Alwhedda Alarabia), 
and Arab integration (Altakamol Alarabi). 
The term Arabism is usually hyphenated, and the term Pan is used to refer to "the 
anti-Imperialist nationalist movement among Arab peoples preceding World War 1" (Pan 
Arabism). The semantic overlap between 'Arabism and Arabness' appears in Bassam 
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Tibi's attempt to define Arabness as the goal of: "developing a new design for inter-Arab 
relations: an interstate structure of sovereign states based on mutual respect" (Tibi, 1999, 
p. 94). 
Despite Bassam Tibi's attempt to situate Arabness as a strategie implementation of 
Pan-Arabism, Arabness, by contrast, has been defined as the sense of the identification of 
the past, present, and future ambitions of Arabs (Nydell, 2004). It is "one of the most 
complex, varicolored and historically and politically contested designations" (Rabbat, 
1996). Although millions of Arabs believe in Arab identity, or at least yearn for 
it, it is impossible to achieve a genuine consensus concerning it (Rabbat, 1996). It is 
proposed to assemble aH the Arabs within one nation. However, there is no overarching 
political movement that can currently bring this about (Rabbat, 1996). 
Arabness is both real and imagined. It lives on in the minds and hearts of Arab 
people, both in Arab countries, and among Arabs who live outside the Arab World 
(Rabbat, 1996). On the one hand, Arabness is real because it depends on real foundations 
based on language, shared heritage, shared family and religious values, and shared 
territories (Nehme, 2003, p. 39). On the other hand, it is imagined because Arabs, 
including those who live in foreign countries, feel that they belong to one nation. Most of 
them do not know their Arab fellows, neither have they met them, nor have they heard 
from them; yet, in the mind of each one of them the image of their nation lives on 
(Benedict, 1983, p. 6). 
This chapter seeks to shed more light on both historical and current images of Arab 
identity. It examines Arabness as a source of complex meanings (Castells, 1997, p. 7). To 
elaborate a comprehensive critical framework, this chapter will examine the various 
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definitions assigned to Arabness as an ethnic, cultural, and post-colonial identity. This 
comprehensive definition of Arabness will be followed by a proposaI outlining the chief 
sources used and the range and kind of interpretations ascribed to them. The closing 
section of this chapter will focus on sources of Arabness relating to the Arab Diaspora. In 
a broader context, this chapter will epitomize the main frames of reference that 
contextualize Arabness, both in the past and the present. 
1.2 Arabness as an ethnie, and cultural identity 
Arab identity is perceived by most scholars to be capable of definition in both ethnic 
and cultural terms. It is ethnie because it distinguishes between Arabs as a group and 
other ethnie groups. Ethnicity appears "as a political and social force on the national and 
international scenes" (Jeffres, 2000, p. 500). From an ethnie point of view, Arab identity, 
whieh constitutes the collectivity's sense of being (Jeffres, 2000, p. 500), refers to Arabs 
as a people who share, and feel they belong to, a common and distinctive culture, a 
collective history, and a dominant religion (Fong, 2004, pp. 4-5). 
Following an established li ne of ethnic scholars, such as De Vos and Romanucci-
Ross (1982), Orbe and Harris (2001), Edward (1997), Coiller and Thomas (1988), and 
Cohen (1974), Arabness is a marker of belonging that indicates a shared heritage (Fong, 
2004, p. 5). In the eyes of a second cluster of ethnie scholars, such as Van Den Berghe 
(1981), Martin and Nakayama (2000), Arab identity can be seen "as an emotional bond 
that unites people together, that is rooted in the past, and that people are born into" (Fong, 
2004, p. 5). It su ms up the entire complex of feelings of the Arab people (Royce, 1982, p. 
18). On a more inspirationallevel, Arabness is a source of motivation, and a fundamental 
principle of action (Fenton, 2003, p. 181). 
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As a cultural identity, Arabness stands for shared Arab representations, collective 
norms, and a shared cultural system of verbal and nonverbal behavior. It provides Arabs 
with certain distinctive vocabularies, concepts, and meanings. In short, Arabness is the 
identification of the reality of Arab communication (Fong, 2004, p. 6). Yet, speaking of 
Arabness as an ethnie and cultural identity is more problematic, since it leads us to speak 
of collective identity, and to engage in a discourse that might weIl incur the charge of 
'essentialism'. Nonetheless, Arab identity has survived as an essential, primordial 
identity that is stable, hegemonic, relatively unchanging, and based on shared experiences 
(Mohanty, 2000, p. 30 & Song, 2003, p. 7). Among the essentialist approaches that 
highlight the importance of Arabness as a prerequisite for the realization of the goals of 
Arabs, and as a key political dimension for the survival of Arab identity (Sciortino, 2000, 
pp. 12,25), are those of the Nasserists3, Bathists\ and Arab Nationalists5• 
3 Nasserists: Nasserism is a movement that strives to formulate Arabs' aspirations. Nasserism, as a 
movement, was initiated and proclaimed after the death of Jamal Abd-Alnasser, who died in September 
1970. Nasser was recognized as an exceptionally charismatic and ardent leader, and no Egyptian leader 
before him had strived for the freedom and independence of the Arabs as a whole. He was one of the most 
significant, if not the greatest, proponent of Arab Nationalism. Nasser's major objective of Arab 
Nationalism focused on the attainment of Arab unit y, and the strength and stability of Arabs everywhere. 
Although his ideas were not especially new, he transformed the idea of Arab unit y into cohesive plans of 
action, and translated it into a tangible reality. By 1958, and because of his inspiration of Arabism, Nasser 
spearheaded negotiations with Syria that led to the creation of the 'Arab Union,' which collapsed in 1961. 
The defeat of the Egyptian army in 1967 weakened Nasser's position and incurred attacks on Nasserism as 
a result. In general terms, Nasserism succeeded in becoming a popular trend among various Arab 
movements, yet it failed to vindicate itselfwhen it became institutionalized (Ismael, 1976, p. 81). 
4 Bathists: The Bath party was established in 1947 in Syria. However, the resurgence of the Bath party was 
supported by three founders: Zaki Alarsuzi, Michel Aflaq, and Salah Aldin Bitar, though Aflaq was 
considered as the party's chief philosopher. The Bath party aimed to rejuvenate the Arabs' will, and 
became the living instrument for the creation of 'one Arab nation' (Dawisha, 2003, pp. 153-154). It shared 
Nasser's political views about Arab unit y, and wedded to the ideas of Arab unit y and Arabism, was the 
assertion of an ongoing Arab history, and the vigorous representation of a new Arab generation (Gogoi, 
1994, p. 137). The Bath party's principal objectives include: (1) freedom, which can be achieved through 
the struggle against foreign colonialism, (2) unit y, which is attained by establishing solidarity among aIl of 
the various Arab groups, and (3) socialism, which aims at the revolutionary transformation of the endemic 
corruption in the econornic, social, and political domains of Arab life (Gogoi, 1994, p. 140). 
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Ideas disseminated under the influence of the essentialist view of Arab identity 
sought to con vince the Arab masses that Arab countries can master the local environment 
when they act together, and thereby create a better system of defense and security for the 
entire Arab region (Nehme, 2003, p. 22). In a more emphatically cultural context, 
essentialist approaches have been perceived as an attempt to establish 'an adequate self-
image' for Arabs. By the mid 1950s, Von Grunebaum pointed to the fact that the Arab 
World had not, up until then, been able to conceive a satisfactory self-image. It was 
evident that by the mid 1950s, Arab thinking had entered a new phase, during which the 
Arab masses were fired with the importance of extolling Arab culture. The masses were 
reminded that the content of Arab culture, its fundamentals, and its overall unit y, are 
issues that must not be taken for granted (Rejwan, 1998, p. 87). 
Nevertheless, essentialist approaches fail to address the dramatic mutation in Arab 
identity. Most of the criticisms that the essentialists faced were due to their perception of 
identity as fixed and unchanging. Accordingly, Arab essentialists have been criticized for 
5 Arab Nationalists: The roots of the Arab Nationalist movement, the argument goes, can be traced to the 
nineteenth century. Modern Arab Nationalism emerged as a reaction to the failure of the ruling family in 
Istanbul to defend Islamic civilization against Western economic, cultural, and political penetration (Gogoi, 
1994, p. 84). Articulated through the Islamic reformist movement, Arab Nationalists questioned the 
apparent reasons for the weaknesses of the Islamic World. Abd-Alrahman Alkawakbi (1849-1902), and the 
Islamic reformists, blamed the Turkish administration for the disastrous mismanagement that led to the 
corruption of the entire Islamic World (Gogoi, 1994, p. 87). By the middle of June 1916, there was a 
remarkable manifestation of the resurgence of Arab Nationalism, at the moment when Sherif Hussein 
dec1ared the 'Arab Revoit'. Enthused about the independence of aIl Arabs, Sherif Hussein was concerned 
with both religion and nationalism. The development of Arab consciousness led to the emergence of the 
Arab Nationalist Movement, which was formed in 1951 under the leadership of the Christian Palestinian 
George Habash, who was loyal to Nasser and his brand of Arab Nationalism. Like Nasserism, Arab 
Nationalism was socialist in the sense that it gave preference to social and public interest issues over those 
of individual freedom. It was both revolutionary and progressive, because it adhered to the concept of 
revolution, and looked ahead to achieve its nationalistic objectives without ignoring the past. Moreover, 
Arab Nationalism was positive, as weIl as spiritually rooted. Its positive orientation derived from its 
fundamental aim to cooperate with aIl nations, and to strengthen its ideals through an infusion of modern 
ideas. Spiritually, Islamic tenets, and religion in general, were very much evident in its program (Gogoi, 
1994, p. 77), yet despite its comprehensiveness, and its democratic nature, Arab Nationalism failed to keep 
its promise of achieving power, and proved unable to unite Arabs into one nation (Kramer, 1993), yet, it is 
still the major historical touchstone for Arabists. 
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their focus on the issue of unit y, while ignoring more important issues, and for their 
inability to address inter-Arab conflicts. Recently, Michel Nehme's book, Fear and 
Anxiety in the Arab World, emphasizes the crisis of poli tic al identity that the Arabs are 
now experiencing. He believes that repeated regional conflicts have led to population 
dislocation, devastation, and distrust arnong Arabs, which in tum, have made Arabs feel 
less certain of their proclaimed identity (Nehme, 2003, p. 38). Inter-Arab conflicts, the 
argument goes, have been a major threat to Arab identity. As Raphael Patai (2002) puts 
it: 
Despite the ideal of Arab unit y, to which lip service is 
constantly being paid by Arab leaders in all their public 
pronouncements, the fact is that ever since World War II, 
which marked the beginning of full Arab poli tic al 
consciousness and intense Arab political activity, the 
relationship between govemments, and parties has been 
dominated by bitter rivalry. At best, this rivalry lay 
dormant for a while; at worst, it burst into the open in the 
form of fiery denunciations, plotting of assassinations, 
attacks or threats of attacks across borders (p. 235). 
Overestimation of the issue of Arab unit y is a second flaw that inheres in essentialist 
approaches, which conceive Arab unit y as an urgent and pervasive public demand, 
indeed, as the main priority for Arabs. Although it has been said that Arab unit y is an 
Arab public requisite, the preoccupation with the issues of Arab nationalism and Arab 
unit y have been the exclusive concem of Arab politicians and Arab elites. It is evident 
that the various Arab publics have been excluded from participation in the activities most 
relevant to Arab unit y (Ibrahim, 1980, p. 111). A recent study, implemented by the Arab 
Thought Foundation in 2002, questioned 3,800 Arab adults from eight countries: Egypt, 
Israel, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, Jordan, The United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. 
The study, which posed 92 questions conceming Arab values, their political concems, 
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their mood and outlook, and their definition as to how they view the world, found that the 
issue of Arab unit y is not in fact a key priority among Arabs. Most Arab respondents 
gave priority to the personal concerns that affect them most directly, such as the quality 
and security of their daily work, their devotion to their faith, and their obligations to their 
families (Zogby, 2002, p. 7). 
When asked about their political preferences, the Arabs surveyed pointed to their 
'civil and personal rights'. Surprisingly, the issue of the 'general Arab situation' was 
ranked as ninth in importance (Zogby, 2002, p. 34). However, the study found that 'being 
Arab' proves to be the most frequently cited source of identity (Zogby, 2002, p. 50). The 
country where an Arab lives and his religious faith are ranked as the second and third 
sources of Arab identity, respectively (Zogby, 2002, p. 50). 
In socio-cultural terms, the perception of Arabs as a homogeneous people 
constitutes a third critique of the essentialist position. Among the critics of Arab 
homogeneity is Bassam Tibi, who emphasizes that Arabs are heterogeneous, even though 
they have a common religion and language. In the eyes of Bassam Tibi (2002) "Muslim 
Arab Kuwaitis and Muslim Arab Moroccans are not of the same culture, and do not 
perceive themselves as such, even though they speak the same language and worship 
within the same faith" (p. 129). 
Based on a critique of essentialist approaches, this study seeks to examine Arabness 
as a situational identity, which is never unproblematic or transparent, "always in 
process," and always transforming its own identity (Hall, 1997, p. 110). Arabness, in this 
sense, can be perceived as a collective true self, concealed inside many others, and 
subject to the continuous 'play' of history, culture, and power (Hall, 1997, p. 112). 
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1.3 Arabness as a postcolonial identity 
Approaches to Arab identity, whether essentialist or situationalist, seek to identify 
'who the Arabs are', and 'the nature of the Other'. That is to say, our identity or sense of 
who 'we' are is incomplete unless it is contrasted with 'Otherness', or in Erik 
Hobsbawm's phrase, 'without outsiders, there are no insiders' (Papastergiadis, 1998, 
p.31). In comparing Arabness with Otherness, Arab identity emerges as a postcolonial 
identity. 
The long history of colonialism the Arab world has endured and the expansion of 
global capitalism has helped to reshape Arab identity, constructing it as an identity of 
resistance. The identity of resistance, as described by Manuel Castells (1997), can be 
claimed by those "actors who se positions are devalued or stigmatized by the logic of 
domination, and who thus build trenches of resistance" (p. 8). When refracted through the 
lens of postcolonialism, Arab identity is perceived as a response to the challenge of 
Western colonialism and domination. Forging a postcolonial and resistant identity has 
been the major preoccupation of several Arab scholars, and poets, since the 1950s. In the 
1950s, Sati' Alhusri6, one of the influential mentors of Arab Nationalism, wrote: 
We rebelled against the English; we rebelled against the 
French. 
We rebelled against those who colonized our land and 
tried to enslave us (Dawisha, 2003, p. 286). 
6 Sati Alhusri (1882-1968), born in Yemen in 1882 into a Syrian family, was considered as the leading 
exponent of secular Pan-Arab nationalism. Alhusri developed a systematic and coherent approach to Arab 
nationalism; he was described as the man who did the most to popularize the notion of Arabism. He called 
for the separation of religion and Arab nationalism. In the eyes of Alhusri, Arab unit y does not necessarily 
depend on a collective religious identity, and religious differences do not impede the realization of Arab 
unity. More importantly, he believed that Arab states are the artificial creations of the imperialist powers 
(Dawisha, 2003, pp. 3, 49, 50; Rejwan, 1998, p. 82). 
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Similarly, in his poem entitled 'Identity Card', the Arab poet Mahmoud Darwish 
(1964) noted the strong bond between the concept of resistance and being an Arab. 
Mahmoud Darwish wrote: 
Record! 
1 am an Arab 
And my identity card number is fifty thousand 
Record! 
1 am an Arab 
You have stolen the orchards of my ancestors 
And the land which 1 cultivated 
Along with my children 
And you left nothing for us 
Except for these rocks. 
So will the State take them 
As it has been said?! (Darwish, 1964). 
1.4 Sources of Arab identity 
The problematic nature of Arabness and its paradoxes calI for the restoration of the 
main components of Arabness, and the deconstruction of the sources of Arab identity. 
Distinct from the notion of fixing Arab identity, the reassessment of the sources of 
Arabness must take into account 'the continuous play' of Arabness, and attempts to 
portray an image of Arab identity that matches the Arab reality. Among the chief 
components of Arab identity are Pan-Arabism, conflicts, religion, language, media 
gender, and cultural traits. 
1.4.1 Pan-Arabism revisited: imagination versus reality 
Pan-Arabi sm is premised on the ideology of establishing one Arab nation? During 
the 1950s and the 1960s, the promise of one Arab nation, and one Arab identity was 
7 In this study, the concept of the 'nation' is defined as a collective distinguished by "human solidarity, 
whose members believe that they form a coherent cultural who le, and who manifest a strong desire for 
political separateness and sovereignty" (Dawisha, 2003, p. 13) 
34 
increasingly proclaimed so that ultimately "no Arab regime in twenty-two states has 
dared formally to go against this proclaimed national self-identification" (Hopkins, 1997, 
p. 4). In a more ideological sense, Pan-Arabism, as the Middle East historian Bernard 
Lewis puts it, "was a sacrosanct ideological principal in all the Arab countries, sorne of 
which even incorporated it in their constitution" (Dawisha, 2003, p. Il). 
Since World War II, the graduaI acceptance of the idea of Pan-Arabi sm has been 
accompanied by several attempts to achieve Arab unification. The first positive attempt 
was the formation of the 'League of Arab States' (Jama't Aldowal Alarabia) on the 22nd 
of March, 1945, which aimed at strengthening relations between Arab states, organizing 
political plans, and protecting their collective and individual independence and integrity 
(Gogoi, 1994, pp. 194-195). However, the first real proactive attempt at unification was 
the union between Syria and Egypt (February 1958 - September 1961). During the 1973 
war, this sense of solidarity was a defining factor in Syria's decision to enter the war 
alongside Egypt against Israel. It marked the first occasion when the Arab states decided 
to limit the suppl Y of oil to the West so as to strengthen Egypt's position during the war. 
During the 1980s, various groups of Arab countries began to form clusters of economic 
cooperation councils, such as the 'Gulf Cooperation Council' (GCC), made up of the six 
Gulf states; the 'Arab Cooperation Council' (ACC), composed of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, 
Yemen; and the 'Arab Maghrib Union' (AMU), formed by Mauritania, Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Libya (Hopkins, 1997, p. 4). 
Despite several attempts at Arab unification and various signs of cooperation, a 
tendency toward Arab disunity has been a persistent obstacle. Of the several 
manifestations of Arab disunity, the most significant were: the Arab civil wars in 
35 
Lebanon (1975-1985), Sudan (1956-1973, 1983-1996), Iraq (1964-1975, 1991-1996), and 
Yemen (North, 1964-1976, and between North and South, in 1996) (Hopkins, 1997, p. 6); 
inter-Arab conflicts, such as the boycott between Egypt and Arab countries as a response 
to Egypt's unilateral decision to negotiate with Israel; border conflicts between Bahrain 
and Qatar; and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990. This latter inter-Arab 
conflict, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, revealed the weakness of the League of Arab 
States, which was hampered by the lack of an institutional framework for conflict 
management (Tibi, 1999, p. 93). Arab civil wars and inter-Arab conflicts have tended to 
prevent or thwart the resurgence of the notion of Pan-Arabism, and have led to more 
damaging charges, such as 'localism8, and 'Islarnic Fundamentalism9,. 
More importantly, the chief consequences of Arab civil wars and Arab inter-
conflicts are manifest in the widely perceived reality of Arab stagnation during the 1990s, 
8 Localism (Koutryia) connotes a local nationalist sentiment hostile to Pan-Arabism. The failure of Pan-
Arabists to acknowledge the localities of culture, and the ethnicities related to them, has contributed to the 
strengthening of authentic local identities (Tibi, 2002, p. 129). Although localism does not preclude union, 
it nonetheless remains a source of disunity (Gogoi, 1994, p. 190). 
9 Islamic Fundamentalism: in the recent past, the first Islamic movement that has been perceived as 
politically oriented was the Muslim Brotherhood (Jamaa't Alikhwan Almouslimeen), which was created by 
Hassen Albanna in 1928. The Muslim Brotherhood has been seen as a non-violent movement, even though 
a number of scholars claim that it sowed the first seeds of Islamic fundamentalism. About 42 years later, 
Islam reemerged as a substantial force in Arab politics during the 1970s, and 1980s, and continues to affect 
the contemporary political context (Gogoi, 1994, p. 212). Islamic movements exist in many different forms; 
the Muslim Brotherhoods in Egypt and Jordan are non-violent movements, while the radical ones are 
'Takfir Wal-Hijira' (Excommunications and Flight), and 'Aljihad Alislamy' (The Islamic Jihad), and 
'Aljama'a Alislamyia' (The Islamic Group). Whereas sorne of these movements, such as 'Takfir Wal-
Hijira,' have disappeared, the prominent voices of other movements are often heard, and regularly resumed, 
particularly in the aftermath of the attacks of September Il th, 2001, and the invasion of Iraq on the 20th of 
March 2003. Most Islamic movements share similar ideological principles. For example, they conceive 
Islam as a total way of life; contend that the pervasive adoption of Western lifestyles has led to the 
deterioration of Muslim society; and proc1aim that to re-achieve power, it is necessary to return to the 
Islarnic Sharia (Islamic Law). Their views as to the Western way of life are wedded to their primary beliefs 
about the West, which has been seen as the personification of evil from the time of the Crusades, through to 
colonialism, neo-colonialism, and Zionism (Gogoi, 1994, p. 212). Many critics believe that the negative 
stereotypes directed against Islamic fundamentalism are the product of the Western media. In these critics' 
eyes, Islamic fundamentalism is an inaccurate, misleading, counterproductive echo of the Western paranoia 
about Islam (Ba-Yunus, 1997). 
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particularly in regard to the lack of a coherent Arab ideology. This has led, in tum, to the 
undermining of the notion of Pan-Arabism. The CUITent near ec1ipse of Pan-Arabi sm as a 
significant force poses an all but impossible challenge to the imagination: to glimpse 
beyond its present failures of will and vision so as to anticipate its resurgent possibilities. 
The failure to achieve a tangible coalition to protect Arab interests has undermined the 
notion of Pan-Arabi sm. Given the failures of Pan-Arabi sm it is widely accepted that 
"Pan-Arabism is temporarily going through a bad phase, and is at its lowest ebb" (Gogoi, 
1994, p. 190). In a rather more pessimistic mode, Martin Kramer believes that "Arabs 
have suspended their belief in the Arab nation, and now openly doubt whether there is a 
collective Arab mission" (Kramer, 1993). 
To conc1ude, the realities of inter-Arab conflict and Arab formaI stagnation have 
meant that the notion of the Arab nation has been widely perceived as a form of wishful 
thinking rather than a realistic vision of a credible, albeit future, reality. The attempt to 
imagine the Pan-Arab nation, and what might have been its accomplishment, has meant 
that two interconnected nostalgic notions have gained cUITency among Arabs: 
(1) The notion that Arabs would have been participants in a better reality if only 
they had lived in the relatively glorious past, because at this moment the Arab world is 
perceived as shameful, wretched and sad, whereas the past had been perceived as great 
(Nassar, 2004 & Gogoi, 1994, p. 113). 
(2) The related idea that Nasser was a personal incarnation of su ch greatness, such 
was the magnitude of his charisma; and thus, wedded to the notion of living in the past, is 
the ritual public commemoration of Nasser. Jamal Abd-Alnasser is always perceived as 
the 'unifier of the Arabs', a man who promised the world, and dared to deliver, despite 
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the consequences (EI-Noshokaty, 2001 & Rabbat, 2002). His charismatic aura began to 
fade gradually after 1967; however, in the eyes of many Arabs, if Nasser had remained in 
power, the face of the Arab world would have been dramatically transformed. According 
to Adeed Dawisha (2003), Nasser would have remained in power not only as the 
confident, vibrant hero, but also as the preeminent symbol of the will to resist (p. 283). 
The notion of 'living in the Arab past and recalling its symbols' influences our 
notions of Arab identity, which seems to place more emphasis on the 'pastness', both of 
its achievements and grievances, than on its 'presentness', because 'pastness' invokes 
something to be proud of, and provides a basis for future aspirations (Nydell, 2004). 
1.4.2 Arab conflicts with others: galvanizing Arab identity. 
The long history of Arab conflict could be dated back to the late 19th century, and 
the early beginnings of the 20th century when the Arabs faced colonial exploitation in the 
form of the expansionist policies of England, France, and Italy. Since 1948, and before 
their emergence from colonialism, Arabs have faced a new kind of conflict with Israel. 
Arab-Israeli conflicts have become much more complicated, especially in light of the 
consolidation of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. The absolute political and military 
support that Israel has always received from the United States has magnified the issue of 
Palestine in the Arab world. As Shibley Telhami has noted of James Zogby's 
international polI findings: 
the Palestinian issue remains an 'identity' issue for most 
Arabs .... Most Arabs are shamed by their inability to help 
the Palestinians and feel personally insulted when the 
Palestinians seem slighted. The way the United States 
behaves toward Palestinians is taken as a message for all 
Arabs (Brynen, 2004, p. 135). 
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The recent occupation of Iraq, headed by the United States and England, has 
strongly awakened, in the minds of Arabs, similar memories to those they experienced 
during the period of colonialism. In the collective Arab memory, Arab conflicts, 
commemorated through firmly rooted habits of historical recollection, are often seen as a 
repeat performance of the Arabs' experience with colonialism (Sid-Ahmed, 2000). The 
continuing conflicts that Arabs are engaged in account for why they are in a more or less 
perpetuaI state of belligerency, which has affected, in tum, Arab social and politicallife, 
thereby making them more emotional and increasingly skeptical about the goals of 
others. 
Scholars have argued that the various emotional outpourings of Arabs can be 
ascribed to the ongoing state of conflict. Critical observations about Arab emotionalism 
are made in Sania Hamady' s article, "The temperament and character of Arabs," which 
states that Arabs "communicate by shouting, accompanied with signs of anger" (Patai, 
2002, p. 170). When hurt, they talk and complain openly, and manifest their sufferings in 
an undisguised manner. As for anger, Arabs are depicted as susceptible, once their anger 
is aroused; indeed, the Arab' s wrath has no limits (Patai, 2002, p. 170). In a similar vein, 
Tarek Heggy, the author of "Critique of the Arab Mind," believes that Arabs have 
become less forgiving, and more or less incapable of tolerating criticism (Heggy, 2001, 
pp. 15-22,63-68). Yet, from another rather more exceptional perspective Arabs are not 
necessarily seen as emotional they have distinct forms of speaking styles, and gestures 
from Westemers, also a different concept of how feelings may be expressed (Nydell, 
2004). 
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More importantly, Arabs believe that they face extemal conspiracies (mu'amarat) as 
a result of the multitude of conflicts they have encountered (Tibi, 1999, p. 92). Scholars' 
attempts to unravel the roots of conspiracy theory have led them to remark upon the 
difficult nature of the challenge faced by those who aim to convince Arabs not to believe 
in the notion of conspiracy. On the one hand, Arabs do not create vague enemies; they do 
not accept random evidence with which to accuse their enemies; rather, they focus on 
what accords with their beliefs and do not leave sufficient space to account for aIl of the 
probabilities pertinent to a given situation. The hope that Arabs would abandon their 
pervasive belief in conspiracies was succinctly expressed by Abd-Almaunim Said, the 
director of the AI-Ahram Research Center in Egypt, when he argued: 
We thought that by the end of the 20th century, the Arab 
mind wou Id be open enough not to explain everything with 
a 'conspiracy theory' ... the biggest problem with conspiracy 
theories is that they keep us not only from the truth but also 
from confronting our faults and problems ... This way of 
thinking relates any given problem to extemal elements, 
and thus does not [lead] to a rational policy to confront the 
problem (Stalinsky, 2004). 
Obviously, conflicts with others can work to galvanize Arab identity through the 
expression of emotions such as anger, and yet these same conflicts can also be adduced 
and subsequently interpreted in light of conspiracy theories. 
1.4.3 Religion: imagining the Umma. 
As shown in the discussion of the first two sources pertaining to Arabness, the 
failure of the project of Pan-Arabism, and the enmity between Arabs and Others, as a 
consequence of the long history of colonialism, continued into the 'postcolonial' era, a 
vacuum has been created within which religion appears as a cohesive bond in the 
definition of Arabness. In general terms, religion was, and for the traditional majority in 
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aIl Arab countries, has remained, the central focus in life (Patai, 2002, p. 153). In his 
article, "Arab Christians as symbols," Hilal Khashan (2001) stresses the importance of 
religion in the Arab region. He writes: "this is a region where religion largely defines not 
just faith but aIso personal identity, so that how Muslims and Christians see each other 
affects politics, economics, and much more" (Khashan). Despite the representation of 
different religious groups in the Arab world (Christian, Bahai, Ahmadi, Druz, and 
Judaic), it is Islam that predominates in 90% of the Arab world, whereas other religions 
are distinct minorities (Hopkins, 1997, p. 1). 
To highlight the connection between Islam and Arabness, it is instructive to 
examine the competing definitions of Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism now prevalent. It is 
generally understood that "Arabism virtuaIly is in separable from Islam, and that the 
doctrines of Pan-Arabi sm, and Pan-Islamism are thus closely related aspirations" 
(Rejwan, 1998, p. 78). It is obvious that the fusion between Islam and Arabism was 
primarily a historicaI matter. Undoubtedly, during the period of colonialism, or 
imperiaIist domination, Islamists and Arabists tolerated one another, and even cooperated 
with each other (Dawisha, 2003, p. 84). Yet, with the end of coloniaIism, it became more 
difficult for Arabists to repeat the refrain of demands for integration between Pan-
Arabism and Pan-Islamism. The loud voice of Islam heard from the majority of people in 
the Arab World conceived Arabists as permanent rivaIs. 
The Pan-Arabist attemptlO to disarm Islam by incorporating it as the primary 
element in Pan-Arabism has failed (Kramer, 1993). The failure of the notion of Pan-
10 Pan-Arabi sm mentors have attempted to highlight the solid bond between Islam and Pan-Arabi sm. For 
Michel Alflaq, for example, the power of Islam has been restored nowadays under the new form of 
Arabism. Similarly, Sati Alhusri argued that the concept of Islamic unit y is broader and more inclusive than 
the concept of Arab unit y (Kramer, 1993, & Rejwan, 1998, p. 83). 
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Arabism has subsequently facilitated the Islamists' critique. Islamists criticize Pan-
Arabism for being a misleading myth. They believe that if the Prophet Mohamed, the 
prophet of the Muslims, had wished to create a Pan-Arabi st movement, he would have 
undoubtedly been capable of inaugurating it (Kramer, 1993). Islamic identity, as the 
argument of the Islamists goes, is the only identity that seems able to bind the different 
types of people into one mosaic (Dawisha, 2003, p. 32). 
When responding to the Islamists' critique, Arabists make a very c1ear distinction 
between the respective missions of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism. According to the 
Arabists, the main task of Pan-Islamism is to establish an Islamic 'Umma', and an 
exc1usively Islamic identity, but emphatically not an Arab nation and an Arab identity 
(Rejwan, 1998, p. 83). Additionally, Arabists believe that Islam is one faith among other 
faiths, and consequently they disagree with Islamist views that conceive Islam as a total 
way of life. Arabists accept the social values of Islam, however, and they criticize those 
aspects of Islamic history that were politically void of councils, communes, parliaments, 
or any other kind of elective or representative assembly (Sadowski, 1997, p. 35). 
Despite the extreme difference of views between Pan-Arabi sm and Pan-Islamism, 
Islam paradoxically remains as one of main source of Arabness. On the one hand, 
Islamists always challenge Pan-Arabism, thereby urging Arabists to take action on behalf 
of Arab unification. On the other hand, Islamic identity has evolved along Hnes not so 
dissimilar to those ascribed to Arabness. Both Islamic identity and Arab identity share the 
concept of the 'Ummall , (Nation). Despite ongoing debate about the concept, the concept 
of 'Umma' in discussions of Arabness is more specific in relation to defining the borders 
Il The Umma refers to disparate groups of people, religious entities, the historical dimension, or the quality 
of uniqueness. It allows ideas to move across borders, and can generate emotions wherever Muslims live 
and practice their faith (Ahmed, 1999, p. 8, & Gogoi, 1994, p. 82). 
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of an Arab Umma. Parallel with the concept of Umma, Arabists have developed the 
concept of 'Watan]2" which is both tangible and amorphous in meaning. In regard to 
Islamic identity, the concept of Umma is intangible and possesses spiritual overtones 
(Ahmed, 1999, p. 8). In accord with the daims made for Arab identity, Islamic identity 
places a similar emphasis on 'pastness'. For Islamists, history is not just an object of 
inspiration, but a reality within which they live. 
During the last twenty years the meanings assigned to Islamic identity have been 
more efficiently disseminated within the Arab Muslim world than ever before. The 
radical transformations in communication technology have resulted in a vastly extended 
field of application, especially in regard to multimedia products. Moreover, the World 
Wide Web offers opportunities for Islamists to create an Islamic web, through which 
Muslims can significantly increase their knowledge of Islam (Anderson, 2003, p. 46). 
The new applications of communication technology, particularly in the creation of the 
World Wide Web, have given millions of Muslims unfettered access to primary texts, and 
new perspectives, nurturing a healthy online religious debate (Islam, 2002, March). 
1.4.4 The Arabie language: the heart and soul of the Arab nation 
Language use functions as a means of communicative expression, and as a marker 
and indicator of the speaker's ethnic and cultural identity. Additionally, it influences, 
reflects, and sometimes misrepresents one's identity (Fong, 2004, p. Il). When 
examining the sources of Arab identity due credit is always given to the unrivalled power 
12 Watan denotes a certain place or region where people aIready live and are firmly established. 
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of the Arabie language13• For Arab nationalists, language is perceived as the heart and 
soul of the Arab nation (Barakat, 1993). The extraordinary esteem given to the Arabic 
language is due to its dynamie nature. The Arabic language "has an unusually large 
vocabulary and its grammar allows for the easy coining of new words" (Nydell, 2002, p. 
117). Because of the power ascribed consciously or unconsciously to words, Arabic 
words "can, to some extent, affect subsequent events" (Nydell, 2002, p. 122). 
The capabilities of the Arabic language may explain why Arabs are extraordinarily 
fond of it. For Arabs, the Arabie language "is their greatest cultural treasure and 
achievement, and an art form that unfortunately cannot be accessed or appreciated by 
outsiders" (Nydell, 2002, p. 117). Arabs' appreciation of, and enthusiasm for, their 
language is reiterated in the comments of the historian Philip Hitti, who wrote: "no 
people in the world has su ch enthusiastic admiration for literary expression, and is so 
moved by the word, spoken or written, as the Arabs" (Rugh, 1987, p. 20). 
Obviously, Arab identity is influenced by severa! attributes of the Arabic language. 
Among the characteristics that directly affect Arabness are the vocabulary's peculiar 
richness, and its powerful rhetoric. The richness of the vocabulary "makes it possible to 
express a wide range of nuances, which in other languages often have to be paraphrased" 
(Introduction, 2002). More importantly, the Arabic language is powerfully rhetorical, and 
has an extraordinary capacity for assertion and emphasis, notably through repetition, 
13 The Arabie language is one of the Afro-Asiatic languages. Since the Koran is written in Arabie, it is 
considered as the main language of Islam. When linguists refer to the Arab language they generally have 
classical Arabie in mind. While the written Arabic language is homogenous across Arab countries, the 
spoken Arabie language is exceedingly heterogeneous, with a number of strikingly different accents, such 
as the Egyptian accent, the Lebanese accent, the Gulf accent, and the Moroccan accent. Another overview 
of the Arabie language classifies the Arab language as follows: (1) classical (Modem Standard) Arabie, 
which is used for aIl writing and formaI speeches and discussions, (2) colloquial Arabie, which is usually 
used for everyday spoken communication, but not for writing, and (3) formaI spoken Arabic, which is 
usually utilized by educated people (NydeIl, 2002, pp. 116-117). 
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metaphor, and rhyme. As Raphael Patai, the author of "The Arab Mind," puts it: "no 
language ... cornes even near to Arabie in its power of rhetoricism, in its ability to 
penetrate beneath and beyond intellectual comprehension directly to the emotions and 
make its impact upon them" (Patai, 2002, pp. 50, 51). Because the principal features of 
Arabie rhetoric (mubalagha) and assertion (tawkid) are employed in the persuasion of 
media consumers, the images Arabs use to portray their identity may inc1ude exaggerated 
statements (Patai, 2002, p. 52), or appear as rhetorical dec1arations presented as c1ear-cut 
facts. 
1.4.5 Arab media: Re-empowering Arabness 
The complex relationship between Arab media and Arab identity has led to a 
prolonged and deeply nuanced debate over the precise nature of this dynamic. On the one 
hand, Arab media scholars are united in their view that the Arab media has made a 
significant contribution to reflecting, and constructing Arab identity. On the other hand, 
the attempts of Arab scholars to contextualize Arab media in light of recent political and 
economic trends indicate that the relationship between Arabness and Arab media seems 
to be politically charged and paradoxical. 
Any adequate engagement with such ostensibly contrasting view~ must start by 
acknowledging that despite the modem transformation in communication technologies 
within the Arab world, "the Arab world remains impeded by old poli tic al divisions, static 
economic models, and poor media structures and performance" (Amin, 2001, p. 24). 
Conversely, it is noted that recent political, economic, and technologie al trends in the 
Arab world have induced significant transformations in the Arab mass communication 
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sphere, thereby providing Arab audiences with a considerably more diversified and 
interactive access to information (Ayish, 2001, p. 111). 
To understand the slippage between the two paradoxicai views mentioned above, an 
examination of the evolution of Arab media during three parallei phases is necessary. The 
first phase, which examines the censorship imposed on Arab media and the theories and 
principles goveming expression, seeks to shed light on the media atmosphere within 
which a sense of Arab identity is disserninated. The creation of a technological paradigm 
that was accompanied by a graduaI demand for a Pan-Arab media during the 1970s and 
1990s will be discussed in the second phase. The third phase will assess the online Arab 
media and discuss its influence on Arab identity. 
Phase 1) Arab media and censorship: the strained survival of Arab identity 
Historically, Arab media have undergone different sorts of censorship. During the 
period of Turkish domination and Western colonialism, Arab media were placed "un der a 
range of social and political controis that adversely affected their freedom" (Ayish, 2001, 
p. 122). With few exceptions in the Arab world, newspapers and magazines "were used 
as the mouthpieces of ruling authorities, seeking to propagate their views and policies" 
(Ayish, 2001, p. 122). Sirnilarly, most radio14 stations were operated, from the very 
beginning, by govemment agencies. Sorne Arab countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, 
depended on foreign companies to establish their broadcasting systems. In Egypt, for 
example, radio was operated from 1934 to 1948 by the British Marconi Company, and in 
Tunisia, by the French authority, beginning in 1939. 
14 Radio took about five decades to be established in aIl Arab countries. It was established in Morocco in 
1928, Iraq in 1936, Lebanon in 1938, Libya in 1939, Sudan in 1940, Syria in 1941, Somalia in 1943, 
Yemen in 1947 and 1954, Jordan in 1948, Saudi Arabia in 1949, Kuwait in 1951, Mauritania in 1956, 
Palestine in 1964, Oman in 1970, and the United Arab Emirates in 1971 (Gher, 1999, p. 62). 
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During the colonial era, aIl attempts to sustain private radio stations that were based 
on commercial objectives and funded by individuals or corporations had failed. Examples 
of private radio stations were to be found in Algeria (1925), Egypt (1926), and Tunisia 
(1935) (Amin, 2001, p. 29). At its inception, television15 broadcasting, which began in 
the 1950s and took about three decades to be established in aIl Arab countries, was 
subject to govemment control. 
Media censorship forms range from issuing laws and legislation to control media 
licenses, through to filtering media content. As noted by the Arab Press Freedom Watch 
(APFW), Arab media have been subject to restrictive laws and codes, which dramatically 
determine the role media can play in addressing issues of political reform in Arab 
countries (The role, 2004). Various forms of censorship that affect both local Arab 
newspapers and transnational Arab media have created a climate of fear among Arab 
media practitioners who "have for a long time tended to cens or themselves in their 
coverage of certain issues" (The role, 2004). The negative effects of self-censorship 
appear in Jihad Khazen's article (1999), "Censorship and State Control of the Press in the 
Arab World." Jihad Khazen, the editor-in-chief of Dar Alhayat, one of the Pan-Arab 
newspapers, wrote: 
Sitting at my desk, 1 feel at times that l'm not so much 
covering the news as covering it up. Editors know the dos 
and don'ts of their trade, so when 1 am shown a story, it is 
often to shift responsibility from the editor concemed, to 
me, should the paper get banned the next day. We can 
afford to he hanned in Sudan, where the currency is almost 
worthless, but if we are banned in Saudi Arabia, we stand 
15 Television was established in Morocco in 1954, in Iraq, Algeria and Lebanon in 1956, Egypt and Syria in 
1960, Kuwait in 1961, Sudan in 1962, Democratie Yemen in 1964, Saudi Arabia in 1965, Tunisia in 1966, 
Jordan in 1967, Libya in 1968, Qatar in 1970, Bahrain in 1973, and in Oman and Yemen, in 1974 and 
1975, respectively (Gher, 1999, p. 63). 
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to lose tens of thousands of dollars in advertising revenue 
(Khazen, 1999). 
During the postcolonial era, Arab media sacrificed their freedom for the sake of 
national and domestic unity. The need to secure national unit y from possible colonial 
attacks was accompanied by oppressive measures toward dissenting opinions. Despite the 
direct and indirect censorship that the Arab media underwent, issues pertaining to Arab 
identity often came under Arab media scrutiny during the 1950s and 1960s. Increasingly, 
the promotion of a sense of one Arab spirit became not merely the dut y of radio and 
television programmers, but rather, the principal agenda of several Arab movies and 
songs. 
Nonetheless, it is evident to Arab scholars and Arab audiences that the increasingly 
important issue of Arab identity has been articulated within the constraints imposed by 
totalitarian regimes. The incubation of the concept of Arabness by undemocratic 
govemments has strained the sense of Arab identity, defining it as increasingly void of 
the legal and institutional safeguards of freedom and democracy. The interconnectedness 
between Arab identity and an undemocratic environment is apparent in the response of 
the Syrian President Bashar Alassad to a question about whether issuing a paper is 
currently permissible: 
It is permissible within certain measures. What is the aim 
of the paper? This is the basis. Does it serve the national 
and pan-Arab line? There is an old printing law that allows 
the publication of newspapers, and it is under review, and 
there will be principles that aim to make the mass media 
contribute to the development process (Interview, 2001). 
This comment by President Alassad can help us to examine the "theory" that 
govems the Arab media system. As indicated by William Rugh (1987), "the prevailing 
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Arab attitude toward mass communications appears to be more akin to the authoritarian 
view" (p. 27). Clearly, up until the 1990s, Arab media operated to "support the policies of 
the govemment, which controls the media either directly or indirectly though licensing, 
legal action, or perhaps financial means" (Rugh, 1987, p. 25). 
Yet, it has become evident that Arab media often function in accordance with 
libertarian and social responsibility theories. In a very few cases, Arab media operate 
through a "self-righting process," entailing the free competition of information and ideas, 
or if they are placed sufficiently far away from govemment control, they can thereby 
provide audiences with precise and objective information. However, it is evident that 
those Arab media that reflect sorne of the features of both libertarian and social 
responsibility theories are undermined by the fact that "the se features tend to be in the 
effects of the system rather than in the underlying philosophy or purpose" (Rugh, 1987, 
p.27). 
Despite recent technological developments in the Arab World that have led to the 
achievement of certain kinds of diversity, the Arab Human Development Report of 2003 
(AHDR), issued by the United Nations, stated that Arab media "operate in an 
environment that restricts the freedom of the press and freedom of expression and 
opinion" (Mass, 2003). Most Arab media systems continue to function as a mobilization 
tool through which Arab regimes can gain support for their political programs. Of the 
features that de scribe how Arab media operate as a mouthpiece for Arab govemments, 
the most notable is the concem for safeguarding the inviolability of the aura of Arab 
leaders. Small numbers Arab media criticize their govemment leaders. Negative 
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information about the character and behavior of powerful rulers never finds its way into 
print, radio, or screen media (Rugh., 1987, p. 33). 
Phase 2) The demand for a Pan-Arab media-identity (1970s-1990s) 
The first attempts of Arab countries to set up a joint satellite, which would serve the 
entire Arab region, date back to the 1960s when the Arab States Broadcasting Union was 
established in 1969. Yet, the Pan-Arab satellite remained a dream, due to political 
differences, and inadequate technical and financial resources, until the establishment of 
the Arab Satellite Communication Organization (ARABSAT) in 1976. ARABSAT was 
the Arab's response to "the New Information and Communication Order, promoted by 
Non-Aligned Movement, which condemned the unequal circulation of information and 
communication flows, the unbalanced distribution of the means of communication" 
(Guaaybess, 2002). 
Arab countries took one more decade to launch ARABSAT into outer space. By the 
end of the 1990s, three more satellites were launched to coyer the entire Arab region: 
NILESAT, INTELSAT, and EUTELSAT. In the eyes of Arab media critics, ARABSAT 
failed to counter the tide of Western cultural products, not merely because it became one 
more satellite among many, but also because Arabs put more "stress on being present on 
the broadcasting scene, than on responses to social or ideological issues, and even more 
stress on broadcasting entertainment programs than educational ones" (Guaaybess, 2002). 
Since the 1990s, the Arab presence within the satellite broadcasting system has increased. 
Broadly speaking, Arab satellite broadcasting has two essential mediums of operation: 
1) Sky contest: The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 had significant consequences 
for the Arab broadcasting system. During the Gulf war in 1991, Arabs realized that the 
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penetration of CNN, which operated a twenty-four-hours-a-day service on a conventional 
terrestrial system throughout Bahrain was su ch that the CNN signal could be received 
throughout Saudi Arabia and in the other Arab countries (Mohammadi, 1998, p. 264). 
The Arabs' response to CNN came first from Egypt, which launched the Egyptian Space 
Channel (ESC) at the end of 1990, and the Nile TV station in 1993. Less than a year after 
the start of ESC, Saudi Arabia established the Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) 
(Mohammadi, 1998, p. 264). Since the Gulf War, Arab states have continued to launch 
television satellites. A recent li st produced by the Arab States Broadcasting Union 
(ASBU) showed that Arab states operate 49 public satellite channels, and 66 private 
channels. Despite the rapid growth of satellite broadcasting, this proliferation of media 
outlets has not been accompanied by complete freedom of expression. Of 115 satellite 
channels in the Arab World, more than 70 percent are officially under govemment 
supervision (Mass, 2003). 
2) Terrestrial contest: The rapid increase in satellite channels has prompted sorne 
Arab countries to enter a more sophisticated phase, working to establish Media cities that 
are designed to function as information cities. For instance, Egypt and the United Arab 
Emirates launched Cairo Media City and Dubai Media City. These cities managed to 
attract media professionals and multinationals, su ch as Reuters and CNN, which opened 
regional offices there. Additionally, sorne Arab television Satellites, such as MBC and 
ORBIT decided to leave Europe to set up their offices there too. Egypt, notably, has been 
able to attract Aljazeera Television to its Cairo Media City. 
The rapid development of Pan-Arab channels has significant implications for Arab 
media. Obviously, the competition between different Arab Satellite channels has 
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progressively led to the modification of the content of the programs. Arab television 
channels have become increasingly critical in the discussion of political issues, and new 
debates are now being conducted around certain social issues that are considered very 
sensitive for Arabs, such as gender issues. Arab audiences, in turn, have gained more free 
access to the media, and have become correspondingly capable of participating in global 
discourses. 
Nonetheless, the positive implications of Arab satellite channels have been 
paralleled by a number of negative consequences. Arab televisions channels continue to 
favor the consolidation of national identities rather than to promote the cause of Pan-Arab 
identity. More critieally, instead of operating to strengthen Arab culture, Arab satellite 
channels have been opened up to foreign influences; many Arab entertainment programs 
are essentially Arabie versions of existing Western programs. Of the many programs that 
have enjoyed a huge success before the Arab public, programs such as 'who wants to be 
millionaire?' whieh was introduced to the Arab public by the MBC (Middle East 
Broadcasting Center) seem to typify the erosion of cultural concerns through capitulation 
to the commercial interests served by the media (Guaaybess, 2002). Yet, despite the 
imitation of foreign programs, a few Arab television channels appear to defend the Pan-
Arab ideology, such as Aljazeera, and Alarabia televisions. 
Phase 3) Arab media and the technological paradigm 
In accordance with the demands of satellite technology, the introduction of new 
technological applications, such as the World Wide Web, have extended media spaces 
beyond the local, regional and national realms (Hafez, 2001, p. 1). Distinct from the Arab 
television satellites, access to the Internet has empowered the Arab public, and it has 
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helped to erode the imposed controls of government on the flow of information. 
Examples demonstrating how the Internet has empowered Arabs are ample and weIl 
documented: 
- Arab human rights organizations that have often encountered difficulties in 
getting their reports published in local Arab media outlets can now disseminate 
controversiaI information more effectively than ever before. 
- Arab, French and English printed newspapers and magazines that had been 
censored in Arab countries have launched online versions over the past decade, or simply 
posted banned stories online. 
- Arab users can find information online that is either nonexistent elsewhere or 
presented through a one-sided perspective in the local news media. Moroccans, for 
example, can find an abundance of information posted on the Web by the Polisario Front 
and other groups whose objective is to challenge the officiaI Moroccan position regarding 
the Western Sahara. Similarly, Algerians and Egyptians can visit the various websites of 
Islamist groups that have been officiaIly banned or have no legal status. 
The World Wide Web 're-mediates' the configuration of time, place, and space 
found in the traditional media, so that Arab users can find publications that are either 
expensive, locally unavailable, or out-of-date by the time of arrivaI. By the end of 1997, 
Arab electronic publications had proliferated to such an extent that they then comprised 
over thirty online daily newspapers, and eighteen weekly magazines. By 2004, this 
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number had jumped to 294 online Arab newspapers l6, among them 125 titles that appear 
in the Arabie language, and represent the online version of printed publications. 
Similarly, the number of Internet users has dramatically increased. By 1997, there 
were about 73,200 Internet Subscribersl7 in the Arab World (Ayish, 2001, p. 121). 
However, the number of Internet users had jumped to 2 million by 2001, then to 3.54 
million by 2002. A parallel investigation made by the AHDR (Arab Human Development 
Report) during 2000-2001, showed that Arab residents who then had access to the World 
Wide Web represented only 1.6 percent (4.55 million) of the total Arab population (284 
million). In October 2002, the Madar Research group predicted that the number of 
Internet users would rise exponentially to 25 million by 2005 (Rinnawi, 2001-2002), (See 
appendix A). 
The dramatic increase in Internet users in the Arab World implies a corresponding 
influence on the construction of Arab identity, and the creation of a new kind of Pan-
Arabism, a sort of virtual Pan-Arabism (Rinnawi, 2001- 2002). Pan-Arabi st thought18 that 
had once been the exclusive property of Arab elites has now become available online for 
the benefit of the Arab public. Additionally, prior to the expansion of television satellites 
and the Internet, Arab media have traditionally worked as 'tribal media' so as to secure 
16 The total number of online Arab newspapers has been obtained from different websites that provide 
information about online newspapers such as www.newspaperonline.com, and www.al-bab.com. 
17 The total number of Internet subscribers does not denote an accurate figure for the number of Internet 
users in the Arab World. Usually, each subscriber shares Internet access with his family or peers. 
18 Among websites that propagate the cause of Arabism are: the Arab Nationalist Thought (Alfekr 
Alqawmy Alarabi) http://www.alfikralarabi.com. The Arab Position Magazine (Elmawkef Alarabi 
Magazine http://www.elmawkefalarabi.com/. The Rise (Altoloa) 
http://members.lycos.co.uklaltoloa/nuke/htmV, The Nasserist Newspaper (Algarida Alnasseryia) Online 
http://alnaserynewspaper.tripod.com/, The Arab Road (Altariq Alarbi) Online http://www.attarik.org/, The 
Voice of Arab Nation (Sot Alumma Alarabia) Online http://www.arab-nation.com/. The Arabism. 
(Alorouba Net) http://www.30rooba.net!, The Arab Union. (Aldawla Alarabia) Online http://www.arab-
union.net!. The Arabi http://www.alarabimag.net!. 
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and delimit each Arab state border, and provide a secure foundation for the socio-culturaI 
and political orders (Rinnawi, 2001-2002). The Internet presented a challenge to the 
tradition al nature and content of the Arab media when they came to produce their online 
versions. 
The World Wide Web "de-legitimizes discourses about Arab regimes, especially 
through converting traditionally private conversations into public discussions" (Rinnawi, 
2001-2002), thereby creating a sort of Arab public space. The public spaces that Arabs 
have opened up through the Internet not only enable Arabs to communicate and convey 
textual and visuaI messages, but aIso to explore "new interpretations that apply 
intellectuaI techniques developed elsewhere than the texts themselves" (Rinnawi, 2001-
2002). 
Briefly, since the 1990s, Arab media have regrouped in a new paradigm, namely the 
technologie aI paradigm, which now empowers the entire range of Arab media. Through 
Arab television satellites and websites, Arabs are capable of resisting the penetration of 
Western discourses, reflecting a Pan-Arab view of the world. Yet, the rosy image 
conveyed by the technologicaI paradigm concerning the Arab media is often countered by 
Arab governments' attempts to cens or the content of media, or to ban certain kinds of 
communication technologies. Syria, for example, has put severe restrictions on the 
possession of facsimile machines and PC owners must register with the military authority 
(Kirchner, 2001, p. 148). Other Arab countries, such as Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain, the 
united Arab Emirates, and Kuwait "have chosen to in staIl screening devices to filter 
unwanted materiaIs" (Ayish, 2001, p. 125). 
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Additionally, the level of technological development is not homogenous in the Arab 
World. The availability of infrastructure necessary for communication differs from one 
Arab country to another (Kirchner, 2001, p. 141). In a rather more critical view of the 
technological paradigm, the rapid transition toward advanced media technology that has 
led to a complete transformation in the media landscape in Arab countries can be said to 
have swept away the old paradigm ascribed for Arab media through the prism of its role 
in social development (Guaaybess, 2002). 
To refer back to the paradox articulated at the beginning of this discussion about 
Arab media, it is evident that the technological paradigm has had decisive consequences 
for the Arab media. Yet, Arab media have been unduly constrained due to such factors as 
political stagnation, inadequate infrastructure development, and the lack of a clear Arab 
voice to speak out on behalf of the progressive and indeed, revolutionary role of the new 
media in the Arab world. 
1.4.6 Arab gender: transformative agendas 
Arab gender constitutes a fundamentaI feature of Arabness. The debate about the 
status of Arab women, while reflecting the reality of Arab gender concems, has 
undergone a significant shift in emphasis from issues related to nationalism and 
development to those stressing the gender dimensions of socio-economic change (AI-
Hegelan, 1980). This section will seek to shed light on the ideology of gender in the Arab 
World, the political participation of Arab women, the significance of socio-economic 
status in the determination of Arab gender, and finally, the new agenda set by Arab 
women. 
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Arab gender differentiation is right at heart of the Arab family' s conception of 
honor. Upon the shoulders of Arab women lies the responsibility for raising children and 
ministering to the needs of each family member. Arabs traditionally depend on a 
woman's nurturing devotion on behalf of her family as the sine qua non of moral and 
educational development. Moreover, Arab women are responsible for the reputation, and 
consequently, the honor of the family. 
The 'honor of the woman' (sharaf) is a quintessential part of the 'honour of the 
Arab man and the family' (ird) (Patai, 2002, p. 128). The preservation of the Arab 
woman's honor is bound up with the vindication of 'ird'. 'Ird' often refers to the "social 
standing of an entity larger than the family, usually the community and its defense and 
protection" (Peteet, 1993, p. 51). In Arab culture, safeguarding the Arab man's 'ird' 
affords women protection in the Arab territories. Arabs express the connection between 
ird and territorial prerogatives through the slogan 'Alard abl al ird' (the honor of the land 
has priority over the ird). 
Historically, the Arab ideology of gender has always conceived women as a 
principal means of defense of Arab identity against Western interpretations of gender. 
The perception of Arab women as political targets has always informed the position of 
Arab conservatives and traditionalists on women, who seek to show how Arab women 
refute the meaningless charges of Western discourses concerning the status of women in 
Arab culture and undermine the ready-made stereotypes brought against Arab-Muslim 
women by simply being themselves with all the dignity that a positive self-conception 
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implies. An idea of the discourses of Arab Women conservatives can be derived from 
Nouha AI-Hegelan's article, "Arab Women: Potentials and Prospects," where she writes: 
In simple terms, Westerners will never achieve a human 
awareness of the Arab woman if they continue to peer 
through the frosted glass of a single image, a narrow 
definition of what every woman should be (AI-Hegelan, 
1980). 
In a rather more challenging mode, Nouha AI-Hegelan provides a spirited response to 
standard Western critiques of Islamic women: 
Long before Western women even considered themselves 
as a group, let alone a group deprived of its rights, the 
Islamic woman had begun her emancipation. From the 
beginning of Islam, 1400 years ago, the Moslem woman 
was born with all the rights - cultural and spiritual - due a 
human being (AI-Hegelan, 1980). 
In a similar vein, postcolonial feminists argue that Arab women were subject to 
colonial critiques as a means of enforcing the colonizing mission. Scholars who write 
from a postcolonial perspective describe Western feminism as "colonial feminism." Leila 
Ahmed, the author of W omen and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modem Debate, 
and an Arab activist, describes what is meant by "colonial feminism." According to Leila 
Ahmed, there was a tendency among Colonial officers to champion Muslim women' s 
rights, while fiercely opposing women's rights in their own countries (AbuKhalil, 2000). 
This view of Leila Ahmed finds an echo in the writings of the Franz Fanon who asserted 
that interference in the conditions of Algerian women during the period of colonialism 
was meant to disturb the 'old patemal assurance' and to undermine the native's 
patriarchal hegemony in respect to native women, so as to make the native patriarch lose 
"his balance" (Olwan, 2004). Franz Fanon pointed out the hidden implications of the 
colonial promise made to Algerian women, who were granted greater 
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freedom and rights in order to better colonize Aigerian men, and "break an already 
fragmented Colonized society" (Olwan, 2004). 
Early attempts to debate the status of Egyptian women, and introduce Western ideas 
about women include the writings of the Arab social reformist, Qasim Amin (1865-
1908), the Egyptian author of the Liberation of Women (1899), and The New Women 
(1900). Although published a century ago, the se two books of Qasim Amin provide a 
key point of reference for understanding the Arab feminist movement. Recent Arab 
feminist movements delimit, and even criticize the notion that Arab women constitute a 
political target for Western ideas. Women activists such as the Egyptian Nawal Aisadawi, 
and the Moroccan Fatima Mernissi, disagree with the view of Nouha AI-Hegelan about 
Islam. Nawal Aisadawi, while considering "Islam as having progressive potential for 
women" (Graham-Brown, 2001, p. 31), criticizes Islam for its "conservative 
interpretations, which cast women only in subordinated roles" (Graham-Brown, 2001, p. 
31). Likewise, Fatima Mernissi charges religious institutions for legitimizing patriarchal 
power (Graham-Brown, 200 1, p. 31). Mernissi argues that, "Islam regards female 
sexualityas active, but therefore potent and dangerous" (Graham-Brown, 2001, p. 31). 
ln making the connection between Arab women and Arabness, Arab women 
activists blame the patriarchal construction of Arab identity for constituting an obstacle to 
their gender goals, implying that Islam poses a parallel threat. The Moroccan sociologist 
Fatima Mernissi asserts that, '''Arab identity' has been conceived in a way that regards 
change as threatening to the moral order, and thus impedes the development of both 
democracy and the emancipation ofwomen" (Graham-Brown, 2001, p. 31). 
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Politically, despite the limitations imposed upon the activities of Arab women, 
gender has been a key driving force in social change. During the colonial period, for 
instance, women in Egypt and Aigeria were "able to carry out underground political 
activity because the authority did not see them as political" (Joseph, 2001, p. 36). Arab 
women, however, have not yet received adequate political recognition. They are still 
prevented from voting in several Arab countries. Gulf States, with the exception of 
Kuwait, do not acknowledge women's right to vote. Moreover, gaining the right to vote 
does not necessarily mean that development in the overall status of women can be 
guaranteed. Women can easily become ballot fodder for political parties; they can also be 
pressured into voting for candidates chosen by their male relatives (Graham-Brown, 
2001, p. 27). 
Arab women rights have been fought for at global conferences19 conceming 
women's issues since the 1970s. As for Arab women, the United Nations Agenda has 
focused on the socioeconomic status of women. For ex ample, the United Nations 
Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has an agenda that is seeking to achieve three 
main objectives, inc1uding: (1) strengthening women's economic rights, (2) engendering 
govemance and leadership, and (3) promoting women's human rights (Arab Women). In 
December 2000, the Arab States Regional Office of UNIFEM established a network for 
Arab women, which is called 'Arab Women Connect' (AWC). Arab Women Connect 
19 Issues concerning women have gained increasing attention since the 1970s. The United Nations has 
organized four World conferences concerning women; The World Conference of the International 
Women's Year (Mexico City, 1975); the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: 
Equality, Development, Peace (Copenhagen, 1980); the World Conference to Review and Appraise the 
Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women (Nairobi, 1985) and the Fourth World Conference 
on Women (Beijing, 1995) (Arab Regional, 2004). 
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(A WC) aimed to build a website containing studies, statistics, and reports about Arab 
women (Arab Women). 
Broadly speaking, the socioeconornic status of Arab women remains a challenge. 
The recent report of 2004, issued by the 'UN Development Fund for Women' found that 
"only 28 percent of Arab women are active in the work force" (UN Wire, 2004). Recent 
statistics, issued by the databases of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) show that 
the unemployment rate of Arab women is higher than that for Arab men. For example, 
the rates of unemployed women were 11.8% versus 5.2% for men in Bahrain in 1991, 
19.9% versus 5.1 % for men in Egypt in 1998,21.0% versus 12.3% for men in Jordan in 
2000,5.2% versus 1.8% for men in Qatar in 1997,7.1% versus 3.5% for men in Iraq in 
1987. During 1999, the unemployment rate for Arab women was lower than the rate for 
men in a few countries, such as Kuwait (0.7% for women versus 0.8% for men), Lebanon 
(7.2% for women versus 8.6% for men), and Yemen (8.2% for women versus 12.5% for 
men) (Gender indicators, 2004). 
In a sirnilar vein, Arab women were found to be more illiterate than men in most 
Arab countries. Statistics gathered by UNESCO in 2000 showed that the rate of illiteracy 
among Arab women who were above the age of 15 was 17.4% versus 9.1 % for men in 
Bahrain, 15.7% versus 5.1 % for men in Jordan, 20.4% versus 16.1 % for men in Kuwait, 
33.1 % versus 17.0% for Egyptian men, 7.0% versus 2.8% for men in Lebanon. Iraq 
registered the highest rate of illiteracy arnong women (70.9%) versus (40.7%) for Iraqi 
men (Gender indicators, 2004). 
Paradoxically, the ratio of women to men in terrns of university enrolment reflects 
the changing status of Arab women in higher education as compared to the illiteracy and 
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employment rates registered for women. During the period between 1998 and 2000, the 
number of Arab women enrolled at the university level was found to be greater than that 
registered for male students. The enrolment ratio of Arab women students versus men 
was 31.1% versus 19.6% in Bahrain, 30.6% versus 26.8% in Jordan, 30.0% versus 13.0% 
in Kuwait, 46.2% versus 13.7% in Qatar, 25.4% versus 19.6% in Saudi Arabia, and 
38.2% versus 35.2% in Lebanon (Gender indicators, 2004). 
The report made by the Gender Statistics Program in Arab countries explains the 
seeming contradiction between the increased rates of unemployment among Arab 
women, and the expansion in the number of Arab women students registered at the 
university level, which should lead, in consequence, to an increased number of university 
graduates in the labor market. When engaged in economic life, Arab women are expected 
to face unfavorable labor market conditions, cultural stereotypes that favor men, limited 
opportunities for career promotion, and wage discrimination (Gender issues, 2004). The 
statistics pertaining to the status of Arab women warrant an agenda calling for an 
improvement in their socioeconomic status. 
Recently, Arab women have sought to re-integrate the notion of Arabness within the 
parameters of the salient realities faced by Arab women. This entails a reconsideration of 
the context of political instability, occupation, and military conflict within which issues 
pertaining to Arab gender must be broached. The integration effected between Arab 
identity allegiances and Arab women issues is emphasized by the Arab Women 
Organization (A WO), which calis for an effective and unified strategy for Arab women. 
The strategy "stresses the importance of achieving the solidarity of Arab women as a 
comerstone for Arab unit y to guarantee joint Arab action regarding women" (Arab, 2004, 
62 
July). According to the AWO's director, Wadouda Badran, synchronizing Arab women's 
issues with the key developmental policies in Arab countries is a significant priority 
(Arab, 2004, July). 
Similarly, Nora AI-Suwaidi, the president of the Arab Women Organization (AWO) 
indicates the need for a new strategy and new modes of thinking in order to address 
perceived threats to Arab societies and cultural identities (Arab, 2004, July). The 
implementation of the new strategy of the Arab Women Organization, which has been 
put forth within the framework of a four-year plan (2004-2008), will be effected by 
employing tactics such as fostering Arab cooperation, and by drawing on the shared 
experiences of women in different Arab countries through engaging in research projects, 
seminars, workshops and pertinent activities within governmental organizations (Arab, 
2004, July). Instead of focusing merely on the socio-economic status of Arab women, the 
new plan of the A WO aims to reinforce the roles Arab women might play in the 
development of the Arab region through a concerted effort to improve Arab women's 
socio-economic status in conjunction with the goals outlined in the four-year plan. 
In a broader context, the latest forum about Arab gender, was the 'Arab Regional 
Forum Ten Years after Beijing: a CalI for Peace', organized by the Beirut-based United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCW A) in July 2004, 
and launched by more than 400 Arab women ministers, parliamentarians, and non-
governmental representatives to reconsider the political and ideological contexts within 
which Arab women must live. 
The Arab region is exposed to harsh conditions as a result 
of instability, occupation, war and economic embargo. 
These conditions hinder growth and progress and, in 
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particular, the progress of women and their empowerment 
(Arab Regional, 2004). 
Arab women suffer the most from the impact of war in a 
region in which instability, armed conflict, occupation and 
economic embargo prevail and they demand to take their 
position alongside men in rebuilding, rehabilitating and 
taking action to unleash peace and security through 
effective political participation at various levels (Arab 
Regional,2004). 
1.4.7. Cultural traits: Renegotiating imperial pleasure. 
Arab cultural traits are representations of Arabness. Most Arabists and Islamists 
believe that these cultural traits are subject to what cultural imperialist theorists term 
'cultural imperialism', 'ideological imperialism', and 'economic imperialism' (Mattelart, 
1994, & Schiller, 1976). Theoretically speaking, these terms are used to explain and 
de scribe the strategies by which the large multinational corporations of developed 
countries seek to dominate developing countries (White, 2001). Though Armand 
Mattelart cautions against interpreting notions of ideological domination too literally or 
imprecisely (Morley, 2000, p. 471), it should be noted that cultural imperialists believe 
that "there is a fixed reality that exists alongside an individual's or an organization's own 
created meaning of reality" (White, 2001). 
When applying the cultural imperialist approach to Arab cultural traits, for instance, 
the consumption of Arab food, it is nonetheless difficult to resist the argument that such 
specifie cultural traits have become a target for cultural invasion. The Arab food system 
has been subjected to the progressive onslaught of fast food products, particularly by such 
multinationals as McDonald's, Burger King, Wendy's, Pizza Hut and Kentucky Fried 
Chicken. In the eyes of Arabists and Islarnists, fast food is perceived as a tool to 
underrnine Arab identity and it has become a major factor in farnily disagreements. 
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Similarly, Tori Haring-Smith complains that the likes of McDonald's and Kentucky Fried 
Chicken, are extensively co-opting, and thereby undermining, the culture of 
contemporary Arab countries, and "that along with this cultural 10ss has come a loss of 
identity and sense of self' (Variations, 2002). She believes that we are living in a "world 
threatened by the spread of a culture which, by reason of its mere economic strength, is 
able to impose itself on others" (Variations, 2002). 
Attempts to warn the Arab public about foreign brand-name products, as with 
Mattelart's call to examine the specifie realities of a particular milieu which resist or 
favor cultural penetration (Morley, 2000, p. 471), have tended to bec orne polarized into 
the following realignments of position: Arabs are urged either to propose a boycott of 
foreign products manufactured in Arabic countries, or to create their own counter-
products. Significantly, those who insist on the boycotting of foreign brand-name 
products often use ongoing Arab conflicts as a pretext to reject foreign brand-name 
products. Figure no. 1-1 indicates how the rejection of foreign brand name products has 
assumed noticeably complex dimensions, though the sense of Arab identity, conceived in 
broad socio-cultural terms, is invariably invoked as a calI to resistance. 
A second aspect of the boycotting of foreign brand-name products is the commonly 
invoked strategy of producing the Arab counterparts of such products. Taufik Mathlouthi, 
an Arab investor, provides an exemplary instance of such a counter challenge, in this 
case, to well-known coke products. He purports that his product, Mecca Cola, has been 
characterized in such a way as to retain a specifically Islamic and Arab sense of identity. 
Sustained by mottos, such as 'drink with commitment', 'drink HalaI', 'shake your 
conscience', Mecca Cola, declared by its owner to be a charity organization, is perceived 
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Boycou+---
Don't buy your 
happiness with 
your brothers' 
blood 
Our brothers are killed by our money 
Source: 
http://www.yahoooh.comlvb/history/topic/3125-1.htrnl 
Figure 1-1. Boycott as a tool for cultural resistance. 
as a viable alternative to its Western brand-name cornpetitors and, as such, constitutes a 
definite "'no' to backing Arnerican irnperialisrn" (See figure 1-2). 
Sorne of the strategie atternpts to interpret why Arabs have increasingly resorted to 
using foreign brand-narne products have received critical attention in Edward Said's 
Culture and Imperialisrn (1993). In this work, Edward Said reiterates sorne of the 
perspectives with which Cultural Imperialist theorists must contend, arguing that large 
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groups of people believe that "aesthetic and psychological pleasure is made possible 
by .. .imperialism" (Said, 1993, p. 161), and this "over time seems to have made 
imperialism much less unpleasant" (Said, 1993, p. 18). Thus, the creation of counter 
cultural products, su ch as Mecca Cola, can be perceived as part of a concerted attempt to 
renegotiate the imperial pleasures created by consuming brand-name Coke products. 
Source: http://www.mecca-cola.coml 
Figure 1-2. Mecca Cola as an Arab counter product 
1.5 Arabs in North America: negotiating a third space of identity 
Arabs in North America are "as diverse as the national origins and immigration 
experience that have shaped their ethnic identity" (Sarnhan, 2001). The Arabs who 
migrated to North America are principally located in the United States and Canada. They 
share broadly similar identities in terms of religious faith and cultural values, and they are 
subjected to a broad range of negative stereotypes disseminated by American and 
Canadian media. 
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Given their specific self-designation as Arab Americans20, it would seem that Arab 
Americans are weIl integrated into American culture and society. The position Arabs 
hold in political life indicates the extent of their integration. Arabs hold positions in 
public office, and four have served on the US Senate. AdditionaIly, they have served in 
Cabinets and other high offices in both the Republican and Democratic administrations. 
Moreover, there have been Arab govemors of both Oregon and New Hampshire. At least 
thirty Arabs have been mayors of US cities (Samhan, 2001). In social and culturallife, 
many Arab Americans have made their mark in America. For example, in the field of 
entertainment, "Arab-American stars have included the comedy actor Danny Thomas, 
actress Kathy Najimy, and Tony Shalhoub, singers Paul Anka, Paula Abdul, and Casey 
Kasem 'American's Top 40' disc jockey" (Samhan, 2001). 
Tuming now to Arab Canadian immigration, Arab migration to Canada existed 
more than a century ago, and since then there have been marked variations in the stream 
of immigration, occasionally reduced to a trickle during periods when restrictive 
measures were applied by the Canadian govemment. Since the Second World War, the 
wave of Arab immigration has been diverse in terms of religion, country of origin, and 
educational and occupational characteristics. The Arab-Canadian community spans four 
to five generations. It now comprises immigrants and the descendants of immigrants 
(Abu-Laban, 1999, p.143). 
From a sociological perspective, the Arab community in Canada21 is one of the least 
studied of the major Canadian ethnic groups. The lack of interest in studies devoted to the 
20 Recently, three million Americans stated that they were of Arab origin (Samhan, 2001). 
21 According to the census of 2001, Statistics Canada estimates that there are 347,955 Canadians of Arab 
origin, and the majority live in Ontario and Quebec. The number of Arabs who live in Ontario are 
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Arab in Canada is due to the customarily perceived image of Arabs as just too different, 
too problematic, or just plain "alien," to warrant academic scrutin y (Abu-Laban, 1999, 
p.284). 
This section seeks to examine Arabness in the case of the Arab in North America, 
particularly Arabs in Canada, where Arab identity is more effectively maintained and 
negotiated. The question of Arab identity calls for a primary discussion of the theories 
that frame the Arab in diaspora. A reassessment of the chief sources of Arabness 
discussed above will be required in the light of this investigation into the theoretical 
framing of Arabs in North America. The role of Arab organizations and Arab media will 
also be examined. 
The phenomenon of Arab migration to North America can be examined within two 
comprehensive frameworks: the diasporic framework, and the postcolonial framework. 
The diasporic definition "has become the key term in contemporary theorizing about 
migration, ethnicity, and identity" (Srebemy, 2000, p. 179). It seeks to destabilize sorne 
of the assumptions relating to the geographical confinement of ethnie experiences, the 
singularity of ethnie identity, and the obliteration of ethnie history and memory 
(Srebemy, 2000, p. 179). 
Additionally, the diasporic approach reflects a basic concem with place and 
displacement. "In that displacement, the borders between home and world become 
confused and the private and public become part of each of us" (Bhabha, 1992, p. 9). 
However, the blurring of the boundaries between the home and the world, or the local 
estimated to be 149.490, constituting 42.9% of the total percent of Arabs living in Canada (See appendix 
B). Quebec has a slightly less numerous Arab population, estimated to be 135,750 (39.01%) of the total 
Arab population in Canada (See appendix B). The total number of Arabs who speak the Arabic language is 
199,940 (See appendix B). 
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and global, while substantially reducing the geographical distance that separates the 
components of pre-modem and early modem diasporas, highlights the dialectical 
character of the process of globalization. The rapid progress of globalization has affected 
migrant communities, and "the way in which individuals and social groups within them 
make sense of their relationship with 'place' and the other, and how they define 
themselves" (Tsagarousianou, 2002, pp. 211-212). 
Embedded in the context of place and displacement are the notions of 'identity as 
space', and the concept of the home as a 'mythic and discursive site'. Arabs in the 
diaspora seek to re-territorialize and re-embed their identity in other imagined spaces, 
wherein identity is seen as the necessary site through which Arabs can counteract the 
dominant discourses (Karim, 2003, p. 9). The recreation of a space for Arab identity has 
been simultaneously accompanied by the de-territorializing of home, or the site of the 
origin. Obviously, the notion of home is at the heart of Arab-Canadian memory, where 
home becomes a 'mythic' place of desire in the diasporic imagination (Brah, 1996, p. 
192), a place of no-retum even when it is possible to visit the geographical place of 
origin. When referring to the imagination, the idea of home is found to be often 
associated with the idea of history, particularly when home is conceived as the historical 
'object' as well as the 'subject' of history (Roy, 1995, p. 104). In other words, home as 
the historical object is about our roots, yet when it is reflected in the lives of real subjects, 
it constitutes our routes (Brah, 1996, p. 192). 
However, while the notion of home forces upon us the stability of the origin in our 
imagination through a nostalgic understanding of the respective communities of the 
private and public selves, this stability brushes up against the highly dispersed nature of 
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home as a historical construct (Roy, 1995, p. 104). Accordingly, Gayatri Spivak argues 
that home is the place for 'un-Iearning our privileges of loss'. That is to say, the loss of 
stable points of reference, as identified in the notion of home, means acknowledging the 
presence of this 'un-homely subject'. Therefore, instead of ignoring this site as a 
redundant or merely nostalgie space, home is perceived as a 'discursive' site (Roy, 1995, 
p.104). 
The notion of home as a discursive site is reaffirmed in the case of the Arab in 
diaspora. Arabs relocate their homes within spaces of solidarity, where they can mobilize 
and manifest their cohesion when they feel that Arabs countries or communities are in 
trouble (Patai, 2002, p. 221). Aspects of this manifestation of solidarity are the 
demonstrations that flare up in foreign cities when Arab homes are endangered, and the 
fundraising campaigns to support suffering Arabs at home. 
Scholars writing from the diasporic perspective tend to orchestrate their discussion 
of ethnic communities within a postcolonial framework. The postcolonial approach to 
diaspora studies is capable of according "a historical and international depth to the 
understanding of cultural power" (Shome, 2002, p. 252), and it views the Arab diaspora 
"as ranged against global and national structures of dominance" (Karim, 2003, p. 5). A 
continuous engagement of the postcolonial approach with the diasporic perspective is 
capable of re-contextualizing the key issues of the Arab diaspora "within the geopolitieal 
arrangements and relations of nations and their inter/national histories" (Shome, 2002, p. 
252). Obviously, the Arab diaspora has taken place within the parameters of national 
history and the socio-cultural power that characterizes the colonizer-colonized 
relationship. Not only has the Arab diasporic phenomenon been caused by different 
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forms of colonization, such as the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon (June 1982-
2000) and Palestine since 1967, but it has also been influenced by the cultural legacy of 
the colonial forces, as mediated by language. 
By the time most of the Arab countries had achieved liberation from British and 
French colonial powers, the Arabs who decided to migrate chose to reside in countries 
where the languages spoken are either English or French. In the case of Arab immigrants 
to Canada, for example, the influence of language as a colonial tool has structured the 
residency of Arabs in the Canadian provinces. Evidence provided by the Canadian census 
of 2001, and reported in January 2003, showed that Arabs who were under French 
colonialism22 favored residence in Quebec where the official language is French. Official 
estimates of the number of Arabs who live in Quebec, c1assified by their national origins, 
show that the Arab population is composed as follows: Moroccans (17,540), those of 
Maghribian origin (39,685), Algerians (13,545), and Tunisians (4,325). In considerably 
lower numbers, the numbers of Arabs who are affiliated to the same national origin and 
live in Ontario are 2,970, 6,275, 1,310, and 845, respectively (See appendix B). 
Significantly, the postcolonial framework has proven to be effective in protecting 
Arabs from misrepresentation and providing resistance to the readymade stereotypes 
propagated against ethnie communities. Studies of Arabs in North America by Amal 
Madani (1999), Saleh Alaswad (2000) and Ali AIKahtani (2002), found that Arabs have 
been subject to a variety of negative depictions. As shown in these studies, Arabs and 
Muslims have been predominantly and persistently portrayed in the US media through 
negative stereotypes (Madani, 1999, p. 3). US and Canadian media outlets commonly 
22 France occupied Arab countries in the Maghreb or that part of North Africa west of Egypt; namely, 
Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. 
72 
misrepresent Arabs as, "the main agents responsible for international terrorism" (Zogby, 
2000). The negative stereotypes that prevail in the US and Canadian media, which are 
confIated within a single representational system, encumber and dis tort Arab and Muslim 
attempts to fight against anti-Arab stereotyping and to present a cogent challenge to the 
dominant system of representation (Eid, 2002, p.274). 
1.5.1 The resurgence of Arab organizations 
The damage caused by negative media images purveyed against Arabs in North 
America has galvanized the Arab community to see itself as a unified or 'co-responsible 
community', whose sense of responsibility must be expanded to mount an able defense of 
Arab culture in general (Werbner, 2002, p. 251). In this respect, Arab organizations in 
North America conceive their responsibilities in terms of presenting a positive agenda for 
change: to monitor and resist negative depictions of Arabs, and to create effective 
counter-images as a strategy of defence. 
Arab organizations in Canada, particularly the Canadian Arab Federation (CAF)23, 
and the National Council on Canadian Arab Relations (NCCARi4, operate cooperatively 
to resist negative representations against Arabs in the Canadian media. Negative images 
of Arabs are particularly prevalent in the "biased reporting against Muslims and Arabs in 
23 The Canadian-Arab Federation (CAF) has been serving Arabs since 1967. It has spearheaded campaigns 
to fight the negative stereotyping of Arabs, ensuring that Arab Canadians have a public voice concerning 
aIl matters that affect the community, both foreign and domestic, and it represents the Arab Canadian 
community at the federal, provincial and municipal levels of government. The CAF has formed a 
partnership with various organizations at the national, provincial and city levels. It has formed partnerships 
with the Canadian Council for Refugees, the Canadian Ethno-Cultural Council, the Ontario Council for 
Agencies Serving Immigrants, Canada's Volunteer Initiative (Anti-Racism), (Media Relations), 
(Government Relations). 
24 The NCCAR was established in 1985. The NCCAR aims to increase Canadian awareness and 
knowledge of the Arab world, and to encourage the expansion of cultural, educational, and commercial 
links between Arab and Canadian institutions. The objectives of NCCAR are based on the belief that 
Canada and the Arab world share aspirations for World peace, have a common interest in increasing trade 
relations, and desire expanded cultural and educational ties. 
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CanWest Publications, particularly the National Post and Ottawa Citizen." Moreover, 
both the National council on Canada-Arab Relations and the Canadian Arab Federation 
have made demands requesting the Ontario Press Council to investigate the insertion of 
the word 'terrorist' into a Middle East story reported by the wire service agency Reuters, 
which substituted the word "terrorist" for such words as "militant" and "insurgent" in an 
Associated Press story (NCCAR in the Media). 
In his comments on the bias against Arabs and Muslims, published in The Globe 
and Mail in September 2004, Mazen Chouaib, the NCCAR's executive director, wrote: 
The practice of vilifying Arabs and Muslims doesn't stop 
there. A recent Citizen front-page headline announced: 
"Ottawa Muslims accused of terrorism". The story related 
to an Ottawa-born man arrested by police on allegations of 
associating with suspected terrorists in London. He has yet 
to be proved a terrorist. The Post, in a recent editorial, 
speaks of "the barbaric standards of the Arab Middle East" 
(Chouaib, 2004). 
Additionally, the creation of counter-images concerning Arabs is among the 
foremost objectives of Arab organizations in North America. The attempt to create 
positive images concerning Arabs has become particularly important in the aftermath of 
the September Il th attacks. When the Arab American Institute issued a booklet, entitled 
"Arab Americans: Making the difference," written by Casey Kasem, the weIl known 
American musician, the booklet included a bibliography outlining the contributions made 
by Arab Americans at various cultural, social and political levels (See appendix C). The 
creation of positive images is a corrective attempt to diminish the misunderstanding in 
the West concerning Arabs, and seems to be a prerequisite for the Arab community. As 
James Zogby, the founder of the Arab American Institute, puts it: "a long and difficult 
road remains before us, but today, at least, Arab Americans have been incorporated into 
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the American process. Our inclusion helps to close the gap in understanding that has 
existed for so long" (Zogby, 2000). 
1.5.2 Arabness in the Canadian context: retained yet confused. 
Arab identity in diaspora does not operate in a vacuum; rather, it derives from the 
principal factors that define Arabness: Pan-Arabism, religion, conflicts, language, media, 
Arab gender, and Arab culture. 
In general terms, Arabs in Canada have a strong awareness of their ethnie and 
cultural identity. Studies examining Arab identity show that Arabs in Canada pre fer to 
identify themselves as Arabs or Arab Canadians (Hayani, 1999, 293, & Eid, 2002, p. 
265). In responding to a question about Arab identity posed by the Canadian Arab 
Federation's study conceming Arabs in Canada, most respondents, "strongly agree that 
they are proud of being Arab" (80.6%), or they are "proud of being Canadian-Arab" 
(69.6%). However, the sense of Arab identity becomes even clearer when 75.5% of the 
respondents report that they strongly disagree with the statement claiming that they 'do 
not feel Arab'. AIso, a strong strain of multicultural thought is prevalent among Arabs, so 
that 70.9% of the respondents strongly agree that they like to be considered as 'both Arab 
and Canadian' (The Knowledge, 2002, p. 9). 
Examination of the sources of Arab identity in diaspora reveals that the Pan-Arab 
notion is both more imaginative and utopian in diaspora, yet also more persuasive, and 
thus, more optimistic about the Arab future. Obviously, the notion of a single collective 
identity is highlighted by the Arab organizations in Canada, thereby representing the 
Arab community as a united and cohesive community. The notion of Pan-Arab collective 
identity is reproduced whenever Palestine, and recently Iraq, is mentioned in discussion. 
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Whereas Arab unit y is a subject for constant debate in Arab countries, the Arab sense of 
unit y has become a necessity of political survival for the Arab community. Despite the 
vast differentiation and heterogeneity characterizing the way it manifests itself, the Arab 
community in Canada is often represented as a united community, especially at the 
politicallevel. As noted by the CAF and NCCAR, Arab organizations continue to exert 
strenuous efforts to ensure that the concerns of the Canadian Arab community are heard 
and responded to (National, 2004). 
As a principal source of identity, religions affiliation has been found to affect the 
sense of identity among Arab-Canadians, especially among the second generation. 
Studies discussing the role of religion in the construction of Arab diasporic identity show 
that Christian Arabs were more disinclined than their Muslim ethnie peers in using the 
label 'Arab' as a meaningful referent of identification (Eid, 2002, p. 265). One reason for 
these differences in using the label 'Arab', as between Muslims and Christians, is the 
Christians' will to "dissociate themselves from a label which in Western popular 
imagery, is often synonymous with a socially compromised identity, that of Islam" (Eid, 
2002, 265). Although, a lesser percentage of Christians use the designation 'Arab' than 
Muslims, it is strongly suggested that both Arab Christians and Muslims of the second 
generation "tend to be enmeshed in pan-Arab consciousness, transcendent over sub-group 
differences" (Eid, 2002, p.265). 
As noted in several studies concerning the Arab in Canada (Abu-Laban, 1999, Eid, 
2002, The Knowledge Center, 2002), the influence of religion on the construction of 
Arab identity reveals the validity and prominence of the religious factor. To say that 
religion is key for Arabs suggests that religion has become less taken for granted, albeit 
76 
contrasting with the pluralistic and secular conditions prevalent in North America. 
Religion, which is nominally assigned at birth, has becomes an active object of 
persuasion (Warner, 1998, p. 17). Arabs, in tum, have become more conscious of their 
religious allegiances, and often more determined about their transmission (Warner, 1998, 
p.17). 
The prominence of religion among Arabs in Canada finds an echo in the reflections 
of Raymond Williams on the experience of immigrants from India and Pakistan in 1980: 
Immigrants are religious - by all counts more religious than 
they were before they left home - because religion is one of 
the important identity markers that help them to preserve 
individual self-awareness and cohesion in a 
group ... religion is the social category with the clearest 
meaning and acceptance in the host society, so the 
emphasis on religious affiliation is one of the strategies that 
allows the immigrant to maintain self-identity while 
simultaneously acquiring community acceptance (Warner, 
1998, p. 16). 
The contribution of religion as a source of Arab identity differs according to the 
pressures of place and community. Religion, particularly Islam, which constitutes a rival 
to Arab nationalistic thought in Arab countries, strongly supports the sense of Arab 
identity in diaspora. Arabs whose religious affiliations are heterogeneous unite in order to 
manifest one Arab view in conflict with another. The fusion of the different religions of 
the Arabs into one melting pot is invariably manifested during the demonstrations Arabs 
organize against deportations, wherein both Arab organizations and religious associations 
and organizations represent cohesive Arab action. 
The conflicts Arabs face in the Middle East continue to constitute a source of Arab 
identity in diaspora. The effect of conflict on the construction of Arab identity varies 
according to different interpretations of the causes of conflict in the Middle East. While 
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most Arabs in diaspora tend to believe that Arabs have been the objects of several 
conspiracies, others prefer to explain eonfliets in the light of the misunderstanding 
between Arabs and the West. Both views of eonfliet inspire a sense of Arab identity, and 
ereate a feeling of Arab solidarity. 
Yet, the pressure of the confliets in the Middle East ean negatively affect Arabs in 
diaspora, thereby leading Arabs to export unhelpful images about themselves. One 
example of the negative consequences of the Middle East eonfliet ean be found in the 
response among Arabs to the speech of Benjamin Netanyahu in Coneordia University on 
September 9th, 2002, when Arab students militated to prevent Netanyahu from giving his 
speech. The Arab students' action against Netanyahu's speech was denounced by 
Canadian officiaIs, as weIl as by the Canadian media. Former Prime Minister Jean 
Chrétien made his apologies at a meeting with Benjamin Netanyahu the next day, and the 
eorporate media was quiek to deseribe the protest as "a grave attaek on the right of free 
speech" (Charron, 2003). 
When talking about language as a source of identity, the retenti on of ethnie 
language is aIways perceived as a strong marker of the sense of belonging. Evidently, the 
Arabie language inspires a sense of Arabness in the diaspora. Yet, the question of 
language is more problematie than this. On the one hand, Arab immigrants have been 
found to have a good command of the Arabie language, even though proficieney in the 
use of the Arabie language deereases through the generations (Eid, 2002, p. 263) On the 
other hand, while most Arabs who were born in Arabic eountries would be expeeted to 
speak Arabie, but not neeessarily to read it, only haIf of those who are Canadian born ean 
speak Arabie, and only a sixth ean read it (Hayani, 1999, 259). At a rather more 
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problematic level, the gap between written and spoken Arabie has become wider in the 
diaspora, while Arabs employ several accents of spoken Arabie. 
Arabs in the diaspora are very aware of the links between the Arabie language and 
the postcolonial context, and consequently manifest a very distinctive form of resistance 
to the absolute use of the English and French languages. In order to con vey the essence of 
the Arabie spoken language in spoken and written interactions, Arabs have begun to re-
contextualize the use of English letters25 and numbers26 in verbal expression. 
As a source of identity, Arab media in the diaspora are important in terms of the 
sense of connectedness and cohesiveness they provide. Yet, Arab diasporic media 
function within a severely limited orbit. Whereas diasporie news media (newspapers, 
magazines, radio, and television) seek to meet the information and entertainment needs of 
their communities (Tsagarousianou, 2002, p. 210), Arab-Canadian media are still far 
from satisfying the needs of Arabs living in Canada. 
Arab media in Canada exist in different forms; there are printed, audio-visual, and 
online networks. Arab-Canadian newspapers provide forums for parochial objectives, and 
evince little evidence of good joumalistic skills. Instead of looking for a more significant 
role in the diaspora, Arab newspapers are largely occupied with persuading Arab 
investors to advertise in their pages. Professionally, the efforts of joumalists in these 
25 Arabs use English letters to create terms such as, 'Alslam Alikum' (peace upon you), 'Amel Eih?' (how 
are you?), AlIhadmulallah (thanks be to god), 'Fi Aman Allah' (in the safekeeping of Allah), 'Bism Allah' 
(in the name of god), and so on; a vast number of Arabie words are expressed through the English 
language. 
26 Sorne Arab Canadians interrnix English letters and numbers, simply because certain English numbers 
have a shape sirnilar to Arabic leUers. Expressions such as '3ki' where 3 is a symbol of the letter A (my 
brother), '7ellw3' (sweet), and a multitude of other expressions are now almost commonplace forms of 
communication among the various members of the Arab speaking community, whereas the numbers 3,5,6,7 
refer, respectively, to the English letters, A, Kh, T, H. 
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newspapers are almost exclusively devoted to the selection of news stories from different 
resources. Though the greatest number of news stories is devoted to news events in Arab 
countries, Arab newspapers do not have ostensibly political agendas for the selection of 
news stories. More perilously, most Arab Canadian media, with few exceptions27, do not 
speak on behalf of a clear constituency, even though they represent different segments of 
the Arab community. The lack of a cohesive Arab ideology undermines the meaningful 
roles Arab-Canadian newspapers can play. Additionally, news stories published in Arab-
Canadian newspapers lag behind in terms of up-to-the-minute news. Most Arab-Canadian 
newspapers are published monthly, or bi-monthly. Misguidedly, they continue to publish 
news stories generally assigned to daily newspapers. In addition to printed newspapers, 
few radio and television programs28 reflect the richness of cultural traits notable among 
the different Arab nationalities. Sorne Arab television programs include contents that 
address the Arab audience in general, yet they are set up exclusively for entertainment, 
social and cultural contents. 
The gradual escalation of communication technology has enabled the Arab 
community to create micro Arab networks and news groups. As noted by Karim Karim 
(2003), "diasporic websites are assembling global directories of individuals, community 
institutions and businesses owned by members of diasporas" (pp. 13-14). The various 
Arab networks are capable of creating a sense of cohesiveness among Arabs. In su m, the 
Arab-Canadian media function and operate as: 
27 The exceptions to be found among Arab printed newspapers are the Alhjjira (The Emigration), and Sada 
Almashreq (The East Echo), published in Montreal, Albilad (The Countries), wherein Alhijira reflects an 
Islamic perspective, and Sada Almashreq and Albilad tend to be Pan-Arab in its coverage. 
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Ethnie and cultural sites: despite the lack of seriousness in Arab-Canadian 
newspapers and radio-televisions programs, they constitute an ethnie and cultural space 
where Arabs can be connected. Arab-Canadian media create small networks of readers, 
listeners, viewers and advertisers, thereby keeping the sense of community alive. 
Sites for representing Arabs: Arab-Canadian newspapers and radio-televisions 
programs evince a concern to talk about news events in Arab countries and to discuss the 
cultural traits of the Arabs. They make a significant and occasionally imaginative 
contribution to the members of the Arab speaking community in Canada, providing the 
community with sources and referents that en able it to maintain its identity, and more 
significantly, they present a multiplicity of images of what many consider to be home to 
this community. 
Yet, Arab-Canadian newspapers, radio and TV programs do not generally respond 
to more than two questions. However, such questions as -- 'In what ways are Arabs 
becoming themselves?' 'How will Arabie media operate to open up a cultural space to 
negotiate between the desire to positioning the self in the ho st country and the demand to 
maintain an original cultural identity?' -- remain a challenge to the community. An 
attempt to represent Arabs was made in the documentary film of Mahmoud Kaabour, 
entitled 'Being Ossama'. The film succeeded in portraying Arabs named Ossama in the 
wake of the September Il th attacks, and by extension, contrived to represent an entire 
community (Katadotis, 2004). 
Among the sources of identity that Arabs strongly retain are Arab cultural traits. 
Arab cultural traits, though taken for granted in Arab countries, play an active role in the 
Arab diasporic context. The cultural features that have been incorporated most actively 
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into Arab Canadian life are the Arab restaurants and cafes, and Arab musical venues that 
provide social and artistic outlets for members of the community. Whereas the former 
provide spaces where Arabs can gather and talk freely, the latter are "probably the most 
familiar aspect of the Arab world in the Western world today" (Introduction). The 
prominence given to Arab culture is a continuaI motif in the festivals organized by Arab 
organizations. During the 2003 Canadian Arab Heritage Day, at least four sessions 
displayed uniquely Arab forms of cultural expression. 
While Arabs in the diaspora significantly retain many aspects of their identity, the 
role played by Arab gender is still the most uncertain factor in the maintenance of a 
tradition al sense of identity, and it is a confusing and sometimes disorienting source of 
identity in North America. Arab women currently face two main challenges: to adapt 
themselves to North American culture, and to maintain their distinctive sense of cultural 
identity (Henry, 2004) in North America and to defend it (Joseph, 2004). In the eyes of 
Arab feminists in North America29, the divided loyalties of Arab women are manifest in 
the struggle between the need to defend their culture and religious convictions from 
hostile and often poli tic al bias, and the commitment they have made to criticize the 
inequality of Arab women in relation to men, and among themselves, in relation to class. 
Indeed, the struggle to incorporate Arab gender into the larger North American and 
global women's movements - have silenced sorne Arab feminist critiques (Joseph, 2004). 
The inequality characteristic of Arab gender relations is documented in several 
studies that have discussed the contribution of gender to the construction of Arab identity 
29 The Arab American Feminist movement has gained ground since the 1970s, particularly in the wake of 
the defeat of the Arab nation in 1967. Both the immigration of more educated and politicized Arabs and the 
advent of the women's movement have inspired Arab feminists. Sorne women's organizations have been 
started to defend Arab women's rights such as, The Union of Palestinian Women's Association in North 
America, and the Arab Women's Solidarity Association of North America (AWSA-NA). 
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in the diaspora. As note d, Arab women do not have the same freedom that men enjoy 
within the family context (Ajrouch, 1997, pp. 246-247). Often the right of women to 
press for more freedom is interpreted in terms of a clash of values, rather than as a 
struggle for equality between Arab men and women (The Knowledge, 2002). The study 
of Christine Ajrouch, "Ethnicity, gender and identity among second-generation Arab 
Americans: Growing up Arabic in America," indicates how this sense of inequality 
affects the formation of Arab identity. Ajrouch's study (1997) found that "Arab families 
are holding onto their Arab identity through their daughters, yet strive to attain the 
American dream through their sons" (p. 250). 
Arab women are subject to several negative stereotypes that portray them as being 
reluctantly or forcibly veiled; moreover, they are represented as being socially mistreated 
by their spouses. The misrepresentation of Arab women has seemingly led to their 
marginalization, or even absence, from discourse so that they might be said to remain, in 
Yasmin Jiwani's words, unspoken in the prevailing "code of silence" (Jiwani, 2001, p.5). 
Their exclusion from discourse practically brings about an increased obligation of 
attentiveness on the part of Arab families to protect the reputation of the community from 
any unforeseen deviations in their conduct (Jiwani, 2001, p.5). 
An attempt to explain the Arab view of gender can be found in the film of Jennifer 
Kawaja, entitled "Under One Sky." Jennifer Kawaja, media producer and director of the 
film, represented, "the viewpoints of women who wear hijab and those who do not" 
(Zaidman, 2000). The Arab women who participated in the film "see the hijab as an 
expression of fidelity to Arab culture, to Islam, and as a statement against imperialism 
and colonialism. They view it as a matter of choice and refuse to be buttonholed as 
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certain type of person" (Zaidman, 2000). Arab non-veiled women indicate their 
acceptance of the hijab even though they do not wear it. They believe that "in order to act 
against racism and imperialism, it becomes necessary for them to defend the right of 
women to wear something they believe is oppressive" (Zaidman, 2000). 
1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter elaborates a panoramic view of Arab identity. It defines Arabness as a 
spectrum of meanings that is derived from ethnic and cultural catalysts. Arab identity in 
this sense entails a sort of common orientation among Arabs who join together to fulfill 
their mutual needs, interests and goals in the interests of joint action (Barakat, 1993). 
More importantly, Arabness appears as a resistant identity that operates against Western 
intrusions. Many vehic1es sustain Arab identity, such as Pan-Arabism, awareness of 
ongoing military conflict and occupation, religion, language, Arab media, cultural traits 
and Arab gender, all of which have made different contributions to the construction of 
Arabness. 
Pan-Arabism, while constituting a tangible project during certain historical periods, 
is currently a utopian or ongoing 'imagined' project that has not had a decisive impact on 
advancing the cause of a collective Arab identity. The history of Arab nationalism reveals 
an overestimation of the various attempts at unification, while providing a necessary 
corrective against the tendencies of parochialism and localism. The current failure of 
Pan-Arabi sm to accomplish Arab unification has given an impetus to those who would 
seek to re-empower Arabs through an invocation of past Arab achievements and 
examples of charismatic leadership. Pan Arabism failed to cope with the realities of inter-
Arab conflict and external Arab conflict. The conflicts Arabs currently face have created 
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a fund of sympathy among Arabs, and they have strengthened the sense of Arab 
solidarity. Yet, for the same reasons, Arabs have become less tolerant and more prepared 
to perceive and interpret conflict according to conspiracy theories. 
Religion, the Arabic language, and the Arab media provide forums or sites where 
Arab identity continues to be debated and maintained. Religion, particularly Islam, has 
played a dual role. On the one hand, Islamists support the essentialist idea of one Arab 
nation (Umma), and highlight the shared Arab heritage and the future aspirations of the 
Arabs. On the other hand, they criticize Arabists for their lack of a solid viewpoint, and 
the failure to engage in the kind of joint action that can only be found through allegiance 
to an Islamic identity. Whereas the Arabic language continues to provide Arabs with a 
rich and vital vocabulary, and an enormously varied range of rhetorical devices, Arab 
media have not only promoted the cause of Arab identity during the period when Pan-
Arabism was victorious but became increasingly capable of reflecting Pan-Arab ideas 
through Arab satellite television and websites. 
Arab gender issues cannot be addressed from an ethnocentric perspective that fails 
to take into account the affirmation and respect granted to women in Arab culture simply 
because the nature of this respect fails to accord with the observer' s own cultural bias. 
Rather, women in Arab culture are envisaged at the very core of the Arab family and 
community. Such is the value placed on women that the defenders of Arab culture feel 
the need to affirm their own conception of gender in the face of attacks that ignore the 
specificity of the socio-cultural tradition that is the very source of their identity, however 
differentiated across gender lines. The new agenda of Arab women is concerned with 
improving the socioeconomic condition of Arab women through ensuring their 
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participation in the lengthy process of cultural and social development. The Arab 
women's agenda increasingly stresses the need for solidarity with other Arab women. 
Arab women are actively engaged in a reconsideration of their political and economic 
plight, since the instability of the conditions under which they live and work negatively 
affects their socioeconomic status and their ability to advance, say, the kind of agenda 
that western feminists can afford to proc1aim through an evaluation of their own cultural 
and political specificity. 
Briefly, this chapter aims to contest the tendency toward an idealized concept of 
identity as something that is completely formed at the outset or taken for granted under 
an essentialist mask. Rather, it examines Arab identity through the dialectical relations 
and development implicit in the evolution of Arabness. The chief components in the 
construction of Arab identity reveal the factors that support and strengthen the Arabs' 
sense of their collective identity, as weIl as the historical contingencies that have resulted 
in the fragmentation and diminution of that identity. 
The latter section of this thesis focuses on the Arab diaspora, examining the social 
context or milieu of Arabness in North America. It shows how Arabs have retained most 
of the attributes of their identity. Yet, while being politically confident about Arabness, 
Arabs in the disapora are socially confused because of the graduaI erosion of the Arabic 
language through successive generations, and through an increasing awareness of the 
attendant risks and opportunities that threaten to undermine the traditional roles assigned 
to Arab gender. 
The attempt to understand Arab identity cannot be made without an awareness of 
the reasons why Arabs have constructed the Other in their own guise. This discussion of 
86 
Arabness has signaled sorne of the reasons that account for xenophobie feeling among 
Arabs; namely, the long colonial history, the CUITent state of conflict, and the negative 
images the Western media chooses to disseminate about Arabs. Conversely, the Other's 
animosity towards Arabs has opened up a chasm between Arabs and the West, which has 
in turn led Arabs to believe that the West will not happily contemplate the specter of a 
united Arab world, nor will it cease to perceive Islam as a threat, or desist from 
describing the Arab media as biased. 
To conclude, contemporary images of Arabness show that while Arab identity is a 
historically fractured identity it nonetheless contains the potential to draw on its own 
internal contradictions as a paradoxical source of strength. Its capacity for retaining and 
revivifying its 'Pan' identity depends on its capacity to cope up with the continuous 
transformations in the Arab world, and to be capable of, and ready to, negotiate with the 
Other through facing up to its own self-contradictions. Such a thoroughgoing self-
examination will enable Arab men and women both here in the diaspora and elsewhere in 
the Arab world to engage in the process of identifying their unique opportunities and 
mediating a Pan Arab vision and identity that is capable of going beyond the CUITent 
imperatives of resistance. 
* 1 am aware that the book of Raphael Patai, The Arab mind, is deeply contested, and 
problematic with respect to its essentialist perspectives and claims. 
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CHAPTER2 
Re-mediating Pan-Arab Media: 
News Construction and Representation in Aljazeera Net 
2.1 Introduction 
The debate about how Internet technology brings about fundamental shifts in online 
news production has now become less problematic, since one can hardly broach a 
discussion about online news without highlighting the effects of Internet technology and 
its concomitant creation of new modes of communication, together with new modes of 
news distribution. Most scholars agree that new technology applications, and particularly 
the World Wide Web, facilitate enhanced and improved modes of news gathering, news 
production and delivery, and they offer structures and interfaces that are sufficiently 
flexible and responsive to the rapidly changing needs and tastes of readers (Herbert, 
2001, p. 9 & Hall, 2001, p. 4 & Kawamoto, 2003, pp. 4-5 & Gunter, 2003, p. 65). 
Yet, the debate about online news30 becomes more problematic when discussion 
about the clear points of convergence between the Internet and news representation 
becomes focused on issues relating to the identity of news organizations, and how they 
represent the news. As shown in my first chapter, the complex realities of the Arab media 
30 My study suggests that online journalism has influenced the ongoing definition of 'news'. The pragmatic 
view of news, as proposed by The Random House Dictionary and The Canadian Oxford Dictionary, defines 
it as "a report of recent events" (Mayer, 1987, p. 67). MacDougall proposes a similar definition when he 
suggests that news is the account of events (Hall, 2000, p. 645). Tony Silvia summarizes the pragmatic 
definition of news more emphatically: "News is what we say it is; they [people] don't know what's news 
until we tell them" (p. 4). 
ln my study, 1 daim that news, considered as the accounting and reporting of events, is inadequately 
defined. The advent of online journalism has altered the definition of news. Online news has become 
extensively institutionalized (Hall, 2001, p. 41); its trustworthiness is governed by "a set of values which 
are as much constructs of the media industries as are genre, style and form" (Hall, 2001, p. 41). News in 
this institutional context has not merely become 'what we say to people, or what to tell people about events, 
rather it becomes how to tell people'. News, as 1 define it, is an attempt to package content, and it 
comprises breaking alerts, spot stories, short stories, long stories, in-depth analyses, and reports about 
specifie events; it affords a frame that indudes different journalistic genres whose aim is not only to tell 
people about an event but, more importantly, to affect the way people rnight perceive the event. 
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make the debate - about how online news re-mediates news which belongs to a complex 
model of Pan-Arab media, particularly Aljazeera - even more challenging. 
On January 2nd, 2001, Aljazeera television launched its Arabie website: Aljazeera 
Net. The resounding suc cess of Aljazeera television has enabled Aljazeera Net to gain 
considerable attention both inside and outside the Arab World. In contrast to its sister TV 
channel, Aljazeera Net off ers an online version of what is being aired on television, and 
furthermore, it has its own special news sections and content. 
Distinct from studies that are driven by a gate-keeping approach, this chapter adopts 
postcolonial and remediation approaches to examine the representation of news in 
Aljazeera Net. The second part of the chapter will examine Aljazeera Television, since a 
comprehensive understanding of Aljazeera must start with a discussion of the social 
construction of Aljazeera Television. The third part examines the structure of Aljazeera 
Net, and examines issues that transform the construction of meaning. The c10sing section 
indicates the re-mediation strategies of Aljazeera Net, and the newly emergent 
communication practices of the network. Throughout the chapter, the discussion of re-
mediation strategies in Aljazeera Net will be compared with the practices and strategies 
of other Pan-Arab and non-Arab web sites that target the Arab public, such as Middle East 
Online, and the Arabie versions of the BBC and CNN. 
2.2 The social construction of Aljazeera 
The gradual expansion of Arab television satellites during the 1990s has been 
achieved through global changes in transnational media and news production. Though 
transnational media emerged "in the nineteenth century in the form of news agencies" 
(Karim, 2003, p. 7), the rapid developments in communication technology have 
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facilitated news flow from north to south, "further reinforcing Northern world views" 
(Karim, 2003, p. 7). Pan-Arab television satellites, operating in the Arab region, su ch as 
MBC, ART, ESC, and Orbit, emerged in response to the penetration of Western cultural 
production, and the dominance of CNN in the Arab region. 
However, while applying modern television journalism, Pan-Arab television 
satellites were far from satisfying the eagerness of the Arab audience for news. 
Affiliation with ruling Arab govemments constrains the purview of Arab television 
satellites (Sakr, 2003). Though they have more freedom than printed media, Arab 
television satellites are subject to different forms of government monopoly. Legislation 
concerning Arab television stations is ostensibly under government control. For instance, 
strict laws control Arab television networks in Egypt and in Saudi Arabia. Law No. 13 of 
1979 and Law No. 223 of 1989 gave the Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU), 
which is operated under the supervision of the Ministry of Information, "a monopoly over 
broadcasting in Egypt, and challenges to this monopoly during the 1990s were bru shed 
aside" (Sakr, 2001). 
In a similar vein, article no. 39 outlines the basic intention behind Saudi Arabia' s 
legislation governing media expression: 
Information, publication and all other media shall employ 
courteous language and the state's regulations, and they 
shall contribute to the education of the nation and the 
bolstering of its unity. AlI acts that foster sedition or 
division or harm the state's security and its public relations 
or detract from man's dignity and rights shaH be prohibited. 
The statutes shall define this in detail (Sakr, 2001). 
In 1995, the Saudi-owned company Orbit Communication signed a deal with the 
BBC to provide Arabic newscasts for Orbit' s main channel in the Middle East. The BBC 
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aimed to offer an objective Arabie language news coverage based on editorial 
independence, which was at odds with the willingness of the Saudi government to allow 
the reporting of controversial views (Gambill, 2000). In April 1996, the BBC broadcasted 
"a story on human rights in the kingdom which showed footage of the beheading of a 
criminal" (Gambill, 2000). The disagreement between the BBC service and the Saudi 
owners regarding the question of editorial independence led to the withdrawal of the 
Saudi investors (EI-Nawawy, 2003, pp. 30-31). 
The stage was set for Aljazeera, when the new Qatar31 Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin 
Khalifa Al Thani, who took over the government on the 27th of June 1995, allocated 500 
Million Rial ($137 million) to Aljazeera, with the intent that the station should be self-
sustaining within five years starting from November, 1996 (Zednik, 2002). However, it 
has been difficult for Aljazeera to make the transition toward self-financing, because the 
station has been unable to attract enough advertisers (Gambill, 2000). Aljazeera's 
inability to attract investors has been due to its persistence on the question of editorial 
independence and its severe criticism of Arab governments. The editorial autonomy of 
Aljazeera has forced the station to face "an economic embargo by regional powers that 
has convinced major advertisers to utilize less viable media," Jihad Ballout, Aljazeera's 
communication and media director, reported (Wolff, 2003). 
The relationship between Aljazeera and Qatar has been characterized by what might 
be called a "media/state tolerance." The mutual tolerance between Aljazeera and the 
31 Qatar is a monarchy whose political system does not inc1ude parties or elections. It is one of the smallest 
states in the world, with a population of only 690,000. The Qatari emir, who holds absolute power, aims to 
democratize his state. In 1999, he called for a legislative committee to set up a new constitution. Later, in 
2004, Qatar launched its first written constitution, which will come into force in 2005. However, the new 
constitution guarantees the absolute power the emir now possesses. 
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government of Qatar has been purposeful on two significant levels: the domestic level, 
and the diplomatie-international level. Domestically, Aljazeera was one of the emir's 
prime moves towards democracy and the freedom of the press. However, free speech, 
freedom of the press, and public criticism of the ruling family in Qatar have generally 
been restrieted (EI-Nawawy, 2003, pp. 75-76). Clearly, Aljazeera is not ready to address 
the views of Qatari politieal dissidents who oppose the monarchy, nor is it likely to 
launch severe eriticism of politieally sensitive issues in Qatar (Gambill, 2000). When we 
now turn to the diplomatie-international front, 'the global fame of Alj azeera' 32 has "made 
tin y Qatar a kind of Arab power" (Williams, 2001). In return, Qatar has endured 
diplomatie clashes with Arab governments33, whieh have escalated as a consequence of 
Aljazeera's style of reporting. 
32 Aljazeera's global fame has been attributed to its hidden agenda and to its identity. Jihad Balout, the 
communications manager of Aljazeera relates: "We've been called the mouthpiece of bin Laden, the 
channel of Saddam Hussein, the channel of Israel" (Cohn, 2003). Others believe that the CIA and Mossad 
fund Aljazeera (Wolff, 2003). Aljazeera seems to have attained an unpredictable measure of global fame. 
Sheik Hamad bin Thamer Thani, chairman of the network's board, reports: "we never expected to achieve 
global celebrity" (Williams, 2001). 
33 In April 2000, Libya rapidly withdrew its ambassador when Aljazeera broadcasted an interview with a 
Libyan opposition figure. Shortly afterwards, Saddam Hussein's government complained to Qatari officiaIs 
when Aljazeera severely criticized the enormous expenses incurred by the celebration of Saddam Hussein's 
lavish April 28 birthday. On May 2 of the same year, the ambassador of Tunisia launched similar criticisms 
concerning a program on Aljazeera that criticized his government for the violation of human rights. A 
week later, a conservative newspaper in Iran accused Aljazeera of disseminating false news about 
Khamenei, after it reported that Khamenei desired the annulment of the parliamentary elections in Iran. In 
his article, "Qatar's AI-Jazeera TV: The Power of Pree Speech," Gary C. Gambill reported that Qatari 
diplomats have received over 400 official complaints from other Arab countries about Aljazeera's news 
coverage and its overtly political and controversial political commentaries (Gambill, 2000). In 1999, 
Kuwait arrested an Aljazeera correspondent, then closed an Aljazeera bureau in November 3, 2002, when 
Aljazeera reported that the American military troops had occupied one third of Kuwait. Similarly, in 2000, 
Egypt reprimanded Aljazeera for what it considered unfair coverage of the Arab Summit in Cairo (Mazid, 
2002, p. 16). In October 2002, the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) recommended that the Gulf States 
should boycott Aljazeera, as a consequence of its distorted news and programs (Ministers, 2002). Recently, 
in August 7th, 2004, the Iraqi authority closed an Aljazeera bureau in Baghdad after accusing Aljazeera of 
provocative violence. 
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Aljazeera has grown unexpectedly34 in a very short time, and has attracted an 
increasing number of Arab viewers, now numbering 35 million. Recently, in 2004, The 
Washington Post reported that Aljazeera is currently the most viewed television channel 
in the Middle East. In a survey that examined viewers of 120 television channels 
operating in the Middle East, 51 % of the respondents reported Aljazeera as their favorite 
channel (PolI, 2004). Accordingly, Aljazeera, the founder of Aljazeera television, was 
named by TIME magazine as "one of 100 of the world's most influential people" 
(Aljazeera, 2004). 
2.3 Aljazeera Net's structure: key issues in the construction of meaning 
Aljazeera Net was inaugurated on January 2nd, 2001, and was rejuvenated on 
September 14th, 2004, recruiting 36 online editors, joumalists and researchers and 26 
technicians (Grenier, & Mazid, 2002, p. 14). Due to its comprehensive coverage of the 
war in Afghanistan, particularly during October and November of 2001, Aljazeera Net 
was extensively navigated, securing 70 million page-views per month. The number of 
visitors35 jumped from 9 million during the first 7 months of its operation in 2001, to 161 
million visitors by the end of 2002 (46 million). During 2003, Aljazeera Net's coverage 
of the occupation of Iraq secured one billion visitors and 14 million page-views (One 
billion, 2004). 
34 At its inception, Aljazeera broadcasted for six bours daily, subsequently prolonged its daily scbedule to a 
period of twelve hours, and then in January 1999, maximized its transmission to twenty-four bours daily. It 
has recruited 500 people (Zednik, 2002), inc1uding 60 journalists and technicians in the newsroom, 40 
correspondents, and 32 bureaus all over the world, among which there are 15 in the Arab world (Mazid, 
2002, pp. 40, 226, 227, & Williams, 2001). 
35 Most of Aljazeera's visitors are Middle Eastern (54%), with a substantial minority of North Americans 
and Europeans (39%). 
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Accordingly, the outstanding quality of its coverage of the invasion of Iraq had the 
effect of promoting its ranking so that it became the 45th most visited site in the entire 
World Wide Web, whereas it was ranked as one among 444 of the most visited websites 
before the beginning of the war (Abd Elatti, 2003). Recently, on September 30, 2004, 
Aljazeera Net was the winner of the PoliticsOnline and the 5th World Forum on e-
Democracy award. In its survey that included 40,000 subscribers, who were asked to 
name the most significant organizations that had changed the world of the Internet and 
politics, PoliticsOnline announced that Aljazeera Net "has been the symbol of free 
expression in the Middle East.. .the wOrld's foremost uncensored Arab news service" 
(Noble, 2004). 
2.3.1 Aljazeera Net's basic structure and design 
Aljazeera Net follows the same values and objectives as Aljazeera on TV, yet it 
produces its own content, and it has its own editors. The reporters of its sister 
organization, Aljazeera TV, were found to be too busy working the camera to have time 
left over to edit stories for the website (Grenier). According to Mahmoud Abd-Alhadi, 
Aljazeera Net's former general manager, Aljazeera Net re-edits news stories obtained 
from news agencies and from their correspondents. It also utilizes the news reports and 
video files of Aljazeera Television (Grenier). Additionally, the website makes use of the 
scripts for Aljazeera' s TV programs and publishes them without any supplementary 
editing (Grenier). 
In addition to the scripts of the television programs, Aljazeera Net provides sections 
for political news, economics, sports, entertainment, medicine and health, reports and 
analyses, art and culture, and e-marketing, and permits its users to follow the latest 
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coverage of Arab and global newspapers. Distinct from Pan-Arab news sites, such as 
Middle East Online, and Dar Al hayat, and non-Arab news sites that target Arabs, su ch as 
the Arabic versions of CNN and the BBC that often specify a single issue for intense 
coverage, Aljazeera Net offers in-depth analysis of current issues and events through 
offering different sections for special coverage, special files, analyses, and point of views. 
Aljazeera Net reserves a section for book reviews that includes Arab and foreign books. 
Aljazeera Net claims that these sections serve as gateways for making people more 
know ledgeable. 
More importantly, Aljazeera Net utilizes the capabilities of what is called "the 
sacred tenet of the Internet," namely, Internet interactivity (McGovern, 2002). To 
understand how Aljazeera Net characterizes interactivity it is first appropriate to examine 
the concept of interactivity. Interactivity is a compelling, yet contested term; sorne 
scholars, such as Morris & Ogan (1996) and Pavlik (1996), suggest that interactivity "is a 
critical concept in computer-mediated communication because it is seen as the key 
advantage of the medium" (Gunter, 2003, p. 61). Conferring privileges on the supposedly 
chief characteristic of the medium has led a second team of scholars to argue that 
interactivity is an overused term, and yet remains under-defined (Ganz, 2003, p.2). In the 
eyes of these scholars, interactivity does not and could not exist on the Internet, since it is 
defined by mere 'point and click' functionality (Ganz, 2003, p. 2). 
Other scholars, such as Williams, Rice and Rogers (1988), Steuer (1993), Ha and 
James (1998) believe that interactivity should be defined according to the reciprocal 
process between communicators and users, and the level to which users can have control 
over the content, exchange roles in mutual discourse, and participate in modifying the 
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form and content of mediated environments in real time (Steuer, 1993, p. 14, & Dholakia, 
2000, p.5). This third cluster of scholars believes that true and meaningful interactivity 
engages active human or machine participation in the process of seeking and sharing 
information (Kawamoto, 2003, p. 4). 
Whereas most scholars define interactivity according to the degree of the 
involvement of the participants, a fourth group of scholars, such as Rafaeli and Sudweeks 
(1997) describe interactivity in the light of the fIow and rotation of messages. For this 
group, interactivity is: "the extent to which messages in a sequence relate to each other, 
and especially the extent to which the last message recounts the relatedness of earlier 
messages" (Dholakia, 2000, p. 5). 
When tuming now to Aljazeera Net, users of websites engage in two different levels 
of interactivity. The involvement of the users of Aljazeera Net is undertaken at a (1) 
reactive level, and at an (2) interactive level. At the first level, the reactive level, users of 
Aljazeera Net draw on the 'point and click's technique so as to respond to Aljazeera PolIs 
that place questions relating to hot political issues. The results of Aljazeera Net' s polIs 
are often employed to support discussion during the on-air programs of Aljazeera 
television. The new version of Aljazeera Net allows users to arrange the appearance of 
news on the screen, since it gives users the choice to open/close sorne news lists. At a 
more interactive level, users of Aljazeera participate in forums that allow users to reply 
to the theme of the forum, and to exchange messages with other participants as weIl. In 
accordance with Rafaeli and Sudweeks's definition of interactivity, the messages in 
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Aljazeera's forums36 often move in sequence and, consequently, the number of replies to 
messages from other users exceeds the number of messages that respond to the themes of 
the forums. 
Despite the various features of interactivity, fully interactive communication does 
not yet exist in Aljazeera Net. While allowing its users to communicate with each other 
Aljazeera net is reluctant to permit users to create their own forums of discussion, nor 
does it facilitate communication with an online editor. Following the same formula used 
by the BBC Arabic news, Aljazeera Net conducts the forum through an introduction, and 
raises questions concerning the participants that inspires Arab users to talk. 
2.3.2 Homepage design and news presentation: from content drive to design 
drive 
Before moving on to examine how the design of Aljazeera Net influences its 
agenda, it is essential to track the basic model that contextualizes the flow of news in 
Aljazeera Net. Obviously, Aljazeera Net follows a bilateral model, narnely the Push-Pull 
mode!. Push technology signifies the concept of delivering information to users who can 
specify the content they want to be presented, as weIl as the regularity of transmission 
(Lasica, 1997). In the case of Aljazeera Net, news and information are "pu shed" to users 
of Aljazeera Net through news summaries bye-mails, or SMS Mobile messages37• 
Additionally, Aljazeera Net plans to launch a multimedia messaging service (MMS), and 
to push news via landline telephone transmission. As part of its e-marketing plan, 
36 Aljazeera Net currently possesses 116 forums, 73 of which are devoted to political themes. The number 
of messages that respond to the forum themes averages 160,747, among which, 84,661 are replies to 
messages from users, and 46,086 are responses to the theme of the forums. 
37 SMS Mobile Service aims to allow subscribers of the service to receive breaking news through their 
mobile phones. Subscribers may choose to receive Arabic or English messages in the following areas: 
politics, sports, and the economy. 
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Aljazeera Net pushes news to its subscribers through a 'syndication' service. Subscribers 
to this service can get breaking news from the network, and post headlines and news 
items from Aljazeera Net on their websites. To take advantage of pull technology, the 
user must go to Aljazeera Net, however Aljazeera users can receive a degree of 
personalization through individuallogins on the website. 
Now tuming to design issues, the design of the web pages of Aljazeera accords with 
a variety of web design conventions. In scrutinizing its design, the web pages of 
Aljazeera Net reflect a functional and full y consistent design strategy. In terms of 
functionality, the pages of the old version and the new version of Aljzaeera do not 
dis tract the viewer with graphic treatments of text that might otherwise cause confusion 
or fragmentation. When a user looks at the screen, neither flashes nor animations are 
there to confuse him; rather, the design reflects "the usage and basic functionality of the 
content" (Thakur, 2004). Conventionally, Aljazeera Net adopts a strategy called 'design 
according to common usage', through which Arab users are capable of scanning pages 
and searching for more appropriate news (Thakur, 2004). 
In addition to functionality, Aljazeera has a consistent design, wherein the position 
of certain elements in the website, su ch as the logo, navigation menus, search bar, and 
Aljazeera's polI, are permanently placed. The consistency of Aljazeera's design goes 
beyond the permanent elements found on the web pages. Distinct from Pan-Arab news 
sites, such as Middle East Online, Aljazeera extends its design consistency to the layout 
of whole site pages (See figures 2-1, 2-2, 2-3). The design of Aljazeera Net, particularly 
the old version, comprises four columns, three of which have the same width, and operate 
as navigation menus. The fourth column always devotes entire pages to the body of the 
98 
Area for date 
and updating 
time 
Link to the 
English 
version of 
AIjazeera Net 
Basic search 
DetaHed 
search 
Interactive 
participation 
Membership' s 
privileges 
Readings in 
Aljazeera Net 
Cornrnercials 
11811 Il.lIiw<t1o/Y 
M: .•. "'" ' ) .:: ):~ ) ~»'Î~f64i);:.{~1_ 
.!'fl),! }~= ':''lr.l14~,... /.a.. J.II ~pt;llo~l.::..J. 
II.. ~)É;;~~~.:: .... ;;~i~~"~h ~ 
'li 
11033.3 ' .... 
31134"",.. ",!JI ~"'\ 
'V :)i~~:ij;~~., ..:..I.."..,dliii:;'" 2004i09/l1 il" 
2004i09/14 ~\ 
of~,y..f." ""...,d';"'" 1'I.t"1 
Ilo.iiY.:.!',L.U, 
r----:~~~i*Ym,~ 
;)~:i~l;"f;~ 
AIjazeera 
Net's PolI 
Latest 
developments 
ill''''Psff:';;;;;Jif tE lA i.tiif'T"~· ) 1 
1y..a ~ iJ',.,T :I,,"Jj ~I.p~ •• p. ... :I,,"Jj ~ ~~.lJJ:lI#1 
.• I~YJ· ."W-i ~~ el-' 
Breaking 
-
,-,> .. 1 dJ 
v~~IJ ~~':Ji "~ 
lf> roi 1"""1 
...., 
. 
y):;UI 
.1.ô1.~I;ijJ-~ 
" 
, 
y}~)tf 
'""'" 
r..P ) ""'J"-'" ;>1" 
.\ 1 Sections' li st 
News 
Business and economy 
Technology and science 1 0\ 0\ Medicine and health 
Sports 
Culture and arts 
Tour in the press 
Issues and analyses 
Special files 
Caricatures 
Books 
Figure 2-1. The old 
homepage of Aljazeera 
Net (1-3) 
Readings in 
Aljazeera Net 
(Links below 
the title are 
issues debated 
in the programs 
of Aljazeera 
TV) 
Aljazeera 
Forums 
(Links below 
the title are 
forums' 
titles) 
Issues and 
Analyses 
(Links below 
the title are 
issues' titles) 
Figure 2-2. The oid homepage of Aljazeera Net (2-3) 
Hyperlinked 
headlines of 
the main 
news stories 
Briefs of 
the main 
news 
stories. 
8 
...... 
'l ~)I w...Jlj .:..; .; ..... ~I ' Microsoft Internet Explorer l:-l!~H~J 
Special Files 
(Links below 
the title are 
titles of files) 
The magazine 
entitled "Books 
are points of 
views" 
(Links below the 
title are articles in 
the magazine) 
Aljzaeera programs 
(Links below the title are titles 
for sorne programs) 
-~ iJ' yi :,& il:!- w· 
M 
;u jOli iJ' :;t.~ ai ;t.~. 
--.l.o-ll ~:~Io< 'jilj. 
~1C'''''JIIi:II 
,~~ 
)1- .;.JI ..... ~:ù 1",... 
.::.1i'MI1:~IJ iJ'. 
''';;';I)I.~I~J:'Y.I 
;y..;.J1--,&,&C'. 
..1 A'Y.I J')I.::.-W J"IJol!l 
),.~ 
.:lw)\>- ""' ...... )l .;"..... i,lll.)l J:.a.. -
J;.l.\ ~1 .• 51 d.!~ .:.>11''';;';\ S\i""1 J.tü d,t~,.w\ -
yi J JI- ':'>\4>."Iy, ~I~i <J!~ r-' ~)i J:.a.. -
~~.l.,!t;ô"..I.I2,..j~J:.a..-
~~IAl\ ~\ "J;>,,6J4 ~Il) .:.>40.,;;.;\-
"lI .:.>IS-')I.!,;;,..\-
.:.>~ .; ~j .j l4i j" a..L.o\y, J4'O'Ï 6;>"Î -
J,J\r'lJ 4mÎ 
~\ JJ~ .j I$;J IoIIF-I \~\; éjij l.l.:.ljAl-
;)"J-.......J \ 'M-.) .j ..,.'i\ ~J;"" .Ml iJt" -
'.~,l\ <,J\,r> ;;:N 1.;.s. )).1. !.+m'il ~1i-'lI\ -
:,e 
...... 
o 
...... 
news story, which is usually accompanied by sorne supporting graphic elements, such as 
photos, or images. 
Similarly, the new homepage of Aljazeera is built upon three columns, where one 
column serves as a navigation menu and the second column features headIines and 
pictures of the main news items. The third column includes a list of headlines related to 
recent news stories (See figure 2-4). Aljazeera Net extends its design consistency to the 
layout of the individual sections of the pages (See figure 2-5) Obviously, the design of 
each section follows the same design as the homepage. In terms of web design 
conventions Aljazeera Net follows the blue color links, which are universally accepted, as 
are the position of the search bar and the familiarity of the fonts, which are easily 
identifiable throughout its pages (Thakur). 
To understand how the layout of the homepage shapes the agenda of Aljazeera Net, 
it is necessary to scrutinize the homepage design of the old and new versions. Aljazeera 
Net' s old version follows a vertical layout that borrows its design concept from 
tradition al newspapers. The verticallayout Aljazeera follows is a common design feature 
in most Arab news sites. One of the examples of the Pan-Arab sites that adopt the same 
style of layout is the Middle East Online (See figure 2-6). 
Not only does the vertical layout facilitate the efficient scrolling of the computer 
screen, but it also enables Aljazeera to design its homepage according to the importance 
of each news item, thereby making sorne news stories more salient than others. More 
importantly, the old homepage's design had a modern layout, a road map through which 
the route makers were the main headline, key photos, and headlines accompanied by 
news summaries (Lowery, 1999, p. 14). That is to say, the design of the old homepage 
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aimed to tell the reader to start in the customary place, and to make sure that the readers 
did not stray too far from the correct editorial path (Lowery, 1999, p. 14). 
Most professionals and web designers support the idea that content should drive 
design. However, they also believe that design and content should be efficient and 
succinct (Lowery, 1999, pp. 16, 18). The old homepage had an established route through 
which to guide the reader, featuring five headlines and news summaries. Obviously, the 
design of the old version enabled Aljazeera Net to set its homepage agenda through 
giving each news story a different degree of prominence (See figures 2-1, 2-2, 2-3). 
When Aljazeera Net made a fundamental change in the layout of the website, the 
new version introduced a change in the layout and design strategies and, consequently, a 
shift in the way of sètting out its agenda. According to Aljazeera Net, the new design 
aimed to change the layout of the website so as to present the content in such a way as to 
facilitate the user' s navigation skills, as well as to assure faster and easier ways to locate 
information. Additionally, the new design has a flexible structure that confers on 
Aljazeera Net the autonomy to add or remove content at will (Within, 2004). 
Clearly, Aljazeera Net has launched a shift in its homepage design in order to focus 
on visu al features rather than tex tu al ones. To increase the saliency given to one of its 
main news stories, Aljazeera Net retains one lead out of the five leads that had 
accompanied the main news stories in the homepage of the old version. Small pictures 
now replace the four leads. fu so doing Aljazeera Net appears to be following the basic 
design of the Arabie website of the BBC (See figure 2-7). 
The new design of Aljazeera condenses the textual representation through only 
presenting the titles of the main sections. As shown in figures 2-3, and 2-6 the old version 
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of Aljazeera included two headlines below the title of each section, in contrast to the new 
version of Aljazeera, which extracts the headlines. That is to say, a reader who had been 
accustomed to scrolling down the old homepage to identify the new headlines that were 
continually added to the homepage now has to access the section he/she wants to read 
through, in the new version, in order to find out about recent news items. 
The shift in the design of the home page of Aljazeera Net signifies a change in the 
representation of news at Aljazeera Net. Whereas hyperlinks in the old homepage 
referred merely to hard news38, particularly to news centered on Arab 'hot button issues', 
the new homepage of Aljazeera has begun to feature sorne soft news items39 among its 
hyperlinks. Certain news features posted on Aljazeeera' s new homepage are not even the 
immediate concem of the Pan-Arab public. Additionally, Aljazeera has adopted a 
38 Hard news is the sort of news that deals with conflicts, wars, and crises, such as the Arab-Israeli conflicts 
and the occupation of Iraq. 
39 Soft news includes news about sports, science and technology, arts and entertainment. 
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strategy of "musical chairs" to eliminate news stories that have remained for a certain 
number of hours on the homepage. As displayed in figures 2-4, & 2-7, below the main 
news story, hyperlinks accompanied by small pictures are arranged in order of priority in 
a circle; therefore, readers can recognize that certain hyperlinks have become less 
important than others when he/she repeats their visits on the website. 
The design of the homepage of Aljazeera Net influences its agenda. News about 
Pan-Arab issues is mingled with news about international affairs, and with soft news 
items that are selected from sections such as sports, medicine and health, and arts and 
culture. In other words, whereas the design of old version's homepage allowed the 
content to dictate the design, the new homepage puts more stress on the design per se so 
that it merely renders the content, and is even assimilated with it. 
2.3.3 Professionalism, objectivity and neutrality: key issues in news production 
revisited 
Any attempt to understand the significant contribution of Aljazeera Net necessitates 
the re-discussion of issues concerning the remediation of news production and 
representation. Such a discussion should be initiated by a consideration of how Aljazeera 
has re-embodied itself as a press institution. When looking at Aljazeera through the lens 
of James C. Scott's Domination and the Arts of Resistance, it appears as a manifestation 
of disobedience to the main discourses that prevail in Arab media. 
Any Public refusal, in the teeth of power, to reproduce 
words ... and other signs of normative compliance is 
typically construed - and typically intended - as an act of 
defiance (Scott, 1990, p. 203). 
Thus, James C. Scott alerts to Aljazeera's rejection of what many of its most 
powerful critics would have it be: namely, a tool to reproduce the logic of hegemonic 
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discourses. In Scott' s terms, not only has Aljazeera broken with the erstwhile silence that 
has prevailed in the Arab region, but it has also appeared as a form of political electricity, 
or as an inflammatory catalyst that has ignited the various Arab regimes (Scott, 1990, p. 
206). 
Khadija Ben-Qenna, one of Aljazeera' s team, a reporter who once worked for Swiss 
radio, characterizes how Aljazeera was perceived as a kind of journalistic and political 
shockwave. Khadija reports: "We have provoked ajournalistic earthquake. Arab regimes 
are not used to honest and direct information" (Williams, 2001). Jihad Ballout, 
Aljazeera's communication and media director, concurs with Khadija's view, and 
perceives Aljazeera as "mini-revolution" (Faine, 2003). In a similar vein, Yosri Fouda, an 
Aljazeera investigative correspondent and London bureau chief, believes that Aljazeera 
emerged as "the rebel," as a channel that tackles the reluctance of Arab regimes to face 
new realities (Fouda, 2001). In the eyes of Fouda, Aljazeera has challenged the fact that 
Arab oral cultural has been for decades "incapable of lending its beautiful treasures to a 
predominantly pragmatic businesslike age" (Fouda, 2001). Whereas Yousri Fouda points 
to a fundamental change in Arab oral culture, Samir Khader, senior producer with 
Aljazeera, concisely summarizes the main features of this change: 
We see ourselves at AI-Jazeera as the manifestation of the 
change that should happen in the Middle East. We 
introduced free speech, pluralism, and openness to the Arab 
world. We were the first and only network to cross red 
lines. To break taboos (Kim, 2004). 
Malek Tirki, one of Aljazeera' s London-based presenters, specifies two emerging 
roles for Aljazeera. He explains that the network "has played a leading role in furthering 
the cause of Arab political development and in liberalizing Arab poli tic al culture" (Deen, 
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2004). Similarly, Hussein Abd-Alghany, an Aljazeera correspondent and Cairo bureau 
chief, highlights two distinguishing features of Aljazeera; firstly, he believes that 
Aljazeera has broken through the normative conception of Arab media, which represents 
Arab govemments or opposition parties. Aljazeera, as Abd-Alghany perceives it, 
propagates the idea of the independent news medium. Secondly, it reaffirms the right of 
Arab people to knowledge about what most concems them, and conceives this right as 
the basis of building responsible public opinion in the Arab region (Abd-Alghany, 2003). 
Aljazeera Net echoes the views of the producers and correspondents of Aljazeera 
TV, and assumes a charismatic niche for Aljazeera, thereby claiming that, "when 
Aljazeera speaks, the world listens and reads" (About, 2004). In accordance with the 
views of its team members, Aljazeera Net exalts the tasks of the website, and the 
objectives and common attributes of its joumalists: 
The website promises to raise traditionally sidelined 
questions and issues. It upholds the same philosophy as the 
mother organisation: "The right to speak up." This 
translates into allowing everyone to express their opinion 
freely, encouraging debates, viewpoints and counter 
viewpoints (About). 
Joumalists at Aljazeera have "multi-national educations and diversified 
backgrounds" (About, 2004). The diversity of the backgrounds of the joumalists is 
deemed an important aspect of the Pan-Arab attitude of the network (Mazid, 2002, p.49). 
Professionally, Aljazeera joumalists are alleged to share a common set of characteristics: 
"objectivity, accuracy, and a passion for truth" (About, 2004). This conception of 
Aljazeera as a professional and objective media leads to the consideration of a cluster of 
issues conceming news production and representation, particularly the issues of 
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professionalism, objectivity, and neutrality, and to the re-examination of these issues in 
the light of Aljazeera Net's communicative practices. 
2.3.3.1 Professionalism 
Recognizing how Aljazeera re-mediates the concept of professionalism it is 
necessary to distinguish between four distinct definitions of the term. The first view of 
professionalism conceives the environment of journalism as, first and foremost, the site 
of a 'profession'. Marshall McLuhan (1967) argues that professionalism is 
environmental, and merges the individual into aspects of the total environment (p. 93). 
Eliot Freidson further develops McLuhan's view, contending that when a journalist is 
blended into the professional environment, he partakes in "a unique form of occupational 
control of work well-suited to providing a complex, discretionary service to the public" 
(Aldridge, 2003, p. 548). 
One of the factors that increase occupational control, and increase the level of 
professionalism, is training. For a sociologist, such as Talcott Parsons, professional 
training should cultivate an appropriate balance between the self and the interests of the 
collectivity (Aldridge, 2003, p. 548). Traditional approaches interpret professionalism "as 
a means of occupational change and control" that should be developed by training 
(Aldridge, 2003, p. 548). 
Meryl Aldridge and Julia Evetts (2003), offer a second definition of the term, and 
contest in their article, "Rethinking the concept of Professionalism: the case of 
journalism," the validity of interpreting professionalism as a set of professional traits and 
modes of occupational control in journalism (p. 548). They argue that the characterization 
of professionalism as an occupational project and an occupational enhancement has never 
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been applied to joumalism (Aldridge, 2003, p. 548). Meryl Aldridge and Julia Evetts 
(2003) argue that professionalism is neither a structure nor "an array of institutional 
protections, nor a checklist of 'traits' being used in places of work as mechanisms to 
facilitate and promote occupational change" (p. 548). Rather, they believe that 
professionalism, understood as a discourse, has now become a slogan in advertising to 
attract consumers, and in political campaigns, to persuade voters. Editors and joumalists 
employ the term as a powerful mechanism of occupational identity and self-control 
(Aldridge, 2003, p. 555). Professionalism as a discourse is motivated by "effective 
mechanisms of occupational socialization and identity formation and maintenance" 
(Aldridge, 2003, pp. 555-556). As noted by most scholars, socialization is a crucial 
indicator of the level of professionalism, particularly as "professionalism can not exist in 
a social vacuum" (Herbert, 2000, p. 7). 
For a third group of scholars, such as Thomas Marshall (1950) and John Herbert 
(2000), professionalism is functional. It operates as a "bulwark against threats to stable 
democratic processes" (Aldridge, 2003, p. 548). Thus, professional joumalists should 
work as "the watchdog of democracy and freedom" (Herbert, 2000, p. 6). Gaye Tuchman 
(1978) proposes another pragmatic view, which defines professionalism as the ability of 
editors "to rework reporters' sentences so as improve upon their intent and to locate still 
unanswered questions" (p.106). This fourth view of professionalism considers the 
commitment editors and reporters enforce to follow their organization's style (Tuchman, 
1978, p. 106). 
In any assessment of the professionalism of Aljazeera, one of the key points of 
reference is the study of Rahim Mazid (2002), AI-Jazeera channel and TV satellites' 
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competition. Mazid's study focuses on and elaborates seven indicators of professionalism 
in Aljazeera: (1) The connection between the salary of the members of Aljazeera and 
their commitment to their work, (2) the extent to which the administration in Aljazeera 
intervenes in the work of the Aljazeera team, (3) the degree of freedom that the Aljazeera 
team enjoys when they deal with news items, (4) the freedom of the employees at 
Aljazeera to leave work, (5) the degree of satisfaction found among people in Aljazeera 
about the reputation of Aljazeera, (6) the news preferences of the people at Aljazeera, and 
(7) the preferences of the members of Aljazeera concerning the use of news from world 
news agencies (Mazid, 2002, pp. 70-83). 
The study found that many respondents expressed their dissatisfaction about the 
salary they got as a reflection of their efforts (32%). Only 20% of respondents agreed that 
their salary was well calculated to remunerate their efforts. When asked if the 
administration of Aljazeera was likely to intervene in their professional work, the 
majority of respondents (76%) reported that the Aljazeera administration did not interfere 
with their work. However, many respondents to the study stated that the administration at 
Aljazeera often interfered in their work (24%), whereas all the participants in the study 
replied denied that Aljazeera's administration always intervened in their work. Similarly, 
the greater part of the study's participants (64%) reported that they enjoyed absolute 
freedom in their work. Moreover, only 28% of respondents expressed a willingness to 
leave Aljazeera, and 36% of them stated that their resignation would depend on the 
working conditions and privileges they would be likely to obtain in a position outside 
Aljazeera (Mazid, 2002, pp. 70-77), suggesting a relatively high level of job satisfaction 
at Aljazeera. 
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Among the indicators of professionalism Rahim Mazid used to assess the level of 
professionalism at Aljazeera he evaluates certain environmental factors, su ch as the 
freedom employees enjoy in their work, the satisfaction of joumalists and editors with 
their salaries, and their relative levels of content with the administration. However, the 
pragmatic indicators that Rahim Mazid has adopted do not seem to be adequate to the 
task of determining the degree of professionalism to be found at Aljazeera. Although the 
study found that 72% of respondents favor political news, and 56% of them prefer to use 
news from Reuters rather than news from AFP (20%) (Mazid, 2002, pp. 79-82), Rahim 
Mazid has made no attempt to correlate such news preferences with the key question of 
professionalism. 
In this reconsideration of the theoretical approaches that address the question of 
professionalism it is helpful to revisit sorne of the underlying concepts of 
professionalism. One of the basic factors that affect an appraisal of professionalism at 
Aljazeera must inevitably be the degree of experience of the joumalists. Hussein Abd-
Aighany, Aljazeera correspondent and Cairo bureau chief, reports that Aljazeera only 
hires professional joumalists who have considerable work experience, and they are 
almost always trained by independent press organizations (Abd-Alghany, 2003). Having 
trained and worked in professional institutions confers on joumalists at Aljazeera 
exception al degrees of autonomy. 
Aljazeera also takes care to implement occupational control and change through 
intensive training. Wadah Khanfar, the managing director of Aljazeera states: 
We have already defined a limited number of policies for 
the next phase. The first policy is "professionalism," not 
just as a slogan but as a commitment that will be 
implemented. And this is why we have started the Al 
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J azeera Center for Training and Development to provide 
our joumalists with the best methodologies and techniques 
of media work (Khanfar, 2004). 
The comment of the managing director at Aljazeera reflects the fact that 
professionalism has become a recognized discourse at the managerial and editoriallevels. 
Its efficacy as a discourse is reiterated by Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani, the 
chairman of Aljazeera, who describes professionalism as one of the key qualities in the 
success of Aljazeera (Schleifer, 2001). 
Aljazeera challenges the normative view of professionalism as an environmental 
mechanism govemed by the political system, and rooted in the political economy of the 
media. In a region where restrictive political systems and govemment control over the 
media are commonly experienced, as in the Arab region, it is evident that the skills and 
professional standards of joumalists will be negatively affected (Carver, 2000). 
Nonetheless, Aljazeera has shown a persistent determination to maintain professional 
standards in the face of political restrictions, and a concomitant quality of resistance to 
the social powers that govem media in the Arab region. For example, although the 
televised reportage of Aljazeera is perceived as a threat by Arab regimes, Aljazeera Net 
has recently introduced a new guide for using cameras in the field. In his comments on 
the new guide, Wadah Khanfar, the managing director of Aljazeera, emphasizes that the 
accumulated experience of the cameramen of Aljazeera can be perceived as an index of 
the high standards of professional organization that Aljazeera implements (New, 2005). 
Obviously, the network aims to create what Gaye Tuchman (1995) termed 
'organizational specialization' in news (p. 297). Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani 
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made it clear that the attainment of a professional organization was one of Aljazeera' s 
deeply held operating principles from the very beginning: 
The idea of AI-Jazeera came about in the beginning when 
we observed that there were many types of media, with 
specialized sports and news and entertainment programs, in 
the West. This type of specialization wasn't found in the 
Arab world. So the idea arose to start a channel specializing 
in news that would serve many viewers in the Arab world 
(Schleifer, 2001). 
In a new phase of 'organizational specialization', Aljazeera instances two different 
leve1s of professionalism: technological and ethical. Firstly, Aljazeera has consistentlY 
advanced the use of technology, as when it launched its news wire service to provide 
subscribers with the latest news through SMS messages. In so doing Aljazeera Net is 
currently the only Pan-Arab news media to have introduced the SMS service to its chosen 
audience. 
Secondly, in keeping with its willingness to assure its professional development, 
Aljazeera has promoted a strict code of ethics, accompanied by a guide for professional 
behavior that subscribes to the criteria of credibility and objectivity in reporting and 
editing (See appendix D). Not only does the code of ethics reflect the adherence of 
Aljazeera to the pursuit of global joumalistic standards, but also bears witness to its 
pioneering commitment to the initiation of new joumalistic conventions among Pan-Arab 
news media. 
2.3.3.2 Objectivity, neutrality, and neo-objectivity 
The argument about the objectivity of joumalism has dramatically changed in 
character. Consequently, scholars do not commonly discuss the degree to which 
joumalism is objective, but rather, how far joumalism remains from its purported goal of 
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objectivity. As E. J. Dionne argues in his book, They Only Look Dead, joumalism faces 
contradictory challenges: to be investigative yet neutral, to have influence but to remain 
disengaged, to be challenging but to retain an edge (Cunningham, 2003). Therein lies the 
dilemma of objectivity. 
In his monograph on objectivity and bias, Robert Hackett notes that objectivity is 
debatable as a conceptual tool for the analysis of the media. He believes that 
communication scholars often speak of 'objectivity' without questioning its value as a 
concept (Miller, 2000, p. 30). Anderlyn C. Moss (2004) suggests that modem joumalistic 
objectivity has two distinct connotations. The first concept is epistemological, and 
"defines real things that can be known, believed or felt" (p.19). The second concept is 
operational, and "involves a personal stance toward the world of objects" (p. 19). 
For scholars, such as Peter Golding, Philip Elliott, Barbara Phillips, and Everette 
Dennis, objectivity remains the major goal of most day-to-day joumalism, and 
contributes to balance and faimess (Golding, 2000, p. 640, & Miller, 2000, p. 40, & 
Everette, 1996, p.1l3). In a different vein, other scholars daim that objectivity attempts 
to neutralize conflicting views, and to conceal the truth. Objectivity is also perceived as 
being elastic, illusionary, superficial, and even as an ideologically loaded term (Gauthier, 
1993, & Miller, 2000, p. 40, & Bagdikian, 1983, p. 182). Ideologically, objectivity seems 
to be "based on a moral foundation that perpetuates the public's false perception of 
trustworthiness" (Moss, 2004, p. 22). 
Michael Rayn (2001) assumes that objectivity is a myth, because absolutes of 
knowledge or values do not exist (Moss, 2004, p. 25). In Online Joumalism: A Critical 
Primer, Jim Hall (2001) proceeds to darify Rayn's notion of mythic objectivity, and 
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c1early suggests that joumalists have the capacity to manipulate the news, operating 
"somehow from moral or intellectual high ground which provides a cri tic al distance from 
world events, and their repercussion" (p. 43). In a further development of Michael Rayn's 
view, James Carey agrees that the ongoing critique of objectivity has had the effect of 
distancing joumalism from its historical conception. Carey' s key point is that "joumalism 
began not as a profession and critical democratic institution, but rather as a branch of 
literature" (McGill, 2004). In Carey's view, there has been a fundamental shift in the 
joumalist' s principal job, which "transformed joumalism from an artistic and interpretive 
role into essentially one of translation and simplification" (McGill, 2004). Accordingly, 
objectivity appears to be perceived as a passive value that has tumed the joumalist into a 
'technical writer' and professional communicator, someone who twists complex matters 
into simple, palatable compositions called stories (McGill, 2004). Karim Karim, recasts 
Carey' s opinion, believing that we cannot speak of objectivity and accuracy in 
joumalism, but only in disciplines such as mathematics (Karim, 2004). 
The conflicting views about objectivity have led to two practical implications that 
reflect the CUITent perspectives of scholars. Firstly, sorne schol ars , such as Brent 
Cunningham and Dennis Everette, believe that objectivity is attainable, and should be 
pursued for a number of valid reasons, the most significant being that nothing better can 
be substituted for it. More importantly, the belief in objectivity as an important value is a 
persistent attitude among many joumalists who conceive it as an essential goal of their 
work (Cunningham, 2003, & Everette, 1996, p.113). Objectivity in this sense appears as a 
method of presenting news, and as a touchstone, that helps joumalists to understand their 
biases, to understand what the accepted narratives are, and to work against them as much 
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as possible (Cunningham, 2003, & Everette, 1996, p.I13). Dennis Everette (1996) points 
to three key advantages that make objectivity a desired goal: (1) the isolation of fact from 
opinion, (2) the maintenance of balance and fairness, in devoting equal periods of time to 
contested views, and (3) the assurance that news items are presented with emotional 
detachment (p.113). 
Controversially, the second common conception among scholars suggests that 
journalists should be less objective, because objectivity exacerbates the tendency of 
journalists to depend on official sources. Official perspectives often unduly influence the 
views of journalists embedded in certain poli tic al institutions. For example, Andrew 
Tyndall's report, examining the coverage of NBC, ABC, and CBC on the war in Iraq, 
found that the majority of stories presented by these networks owed their provenance to 
the White House, Pentagon, and the State Department. Of 414 stories on Iraq, only 34 
stories were collected from an alternative source (Cunningham, 2003). As a result of this 
second consensus of opinion, in 1996 the Society of Professional Journalists 
acknowledged the dilemma of pursuing 'objectivity' and dropped the term from its code 
of ethics (Cunningham, 2003). The pursuit of objectivity is deemed unnecessary, or even 
superfluous, in an attempt to arrive at the truth. Among the scholars who applaud this 
trend is Robert Jensen, who writes: 
The real problem is that reporters aren't biased enough, 
honestly. The journalistic norms of neutrality and 
objectivity so constrain reporting that much of the news 
ends up seeming - or actually being - contradictory or 
incoherent. The solution: We need journalism that is more 
biased to help readers get at the truth (Jensen, 2000). 
In presenting his views about the importance of objectivity, as cited above, Brent 
Cunningham corroborates Robert Jensen's opinion, in asserting that journalists should 
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acknowledge that they are far more subjective and far less detached than the pursuit of 
objectivity would seem to imply (Cunningham, 2003). In a corresponding view, John 
Merrill argues that: "in no way can a journalist be detached, unprejudiced, un-
opinionated, unbiased, and omniscient" (Everette, 1996, p.112). More strikingly, because 
of the lack of information available to a journalist, Merrill is doubtful about the capability 
of reporting truthful information, especially when the search to find it is unavaïling 
(Everette, 1996, p.112). 
The dilemma posed by the pursuit of objectivity becomes even more problematic 
when communication scholars faïl to make distinctions between the concepts of 
objectivity, balance and neutrality, thinking of them as if they bore a symmetrical relation 
to each other. In Westerstahl's model of journalistic objectivity, for example, the term 
'objectivity' stands for factuality and impartiality, which themselves implicitly bespeak 
truth, balance and neutrality (Miller, 2000, p. 39). This semantic blurring of objectivity 
and neutrality becomes even more perplexing, when scholars such as John Herbert 
attempt to locate the margin of overlap between the two terms. Herbert (2000) 
emphasizes that journalists must believe in the neutral, objective approach, yet they 
should also be aware that they do so within the parameters determining the three principal 
roles of journalism: the dissemination of information and news, the interpretation of 
information and news, and the investigations of newsmakers and politicians to arrive at 
the truth (p. 7). 
Other scholars criticize the notion of neutrality, and attempt to differentiate it from 
objectivity. Srajan Ebean's article, "Objectivity Vs. Neutrality," attacks the concept of 
neutrality for its fear of "getting involved ... taking a stand ... and making mistakes" 
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(Ebaen), and for its noncommittal cowardice. That is to say, neutrality is one of the 
symptoms of self-censorship. To explain the difference between the two terms, 
objectivity and neutrality, Budziszewski (1999) and Thomas Sowell (2004) suggest that 
to be objective means to entertain certain presuppositions, which posit the truth, whatever 
its nature and regardless of its implications. As for neutrality, if it were possible to be 
neutral, this implies the ability to dispense with presuppositions, or to achieve a 
"preconceived balance, which subordinates the truth to this preconception" 
(Budziszewski, 1999, & Sowell, 2004). 
If we now examine how Aljazeera re-mediates the issue of objectivity, it is 
important to examine the critiques Aljazeera has so far received. As indicated at the 
beginning of this chapter, Aljazeera receives constant reproofs from Arab governments. 
Yet, critiques of Aljazeera assume global significance when they come from the West. 
Obviously, the parameters of the Western critique of Aljazeera are often stretched beyond 
their usual bounds during the coverage of what may be called 'the hot button issues', 
namely, affairs of war and political struggle. During the war in Afghanistan, AI-Jazeera 
was the only station broadcasting on the ground from the time when the United States 
began its bombing operations (Martin, 2002). Aljazeera gained the enmity of the US 
administration for its critical coverage of the war in Afghanistan, and especially after 
broadcasting interviews with Osama bin Ladan and other leaders of Alqaeda (James, 
2001), and later, because of its coverage of the occupation of Iraq. 
More importantly, Western media analysts, and officials in the US administration 
have condemned Aljazeera for its 'inflammatory' news coverage. In the eyes of Richard 
Boucher, the former US spokesman, it misconstrues, inflames things, and jumps to the 
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wrong conclusions (US Disturbed, 2003). In a similar vein, Colin Powell has criticized 
the absence of an editorialline in Aljazeera, and its "way of presenting news that appeals 
to the Arab public" (US Disturbed, 2003). He added that Aljazeera "was portraying the 
invasion of Iraq in a negative light" (US Disturbed, 2003). During the G-8 summit in 
June 2004, President's Bush national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, accused 
Aljazeera of "purely inaccurate" reporting, and she blamed the network for presenting a 
biased account of conflicts in the Middle East (White, 2004). 
US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, engaged In a parallel critique of 
Aljazeera, claiming that the network "has a pattern of playing propaganda over and over 
and over again" (Semitsu, 2004). Senior military spokesman, Mark Kimmitt, advised the 
Iraqis who saw civilian deaths40 on Aljazeera to "change the channel to a legitimate, 
authoritative, honest news station" (Fair, 2004). He added that the "stations that are 
showing Americans intentionally killing women and children are not legitimate news 
sources. That is propaganda, and that is lies" (Fair, 2004). Additionally, Aljazeera has 
attracted criticisms from the general public in the West. In the wake of the invasion of 
Iraq, and particularly after airing sorne clips concerning the capture of U.S. PWOs in 
March 2003, Onegoodmove41, Crusor.orl2, and The Command Post 43 conducted two 
leading debates about Aljazeera. 
40 The thematic analysis 1 conducted about photos used in 100 news stories, relating to the issues of the 
occupation of Iraq, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and published on Aljazeera Net during October 
2004 showed that Aljazeera has responded to the criticism of images of death causalities by reducing their 
number. Only 17% of the photos published in Aljazeera Net portrayed death casualties. The network put 
more emphasis on documenting events in Iraq, and consequently increased the percentage of 'sight scene' 
photos to 108%. When compared with photos related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the use of photos 
about death casualties was found to be pervasive (82%). Aljazeera Net maintained its strategy of publishing 
more than one 'sight scene' photo in each news story about the conflict, which likewise increased the 
percentage of sight scene photos to 108%. 
41 Onegoodmove.org is an anti-war organization. 
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Crusor.org talked about the 'good, bad, and the very ugly of Aljazeera'. Likewise, 
The Command Post launched a debate that questioned whether Aljazeera is 'evil or just 
different'. Recently, America 's Debate44 raised a question on the part of its users 
conceming the influence of Aljazeera. Similarly, CNN argued that the bigger story 
beyond civilian deaths, which Aljazeera extensively displays, is "what the Iraqi 
insurgents are doing" to provoke a V.S. response (Fair, 2004). 
Arab scholars and joumalists have launched severe critiques of Aljazeera. For 
instance Iylaf, an Iraqi newspaper, recently published an ultimatum signed by 120 Iraqi 
poets and members of the cultural elite calling for the closure of Aljazeera, and claiming 
that Aljazeera stands for unprofessional, radical and rebellious values that are harmful to 
Iraq, and have had the effect of provoking violence and bloodshed among Iraqi citizens 
(Ghylan, 2004). In similar vein, Koba'a Aloutayby, the editor-in-chief of the online 
Modem Discussion, has critiqued Aljazeera for hysterical propaganda that has deceived 
the Arab public (Aloutayby, 2004). Finally, Jamal Khashoggi, a prominent Saudi Arabian 
joumalist has revisited the issue of objectivity, and has likewise critiqued Aljazeera for its 
ostensibly populi st or demagogic tendencies: "AI-Jazeera has a big problem with 
objectivity ... They [Aljazeera] are being led by the masses, they don't lead the masses. 
42 Cursor.org mingles the original contents of daily-updated media with politics. It is a Weblog that 
comments upon and responds to the work of major news organizations, as weIl as to critical, unconstrained 
voices available on the Internet. It contextualizes daily news in a broader perspective than that offered in 
the main stream media. 
43 The Command Post, www.command-post.org, was created on the 20th March 2003 by a group of 
bloggers who sought to post recent professional news, provided links to original sources, and encouraged 
users to follow certain news sites. It opened up debates and dialogues about media issues, and promoted the 
idea of 'open-source citizen journalism'. The site creators aim to create a historical context for the topics 
posted, so that historians are able to make use of it. 
44 America's Debate, www.americasdebate.com. hosts many constructive political debates on the Internet. 
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They know the taste of the Arab street, and the Arab street is anti-American" (Waxman, 
2001). 
Roger Hardy, a Middle East specialist for the BBC World Service in London, 
observes that despite fervent criticisms of Aljazeera, it is "undoubtedly a new trend in 
Arab media" (Martin, 2002), and he notes that it has prompted an interesting ongoing 
debate about objectivity and neutrality. In order to understand how Aljazeera reevaluates 
issues related to objectivity, it is helpful to examine the criteria Aljazeera sets out in its 
guide to professional behavior, especially in regard to the two operating assumptions 
about objectivity developed through the journalistic practices of Aljazeera. In its guide to 
professional behavior, Aljazeera has provided a checklist of 16 criteria for objectivity and 
credibility (See appendix D). Briefly, Aljazeera Net highlights its adherence to the ideal 
of reporting honest, accurate, fair, and c1ear information, and to avoiding coverage that 
contains distorted images, stereotypes, bias, and ethnie prejudice (Aljazeera, 2005). The 
criteria of objectivity and credibility are motivated by Aljazeera's editorial polie y, whose 
four operating principles are the pursuit of objectivity, newness and factuality, accuracy 
and authenticity, and a wide-ranging discourse (Aljazeera, 2005). While the criteria of 
objectivity ostensibly assures Aljazeera users that the network's aim is the provision of 
objective and neutral reporting, the actual practices of Aljazeera lead us to propose two 
major assumptions: 
Firstly, objectivity is an institutional 'slogan' and/or goal that generally 
conflicts with actual journalistic practices. In Aljazeera Net' s introductory statement, 
the network boldly states its intention to provide coverage of "boiling topics and heated 
debates along with objective news reporting" (About, 2004). More importantly, 
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Mahmoud Abd-Alhadi, Aljazeera Net's former general manager, explains that the news 
policies of Aljazeera "depend on objectivity and freedom" (Grenier, 2004). He adds that: 
"We are trying to introduce a professional media in the Arabic region based on 
objectivity and neutrality" (Grenier, 2004). 
During the war in Iraq, when Aljazeera aired images of dead V.S. servicemen, the 
term 'objectivity' was used as a pretext to show these images. "In the interests of 
objectivity, we felt we had to share them with you," an Aljazeera spokesman reports 
(Cohn, 2003). Hafez Almarazi, a former reporter for the BBC and the Voice of America, 
is Aljazeera's Washington bureau chief, and he admits, "that sorne of the criticism 
leveled at the station is valid" (Fahim, 2004). Almarazi states that there is a tendency in 
sorne field correspondents and reporters to editorialize (Fahim, 2004). The contrast 
between the above stated views of Hafez Almarazi, and Mahmoud Abd-Alhadi indicates 
that while the news organization might weIl speak of 'objectivity', it is often quite 
another matter to maintain such standards in the field. 
Secondly, Aljazeera purports to stand for neo-objectivity, a concept based on 
three prescriptions: balance with perspective, accuracy without embellishment, and 
fairness without mediation. 
'Neo-objectivity', the newly hyphenated halfway term for objectivity, has been 
coined almost as a disclaimer, or disavowal, of the possibility of objectivity, and invites 
attention in terms of how Aljazeera's practice has entailed the abandonment of normative 
views of objectivity. The newly emerging concept that Aljazeera practically endorses is 
based on three rules: balance with perspective, accuracy without embellishment, and 
faimess without mediation. 
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Balance with perspective45• Aljazeera's motto, 'The opinion and the other 
opinion', reflects Aljazeera's aim to present both sides of the truth. Often, the network is 
charged with being too balanced. Amy Jasperson and Mansour El-Kikhia's study, CNN 
and al Jazeera's media coverage of America's war in Afghanistan, criticized Aljazeera 
because " it is never sure of its position, and constantly playing a balancing act over the 
edge of a sword" (Jasperson, 2003, p. 130). However, the editorial balance of Aljazeera is 
applauded by many scholars, such as Jessica Reaves, a TIME magazine reporter, who 
wrote that Aljazeera has been appreciated by Western media, including TIME, for its 
courageous reporting and for its concern to give equal time to dissenting voices (Reaves, 
2001). In a similar vein, Muftah AIsuwidan, Aljazeera's London bureau executive 
director, explains that Aljazeera struggles to maintain free, independent, and balanced 
perspectives, wherein the common denominator always remains the people's right to 
know and the freedom of journalists to express themselves (Jayasekera, 2003). Other 
members of Aljazeera have justified the exemplary balance of the network. Ghida 
Fakhry, Aljazeera's correspondent in New York and at the United Nations, and Hafez 
Almarazi, Aljazeera' s Washington bureau chief, have significantly endorsed the classic 
paradigm for measuring journalistic balance. They believe that if the furor is coming 
from all sides and makes all sides unhappy, then the network is clearly doing something 
right (Gabriel, 2002, & Fahim, 2004). 
Aljazeera Net recognizes the fruitful tension that operates between balance and 
perspective. Joanne Tucker, the manager of Alajzeera Net, implies, in her answer to a 
question about objectivity, that every media network has an implicit perspective. When 
45 Perspective is always embedded in discourse, and it is defined as a 'point of view' (Ensink, 2003, pp. 9-
10). 
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asked about whether journalists at Aljazeera are capable of being objective about the war 
in Iraq, Joanne Tucker responded thus: "1 will answer the question by asking a question: 
are any V.S. journalists objective about this war?" (Noujaim, 2004). Samir Khader, an 
Aljazeera senior producer, differentiated between perspective and bias, when he 
commented on the decision of Aljazeera to publish images of Iraqi children killed by 
American attacks: "We want to show that any war has a human co st. If this is bias, this 
rationale is certainly no more biased than the decision by Fox News, for example, to not 
air such footage" (Semitsu, 2004). Mohammed EI-Nawawy and Adel Iskandar (2003), 
the authors of AI-Jazeera : The Story of the Network that is Rattling Govemments and 
Redefining Modern Journalism, explained that having perspectives in news reporting 
does not necessarily mean that Aljazeera is biased (EI-Nawawy, 2003, p. 54). 
Hussein Abd-Alghany, Aljazeera correspondent and Cairo bureau chief, by way of 
applauding the views of the practitioners and scholars outlined above, explained that 
objectivity means to be balanced, but not necessarily to be neutral. He added that Arab 
audiences who read Aljazeera Net are right in feeling that the network has a Pan-Arab 
perspective (Abd-Alghany, 2003). Accordingly, Mohammed Jasim Alali, the managing 
director of Aljazeera, emphasizes that Aljazeera has its own distinctive ideas and its own 
perspectives (EI-Nawawy, 2003, p. 53). 
Accuracy without embellishment: Aljazeera daims that its balance is wedded to 
its accuracy. Jihad Ballout, Aljazeera's communication and media director, states: "What 
we are trying to do is to provide a comprehensive picture of what' s happening in as much 
of a balanced way as possible" (Sharkey, 2004). Faisal Bodi, an online editor in Aljazeera 
Net, frankly stated that Aljazeera's coverage is accurate because its editorial line 
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represents the war in Iraq as an "illegal enterprise" (Bodi, 2003). On a similar note, 
Sheihk Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani made it c1ear that the images the network presents 
describe "what takes place on the ground" (Fair, 2004). His point of view is that it is the 
dut Y of joumalists to report on the "destructive nature of the war, and the human cost of 
su ch conflict" (Aljazeera, 2004). He proceeded to characterize how the accuracy in 
Aljazeera' s reporting has been achieved in reporting the grim face of war: 
Sorne people say we are taking the nightmare into people's 
houses and we are putting too much blood on the screens. If 
we don't report the ugly face of war, would that mean we 
abided by the criteria? W ould we be embellishing the face 
of the war? (Aljazeera, 2004) 
Now, to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of how Aljazeera accounts for its 
mission to enforce joumalistic accuracy, it is important to focus on Aljazeera's coverage 
of the war in Iraq. During the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Aljazeera's coverage was 
perceived as a radical redefinition of the value of accuracy. While most of the world's 
media reported the uprising in Basra and the occupation of Umm Qaser, just a few hours 
after the beginning of the battle, "Aljazeera reported differently and correctly" (Index, 
2003). As Faisal Bodi puts it, Aljazeera reported "the horror of the bombing campaign, 
the blown-out brains, the blood-spattered pavements, the screaming infants and the 
corpses" (Bodi, 2003). Joanne Tucker, the manager of Aljazeera Net, succinctly 
summarized the remarks of Faial Bodi, saying: "let the people understand that this is a 
war, and people are dying. It is not a c1ean war; it is a messy war. It will continue to get 
messier" (Noujaim, 2004). 
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Controversially, critics of Aljazeera believe that while its reporting is accurate, 
timely and daring, it is also "aggressive, selective, demagogical and gruesome" (Young, 
2004). Other opponents, such as William Fisher, praised the Iraqi government's decision 
to prevent Aljazeera from operating in Iraq. In his article, 'Shooting the Messenger', he 
claims that Aljazeera's absence, while creating a news vacuum, will be shortly filled by 
other media outlets (Fisher, 2004). 
Aljazeera' s bare reporting has created much confusion among media observers. 
Examples of su ch confusion can be found in the opinions of ABC reporters, Charles 
Gibson and Ted Koppel. While the former believes that showing dead bodies is 
"disrespectful," the latter considers that it is "an obligation to remind people in the most 
graphie way that war is a dreadful thing" (Alter, 2003). 
Fairness without mediation: The issue of fairness at Aljazeera is as problematic as 
the issues of accuracy and balance. For Andrew Marr, the BBC's political editor, the 
balanced coverage of politics is not sufficient. Decent poli tic al coverage requires fairness 
as weIl (Marr, 2005). Defenders of Aljazeera not only believe that the network is fair, but 
also invite, or even challenge, the Western media to be as fair as Aljazeera. Their point of 
view is that the Western media operates according to a double standard, or, at the very 
least, is unfair. Faisal Bodi, Aljazeera Net's editor, undermined the British media's 
decision to condemn Aljazeera' s choice to conduct a report about two dead British 
soldiers. He argued that "this is simple hypocrisy" (Bodi, 2003), since the British media 
did not react similarly when they showed images of Iraqi soldiers either being captured, 
humiliated, or killed (Bodi, 2003). 
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An assessment as to how the V.S. media, particularly CNN, might have evaluated 
Aljazeera' s choice to publish images of dead civilians in Iraq has been proposed by 
FAIR46: Fairness & accuracy in reporting. FAIR's report comprised a message for CNN, 
urging the network to examine Aljazeera's reports from the ground, which described 
hundreds of civilians being killed by V.S. forces, and it admonished CNN to enquire into 
the accuracy of these accounts, reflecting that the organization would be better served by 
asking whether the footage "corroborates those accounts -- not badgering Al Jazeera's 
editor about why he doesn't suppress that footage" (Fair, 2004). 
The appeal challenging CNN to be as fair as Aljazeera leads us to examine the 
views of media critics who are skeptical about the fairness of the Western media in 
general' particularly regarding the publication of Bin Laden tapes, and in depicting 
images of casualties of war. 
Michael Moran is a senior producer for special projects at MSNBC.com, and he 
argues that criticizing Aljazeera for publishing the Bin Laden tapes is unfair. He offers an 
instructive comparison between the enthusiasm of Bin Laden for Aljazeera, and the 
parallel actions on the part of the rebel Irish Republican Army, or Saddam Hussein. 
Michael Moran aptly asks: 
Did the rebel Irish Republican Army send coded messages 
to the BBC and the Reuters news agency claiming 
responsibility for its bombings because it thought British 
journalists would be sympathetic? Did Saddam Hussein 
choose CNN as a conduit for his own propaganda during 
the Persian Gulf War because he took a shi ne to Peter 
46 FAIR, the national media watch group, has been offering well-documented criticism of media bias and 
censorship since 1986. It works to invigorate the First Amendment by advocating greater diversity in the 
press and by scrutinizing media practices that marginalize issues of public interest, as weIl as minority and 
dissenting viewpoints. As an anti-censorship organization, it exposes neglected news stories and defends 
working journalists when they are muzzled. 
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Arnett? Of course not, though sorne - most memorably 
former Republican Sen. Alan Simpson, claimed so at the 
time (Moran, 2001). 
Additionally, the Western media seem to be unfair when they blame Aljazeera for 
posting, and broadcasting images of death casualties. In its introductory statement on the 
forum of The Command Post, which raised a question about whether Aljazeera is evil or 
just plain different, the forum questioned why Western networks regularly show images 
of dead people from other parts of the world, especially from the Middle East, while 
attacking Aljazeera for showing pictures of dead American soldiers (Al Jazeera, 2003). 
As The Command Post puts it, Aljazeera merely represents the views of its viewers and 
users, as do the D.S. media. The forum then posed a rhetorical question for its users, 
asking whether it is fair to criticize Aljazeera for doing what seems natural and normal, 
even when the images it presents are disgusting and reprehensible (Al Jazeera, 2003). 
2.4 Strategies of news remediation in Aljazeera Net 
The question of how Aljazeera Net alters news representation requires an analysis 
of the strategies of news representation and navigation, together with an examination of 
the emergent practices in Aljazeera Net. This section will theorize news re-presentation 
on Aljazeera Net, and looks into how Aljazeera Net refashions and creates new sorts of 
representation. 
2.4.1 Refashioning features of news representation 
a) Re-thinking homepage layout: from simple discursive catalog to simple 
surprise catalog 
As described in previous sections of this chapter, the design of the homepage of 
Aljazeera Net has moved from textual to visual representation. The old version of 
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Aljazeera Net, as shown in figures 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3, was based on a 'simple discursive 
catalog'. Eric S. Fredin (1997) explains that the essence of discursive format is to break 
the page into smali sections, where each section has its own subhead, and headlines (p. 
11). The discursive format is empIoyed to encourage nonlinear modes of reading, and 
helps users to go to the specific section he wants to browse (Fredin, 1997, p.11). 
Additionally, it enables users to compare the contents of each section. Because the design 
in digression format is a road map, this format do es not leave any room for confusion. In 
comparison with news sites that offer similar content, it appears that the CNN Arabic 
website matches the 'simple discursive format'. 
The new design of Aljazeera Net follows what Eric S. Fredin caUs the 'simple 
surprise catalog' (Fredin, 1997, p.13). Aljazeera Net often alters the arrangement of 
pictures on its home page. During a striking or challenging event, Aljazeera Net modifies 
its homepage design to increase the saliency of the event, thereby assigning extra space to 
the main news story. More importantly, as shown in Figure 2-8, hyperlinked headlines 
attached to the main news story Iead the user to visit various sections that he/she may not 
intend to access. Figure 2-9 shows a compelling example of a surprise format. Prior to the 
Iraqi elections, AIjazeera Net's main story included a headline and four sub-lines, 
wherein the main headline leads to a section about Arab news and the other four sub-lines 
lead to different sections. The first sub-line, conceming the Iraqi election of 2005, refers 
to comprehensive coverage of the Iraqi elections (See figure 2-9). 
Surprises may also occur when the user clicks on one of the iconic photos and/or 
hyperlinked headlines that constitute the central part of the homepage design, so that 
he/she may find himself once again in a section he/she is not willing to visit. 
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As described by Eric S. Fredin (1997), surprise "occurs when the person's 
expectations turn out to be misleading, incomplete, or wrong" (p. 13). Though often 
confusing, the surprise format may encourage the reader to navigate the website, improve 
recall, and to give it more careful consideration (Eric, 1997, p. 13). 
b) Hybridizing journalism: Re-adapting news genres to the online 
environment. 
Hybridity is an elusive term that can be defined in many different ways. It is 
celebrated as being both powerfully interruptive and yet commonplace and pervasive 
(Werbner, 1997, p.1). Its meaning, which has undergone dramatic modifications, is 
derived from biology and refers to the selective cross-breeding or cross-fertilization of 
plants (Staffor, 2001). However, its use in postcolonial studies is associated with colonial 
ideas about racial purity, and the creation of new transcultural spaces. For Bakhtin, 
hybridization constitutes a different linguistic consciousness: organic hybridity and 
intentional hybridity, simultaneously (Werbner, 1997, p. 4). Organic hybridity is one of 
the characteristic features of the historical evolution of alllanguages. Distinct in meaning, 
intentional hybrids create an ironic double consciousness, a collision between differing 
points ofview on the world (Werbner, 1997, p.5). 
In applying Bakhtin's classification of hybridity, digital journalism can be seen as a 
loosely hybrid medium through which digital, print, and audiovisual modes are 
combined, and historically discrete technologies are blurred (Kawamoto, 2003, p. 4, & 
Tanjuakio, 2002). Fusion between different sorts of media hybridizes news and drives its 
representation. It opens up a new 'Multi-media presentation-model', within which "news 
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texts can be accompanied by photography, graphics, animation and video" (Gunter, 2003, 
p.63). 
In AIjazeera Net, hybridity manifests itself in various forms. It occurs when live 
programs of AIjazeera permit viewers to visit the AIjazeera website to express how they 
perceive certain issues that were raised during the program. Additionally, Aljazeera Net 
re-employs televised modes of presentation, such as visual reports of AIjazeera' s 
correspondents, the newsbreak template, and the recent news development template. 
Engagement between computer technology and design is another form of hybridity. 
The new version of AIjazeera employs news navigation tools, such as a search-listing bar 
that includes a list of sections, wherein the reader can move from one section to another. 
Also, Aljazeera's users have become adept at controlling the appearance of entire 
sections of its pages. To empower its users, Aljazeera places movable lists at the side of 
each page. Conveniently, users can close or open them by clicking on the plus or minus 
sign at the top of each list. 
More importantly, distinct from most Pan-Arab news sites, Aljazeera Net has 
altered two distinct genres of online joumalism so as to take advantage of the capabilities 
of the online environment: news stories and cartoons. To make the news story more 
compatible with the online environment, Aljazeera Net has hyperlinked two of the basic 
elements in the news story's structure; namely, headlines and brief leads. Abandoned in 
the new version of Aljazeera Net, the brief lead, a common structural device of Arab 
news stories, was used in its oid website, and had both dynamic and interactive modes. 
On the oid homepage of Aljazeera Net, brief Ieads of the main news stories appeared 
before the reader in the traditional statie mode. Yet, when a user scrolled down to 
134 
navigate other news sections, the brief lead was redirected so as to become more 
dynamic. In other words, when a user clicked on a headline, a hyperlinked brief lead 
would appear, so that the user could read it before deciding whether to go on to the news 
story or not. 
The second journalistie genre that Aljazeera Net has modified is the cartoon47• 
During the period, 2003-2005, Aljazeera Net posted 156 animated cartoons. Theoretically 
speaking, the cartoon48 is a visual form, whose fantastic characteristics elicit laughter and 
anarchie disorientation (Chadwell, 1997, p. 16). The politieal cartoon often responds to 
information the readers already know, yet it makes them see details they could not see 
before, or to represent a somewhat unexpected editorial line, stance or point of view 
(Berger, 1998, p. 136). In the Arab context, the cartoon, as a form of popular culture, is a 
genre that challenges press censorship, and serves as an index of the "power of the media, 
politieal rhetoric, and persuasion, ... and resistance" (Slyomovics, 2001, p. 74). Pantu, Le 
Monde's cartoonist, believes that the art of the cartoon in the Arab world con veys a 
public worldview, which, if studied more carefully, would provide a more accurate 
understanding of the area (El Gartit, 2005). 
47 Aljazeera Net replaced the term cartoon with caricature, because the latter genre is more popular among 
Arabs. 
48 Both caricatures and cartoons can be defined as pictorial representations within which the physical 
characteristics of an object or person are exaggerated (Othman). Political cartoons are usually composed of 
two elements: caricature, which parodies a person or an object, and the provision of a simple or more or 
less complex context, accompanied by an allusion (Backer). Historically, the origins of visual 
representations and drawings are deeply rooted in ancient Egyptian culture. Yet, the earliest modern Arab 
contributions to the field were initiated by Yaqub Sannu', an Egyptian journalist, who created the first 
cartoon character called Abu Naddara ("the man wearing glasses"). Since, the cartoon is now a popular 
genre, it has served as a means of overcoming censorship, and Arab cartoonists play a significant role in 
Arab countries. The major cartoonists have created enduring cartoon characters that are popular throughout 
the Arab world and beyond. Among cartoonists who inspired the Arab public with their cartoons are the 
Egyptians, Toughan, George Albahgouri, Hakem, Salah Jaheen, Abd-Elsamea, Rakha, Nagi, Mustafa 
Hussein, Raa'ouf, Gomaa; the Palestinian, Nagi Alali; the Iraqi, Ghazi; the Lebanese, Pierre Sadeq; and the 
Libyan, Muhammad Alawawi. 
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To hybridize the cartoon, the Pakistani cartoonist, Shujaat Ali49 , has transformed 
Aljazeera Net cartoons from a static mode to a more dynamic mode, through the use of 
the art of animation. Animated cartoons can re-inscribe space and time, and they make it 
possible to mingle an unlimited number of frames and drawings into one animated 
drawing (See figures 2-10 & 2-11). Animation has been the subject of endless 
technologie al discourses that purport to define it (Chadwell, 1997, p. 40). As Joanna Rose 
Bouldin (2004) puts it, many books have been written about animation, and there have 
been many attempts to analyze it, yet there is very little consensus about what it is (p. 4). 
The problem of arriving at an inclusive definition of animation is compounded by 
its diverse technical applications, and its multiple institutional contexts (p. 5). The 
techniques that can be classified under a hypothetical definition of animation are 
enormous. Similarly, there are a vast range of applications and formats, such as 
television, video games, film, advertisements, military simulations, scientific imaging, 
Internet graphies, cartoons, and many others besides (Bouldin, 2004, p. 5). Indeed, the 
many institutional factors that determine our CUITent conceptualizations of animation 
make an inclusive definition of animation especially problematic (Bouldin, 2004, p. 6). 
However, Norman McLaren, a Canadian animation pioneer, proposed a working 
definition of animation in 1950: 
49 Shujaat Ali is a political cartoonist whose professional avocations combine the creation of art/cartoons 
about aviation and modem art animation. Born in Rawal Pini, a city close to Islamabad, in 1971, Shujaat 
studied chernistry, mathematics, and physics at the university of Punjab-Lahore. He started his career as a 
cartoonist at the age of twenty-three, and received an education in modem art in 1990. He teaches the art of 
cartoon creation at the Institute of Mass Communication (!MC) in Islamabad. He is a member of the 
American Society of Aviation Art. Shjuaat has not yet created a distinctive cartoon character(s). Other Arab 
cartoonists have become popular because of the cartoon characters they have created. Among the se Arab 
cartoonists are the Egyptian, Musfafa Hussein, who created several cartoon characters, and the Palestinian, 
Nagi Alali, who inspired Arabs through his cartoon child, Handala. 
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Figure 2-10. An ex ample for animated cartoon: four drawings animated into one cartoon 
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Figure 2-11. The 
sophistication of an 
animated cartoon in 
Aljazeera Net.: 2 drawings 
with Il animations. 
Animation is not the art of drawings that move, but the art 
of movements that are drawn. What happens between each 
frame is much more important than what exists on each 
frame. Animation is therefore the art of manipulating the 
invisible interstices that live between frames (Bouldin, 
2004, p. 7). 
Norman McLaren's tentative definition of animation takes note of the different sorts 
of frames that are employed in cartoons. In the case of Aljazeera Net' s cartoons, while 
the animation of the main objects in cartoons is superficial, the effects Shujaat Ali often 
employs, such as fading, zooming in/out, expanding, and fading zoom, incorporate 
invisible frames that contextualize the cartoon, and prompt users to entertain a more 
calculated interpretation of its meaning. 
c) Reviewing news sectioning strategies: silencing the representation of spatial 
bias 
When Aljazeera Net established a visual representation in its new version, the 
arrangements of the content were accordingly transformed. The old website of Aljazeera 
underscored a geographical arrangement and classified the news into four sections, 
comprising the Arab Watan (Arab Home), Asia and the Pacific, the Americas, Europe 
and Israel. Moreover, it included thematic arrangements for news about the arts and 
culture, medicine and health, sports, books, the economy, science and technology, special 
interest files, and various points of view. 
Although no study has yet been conducted about the news flow at Aljazeera Net, the 
geographical arrangement of the content demonstrated that the representation of the news 
at Aljazeera Net was spatially biased. Conclusions about the geographical bias of 
Aljazeera Net may be predicted through a parallel study of the news coverage at 
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Aljazeera television. The study conducted by Ayish 1. Mohammed found that Aljazeera 
carried "a high percentage of news items about pan-Arab developments and issues" 
(Ayish, 2001). Of five television networks, Aljazeera registered the highest percentage 
(72.3%) of Pan-Arab news coverage. Understandably, studies of news flow indicate the 
predictability of cultural affinity and distance that permit the news to move in greater 
volume between immediate geographical regions (Galtung, 1992, p. 39, & Kariel, 1995, 
p. 136). However, similar Pan-Arab networks, such as the MBC, do not show as much 
interest in Arab issues as Aljazeera. Mohammed Ayish's study found that only 51.5% of 
MBC's coverage was devoted to Pan-Arab issues (Ayish, 2001). 
The new version of Aljazeera Net reflects the aim of its television sister in positing 
itself as a transnational network50• In an attempt to blur the boundaries between 
geographic borders, and to create a balance between Pan-Arab news and foreign news, 
Aljazeera Net has classified the news into two categories: Arab news and international 
news. In so doing, Aljazeera checked its obvious spatial bias toward news coming from 
the Arab home countries. However, Aljazeera Net remains distinct from the global and 
non-Arab web sites that target the Arab public, such as the CNN Arab service, and the 
BBC Arab network. Whereas both these websites choose to insert Arab news within the 
wider umbrella of the Middle East, Aljazeera Net retains the prime symbol of Arab 
countries in employing the label "Arabi." In using the term 'Arabi', which literally means 
Arabic, the immediate connotation of the term indicates a radical change in news 
representation. Whereas news in the old version of Aljazeera remediated places, the new 
version of Aljazeera Net re-presents news as content. 
50 AIjazeera television is planning to launch an English channel during 2006. It established its English 
website in 2003. 
139 
d) Challenging the characteristics of hypertext: non-centric, yet selectively 
sequential navigation 
Aljazeera Net is an ideal instance of the chief characteristics of hypertextuality. 
Hyperlinks in both the old and new version of Aljazeera Net, while being technically 
different, emphasize the non-centric nature of hypertext. Hypertext, as defined by 
Theodor Nelson, and George P. Landow, is a "fully non-sequential writing," an infinitely 
re-centerable system of non-linear reading and writing (Libby, 2004), which is 
"composed of bodies of linked texts that have no primary axis of organization" (Landow, 
1997, pp-36-37). 
Accordingly, hyperlinks at Aljazeera Net take their users on a non-centric, and ever 
ramifying tour. Unless the reader is prepared to leave the text, navigation can only lead to 
a point of no retuffi. However, the challenge Aljazeera Net now faces is to formulate an 
effective response to the change in the nature of navigation. Usually, the user moves 
through a discursive, non-centric route. The Aljazeera website facilitates chronological 
navigation through news stories by providing hyperlinks at the side of each news story, 
wherein users can read the old stories in the order of their original posting. Significantly, 
when Aljazeera Net's users choose to go through hyperlinks adjacent to the news stories, 
they are in a position to replay the entire series of events they are engaged in reading 
about (See Figure 2-12). As one of its defining characteristics, hypertext fundamentally 
embeds an intertextual system that has the capacity to emphasize intertextuality in a way 
that the printed pages in newspapers or magazines cannot (Landow, 1992). By removing 
the linearity of print, which has hitherto defined the idea of a 'fixed unitary text' , 
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Figure 2-12. Hypertext in 
Aljazeera Net news story: 
chronological replaying for 
developments of the assassination 
of the Lebanese Rafik Alhariri 
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hypertext offers users the opportunity of floating from one passage to another, "with the 
seamless ease and usability the print text offers" (Schubert). Intertexts are extensively 
used in the scripts of the Aljazeera TV programs, and in the special files of Aljazzera Net, 
where readers can find hyperlinked words that provide more information about the 
various personnel, places, and concepts. For example, a user who reads a special file 
about the Iraq invasion can find hyperlinked words for Alnajaaf and Shiite. While most 
of the hyperlinks at Aljazeera Net refer to internal texts, the network occasionally permits 
the user to access other websites, particularly when it provides externallinks related to 
the resources used for in-depth coverage. 
d) Transforming the visual: turning photos into icons 
The change Aljazeera Net has made in its mode of representation also signifies a 
shift in the use of photos. In the old version of Aljazeera Net, only one photo - with a 
width of 13 cm and a height of 10 cm - was associated with the main news story, and 
used on the homepage. The new version of Aljazeera Net has increased the number of 
photos, and minimized their sizes. Although the size of the main photo has dramatically 
decreased to a width of 6.7 cm, and to a height of 5.3 cm, its size remains bigger than that 
of the other photos whose size has been equally reduced to a width of 3 cm, and a height 
of 2.4 cm. 
The reduction in the size of the photos has turned the photos into icons, and has 
transformed their function to serve as eye-catching images. In so doing, Aljazeera Net 
seems to have followed the design of sorne of the Pan-Arab websites, such as Middle 
East Online, wherein the iconic images on the homepage are merely smaller copies made 
from bigger photos. In other words, when Aljazeera's user clicks on an icon on the 
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homepage, s/he always moves to a page that includes the 'normal-usage' size of the 
photo, or at least the bigger sizes thereof. More importantly, icons on the homepages of 
Aljazeera Net often become symbols when they signify issues and concepts related to the 
photograph, because icons related to images attain larger frames of reference and 
symbolic overtones (Cannon, 2001, p. 18). 
f) Photo composition: erosion or re-negotiation of visual truth? 
While imitating the graphie treatments in printed newsmagazines, Aljazeera Net 
distinctively employs different graphies techniques of photocomposition than those used 
in other Pan-Arab sites, or even global networks that target the Arab public, such as the 
BBC Arab service and the CNN Arab network. Aljazeera Net merges drawings, photos, 
and icons to create different sorts of collages. The enmeshing of photos serves to 
legitimate images so that they become images with the power of persuasion (Newton, 
2001, p. 89). More importantly, the photocompositions found at Aljazeera Net sacrifice 
visual truth51 • Whereas various factors influence photojoumalism at Aljazeera Net - such 
as the camera angles, the viewpoint of the cameraman, framing, focus, and the position of 
the photos and the headIines - photocompositions serve to subjectif y and renegotiate 
visual truth, and seem to bring about an erosion of the original image. Charles Traub, the 
consulting photographie editor, explains that the "digital world tells us unequivocally that 
not only is there no one-to-one correspondence between the image and the scene, but 
there is no original" (Traub, 1999). 
Evidently, the photocompositions used by Aljazeera Net seem to occasion an 
erosion of visual truth, and undermine what is traditionally at stake in the construction of 
reality. Looking c10sely into how the photographie treatment at Aljazeera Net guards 
51 Visual truth is defined as authentic knowledge that is derived from seeing (Newton, 2001, p. 89). 
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reality within the culture of the virtualleads us to talk about Guy Debord's notion of the 
society of the spectacle, wherein images are united and visibly affirmed in order to point 
to separation, and the negation of the Arab reality (Debord, 1992, pp. 64-65). 
2.4.2 Absorbing the medium: removing the tele-visual codes, and hyper-
mediating verbal codes. 
Aljazeera Net adopts a text-audio strategy to assure its users the right of initiation 
into appropriate ways of following Aljazeera's news bulletins and programs. Through 
this text-audio strategy, the programs of Aljazeera Television are transformed into scripts 
and audio files, within which Aljazeera's users can follow the discussion of the pro gram 
through reading its script while listening to the program through an audio file. In so 
doing, Aljazeera Net has erased the need for visual codes. Codes that constitute the tele-
visual, such as codes of composition and movement have been removed. In other words, 
codes of composition - that govern the picture frames and their colors, the number of 
elements on the screen and their relationship to each other - and the movement' s codes 
that control the frame of both the camera and the subject, have been eliminated. Aljazeera 
Net's strategy of absorbing the visual codes of its programs has even more significant 
implications. Whereas the audio file of any pro gram of Aljazeera operates as a cast 
player, and mediates the vocal codes, the scripts of Aljazeera Net's programs hyper-
mediate the colloquial speech of the program's guests. 
Aljazeera seems to unwittingly rehearse Derrida' s theoretical objections to de 
Saussure concerning the relation between speech and writing. Saussure "favors speech as 
the proper object of linguistic investigation, rather than writing as a secondary 
representation, or even disguise of speech" (Groden, 1997). Derrida, on the other hand, is 
144 
forced "to acknowledge the dangerous, and usurping power of writing over speech" 
(Groden, 1997). IronicalIy, Derrida confirms the historical priority of the voice over the 
letter. In Derrida's eyes, while speech is self-present, immediate and authentic, writing is 
derivative, because it is just a copy of speech (Groden, 1997). Significantly, the scripts of 
the programs at Aljazeera Net justify Derrida's argument. These scripts are merely 
duplicates of speech, or a copy placed on the other window. 
2.4.2 Re-employing users: re-shaping perceptions to construct news 
Since its conception in January 2001, and up to March 2005, Aljazeera Net has 
posted 775 polIs 52 that address users' perceptions conceming different topics. The 
network often utilizes the results of certain polIs to create a news story, which are then 
wedded to a popular analysis of the results of the posted polIs. Although the adaptation of 
the results of a survey to a news story has become a common practice in different media 
outlets, the way Aljazeera Net has decided to edit the results of its polIs constructs a 
meaning that does not necessarily exist. Whereas all the polIs that Aljazeera Net posts are 
constrained by a time limit, who se online duration never exceeds 4 days, Aljazeera Net 
deliberately uses the term 'referendum' when it edits its news stories about polIs. In the 
course of 2004, Aljazeera Net dramatically changed its lexicon, particularly in regard to 
news stories relating to its polIs. In an attempt to be more balanced, Aljazeera dispensed 
with the adjectives that describe the consensus of its respondents. Terms such as 'vast 
majority' and 'popular majority' have been replaced by the term 'majority'. 
52 Aljazeera Net posted 158 polIs during 2001, 152 polIs in 2002, and 157 polIs in 2003. In 2004, the 
number of polIs of Aljazeera Net jumped to 267 polIs. Since the beginning of 2005, Aljazeera Net has 
posted 41 polIs. 
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2.4.4 Retracing McLuhan's theory: how content re-mediates Aljazeera 
The aim of Aljazeera to be an exclusive media network that off ers non-aired and 
non-published content entails a reexamination of the issue of news mediation per se. 
Whereas the normative view of news collectively determines that media mediate news, 
news aired or published in Western media about Aljazeera not only re-represents the 
content of Aljazeera Net, but also re-mediates Aljazeera per se. 
To understand how Aljazeera is re-mediated, it is necessary to recall the association 
between Aljazeera and Alqaeda' s leaders. Since the September Il th attacks, Aljazeera 
television, which often presents audio-visual messages from the leaders of Alqaeda, has 
gradually become part of the news story. Similarly, Aljazeera's website uses screen 
pictures of Aljazeera television which includes its logo and its news label to emphasize 
that Aljazeera is involved in the news story. For example, the image of Aljazeera 
television that shows Bin Laden's tape on October 29, 2004, was posted in many 
websites, among which were ABC News and the MSNBC. The latter makes it clear that 
Aljazeera is part of the story. As shown in figure 2-13, Aljazeera has become embedded 
as part of the content. 
Following McLuhan's statement, 'the medium is the message', Aljazeera has 
become a new element in the non-Arab news sites. Whenever non-Arab websites - such 
as MSNBC, ABC News, and BBC News World, point to Aljazeera's statement about the 
length of the tapes aired - a veiled signal about the newsworthiness of Aljazeera is 
emphasized. Examples supporting the claim that content re-mediates Aljazeera, are 
ample. On November 29,2004, the BBC News World's story about "Alqaeda deputy in 
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Figure 2-13. News stories in MSNBC, CNN, BBC News World, and ABC news show that 
Aljazeera has become embedded part of the content 
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new tape," indicated the decision of Aljazeera to air only eight minutes from Alqaeda's 
deputy leader tape as a consideration of its newsworthiness. Similar considerations 
dictated the decisions made by MSNBC and ABC News on February 20, 2005, when 
Aljazeera aired another tape from the same leader. MSNBC and ABC News reported The 
Associated Press story, clarifying that "AI-Jazeera reported that the excerpt was part of a 
longer videotape, but it did not indicate the length of the entire tape. The station did not 
say if it would air the rest of the video" (Purported, 2005, & Nasrawi, 2005). 
2.5 New emergent practices at Aljazeera Net 
In Understanding News (1982), John Hartley reminds us that news gains much of its 
form "from the characteristics of the medium in which it appears" (p. 5). On the web the 
convergence of media technologies re-shapes news representation by allowing its 
elements to be reconfigured in a new set of relationships (Hall, 2001, p. 209). The new 
configuration of news representations often alter the structure and modes of informing 
people, or at least re-determine new kinds of relationship between the various news 
elements, namely, the text, the headlines and the images. 
Accordingly, Aljazeera Net exemplifies new modes of news representation, and 
suggests new structures through which to inform people. As 1 will explain in this section, 
although Aljazeera appears to imitate non-Arab news sites, or at least re-fashions their 
presentations of print media, the design Aljazeera Net adopts specifically reflects the 
strategy of the network to tell people differently through two contrasting techniques, 
comprising the path and the master narrative. 
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2.5.1 Paths: how visualization of elements empowers interactivity 
In a section entitled "knowledge," Aljazeera Net provides its users with in-depth 
coverage, special reports, and points of view. The network emphasizes the power of its 
paths. Figures 2-14, 2-15 show that Aljazeera Net elaborates distinct paths when covering 
Arab issues. Clearly, Aljazeera Net resembles the design of the magazine's pages, yet it 
combines images, headlines, texts, colors and backgrounds, whereas the paths in the 
CNN Arab network, and the BBC Arab news service are dependent on the adjacency of 
the images, headlines and texts. 
Aljazeera Net emphasizes the emotional power of its images, whieh depend on the 
graphic manipulation of the photo along with its mimetic qualities, and not on the merely 
realistie quality of its imitations (LaGrandeur, 2003, p. 120). A comparison between 
Aljazeera Net and the CNN Arabie network will afford a signifieant ex ample of the 
emotional appeal of these paths (See Figure 2-15). 
Whereas the elements of the paths in the CNN Arab network and the BBC Arab 
news service are adjacent to each other (See figure 2-15), Aljazeera Net relies on one 
image, whose size is predominant. Within the image, Aljazeera Net incorporates 
hyperlinked headlines, texts and images that form one dominant colored image, 
constituting the path. This incorporation of the image, text and headlines does not merely 
create a dominant view about the issue being discussed, but also increases the level of 
user interactivity. Because the path includes dynamic re-presentation and hidden links, 
the user is invited to highlight each link and choose headlines or images from the lists 
provided for him (See Figure 2-14). 
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Video clip 
Figure 2-14. An ex ample for the path in Aljazeera Net 
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2.5.2 Master narratives: challenging the inverted pyramid structure 
For journalists and editors, the ability to build narratives is a skilllearned during the 
earlier years ofpracticingjournalism (Tuchman, 1978, p. 105). Technically speaking, 
journalistic narrations follow a basic structure, which are collectively termed an 'Inverted 
Pyramid'. Within this structure, the editors concisely identify the most striking news first, 
and consequently get "to the point as quickly as possible" (The Missouri, 1999, p. 171). 
Jakob Nielsen (1996) argues that the inverted pyrarnid becomes even more important on 
the web, especially as several studies have suggested that users do not scroll, which 
means that if the users are not very interested in the news immediately presented, they 
will frequently be left to read only the first paragraphs of the news (Nielsen, 1996). 
Yet, for scholars in The Missouri Group, who write about news reporting and 
writing, the inverted pyramid "is not the best way to tell stories" (p. 171). Similarly, 
Karim H. Karim (2003a) invites us to think in terms of other ways of telling (p. 183). In 
his book, Islarnic peril: Media and global violence (2003a), Karim addresses the current 
challenges faced by journalists. He supposes that polyvalent discourses, occasioned by 
postcolonial writers, permit journalists to explore new forms of narrative (p. 183). 
Aljazeera Net seems to have taken on the challenge that Karim refers to, because it 
decides to tell its stories through a different mode of narration, namely, the master 
narrative model. Understandably, the master narrative is "the story that generates all the 
other stories" (Rosen, 2003). In their book, Contesting the Master Narrative, Jeffery Cox 
and Shelton Stromquist (1998) cogently account for the loss of objectivity that occurred 
in the early 1990s, creating a vacuum that calls for self-conscious alternative narratives 
(p. 8). Jay Rosen (2003) describes the master narrative as "the big story, sometimes the 
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back story, often a fragment of a narrative that generates all the other stories, which are 
smaller pieces" (Rosen, 2003). 
The design of news at Aljazeera Net reflects the features of the mas ter narrative that 
Jay Rosen has outlined above. Clearly, as shown in Figure 2-16, Aljazeera applies three 
types of master narrative: the big story, the back-story and the fragmented story. Figure 
2-16 explains how Aljazeera Net has used three stories to create 'the big story', within 
which the inverted pyramid has become part of the structure. Accordingly, when the big 
story, the all-encompassing story, is placed adjacent to hypertexts of news stories that are 
synchronized in chronological perspective, with hyperlinks to audio and visual files, the 
back story is emphasized. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has concretely examined the concept of remediation of the news in 
relation to digital technologies. It stresses the fact that while digital technologies are 
perceived as a "hybrid of technical, material, social, and economic factors" (BoIter, 1999, 
p. 77), the identity of media is constructed outside the digital realm. The World Wide 
Web does not construct Aljazeera Net; rather, it alters the way it constructs meaning, 
which is influenced by the characteristics of the medium per se. The first part of the 
chapter seeks to shed light on how Aljazeera emerged as the electrical shockwave that 
jolted the consciousness of many Arabs, as weIl as having a galvanizing effect in the 
West. Evidently, Aljazeera Net sought to spread counter hegemonic ideas that resist 
hegemonic discourses adopted by both Arab and Western regimes. Aljazeera has been 
found to be a professional network that applies different yet carefully elaborated 
standards of professionalism. 'Expert organization' in news has been achieved through 
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Figure 2-16. Master 
narrative's model as it 
appears in Aljazeera Net 
the adoption of professionalism as a discourse, and there is an array of checklists to 
enforce these standards. As a professional media network, Aljazeera challenges the 
normative view of environmental adaptation, while reflecting a qualified adherence to the 
notion of occupational socialization. Whereas Aljazeera Net characterizes itself as an 
objective or neutral media, the Aljazeera team has expressed controversial views that 
warrant the description of objectivity as an institutional slogan or goal, albeit one that 
cannot be realistically attained. More significantly, the actual work practices of Aljazeera 
have given birth to the new concept of neo-objectivity, based on three main rules: balance 
with perspective, accuracy without embellishment, and faimess without mediation. 
The last section of this chapter explains how the construction of meaning at 
Aljazeera Net has been influenced by its remediation strategies, wherein meaning resides 
in representation, and is intricately linked to design. Significantly, the strategies adopted 
by Aljazeera Net have helped to redefine the normative deployment of different 
joumalistic genres, such as photographic images and cartoons, and they help to avert the 
chorological dilemma of hypertext. Aljazeera Net has proven that characteristics that 
have hitherto defined a certain medium, such as television, can be reabsorbed. Aljazeera 
Net has taken on the challenge of creating a new model of narratives, namely, the master 
narrative model, which makes Aljazeera Net distinct from other Pan-Arab websites, and 
non-Arab news sites that target Arabs, such as the BBC Arab news service, and the CNN 
Arab network. 
Finally, as part of its strategy of counter-hegemony, Aljazeera Net has successfully 
worked to remediate the flow of information. As a network that offers exclusive or 
original content Aljazeera Net has achieved its self-professed aim. Instead of re-
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contextualizing the news of Aljazeera Net, Western media remediate Aljazeera per se, 
and thereby accredit its newsworthiness. The design of Aljazeera Net explains why 
digital technology, while refashioning different genres and the absorbing characteristics 
of Aljazeera television, cannot absorb the unique identity of this media. 
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CHAPTER3 
Aljazeera as the voice of Arabs on the Internet: 
Representing Arab identity and "the Arab Diaspora" 
3.1 Introduction 
The complexities surrounding the notion of Arabness have to do, on the one hand, 
with its construction as a collective identity and the historical contingencies that have 
brought about the fragmentation and diminution of this identity and, on the other hand, 
the identity of the Pan-Arab media, such as Aljazeera and, more specifically, its news 
remediation strategies, which suggest that the ability to articulate issues of identity and 
news resides in strategies of representation as they intersect both domains. 
Representation, a widely used term in media studies, refers to the construction of various 
aspects of reality, such as objects, places, events, and cultural identities (Chandler, 2003). 
Media scholars and ethno-methodologists properly discem and distinguish among 
representation, identity and news. For example, Stuart Hall (1991) briefly characterizes 
the relationship between identity and representation, stating that identity is "always in 
part a kind of representation" (p. 49). Ethno-methodologists, on the other hand, classify 
this sort of representation of identity in news media into two contrasting categories: 
reflexivity and indexicality. Both terms have been used to explain how media and ethnic 
groups can attain a reciprocal sense of identity (Tuchman, 1978, p. 189). Whereas 
reflexivity stipulates that news representation is embedded in the identity it characterizes, 
indexicality specifies that news representation may attribute meanings distinct from, or 
apart from, the context in which this identity is produced (Tuchman, 1978, p. 189). 
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This chapter utilizes reflexivity and indexicality as part of its ongoing examination 
of the representation of Arab identity, yet it employs a broader framework of analysis to 
discuss the various representations of Arabs and the sources of Arabness. For instance, it 
employs framing and perspectival analysis to investigate how Arab identity is represented 
in Aljazeera Net, and to assess Aljazeera's capacity to reciprocally become the voice of 
Arab identity in the Arab community in North America. Moreover, the second part of this 
chapter sheds light on the senses of perception, the essence of representation, and its 
problematic nature. It articulates the relationship between representation and the distinct 
properties of identities. 
The discussion that follows in the second part will be followed by an examination 
of media framing, and the relationship between perspectives, frames and representation. 
The rest of this chapter will be devoted to the representation of Arabs and the sources that 
govem Arab identity at Aljazeera Net. The closing section will investigate how Aljazeera 
represents Arab Muslim Americans, and how Arab scholars, media experts, and 
academics in North America characterize Arab identity and, more specifically, Aljazeera. 
3.2. The senses and the essence of representation in relation to the properties of 
identity 
Representation remains one of the most vague and misunderstood concepts in 
academia. Its ambiguity resides, not so much in its definition as a term, but as a concept. 
Most scholars who examine representation tend to highlight its definition through listing 
its various senses or meanings. Altematively, attempts to undo the concept of 
representation often go beyond the definition of the term to focus on the problematic 
essence of the concept itself. 
158 
In examining the various senses of representation, Stuart Hall (1997a) adduces two 
relevant meanings for the word: 
(1) To represent something is to de scribe or depict it, to calI it up in the mind 
by description or portrayal or imagination; to place a likeness of it before 
us in our mind or in the senses. 
(2) To represent also means to symbolize, or to stand for (Hall, 1997a, p.16). 
Whereas the first meaning of representation refers to its intentional but superficial 
depiction, the second meaning implies delegation to speak for or act on behalf of another 
(Barnett, 2003, p. 15). Depiction and delegation in representation can be undertaken 
through the use of the perspectives and frames that contextualize content, as well as the 
signs and codes that govern il. 
Representation, then, can be linguistic, or pictorial. As Stuart Hall (1997a) aptly 
defines it, linguistic representation is the production of meaning through language (p.16). 
This concerns not only how identities are represented within the text, but also, how they 
are constructed in the process of production and reception (Chandler, 2003). Pictorial 
representation "derives from both the arrangement of elements and the implicitness of the 
interrelationships inherent in the representation" (Peuquet, 2002, p.191). 
Using the same classifications outlined by Stuart Hall, yet with more stress on the 
articulation between representation and reality, Andrew Gibson (1996) differentiates 
between two types of representation: surface representation and depth representation. In 
the eyes of Gibson, surface representation is "a realism of parti cul ars. Its view of 
language is innocent. It conceives language as unproblematic and adequate to what it 
represents" (p. 81). Additionally, surface representation does in fact .ogive primacy to the 
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visible" (Gibson, 1996, p. 82), even though it is not necessarily confined to it, but 
practically encompasses what is uttered and heard (Gibson, 1996, p. 82). Surface 
representation in fact looks like what Martin Heidegger termed "the blueprint of nature," 
yet it never goes behind the blueprint framework (Gibson, 1996, p. 83). Representation, 
in this sense, is not a copy of something; rather, as with the point of view expressed by 
Barry Brummett (2003), who invites us to understand representation as a kind of 
simulation, it is an entity "that is different from that which it represents" (Brummett, 
2003, p. 4). 
Conversely, representation of depths "means penetrating the visible" (Gibson, 1996, 
p. 82), and paradoxically anticipates the invisible form of the visible (Gibson, 1996, p. 
82). It often stresses the "validity of foundations, and essential intuitions at the expense of 
linguistic habits, social conventions, and ideological constructs" (Gibson, 1996, p. 85). 
However, because of its arbitrariness in regard to culture, it recognizes the contingency of 
"culture's ontological point of view" (Gibson, 1996, p. 85). Moreover, depth 
representation is more elastic, because it cannot daim "incontestably to have captured 
deep, hidden, metaphysically significant natures, once and for all" (Gibson, 1996, p. 85). 
Nonetheless, it refuses to "find life at the level of life itself, as surface, flux, proximity" 
(Gibson, 1996, p. 85). While the represented is articulated through its ontological 
foundations, representation is epistemological, since it is "an analogue of reality, a 
shadowing of reality, but not a precise copy of it" (Brummett, 2003, p. 4). 
Clive Barnett (2003) adduces two senses of representation: depiction and delegation 
(p. 15). To further Barnett's characterization of representation, Stephen Coleman, and 
Jacques Derrida explore sorne alternative meanings of representation. Stephen Coleman 
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(2004) concisely confines representation to its essentials, defining representation as 
mediation between the absent and the present. Representation, in this sense, is a 
"communication activity entailing the symbolic embodiment of a previously absent 
entity" (p. 8). In a more theoretical sense, Jacques Derrida distinguishes between two 
senses of presence in representation; firstly, as differential repetition that modifies 
presence, and secondly, as a substitution of "what takes the place of, what occupies the 
place of, another" (Bamett, 2003, p. 14). 
Now, when looking at the doubts surrounding representation, the concept of 
representation becomes a subject of debate between poststructuralists53 and 
postmodemists. Christopher Prendergast (2000) attempts to account for the feeling of 
skepticism surrounding issues of representation. Prendergast believes that nowadays, "in 
our so-called postmodem times, we are more likely to be seduced by the daim that what 
matters to us, existentially and historically, is unrepresentable" (p. 1). 
53 Despite the ongoing critiques of representation and identity made by postmodernists, this dissertation 
adopts the poststructuralist approach, since, briefly speaking, one cannot claim that Arab identity is not a 
historical construct, nor can one allege that it is not articulated through various sorts of cultural signs and 
codes. Moreover, the poststructuralist approach can be seen to be more appropriate for this study, since this 
approach articulates a thoroughly historical view, which looks at "different forms of consciousness, 
identities, signification, and so on, as historically produced and therefore varying in different historical 
periods" (Be st, 1991, p.20). Since poststructuralists confer primacy of meaning on the signifier, their 
approach affords more opportunities to examine Aljazeera Net, and related questions, such as the instability 
of meaning, the dynamic productivity of language, the intertextual play of the signifier, and the referential 
relationship between subject and object (Best, 1991, p.20). In stressing the importance of differences in the 
matter of unities and identities, the poststructuralist approach is more germane to this study, because it 
facilitates investigations into the fragmentation of Arab identity, or, more properly, it can be enlisted to 
explore the divisions and fragmentations of Arabness, thus scrutinizing from within the sources of identity 
that have aIl too often been thought to be stable throughout the various phases of postcolonial history. A 
certain overlapping occurs between the postmodern and poststructuralist approaches, especially when the 
discussion focuses on features of Arab culture and Arab identity, and a new historical phenomenon has 
been seen to penetrate the Arab World in the post-modern era. However, considering that postmodernists 
attempt to subvert the former grand narratives, and favor 'mini narratives' - which are contingent, 
provisional, and temporary, at best - and local events, rather than large-scale global concepts (Best, 1991, 
p.27, & HjfIand, 2005), a poststructuralist approach is clearly more relevant and comprehensive in scope 
when discussing the key components of Arab identity, and despite postmodernist claims to be contesting 
master narratives, an approach situated at the sites of intersection of postmodernist and poststructuralist 
thought, can be paradoxically more global in its range of enquiry. 
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Yet, Christopher Prendergast alleges that while representation is not universal, 
everything is representable (pp. 1-2). That is to say, when something is seen to be 
unrepresentable, this does not mean that representation is impossible, but rather, it 
indicates the inadequacy of representation to represent what it represents, since it may fail 
in its purported task (Prendergast, 2000, p.2). Prendergast appears to draw our attention 
to what we might call the impurity of representation. The impurity of representation, the 
argument goes, refers to its ambivalence, and this "implies the absence of what is being 
made present again, and this absence cannot be assumed to be merely contingent" 
(Barnett, 2003, p. 16). John Zeran believes that in considering matters of representation 
"to represent or to be represented is a degradation, a reduction, both in the sense of 
symbolic culture and in terms of power" (The refusaI, 2004). In a rather more critical 
view of the essence of representation, Andrew Gibson (1996) decries representation for 
appearing in "a double figure, in the imitation of the imitation, the simulation of imitative 
form" (p. 71), and for being "wedded either to an empiricism that refuses to interrogate 
its own bases, or to an essentialism opened up to question" (p. 69). 
When relating the notion of representation to the properties of identity, 
representation can be considered to be a communicative mechanism of identity. Mary 
Fong's article, "Multiple Dimensions of Identity," indicates three distinct properties of 
identity, conceived in terms of: (1) modes of expression, (2) content and relationship 
levels, and (3) salience and intensity. Thus, representation entails the repetition of the 
'core of symbols', 'names and labels', as well as the 'norms', which underlie the various 
modes of expression (Mary, 2004a, p. 22). In representation the content has a relational 
aspect with the message, thereby deterrnining how the message is presented. Salience and 
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intensity of identity reveal the various degrees of attention attracted to, or, altematively, 
performed by a given identity (Mary, 2004a, p. 26). 
3.2.1. Perspective and framing 
Initially, the study of frames, pioneered by Snow and his colleagues (Snow, 
Rochford, Worden & Benford 1986), and subsequently developed by Gamson (1996), 
was centrally based on the works of Erving Goffman (1974), who, in tum, was influenced 
by the social anthropologist Gregory Bateson (1973). Erving Goffman (1974) refers to 
frames as the principles of organization that used to "locate, perceive, identify, and label" 
(p. 21). Others define frames as the "structures of expectation, that is, on the basis of 
one's experience of the world in a given culture (or combination of cultures), one 
organizes knowledge about the world and uses this knowledge to predict interpretations" 
(Tannen, 1993, p.16). 
Before moving on to look into the connection between framing, perspective and 
representation, it is important to relate frames to the concepts of media and identity. 
Usually, discussions about the relationship between media and frames focus on the 
various functions of media frames. Indeed, media frames serve several functions: (1) they 
include sorne messages and exclu de others, (2) they focus on what is inside the frame, (3) 
they influence the viewing of what is inside the frame so that it is opposed to what is 
outside the frame, (4) they offer instructions for understanding the message in the frame, 
and (5) they delimit what is properly outside their bounds (Greer, 2000, p.5, & Severin, 
1997, pp. 320-321). 
Robert Gardner (2003) deftly introduces the issues of framing and identity into the 
discussion, thereby seeking to explain the significance of what he calls the 'identity 
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frame'. According to Gardner, the concept of 'identity frame' helps to analyze how 
collective identity influences the view of, and response to, conflicts (Gardner, 2003). 
Frames, in this sense, can be said to define the core of a group's beliefs and values. 
Whereas the frame points to the fact that the content is strictly shaped, perspective 
indicates the fact that content is inevitably 'displayed' from a given point of view 
(Ensink, 2003, p. 2). The connection between perspectives and frames on the one hand, 
and representations, on the other hand, are invariably reciprocal. Since framing focuses 
on how news is presented and how joumalists structure their representations of events, 
given frames of reference can also negotiate the acceptance of peoples' perceptions 
conceming certain explanations about issues and events, and they inevitably produce 
images (Stumpf, 2000, & Fisher, 1997). Representation, in tum, relies on the common 
sense interpretation of collective images and meanings, and embodies the ideas 
themselves, reinforced by frames (Fisher, 1997, & Beetham, 1998). When relating 
perspectives to representation, the processes of delegation and depiction are implicated 
since the content normally speaks from a certain perspective and it is possible to speak 
within, or about, certain perspectives as weIl so that perspective, in this sense, can be 
understood as a direction of the perception, or, put more succinctly, a concept c1aiming 
that no sentence in any representation is free from a certain slant or perspective (Ensink, 
2003, pp. 10, 14). Practically speaking, to identify perspective in terrns of representation, 
the observer should look into at least two different textual components: (1) the tone of the 
content, which confers on the representation an active or passive voice, and (2) the lexical 
choice (Ensink, 2003, p. 10). The scholar, Kelton Rhoads (1997), associates perspective 
with frames, simply affirrning that: a "frame offers a perspective" (Rhoads). From a 
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consideration of the positions outlined above, it can be seen that the study of media 
frames has become a growing trend, since it is perceived as an alternative to the study of 
the question of objectivity and bias in the media (Severin, 1997, p. 320). 
3.3 Representation of Arabs and the sources of Arabness 
The entanglement between perspective and framing does not necessarily obscure the 
independent analysis of each concept. However, in the context of this study, it is more 
fruitful to highlight Aljazeera's perspective at the concluding section of this chapter, 
taking into account the overlapping between perspectives and framing. This section 
begins with a reflection on the introduction of the term 'Arabs', as a proxy and voice for 
different designations in Aljazeera Net. Aljazeera Net uses the label 'Arabs' to describe 
the general population of Arabs, Muslims and Christians. The label 'Arabs' is principally 
used to describe Arabs as a collective entity, such as 'Arab leaders', 'Arab ruling 
regimes', 'the Arab World', 'Arab countries', 'Arab officials', and Arab immigrants. 
Examples that show how the label 'Arabs' is employed to relate to degrees of Arab 
status, and more comprehensively, to collective Arab identity, appear in the following 
headlines featured at Aljazeera Net: 
The use of the term 'Arab' to refer to Arab leaders and regimes: 
Arabs agree upon the necessity of domestic reform. ~b ~6)l...a} ~ Y?".J i .).Jy:,:. .)c. 0.fo:i:! ~ 
Arabs accuse Washington of magnifying the terrorist ~~I W.)~.fo. ~I.J 0~ ~ 
threat. y tA .)'14 
When will an equal relationship exist between Arabs and ~ WH ~..l....l ~ f' ~ ~ 
Washington? Y~I.J.J 
The responsibility of Arabs in Sharm Elsheikh's ~I f'~.J4i.)A'; ~ ~y..... 
conference. 4JSlS..o.J ~ ~ 
The dilemma of Arab summits Y"t:§~1 f'1 "I~I i~I ü'y'J)I.J ~ 
Arabs and the United States: enemies or friends? y y:,:. .; ~ .)u..JI f'~ .)c. ~ ~ ~.JA 
Mousa urges Arabs not to participate in attacking Iraq. JlyJI 
Here the label' Arab' is used as a proxy for Arab officiais: 
Arabs express their condolences to the Pope and describe him 
as a 'man ofpeace'. 
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J;.. y. A..i.M.J 4411 ù~ ~ 
f')l..., 
The label' Arab' used to denote the voice of the various Arab publics: 
In a PolI: The enmity of Arabs toward the United States bears 
no relation to Islam. 
1.4 trillion dollars: the wealth of Arabs outside ... 
How do Arabs view the Iraqi elections? 
Unit y is the dream of Arabs, and economic integrity is its 
basis. 
The Arabs refuse to countenance the American project in Iraq. 
The label Arab as an index of the status quo: 
An Arab researcher asserts that Arabs lack accurate 
information. 
Arabs must develop higher standards to tackle unemployment. ~\..,.J ~~ .JAÏ ü'J~ ~j ~~ ~ 
Â.l~\ 
The label Arab is used as a substitution for Arab Americans: 
Arabs support the Bush campaign 
When the news raises certain religious questions and employs images hostile to 
Arabs, Aljazeera Net hyphenates Arabs with Muslims or Christi ans. The following 
headlines are examples of how Aljazeera Net conflates Arabs and Muslims. 
Schroeder refuses to resort to the Arab and 
Musiim stereotype in Frankfurt 
German police continue in their hunt for Arabs 
and Musli ms 
America questions hundreds of Arabs and 
Muslims 
Racism is disseminated against Arabs and 
Musiims throughout the Internet 
The hateful upsurge against Arabs and Muslims 
in American and Europe 
America prepares for the deportation of six 
thousand Arabs and Muslims 
The Orthodox refuse to accuse Arabs and 
Musiims branded with terrorism 
The September events and their impact on 
Christian Arabs 
The Arab Sunni and the Iraqi Elections 
Shia't Arabs ... the forgotten Muslims 
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Additionally, Aljazeera Net often uses the label 'Arabs' when its content refers to 
discrimination against Arabs, or to issues of political resistance. Figure 3-1 demonstrates 
that Aljazeera Net draws on the term 'Arabs' to refer to Muslims. As revealed in figure 3-
1, while the headline of the news story indicates that, "Washington refuses to 
discriminate against Arabs," the picture of the young Muslim girl, associated with the 
news story, shows that the term 'Arabs' is used as a signifier for Muslims. 
An additional example of how Aljazeera Net resists the designation of Arab 
insurgents fighting as terrorists appears in figure 3-2. Whereas the former administrator 
of Iraq, Paul Bremer, stated that "hundreds of trained terrorists sneak: into Iraq from 
Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Sudan," Aljazeera Net chose to alter Bremer' s 
statement, reporting in the headline that: "Bremer stated: hundreds of Arab fighters sneak: 
into Iraq." 
3.3.1. Frames that govern Arabs in Aljazeera Net 
This section begins with two frames that confine or distort the image that AIjazeera 
Net projects regarding Arab leaders, regimes and publics. The rest of this section will 
look into the representation of the chief sources of Arab identity in Aljazeera Net. 
Generally speaking, the images Aljazeera Net portrays of Arabs reflect an identity crisis, 
characterized by unconstructive meanings to describe Arab leaders, regimes and publics. 
The following frames pro vide clear outlines of the images of Arabs that have endured: 
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Washington 
refuses to 
discriminate 
against Arabs 
Bremer states: 
hundreds of 
Arab fighters 
sneak: into Iraq 
TheUS 
Figure 3-1. The use of the term 'Arab' as a signifier for Muslims. 
"'~ Jl.ocYJ""'1 ~ Ù>J!Ùl.!I"JYJ" <lI,(J.,f >'Ùl ~ ~ 6Ill, 
.c3!.,.lql ~,»''v1 ~1II <!>u.L.w...... qI 
administrator of 
Iraq, Paul Bremer, 
claims hundreds of 
trained terrorists 
sneak: into Iraq 
from Syria, 
Yemen, Saudi 
Arabia and Sudan 
Figure 3-2. The term Arab fighters is used as a substitute for terrorists 
168 
a) Distrustfulleaders; corrupt, tyrannical, and deceitful regimes 
The representation of Arab leaders and Arab regimes is one of the most frequently 
discussed issues at Aljazeera Net. A negative frame in regard to Arab leaders is 
repeatedly used by Aljazeera Net, and this takes place across a wide spectrum of 
journalistic genres, such as television programs on the Aljazeera channel, reports, 
analyses, news stories, images and cartoons, all of which describe Arab leaders as 
deliberately rnisleading Arabs, and Arab regimes, as being corrupt, deceitful and 
tyrannical. 
When Aljazeera's host, Faisel Alqasim, posed the following rhetorical question 
during his program, 'The Opposite Direction' (Alitejah Aalmoakes), "why have Arabs 
become the joke of the World, and the mockery54 of nations?" his introductory statement 
began with an aggressive and distorted critique of Arab leaders, describing them as a 
collection of rotten fish with egocentric leaders, who se main concern continues to be the 
perpetuity of clan, tribe, farnily, and the irnrnediate in si der group; moreover, he branded 
their leaders as being responsible for the deplorable state of Arab poli tic al and economic 
coll apse , adducing as an example the way they turn the 'Watan' into private farrns' 
(Alqasim, 2003, February). During another one of his programs, Alqasim referred to the 
egocentrism of Arab leaders, depicting them as "earth, sky, water and electricity" 
(Alqasim, 1999, December). Faisel Alqasim constantly uses the same sarcastic and ironie 
tone of criticism when he talks about the various Arab regimes. Reporting on how Arabs 
celebrated the twentieth century, Alqasim posed the following questions 
What have the Arab regimes achieved other than 
underdevelopment, subjugation, repression, ignorance and 
54 The researcher has italicized sorne of the words and expressions used in AIjazeera Net. Their significance 
will be explained later in tbis chapter in a discussion of the Arabic language frame. 
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poverty? Why have Arabs reached their lowest ebb given 
that their leaders are said to be so outstanding? Isn't 
conspiracy merely a shoddy pretext that Arab regimes 
exploit in order to authorize their outrages? What can you 
expect from regimes that rely on loyalty but not on 
professionalism? What can you expect from regimes 
swamped by ancestors, kinsmen, clans, and tribes? 
(Alqasim, 1999, December): 
Aljazeera Net's host, Ghassan Ben-Gedo, summarizes Aljazeera's viewpoint, and 
reiterates Faisel Alqasim's assessment of the Arab regimes. Ben-Gedo, who seems to 
present a more metaphorical image of Arab leaders, states: 
People who enter through high doors remain for 
ever ... Normal people are marginalized ... Activist 
movements are engulfed, but fading decorative groups last 
for ever ... Fake elections continue in many countries, and 
the family is the most powerful authority in both 
monarchie al and republican regimes (Ben-Gedo, 2002, 
May). 
Warned claims that the tendency of sorne regimes to consolidate the power of their 
families forms part of the wider strategy of Arab leaders to stagnate 'the rotation of 
power in the Arab World', and to maintain the political map of Arab regimes in a statie 
mode (Warned, 2005). Aljazeera Net's bloody depiction of the rotation of power in the 
Arab World, shown in figure 3-3, accords with the report of the Arab Organization for 
Human Rights (AOHR), in 2003, which criticizes Arab regimes for their tardy and 
inadequate transition towards democracy. Aljazeera Net highlights the (AOHR) warning 
about the high incidence of violence exerted by different political movements to propel 
the rotation of power in Arab Countries (Warned, 2005), and further refers to the lack of 
freedom given to the political opposition, which consequently limits the influence of 
political parties. More particularly, the erosion of the opposition parties undermines their 
opportunities for fair competition in the forthcoming elections. In sorne cases, political 
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parties that might compete and run for office in elections are not permitted to wield 
power, or, at the very least, they are severely hampered; others cannot obtain their fair 
share of votes in the elections. In aIl the above cases, votes tend to go to the opposition 
parties, which are generally considered to be incompetent and without an effective voice 
(Warned, 2005). (See figure 3-4). 
Obviously, Arab leaders have often been charged with obstructing attempts to 
facilitate the rotation of power, and to bring about political reform. Their self-justificatory 
claim, which Aljazeera Net is prompt to criticize, is that it is all too risky for leaders in 
the Arab region to initiate political reform, especially if these reforms are to be imposed 
from above by the United States. The regimes in Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have 
criticized the United States' plan for reform in the Middle East, since the American plan 
is seen as a sort of unofficial encroachment upon Arab internal affairs and, more 
significantly, as an attempt to sweep away the real dilemma in the Middle East, which is 
precisely the Israeli occupation of Palestine (Lawyers, 2002, & The plan, 2002, & Saudi, 
2004, & Syria, 2004). 
Despite the gloomy images and portrayals of Arab regimes, Aljazeera Net has 
cautiously talked about the Egyptian, Saudi, and Syrian initiatives for political reform, 
announced at the end of 2004, in order to address the increasing demands for reform in 
the Arab region. Yet, the lack of any clear position with regard to political reforms 
provokes Aljazeera Net's doubts concerning the seriousness of the Arab regimes' 
attempts to develop a significant platform for reform (Shoqayer, 2004). 
Indeed, Aljazeera Net's unconstructive characterization of Arab leaders and their 
regimes always goes beyond domestic issues to articulate views about general Arab 
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Figure 3-3. An Aljazeera Net viewpoint 
concerning the rotation of power in the Arab 
world. 
Published in Aljazeera.net on 23-08-2001 
Source: 
http://www.aljazeera.netINRlexeres/OC0282FB-075A-
4997-B714-03ED21ACC344.htm 
Figure 3-4. Democracy in Arab political 
parties. 
Published in Aljazeera.net on 25-07-2003 
Source: 
http://www.aljazeera.netINRlexeresI2D2355F A -8204-
430E-B391-38DC38509D8D.htm 
issues, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the recent occupation of Iraq in March 2003. 
Arab leaders are criticized for exploiting the Palestinian issue to legitimate their domestic 
actions, while they seem to be irresponsible about the Palestinian issue per se. Faisel 
Alqasim raises the following set of questions, debating the seriousness of Arab leaders 
concerning the Palestinian issue: 
Is the Palestinian issue really the most urgent one? Has it 
ever been the central issue or is it just a pretext for the 
avoidance of other issues that are not less urgent, nor less 
tragic? How many Arab regimes authorized repression and 
oppression, and enjoyed a monopoly of power, while 
adopting the slogan of the liberalization of Palestine? 
(Alqasim, 2001, April). 
Why do Arab regimes associate the Palestinian issue with 
the issue of reform, apparently forging an essential 
connection with it, precisely because, if the Palestinian 
issue remains unresolved, there will likewise be a 
continuation of corruption, torture and despotism, and 
contrariwise, a ration ale for the forestalling of democracy, 
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the power of law and human rights in the Arab World? 
(Alqasim, 2004, August). 
Faisel Alqasim's doubts about the weightiness of the Palestinian issue are 
corroborated by reports from the Arab press that Aljazeera Net frequently showcases. 
Indeed, Aljazeera Net regularly selects representative reports from the Arab press, and 
then re-introduces them to its users. One remark, in particular, from an Arab newspaper is 
of significance here. Thus, Mohamed Ahmed Alhassani, a writer at the Saudi paper, 
Okaz, argues that the perceived failure of Arab leaders to vindicate their daims is due to 
their reluctance to strive for a fair end to the Palestinian conflict, precisely because it is 
convenient to have a scapegoat to justify their costly mistakes and failures, and the 
further deterioration of the notion of the Arab nation in the aftermath of liberation can 
also be ascribed to the same scapegoat (What, 2005). Alhassani, however, seeks to 
sidestep the questions raised by Faisel Alqasim by asking: H the Palestinian issue is 
resolved, if this scapegoat can no longer be used, what scapegoat will be found to justify 
future mistakes and failures of initiative? (What, 2005). 
The fecklessness and irresponsibility of Arab leaders conceming the Palestinian 
issue is illustrated by Aljazeera Net' s cartoonist, Shujaat Ali, who se indexical mode of 
illustrating unpalatable truths is seen through the depiction of an Arab leader covering his 
eyes with is hands: More specifically, this representation depicts an Arab leader with the 
tradition al head-fetter, willfully restricting his gaze to the Americans by his side, while 
deliberately tuming his back on an Israeli soldier who kills a Palestinian. He then 
responds to the cameraman' s warning about the murder taking place behind his back by 
exc1aiming: "It is normal!" (See figure 3-5). 
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Aljazeera Net cartoons often depict the relationship between Arab leadership 
initiatives and the issue of Palestine by emphasizing Aljazeera's frequently stated view of 
the correlation between Arab regimes and the United States' role and mission in the Arab 
region. Arab leaders officially objected to the United States' decision to invade Iraq at 
their summit meeting, held in March 2003. In his speech at the summit, Emil Lahoud, the 
Lebanese president and the President of the Arab Summit at that time, stated: "We are 
repeating our objections to the war against Iraq, or Kuwait, or any other Arab country, 
because it would pose a threat to the entire Arab nation" (The Emirate, 2003). This 
statement by the Lebanese President did not essentially modify Aljazeera Net's 
perspective conceming the relationship between the Arab regimes and the United States. 
In April 2002, an Aljazeera Net cartoon showed that Arab leaders deceive their 
respective publics, giving the United States an ostensible cause for alarm in front of their 
home-based fans, while begging the United States for support out of sight of the Arab 
public (See figure55 3-6). The view of Aljazeera Net, conceming the relationship between 
Arab leaders and the United States, did not change at the time of the latter's invasion of 
Iraq. Among the many graphie examples that indicate Aljazeera Net's perspective is the 
cartoon published on April 4th, 2003, shown above in figure 2-10, which depicts Arab 
leaders lying down on a bed, tuming their backs on the American and British tanks 
marching in to invade Iraq. 
Portraying Arab regimes as hypocritical and deceitful is a common procedure with 
Aljazeera Net freelancers and television program anchors. For example, Mohamed Garnil 
Ben-Mansour, an Aljazeera Net freelancer and a Mauritanian writer, believes that despite 
the alleged objections of most Arab regimes to the invasion of Iraq, these regimes seem 
55 Sorne of Aljazeera Net's news content and cartoons contain hostile descriptions and derogatory words. 
174 
Figure 3-5. An Aljazeera Net cartoon about 
Arab leaders and the Palestinian issue. 
Published in Aljazeera.net on 2-09-2002 
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Figure 3-6. An Aljazeera Net view of the 
relationship 
between Arab leaders and The United States. 
Published in Aljazeera.net on 30-04-2002 
to be in a state of panic regarding the American administration (Ben-Mansour, 2004). 
Parallel views are provided by Aljazeera Net freelancers, such as Yasser Alzatrah and 
Hassen Naffah, who argue that while Arab countries were divided about the war against 
Iraq, certain countries emphatically welcomed the war (Alzatrah, 2004, October, & 
Naffah, 2004). Faisel Alqasim shares the views of the above-mentioned writers and 
clearly reflects Aljazeera's perspective about the Arab's position toward the war. 
Alqasim consequently raises the following questions: 
Why do sorne people characterize Arab regimes as 
troublesome, given the success of the American mission in 
Iraq, and why do they claim that the invasion was 
something forced upon them? Could the legions of 
American invaders have reached the Raffdin country [Iraq] 
without counting on an enormous degree of Arab support? 
Aren't neighboring and distant govemments intensively 
involved in the American invasion of Iraq? Didn't they 
conspire with Uncle Sam, sharing in the guilt of one of the 
most momentous and horrible betrayals in history? Hence, 
how can we now say that these regimes were hoping for the 
failure of the American plan? If they really wanted the plan 
to have failed, they could have impeded it at its very 
inception, but they continued to support it and even to 
implement it? (Alqasim, 2003, October). 
Working along parallellines, Borhan Ghalyoon, an Aljazeera Net freelancer, draws 
a significant conclusion about the bond between Arab leaders and the United States. In 
his article, "The Iraqi dilemma ... the drama of the choice between colonialism and 
despotism," Borhan conclu des that the occupation of Iraq is a reasonable outcome, given 
the despotism of Arab regimes. He believes that it is difficult to find a better embodiment 
anywhere else in the world of the reciprocal support marking the relationship between 
despotism and colonialism than in the Arab region (Ghalyoon, 2002). 
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Of the many issues that have subverted the potential impact of Arab leaders on the 
world stage, the dominant factor in any account of lost opportunities for Arab unit y must 
be the failure to signify an effectively unified voice at the Arab summits. Aljazeera Net's 
content reflects this failure of Arab summits to adopt resolutions that accord with the will 
of the various Arab publics, especially in c1aiming that: "Arab summits come to an end at 
their beginnings" (The phenomenon, 2005). Prior to the invasion of Iraq, AIjazeera Net 
explored the opinions of twenty Arab experts conceming the Arab summit at Sharm 
Elsheikh in March 2003. It skeptically questioned the goals of the leaders, as voiced at 
the imminent Arab summit at that time, predicting that it would achieve little beyond 
settling the mundane issues of the day. 
Later, in the wake of the Arab summit at Sharm Elsheikh, Aljazeera Net reported 
that the Arab leaders utilized verbose language to conceal their real disputes, although 
they agreed to support Iraq and collectively objected to the war (Damascus, 2003). 
Repeating the same joumalistic formulas one year later, Aljazeera Net's coverage of the 
Arab summit in Tunisia in 2004 questioned whether the summit would be capable of 
going beyond mere rhetoric to attain real objectives (Will, 2004). Likewise, Karim 
Hussein Nemah, an Aljazeera Net correspondent, briefly outlined his doubts and hopes 
conceming the Arab summit, held in Algeria in 2005. Nemah wrote: 
As usual, every year the Arab street questions whether 
Arab leaders have the capacity to confront buming issues 
and to find appropriate resolutions for them, or whether 
they will simply mask the real issues hy adopting rhetorical 
and unproductive statements (Nemah, 2005). 
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Even more satirically, an Aljazeera Net cartoon caricatures Arab summits as venues 
for dozing Arab leaders who participate at these summits merely to enjoy the choice and 
abundant supply of food and drink (see figure 3-7). 
b) The Arab public and the 'irresponsible' Arab world: Representations of 
anger and oppression 
Up-to-the-minute reflections on the greater Arab public have always played an 
important role in forming, or disseminating, Aljazeera Net's evolving conception of Arab 
identity. Since the Arab region has dramatically undergone a number of changes lately, a 
brief chronological survey will be necessary to examine the permanent and changing 
aspects of various Arab publics. During 1999-2004, Aljazeera Net repeatedly underlined 
the domestic repression that most Arab publics have endured, and more particularly, it 
gave vent to public dissatisfaction with the performance of Arab regimes in preventing 
the occupation of Iraq, as weIl as emphasizing the incapacity of these regimes to end the 
occupation of Palestine. Invariably imagined to occupy 'underdog' positions, the 
different Arab publics are also seen as victims of subjugation; they are thus passively 
characterized as being incapable of facing up to corruption and despotism. Consequently, 
despite their best efforts to channel their resentment productively, the efforts made on the 
part of the various Arab publics to resist the pressure of corruption and despotism usually 
seem unproductive and inadequate. 
The images and representations of Aljazeera Net generally correspond with reports 
about human rights in the Arab region, as set out in the recent report of 2004, conducted 
by the Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR), which warns about the depressing 
lack of rights enjoyed by most Arab people in most Arab countries (Recent, 2004). 
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Figure 3-7. An Aljazeera Net view of Arab summits. 
Published in Aljazeera.net on 20-03-2005 
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Examples of su ch representations in Aljazeera Net are all too ample. The lack of freedom 
that characterizes the many Arab publics is portrayed in images that show the hands of 
the representatives of the Arab publics being bound and fettered, and their minds divided 
and at odds with each other on the map of the Arab World (See figures 3-8 & 3-9). 
Implicitly, these Aljazeera Net images posit that the greater Arab public aims to eradicate 
despotism and corruption among Arab regimes. However, these Arab publics seem to be 
unable to resist corruption, nor to remove dictatorships, since corruption is perceived as 
being too deeply rooted and endemic, and despotism appears to be inevitable or 
inextinguishable (See figures 3-10 & 3-11). 
Additionally, Aljazeera Net is keenly alert to the dangers of anger and indignation, 
given that the mood of outrage pervades the entire Arab region, and points to the fact that 
most Arab publics do not merely resent their leaders and regimes, but actively distrust 
them. Of the many aspects of Arab public anger that are extensively publicized, the 
prote st movements that have emerged across the entire Arab region receive the most 
attention. According to Aljazeera Net, sorne of these demonstrations depict the greater 
public's rage against the events that take place daily in occupied Palestine, and the refusal 
to denounce the invasion of Iraq more actively (Students, 2001, & Protests, 2002, & 
From, 2003). 
Aljazeera Net daims that the Arab regimes' failure to address the continued 
occupation in Palestine, as weIl as the invasion of Iraq, has made the various Arab 
publics doubtful about the seriousness of Arab leaders to take on any kind of collective 
action. More lately, this has contributed to the Arab publics' relative indifference to the 
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Figure 3-8. An Aljazeera Net image 
conceming Arabs 
and the modemity of the 'watan'. 
Published in Aljazeera.net on 7-11-2004 
Source: www.aljazeera.netJNRlexeres/916B8F3D-
4B25-4BAA-B5BC-CFADC90D128A.htm 
Figure 3-10. An Aljazeera Net view of the 
possibilities of eradicating corruption in the 
Arab World. 
Published in Aljazeera.net on 04-10-2003 
Figure 3-9. An Aljazeera Net image 
specifying 
despotism in the Arab World. 
Published in Aljazeera.net on 10-09-2004 
Source: www.aljazeera.netJNRlexeres/087F2086-
2ABF-4329-8AII-DB06C4C40A13.htm 
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Figure 3-11. An Aljazeera Net view of 
the power of dictatorship in the Arab 
World. 
Published in Aljazeera.net on 08-11-2003 
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Figure 3-12. The results of an 
Aljazeera Net polI about the 
credibility of Arab regimes 
statements protesting against 
imminent war against Iraq. 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
04-01-2003 
Figure 3-13. The results of an 
Aljazeera Net polI about Arab 
public feedback conceming 
the delay of the Arab summit. 
Published on Aljazeera Net on 
31-03-2004 
Are you 
concerned about 
the delay of the 
Arab summit? 
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Total number of 
participants: 
73194 
Arab leaders' meetings and summits. PolIs conducted by Aljazeera Net have explored the 
perceptions and beliefs of 37,316 & 73,194 of its users, consecutively, and these have 
shown that the different Arab publics do not seriously believe the Arab leaders' 
statements about the objections of the latter to the invasion of Iraq, nor were they upset 
on account of the postponement of the Arab summit in 2004 (See figures 3-12 & 3-13). 
Apart from images conveying feelings of repression and resentment conceming the 
various Arab publics, Aljazeera Net often concentrates on other images that criticize the 
various Arab publics for their docility, and invites them to revoIt against their leaders. 
Mohamed Garnil Ben-Mansour, an Aljazeera Net freelancer, daims that the different 
Arab publics have become silent due to their fear of what Ben-Mansour terms: 'the 
officers and watchdogs of Arab security' (Ben-Mansour, 2004). Even more 
provocatively, Faisel Alqasim, an Aljazeera ho st, urges the various Arab publics to rebel, 
to draw on the wisdom of the alert and 'sentient' publics supposedly found in other 
countries, to discard their preconceptions about the despotism and repression of Arab 
182 
leaders, and to reject the idea of the foreign liberator (Alqasim, 2003, December). In a 
similar vein, Borhan Ghalyoon, an Aljazeera Net freelancer and a professor of sociology 
at the Sorbonne University, writes that domestic reform has become unfeasible, and has 
described the uncaring feelings and the loss of national loyalty found among the various 
Arab publics (Ghalyoon, 2004). 
While Aljazeera Net's content acknowledges that Arab publics widely reject the 
policies of the United States in the Arab region, the cartoons found at Aljazeera Net 
paradoxically show that Arab publics do not entertain consistent views about the world, 
and even more negatively, show Arab publics to be careless about the events of the real 
world (See figures 3-14, & 3-15). 
While Aljazeera Net remains pessimistic regarding the aims of the Arab regimes to 
bring about a democratic transformation, it reflected a more positive viewpoint toward 
the different Arab publics, particularly during the closing months of 2004, when sorne 
Arab regimes acknowledged a readiness to discuss the issue of political and social reform 
more openly. Aljazeera Net freelancers, Ibrahim Ghraybah, and Tujan Faisel, are also on 
record as stating that the Arab publics' pressure on Arab regimes has increasingly 
become more effective. Described as a 'tomado', certain reforms induced by the various 
Arab publics are indeed the consequences of the publics' commonly proclaimed agenda, 
and their collaboration is generally considered to be greater than the CUITent degree of 
cooperation to be found among the leaders of Arab regimes (Ghraybah, 2004, & Faisel, 
2005). 
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Figure 3-14. Division within the various Arab publics. 
Published in Aljazeera.net on 25-03-2003 
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Figure 3-15. The Arab world as 'unreal' and inattentive world to events in the 'real' the 
World Published in Aljazeera.net on 22-10-2003 
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3.3.2. Frames governing Arab identity: Its sources of strength and fragmentation 
The earlier discussion in this chapter about how Aljazeera Net describes the 
relationship among Arab leaders, regimes, and publics, and how Arabs reciprocally 
respond to the challenges their region now faces, has further problematized the argument 
about Arab identity. As indicated above, Aljazeera Net portrays uniformly dismal images 
of Arab leaders, regimes and publics, and sheds doubts as to the prospects for any real 
reform in the Arab world, and it is likewise gloomy about the possibilities of Arab states 
gaining ascendancy over their region and assuming firm control over their own 
immediate sphere of influence. 
In this section, 1 will examine how Aljazeera Net represents the referents of Arab 
identity outlined in the first chapter. Whereas the former 
section sets up an image of Arabs through a process of induction, this section will 
examine the methodological terms to deduce the key frames of reference that function as 
catalysts of Arab identity: Pan-Arabism, conflict, religion, media, language, gender and 
culture traits. 
3.3.2.1. The virtual Pan-Arab frame: Uncertain Pan-Arabism and Arab 
nationalism 
In 2004, Thalif Deen, a writer at the IPS-Inter Press Service agency, applauded the 
opinion of Mouin Rabbani, a contributor to the Washington-based 'Middle East Report', 
who believes that Aljazeera "represents an important facet of contemporary Pan-
Arabism" (Deen, 2004). Additionally, Thalif Deen supports the premise that Aljazeera is 
a symbol and "bastion of Arab nationalism" (Deen, 2004). 
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In accord with Thalif Deen's premise, his view of Aljazeera Net's content is also 
consonant with the idea that the ultimate goal of Aljazeera Net's use of the label 'Arabs' 
is to make it function in such a way as to speak for Arabs as a collective entity. This 
pronounced preference to address Arabs as a group can be indicated through an 
examination of Aljazeera Net's archive between 1999 and June 2005: When comparing 
the use of lexical terms, such as 'Arabs', and 'Arab countries' , as used in the headlines of 
Aljazeera Net, there are 779 reported uses of the term 'Arabs' versus 79 uses of 'Arab 
countries'. Similarly, Aljazeera Net prefers to modify the designation of the 'The Arab 
League of States', switching its designation to 'The Arab League'. In conducting a search 
for the terms, 'The Arab League' and 'The Arab League of States', in reference to 
Aljazeera Net's archived headlines, only 6 headlines came back in response to the former 
designation, whereas Aljazeera Net appeared to repeatedly emphasize the latter term, 
recording 133 uses of the term 'The Arab League' . 
Talking about Arabs as an entity, rather than as a c1uster of Arab speaking countries, 
facilitates Aljazeera Net's c1aim that "Arab unit y is the ultimate dream of Arabs" 
(Rashid, 2004), and likewise demonstrates that the desire for Arab cooperation is deeply 
rooted and pervasive (See figure 3-16). Aljazeera Net commonly interrogates the causes 
of Arab failure concerning the issues of political unit y and economic integrity. Indeed, 
one year before the invasion of Iraq, specifically in 2002, Aljazeera Net created a special 
file concerning the issue of 'Arab cooperation'. Despite the po or progress of Arab 
cooperation, Aljazeera Net considers that the current state of Arab cooperation is 
nonetheless encouraging. Reiterating the need for Arabs to attempt to achieve unit y, the 
network points to Arab achievements in the wake of the Gulf Warin 1991, such as 
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Figure 3-16. An Aljazeera 
Net view considering that 
'Arab cooperation' is 
engraved on stone. 
Published in Aljazeera.net 
on 13-06-2002 
Egyptian-Sudanese reconciliation, the Arab-Iranian compromise, the improved relations 
between Libya and other Arab countries, and the peaceful resolutions in regard to inter-
Arab border conflicts, such as those on the Saudi-Emeriti border, the Saudi-Yemeni 
border and the Yemen-Omani border (Ghraybah, 2002). Moreover, Aljazeera Net 
favorably assesses the performance of the Arab League of States since it can be seen as 
having made a positive contribution on the road to integration. The Arab League of 
States, which was established in 1945, was the first initiative to promote Arab 
cooperation, and des pite the shortcomings of the Arab League of States, its achievements 
have been optimistically appraised in the economic field, particularly regarding its 
exertion to increase the level of trade among Arab countries to 9% from its former level 
of 2%. While reckoning this level of trade to be unsatisfactory, Aljazeera Net considers 
that The Arab League of States has created a legitimate rallying point and, furthermore, it 
has helped to solidify Arab ties (Arab, 2002). 
Considered as a symbol of Pan-Arabism, the Arab League of States is a reflection of 
the weaknesses and fragmentary state of union of the Arab countries it serves. 
Nevertheless, the dubious foundation and desultory performance of the Arab League of 
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States has been often subject to Aljazeera Net's criticisms. For instance, Faisel Alqasim, 
an Aljazeera Net host, raises the following questions to reflect on the fundamental basis 
and functioning of the Arab League of States: 
Was not the league conceived out of SuspIcIOn and 
malaise? Is it not true that the Arab League of States was 
initially a British idea that actually aimed to undermine the 
cause of Arab unification? Does the Arab League of States 
constitute a viable framework for Arab unit y, or, more 
controversially, does it promote the fragmentation of the 
local autonomy of Arab countries, whose national 
sovereignty, borders, and independence are only ostensibly 
glorified by the Arab League of States? Does it represent 
all Arabs? That is, is it the home of all Arabs or just sorne 
of them? Why does the league de vote greater attention to 
the issues of sorne countries, while ignoring the key issues 
of other Arab countries? Shouldn't the league be in a 
position to prevail over all Arab conflicts and divisions? ... 
Why has the league become incapable of holding an Arab 
summit? Who controls the league - the Arab countries or 
America? How serious is the league about plans of Arab 
cooperation, Arab security, and Arab economic integration? 
(Alqasim, 1998, April). 
Aljazeera also criticizes the performance of Arab councils, whose objective is to 
enforce Arab cooperation. The existing councils, formed to facilitate Arab poli tic al and 
economic cooperation, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Arab 
Cooperation Council (ACC), and the Arab Maghrib Union (AMU), are considered 
unproductive, and the establishment of one of them, namely, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), was seen as a response to the increasing demand for security in the Gulf 
region (Arab, 2002). The accomplishments of the GCC were deemed unsatisfactory, or 
even negligible, compared to the challenges the council was supposed to meet in the 
region (Arab, 2002, & Alheyagnah, 2002). 
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Aljazeera revisited the issue of Arab Unit y once again in May 2004. This gave 
Faisel Alqasim the opportunity to wonder out loud why Arabs have failed in what 
Europeans have succeeded in, and why all other nations strive for unification, while 
Arabs achieve fragmentation and division (Alqasim, 2004, May). One of the responses to 
Alqasim' s questions, though less surprising than his queries, throws a sidelight on the 
significance of the issue of identity. Ahmed Faisel Khattab, a political science professor, 
responded thus: "while it is ironic to talk about Arab unit y , it is nonetheless a tearful 
subject" (Alqasim, 2004, May). When asked about the way to overcome Arab 
fragmentation, Ahmed Faisel Khattab states: "we need to know who we are, what we 
need, and why we have reached this level of humiliation in Iraq, and in Palestine" 
(Alqasim, 2004, May). 
Aljazeera Net's presumption that Arabs should act collectively and simultaneously 
broaches the question of the Arab nation, and Arab nationalism. Surprisingly, discussion 
about the 'Arab nation' is not particularly abundant at Aljazeera Net: Only 6 headlines 
were produced in response to a search for the term 'Arab nation' on Aljazeera Net's 
archive. Aljazeera Net's limited discussion in regard to the Arab nation has been bound 
up with conflicts concerning Arab countries' borders. Indeed, conflicts relating to the 
borders of Arab countries seem to occasion the further fragmentation of Arab states. 
Consequently, Faisel Alqasim, Aljazeera's host, describes them as 'time bombs', and 
'colonial traps' (Alqasim, 1999, March). Symbolically, the images employed in figures 3-
3, & 3-4, & and later, in 3-16, explain how Aljazeera Net has visualized the geographic 
borders of the Arab nation, conferring upon its users a conceptual, geopolitical image as 
to what the Arab nation might be. 
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In turning now to Aljazeera Net's Vlew of Arab nationaIism, somewhat 
paradoxicaIly, Aljazeera Net has continued to maintain a duaI position in regard to Arab 
nationalist thought. On the one hand, the network has critiqued the tenets of the Arab 
nationaIist movement, describing them as rebellious and undemocratic (InternaI, 2003). 
For instance, in its anaIysis of 'internaI democracy in the Arab nationalist movement', 
Aljazeera Net reports that: 
TaIk about internaI democracy within the movement is not 
feasible, since democracy is lacking. Even during the later 
stages of the movement, when electing the movement' s 
leaders was permitted, elections did not have any practical 
basis. The movement was not a democratic politicaI party 
in the manner of the other Arab parties working in the same 
arena, since these relied on the people, and appealed to 
them to determine their politicaI goaIs and other matters of 
concern. The movement was a sort of 'revolutionary' party, 
who se tenets and theories were c1ear-cut and 
indisputable ... It was a party that looking forward to the 
'next revolution' rather than the 'next election' (InternaI, 
2003). 
While Aljazeera's hosts debate the question of Arab nationalist thought, dismissing 
it as just a matter of 'slogans' that the various Arab publics have ceased to swaIlow, or as 
a pretext for the dictatoriaI regimes to continue in their despotism, Aljazeera, on the other 
hand, in its paradoxicaIly dual response to the question, aIso tends to bemoan the faII of 
Arab nationaIist thought and the growing tendency to disbelieve in Arab nationaIism, 
while striving to demonstrate, in a parallel view, that though it is subject to distortion and 
irrationaIity, it has nonetheless been an un justifiable target on the part of the opponents of 
Arab unit y (Alqasim, 1998, February & Alqasim, 2003, July). 
In the wake of the invasion of Iraq, Aljazeera focused on the future of Arab 
nationaIism, inquiring whether Arabism, and Arab nationaIism, will be eliminated or 
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renovated. Ghassan Ben-Gedo, Aljazeera's host, questions whether international pressure 
will push Arab nationalists toward a cri tic al revision, or will lead them to escape what 
they caU the American hegemonic plan, and the closely aligned Israeli threat (Ben-Gedo, 
2005). Sorne of Aljazeera' s hosts, such as Faisel Alqasim, tend to consider that 'the 
recent fall of Baghdad' will usher in the end of Arab nationalism (Alqasim, 2003, July). 
Briefly, Aljazeera Net's appeal to Arabs to act coUectively to increase their political 
and economic cooperation, and its strategy to address Arabs in general, regardless of their 
local affiliations, explains why Aljazeera Net has bec orne a 'virtual' space for Pan 
Arabism, that is, a space for the paradoxes of the uncertain reality of Arabism and the 
symbolic hope, for better or worse, of enhanced Pan-Arab cooperation. Likewise, 
Aljazeera Net' s image of Arab nationalism explains why Arab nationalism remains 
merely an idea that, in the safekeeping of Arab nationalists, is not currently capable of 
becoming a reality. Moreover, it is an idea that is strained by the undemocratic roots of 
Arab nationalism movements per se, and co-opted by the cynical and tyrannical practices 
of Arab regimes (Alqasim, 2003, July). However, despite Aljazeera Net's criticism of the 
key theories that govern Arab nationalism and the performance of Arab nationalists, its 
essential vision - which is more or less hopeful about the endeavors of Arab nationalists 
to employ more democratic strategies on a domestic level and to be capable of resisting 
colonial plans with regard to the Arab region - not only points to the 'symbolic' nature of 
Arab nationalism, but also accounts for Aljazeera Net's stress on the imaginative, 
perpetually evolving and consequently uncertain character of Arab nationalism. 
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3.3.2.2. Arab conflict frames: Imperative resistance, legitimate anger and 
hatred, and obsessive rlXations on alliances and enemies 
This examination of how Aljazeera Net represents Arab conflicts with others may 
require a brief reconsideration of the argument, initiated in the first chapter, about Arab 
identity, which explains why Arab engagement in conflicts can in fact galvanize their 
identity, thereby leading them to engage in various forms of resistance, and to instigate 
widespread eruptions of anger in the Arab world. Reciprocally, Aljazeera Net's 
contextualization of Arab conflicts with the Other is forged by means of a bilateral frame, 
who se basis resides in resistance to the other and the expression of outraged indignation 
towards it. This section begins with the representation of resistance in relation to the 
conflicts of Arabs with others. The ensuing analysis of this image of resistance will be 
followed by a discussion relating to how Aljazeera Net depicts and rationalizes what it 
sees as anger and hate expressed towards the Other. Further debate will portray the 
potential grounds of alliance of Arabs with their enemies. 
For Aljazeera Net, conflict with the Other refers to conflict with the West and, more 
particularly, with the United States, Britain and Israel. Current conflicts do not merely 
center on the question of occupation per se, but on the right of Arabs to resist occupation, 
since they tend to focus on dis agreements about the definition of 'resistance' versus 
'terrorism'. Although Aljazeera Net criticizes Arab leaders and the Arab League of 
States, it endorses their positions regarding the importance of differentiating between 
'resistance' and 'terrorism'. Aljazeera Net's appraisal of the Arab leaders' standpoint 
toward resistance is evident in its representation of a number of incidents. Thus, it 
emphasizes the constant calI of the General Secretary of the Arab League of States, Mr. 
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Amer Mousa, as weIl as Arab regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Qatar, to make terminologie al 
distinctions between conflicting terms (Syria, 2001, & Qatari, 2001, & Amer, 2001, & 
The Islamic, 2002). 
After conferring official status on the importance of resistance Aljazeera Net 
proceeds to reflect on its users, claiming them as a representative sample of those Arab 
publics whose perceptions tend to support resistance, especially resistance expressed 
against the coalition troops that invaded Iraq in March 2003. During 2003, particularly 
between June and December, Aljazeera Net conducted four poIls to examine the 
perceptions of its users conceming resistance. At least 80 percent of those who 
participated in Aljazeera Net's poIl in June 2003 agreed that resistance was being waged 
for the sake of the Iraqi people (Aljazeera Net, 2003, June). Before the capture of former 
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, 61 percent of Aljazeera Net' s users claimed that 
Saddam's audiotape, broadcast by Aljazeera in July 2003, would strengthen Iraqi 
resistance (Aljazeera Net, 2003, July). 
Correspondingly, in November 2003, when asked whether resistance operations 
would force the occupying troops in Iraq to accelerate their withdrawal, 81 percent of 
Aljazeera Net's users responded positively to this question (Majority, 2003). Immediately 
after the capture of Iraq's former President, Saddam Hussein, in December 2003, a 
majority of Aljazeera Net users, that is, precisely 88.9 percent of the total polled assumed 
that resistance wou Id not end as a result of his capture (Aljazeera Net, 2003, December). 
(See figures 3-17, & 3-18, & 3-19, & 3-20). Likewise, in an opinion proclaimed as late as 
the winter of 2004, Aljazeera Net continues to count on a considerable percent age of its 
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Figure 3-17. 82% of Aljazeera Net's 
visitors believe that resistance is in the 
interests of the Iraqi people. 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
28-06-2003 
Figure 3-19. 81.7% of Aljazeera Net 
visitors believe that resistance 
operations will accelerate the 
withdrawal of the occupation troops. 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
06-11-2003 
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Figure 3-18.69.5% of Aljazeera Net 
visitors believe that Saddam Hussein 
audio tape broadcast in July 2003, 
will intensif y the Iraqi resistance. 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
09-07-2003 
Figure 3-20. 88.9% of Aljazeera Net 
visitors believe that the detention of 
Saddam Hussein will not lead to the 
termination of Iraqi resistance. 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
17-12-2003 
users (85.5%) to express their support for the 'Palestinian Intifada', regardless of how 
disastrous the Palestinian sacrifice is conceived to be (Do, 2004). (See figure 3-21). 
In examining the representation of resistance in Palestine and Iraq, it becomes clear 
that Aljazeera Net's support56 for the Palestinian 'Intifada' has taken on a variety of 
forms. Aljazeera Net is at pains to track the historical roots of resistance (Abd-Elatti, 
2000, & Ahmidi, 2002), describing armed resistance as a power - that has become more 
creative, and whose influence has increased through the preceding decades (Dawood, 
2002). Moreover, it is seen as 'the absolute way for Palestinians to respond to Israel' 
(Resistance, 2001), and as the "univers al law that enables human beings through the 
centuries to obtain their freedom and independence" (Abd-Elatti, 2000, The Intifada, 
2004). The images Aljazeera Net employs, both pictorial and linguistic, often describe 
the Palestinian resistance, sometimes depicting it as a "sad lion" terrified by pressure 
from the Palestinian authority (see figure 3-22), and then paradoxically, or even 
contradictorily, conceiving it as "heroic" (Heroic, 2002). 
Whether the Intifada should be peaceful or militant is a key subject of debate at 
Aljazeera, which devoted 36 of its programs57 to discuss the issue over a period of two 
years, particularly from October 2000 to December 2002. Both quantitative and 
56 Aljazeera's support for resistance often prompts the allegations of its critics, presented in the second 
chapter, who assume that Aljazeera is a provocative, or even, bellicose media. In response to this claim, 
Aljazeera Net continues to count on its users' perceptions concerning the performance of Arab satellite 
media. In one of Aljazeera Nefs poIls, users report that they cannot support a statement stating that the 
Arab channels' satellite, including Aljazeera, provoke resistance against the occupation troops in Iraq 
(Aljazeera Net, 2003). (See figure 3-23). 
57 Among the thirty-six programs Aljazeera devoted to a discussion of the issue of the Intifada, there were 
thirteen debates about the militant Intifada, wherein 18 interviewees supported the notion of the 
comprehensiveness of the actions undertaken by Intifada, including the need for militant resistance. 
Moreover, eight of the se interviews were conducted with religious preachers, including seven Muslim 
sheikhs, and one priest. 
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Figure 3-21. 85.5% of 
Aljazeera Net visitors 
support the 
continuation of the 
Intifadda despite the 
tragic sacrifices 
incurred 
Published in Aljazeera 
Net on 
03-10-2004 
Figure 3-22. An Aljazeera Net cartoon about the domestication of the Palestinian 
resistance movement Published in Aljazeera Net on 25-08-2003 
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Figure 3-23. 54.8% of Aljazeera Net 
visitors believe that Arab satellite 
channels do not provoke resistance 
against the occupation of Iraq 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
02-08-2003 
qualitative analyses show that Aljazeera favors a militant Intifada. In examining the 
debate at Aljazeera, 36 guests58 agreed that an armed Intifada was the legitimate 
vindicator of the Palestinians, c1aiming that is the legal right of Palestinians to resist the 
daily aggression unleashed against them (Alqasim, 2001, May, & Alqasim, 2002, April, 
& Alqasim, 2002, December). Furthermore, the supporters of the resistance of the 
militias have described their opponents as hopeless, and even craven in spirit (Alqasim, 
2002, December). 
58 Among the thirty-six guests, interviewed by Aljazeera, who support the idea that resistance should be 
comprehensive, including the militant supporters of Intifada, the following may be specifically mentioned: 
• Thirteen Arab scholars: Mohamed AIsaeed Idris, a researcher at the AIAhram Center for Political 
and Strategie Stuties, Egypt; Borhan Ghalyoon, an Aljazeera Net freelancer and a professor of 
sociology at the Sorbonne; Azaam Altamimi, the director of the Institute for Islamic Political 
Thought at Westminster University - Mohmaed Alhassen Weld Alddou, the director of the 
Scientific Center in Nouakchott; Abd-Alwahab Almiseeri, an Egyptian expert on the Zionist 
movement; Abd-Allatif Almahmoud, a professor at the University of Bahrain; Rashed 
Aighanoushi, the leader of the Alnahdah Party in Tunisia; Abd-Alelah Baleqeez, a member and 
the General Secretary of the Arab National conference; Maher Osman, a political analyst; Abd-
Alwahab Altartiri, a scientific manager of the Islam Today Website; Shalabi Altalhami, a 
professor of International Relations at the University of Maryland; Ra'ef Nejm, a former 
lordanian Minister; and finally, Hamadain Sabahi, an Egyptian Member ofParliament. 
• Four leaders of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS, Harakat al-Muqawamah al-
Islarniyyah) were interviewed: Mohamed Nezal, Khaled Mashael, Osama Hamdan, and Mahmoud 
Alzahar. 
• Three members of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (FATAH, Harakat Altahir 
alwatani al-Phalestini): Hatem Abd-Alqader, Hussein Aisheikh, and Abu-Khaled Alomlaa. 
• Abu-Ali Mostafa, the fomer General Secrtary of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 
• Three religious scholars: Sheikh Yousef Alqaradawi, Abd-Almo'ty Mohamed Bayoumi, the dean 
of the faculty of Ossoul Adeen, and Attallah Hana, the spokesman of the Roman Orthodox church. 
• Two Palestinain writers: Yasser Alzatrah and Anis Alnaqash. 
• Three Palestinian OfficiaIs: Farouk Alqadoumi, the director of the political table of the PLO, the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization; Mamdouh Nofal, the advisor of the President of the 
Palestinian National Authority; and Ali Sadek, the Palestinian Deputy Minister of Planning and 
International Relations. 
• Five Palestinian Personnel: Abd-AIsttar Qasim, Mohamed Sawalah, Yousef Alkhateeb, Maryam 
Abu-Daqa and Ibrahim Abu-Alnaja. 
• Hassen Nasser Allah, the General Secretary of Hizb-Allah in the Lebanon. 
• Ali Akbar Mohtashmi, the leader of a reforrnÏst group in the Iranian parliament. 
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On the contrary, only 12 guests59 appear to have rejected the pro gram and aims of 
the militant Intifada. The opponents of militant resistance invite their challengers to cease 
being so provocative, as weIl as to consider the harmful consequences of armed 
resistance. Their rationale is that the militant Intifada incites Israel to be always on the 
offensive, increases the incidence of famine among Palestinians and escalates the rate of 
unemployment found among them, putting acute pressure on women who have lost their 
husbands or family members, and aIl this, to achieve a result that still posits the 
Palestinians as the political losers (Alqasim, 2001, May, & Alqasim, 2002, April, & 
Alqasim, 2002, December). In accord with this view, Aljazeera Net's statistics for the 
five years of Intifada, proves that militant Palestinians have, perhaps inadvertently, 
inflicted considerable harm on the side of the Palestinians60 rather than on the side of the 
Israelis (The Alaqsa, 2005). 
Edward Said, in an interview with Aljazeera, stated his uneasiness with the 
militarization of resistance, describing the conflict as a war of attrition, whose cost is paid 
by the Palestinians who are killed on a daily basis, and not just by Israelis (Mansour, 
2000, November). Recently, in the 2005 coverage of the Palestinian Intifada, while 
Aljazeera Net invites its users to assess the outcome of five years of Intifada, dedicating 
one of its forums to talk about four years of resistance (Four, 2005), the main content of 
59 Twelve guests interviewed by Aljazeera appear to have rejected the militant Intifada: the Palestinian 
Edward Said, the late professor of literature at Columbia university; Sari Nessbeyah, a professor of Islamic 
philosophy at Alqods university; Ghassan Alateyah, a professor of political science and the editor in chief 
of Almalef, an Iraqi magazine; Ahmed Matter, a researcher and Palestinian writer; Shi mon Shetrit, former 
Israeli Minister; Ziad Abu-Ziad, a Palestinian Minister; Jihad Alkhzen and Alsaleh Bou Walid, writers at 
Dar Alhayat Newspaper; Ahmed Alhmaly, political analyst; Selim Nassar, a Lebanese writer and political 
analyst; Mazen Ezz-Eldin, a member of the Palestinian Authority, and Abas Zaki, a member of the 
Palestinian National Liberation Movement (FATAH, Harakat Altahir alwatani al-Phalestini). 
60 Statistics that Aljazeera Net has published indicate that the Palestinians who have been killed during the 
2000-2004 Intifada are 4130, versus 1068 Israelis (The Alaqsa, 2005). 
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its coverage lends support to the views of the advocates of militant Intifada. Obviously, 
this perspective reflects the views of the various Islamic movements and pro-Islamic 
writers (Alrajoub, 2004, & The spokesman, 2004, & Alzatrah, 2004), and seeks to 
present the view that the development of resistance: enables the Palestinian issue to 
remain alive (Alzatrah, 2004), triggers the fears of Israelis (Ramadan, 2004), and belies 
the falsity of the peaceful negotiation process (Alrajoub, 2004). 
More significantly, Aljazeera often re-mediates the debate about military resistance. 
In two responses, or challenges, from Faisel Alqasim, Aljazeera's anchor, to two 
opponents of Intifada, Ahmed Matter, a researcher and Palestinian writer, and Ghassan 
Alateyah, a professor of political science and the editor in chief of Almalef, the Iraqi 
magazine, Alqasim criticized Ahmed Matter for his supposed psychosocial inferiority, 
and for lending propagandistic support to the cause of Palestinian defeat (Alqasim, 2001, 
January). By linking the Israeli occupation of Palestine to issues that do not address the 
core of the conflict, and yet appeal to the sympathies of Arabs, a similar critique was 
likewise made by Alqasim, who had the following to say to Ghassan Alateyah: 
But you know that Israel plays strategie colonial, 
imperiaz61, and ever expanding roles; and whatever role is 
chosen, the Intifada partially prevails over its outcome. 
Now Israel could hardly fail to secure its domestic position, 
and its very existence ... whereas you come here to make 
resistance on the street hopeless (Alqasim, 2002, May). 
'The cinema of resistance' and graphie arts are two major cultural forms of 
resistance that Aljazeera Net employs, and they occasionally serve as sites of an implicit 
struggle to hi ghlight Palestinian grievances against the occupation. They are 
61 The words have been italicized by the writer to refer to Alqasim's exploitation of expressions that exert 
an emotional appeal in regard to the perceptions of Aljazeera's viewers and users. 
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consequently used to brief readers of Aljazeera's website about the Palestinian people's 
suffering, to document the Palestinians' distress, and to perpetuate the symbolic signs of 
Palestinian identity, such as the Palestinian scarf, handcuff and cactus, thus serving to 
mobilize people to engage in resistance (Two, 2003, & Alrajoub, 2004, October). 
According to Aljazeera Net, the directors of the movies, 'Ticket to Jerusalem', 'Cookies 
are Still to be Found on the Sidewalk' and 'The Business' do not only invite the Arab 
public to sympathize with the Palestinian struggle; rather, they believe that the images 
that these films portray of Palestinians, who must live under occupation, are compelling 
enough to motivate resistance (Screened, 2002, & Two, 2003). Mohamed Aladdle, the 
producer of the movie, 'The Business', told Aljazeera Net that his film serves as a call 
urging the refusal of reconciliation with Israel, and an urgent attempt to rescue Arabs 
youths from their indifference (The Business, 2001). 
Following the same line of argument, AIjazeera Net portrays a sustaining image, or 
even myth, of resistance against the occupation in Iraq. It explains that the success of 
resistance has increased the capabilities of the Iraqis to challenge its invaders (Rashid, 
2003), and that the efficacy of resistance has caused a political crisis for US President 
George W. Bush, costing him 4 billion dollars monthly to coyer military operations 
(Four, 2003). Resistance, the argument of Aljazeera Net goes, forces the United States to 
transfer political power to the Iraqis (Rashid, 2003, November). The formidable scale of 
resistance in Iraq is assumed to be an occasion for triumph. For example, Yasser Alzatrah 
(June 2003) writes, conceming the resistance in Iraq: "when resistance is the choice, the 
victory of free publics will be guaranteed" (Alzatrah, 2003). 
200 
Obviously, for Aljazeera Net, the question of Islamic resistance is a key issue. It 
criticized the Shiite source (The Howza) for being silent despite the attack against the Ali 
Ben Abu-Talib mosque (Mohamed, 2004), and in a similar vein, sorne of the Aljazeera 
Net writers are determined to theologize resistance to the occupation in Iraq. At least two 
articles of Yasser Alzatrah, the Aljazeera Net freelancer, express pro-Islamic views about 
resistance. Questioning whether the identity of resistance in Iraq is Bahthi or Islamic, 
Alzatrah writes: 
The fact of it being Islamic resistance is one of the most 
important guarantees for the continuation of resistance in 
Iraq; not just because there is an Arab sunni space, but also 
because there are other ethnie and religious spaces, and 
more importantly, because it strengthens the rationality and 
practieality of those who resist, and the people who help 
and support them. (Alzatrah, 2003, October) 
Almost a year later, in September 2004, the same writer who had thus pointed to the 
rationality of those who ensure continued resistance in Iraq accused the Islamists, 
particularly those who resist, of being prompted by what he calls jihad thought. Alzatrah 
writes: 
When the Moujahedeen make mistakes during resistance, 
there is always an immediate and unqualified criticism 
condemning them and refusing their mistakes ... What is 
notieeable is that many Islamists are still influenced by this 
conditioning, especially as the 'modemist' condemnatory 
perspective demands the same kind of clear collective 
Islamic position to confront 'terrorists and extremists'. 
Otherwise, Islamists are charged as being in the same camp 
as the terrorists. If the Islamic effort does not have even 
more considerable achievements to its name, this is because 
the voices that calI for putting Islamists and terrorists in the 
same category are increasing. According to these voices, 
the resistance, inspired by jihad tendencies, leads to 
uncontrolled violence that may necessitate the rejection of 
these thoughts on the part of their followers, in the interest 
of making every thing ready for the spread of the 
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'modernist' commodity without 'radical' barriers (Alzatrah, 
2004, September). 
After two years of occupation, Shafiq Shoqayer, the Aljazeera Net writer, attempted 
to assess the outcome of resistance in Iraq in 2005. While describing the significance of 
resistance as being rapid and positive, Shoqayer called on the Iraqi resistance movements 
to desist from their acts of terror and to cooperate with the Iraqi Politicians who support 
resistance and oppose occupation. Shoqayer' s concern is that uncontrolled resistance may 
lead to ethnic clashes. Therefore, he invites Iraqis to discard the groups that target both 
Iraqi and non-Iraqi civilians, and enjoins their condemnation against those who behead 
people (Shoqayer, 2005). 
Aljazeera Net draws on its users' perceptions about the imperative of resistance in 
Iraq. In two of Aljazeera Net's polIs, the majority of respondents (89%) recommended 
armed resistance as the way forward for Iraqi liberation in 2004 (Aljazeera Net, 2004), 
whereas (59%) of all participants later refused to entertain the ide a of the engagement of 
armed resistance groups in the political processes now in play in Iraq (Aljazeera Net, 
2005). (See figures 3-24, & 2-25). 
Certainly, the barrage of images relating to the events in Palestine and Iraq increase 
the anger and indignation of Arabs, and also inflame the debate about the Other in the 
context of Aljazeera Net. Two clusters of images associated with the recent occupation of 
Iraq are especially significant here. The first group of images is related to the US soldiers 
who abused Iraqi prisoners in the Abu Gharib jail. The images from Abu Gharib prison 
were frequently utilized as raw material for Aljazeera Net writers, whose articles 
assiduously traced the leak of Abu Gharib images, and sought to explain how these 
would further contaminate the image of the United States in the Arab World. 
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Figure 3-24. A year after the occupation 
of Iraq, 89% of Aljazeera Net visitors 
believed that Armed resistance was more 
significant than peaceful resistance 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
12-04-2004 
Figure 3-25. 59% of Aljazeera Net 
visitors do not urge the incorporation of 
Iraqi resistance within the political 
process 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
09-07-2005 
Ibrahim Abu-Alhayja's article, entitled: 'Abu Gharib: the embodiment of American 
values rather than an exception', describes the United States as a country that is 
constantly implicated in colonialism and war. He believes that what happened at Abu 
Gharib jail was not merely an individual mistake nor the product of a 'sick desire', but 
rather, could be emblematically situated: "at the heart of the American ethos that 
produces the seeds of fascist authoritarianism" (Abu-Alhayja, 2004). Mohamed Ben-
Almokhtar Alshankity, a Mauritanian writer, reiterated the same ideas as his fellow 
freelancer, Abu-Alhayja. In this respect, Alshankity writes: 
The scandaIs conceming the occupants of Abu Gharib jail 
expose the dark side of the American personality, which 
most Arabs and Muslims are not even aware of; the 
dimension of violence, sexuality, indulgence, sadism; the 
culture of Hollywood who se effect is so destructive on the 
American psyche; and finally, a culture that is indoctrinated 
with the fundamentalism of religious extremism, while its 
depraved moral mores can reach a pitch of animality 
(Alshankity, 2004). 
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Ahmed Farouq, the editor of Aljazeera Net, stresses the idea that scandaIs in Iraq 
will be constantly repeated, using this as a justification for the following remarks: 
Iraqis and the public opinion in the World will be waiting 
for the next news event that will reveal even more scandaIs 
prompted by American and British excesses in Abu Gharib, 
Guantanamo and Afghanistan against the prisoners and 
detainees of the American war that is supposedly being 
waged against terrorism (Farouq, 2005). 
A few months later, a video clip showed an American soldier killing a wounded 
man in one of the Mosques of Alfaluja, an image hardly less harmful than the images 
depicting the abuse of Iraqi prisoners. The comments of Rania Alzoghby, an Aljazeera 
Net editor, about the video clip reinforce the image of the false and inauthentic nature of 
American basic principles, outlined above, and it is representative of the recent reports 
contained in Aljazeera Net. Thus Alzoghby states: 
The cameras of the Westem media once again disclose the 
violations and scandaIs of American troops, which came to 
Iraq with slogans announcing the protection of human 
rights and freedoms, justice, and peace, and yet they 
committed a new scandal in addition to the outrages of Abu 
Gharib that shook the World a few months ago (Alzoghby, 
2004). 
Whereas a number of Aljazeera Net writers exploit single events through which to 
extrapolate their views about American culture, others, su ch as Kamal Alhelbawi, the 
leader of the Arab association in Britain, differentiate between American foreign policies 
toward the Middle East in the last fifty years and Arab resentment towards the United 
States. Alhelbawi alerts Arabs to three features of what he terms "American strategie 
thinking:" first, he notes the persistence of the United States in consolidating its power as 
the most wealthy, powerful, resource-monopolizing country in the world, always intent 
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upon ensuring the dominance of its affairs and its business interests everywhere. 
Alhelbawi explains that the United States always succeeds in its strategy through the 
power of its material resources, and through its extensive web of relations, and its ready-
made resolutions to any problem (Alhelbawi, 2002, February). Secondly, he shows how 
the United States is quick to exploit weaknesses in others62• Finally, protecting Israel and 
securing its expansion is seen as the third strategy of the United States (Alhelbawi, 2002, 
February). More challenging still is Alhelbawi's view of the principles that guide US 
strategy, which appear in a conversation between Maher Abd-Allah, Aljazeera's anchor, 
and Alhelbawi. In the words of Kamal Alhelbawi: 
The chief American strategy is to keep the world in 
ignorance, thereby preserving its status as a supremely 
powerful and wealthy state, while others are obliged to 
remain ignorant... They [the Americans] do not even deny 
that.. . no American President fails to state that America 
should lead and others should follow (Abd-Allah, 2002, 
November). 
Edward Said seems to share the views of Kamal Alhelbawi about America's 
insistence on protecting its business interests, even through the use of force. Yet, Said 
further tells Aljazeera that the United States remains unknown to the Arabs, since almost 
no Arabs have attempted to conduct comprehensive investigations into American history 
(Mansour, 2000, November). Edward Said criticizes the failure of Arabs to understand 
that "America is more concemed with its business and affairs, but not with humanity and 
the self-determination of rights" (Mansour, 2000, November). Said further states, in 
regard to human rights slogans, that: "we [Arabs] take these slogans literally, and think 
that they represent America" (Mansour, 2000, November). However, Edward Said 
62 Kamal Alhelbawi used the CNN coverage of the frrst Gulf war as an example of how far the United 
States was prepared to go to exploit the vacuum of Arab media to control media coverage in the Arab 
region (Alhelbawi, 2002, February). 
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asserts: "Americans are against all liberation movements without exception ... without 
exception" (Mansour, 2000, November). 
In its coverage of events in Palestine and Iraq, Aljazeera Net describes Arab streets 
as being overwhelmed by "Arab public anger," by "the volcanoes of people anger," and 
by "anger protests" (Parallel, 2002, & Clashes, 2003, & The anger, 2003, & The Arab 
public, 2003). Reminding us with the argument initiated in the first chapter about how 
Arabs communÎcate by shouting, accompanied with signs and gestures of anger (Patai, 
2002, p. 170), Aljazeera' s reportage concerning the essential tasks of resistance, 
propelled by images of Arab public anger, as shown in figures 3-26, & 3-27, can be 
adduced to contextualize the image Aljazeera Net wishes to convey of the Other. 
Nevertheless, in examining how Aljazeera Net characterizes the West, it should be noted 
that the relationship between Arabs and the West is generally conveyed in terms of 
paradox and ambiguity. Generally speaking, Aljazeera Net assumes that there is a 
reciprocal 'hatred' between Arabs and Muslims on one side and the Other on the 
opposing side. At least two of Aljazeera Net's programs, broadcast on Aljazeera Net, 
talked about the longstanding grudge nurtured in the West towards Muslims and Arabs 
(Mansour, 1997, August 31, & Abd-Allah, 2002, July 7). 
In response to the questions raised by Aljazeera hosts about the deep-rooted reasons 
for the 'hatred' believed to exist between Muslims and the West, Ahmed Alrawi, the 
chairperson of the Islamic organizations' Union in Europe, relates this legacy of hatred to 
the ongoing conflicts with the West, such as the Crusades, the conflict with the Ottoman 
State, and the consequences of Western colonialism, all of which have produced a culture 
of hatred (Mansour, 1997, August 31). While Alrawi considers that it is unfair to deal 
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Figures 3-26, 3-27. Images of Arab anger 
within Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan 
Sources: 
http://www.aliazeera.netlnews/archi ve/archi ve? Arch 
iveId=50931 
http://www.aljazeera.netinews/archive/archive?Arch 
iveId=52254 
with the West as an absolute entity, he believes that hatred of Islam has long been at the 
heart of Western consciousness (Mansour, 1997, August 31). In a different posture, 
Mounzer Alassad, an Islamic researcher, responded positively to the same question put to 
him by the Aljazeera host, stating: "the grudge of Westerners toward us is not absolute. 
Not every Westerner bears the same malice towards us as others do. Perhaps this is the 
image we are content to nurture, but it may nonetheless deceive us" (Abd-Allah, 2002, 
July 7). 
Before moving on to explain how 'hate' influences the image Aljazeera Net has of 
the Other, it is worth shedding light on its relations with two particular Others that 
Aljazeera Net represents as being pro-Arab, or as confirming an implicit alliance with 
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Arabs, namely, those Others viewed through the prism of Arab-European relations and 
Arab-Latin American relations. Arab-European relations are seen as an example of what 
rnight be considered a more positive orientation between Arab countries and the West. 
The European Union, for example, is considered to be cooperative with both Arabs and 
Muslims. It called on Israel to end the econornic siege imposed on the Palestinian 
territories in March 2001 (Protests, 2001), supported the former Palestinian President 
Yasser Arafat and refused to share in Israel and the United States' attempt to marginalize 
him in 2003 (Europe, 2003), and finally, with the exception of Britain, it rejected the war 
against Iraq (Criticizing, 2003). Aljazeera Net considered that the participation of the 
European Union's representatives in the meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers in February 
2003, just a month before the invasion of Iraq, was "an appeal from Europe to the Arabs 
to safeguard their future development" (When, 2003). 
Although Arab and Islarnic countries announced their aim to participate in the war 
against terror in the wake of the September Il th attacks, the dis agreements between 
Europe, and Arab and Muslim countries, nonetheless appeared on the surface, 
particularly when it came to the interpretation of 'resistance' and 'terrorism' 
(Disagreement, 2001). Aljazeera Net referred to the offenses of five Muslim countries, as 
detailed by European Union representatives, who refused to exc1ude the occupation of 
Palestine from the list of reasons for the September Il th attacks (Disagreement, 2001). 
To Aljazeera, Arab-Latin American relations appear to be stronger than Arab-
European relations, and not merely because of the "increasing enrnity of the Latin 
American people to the United States" (An increase, 2003) as a result of the occupation 
of Iraq, but rather because of the inspirational image of Hugo Chavez, the Venezuelan 
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President, who is honored as a charismatic symbol of resistance against the United States. 
Adulation for Hugo Chavez, notably in respect to his message to Arabs, emerged wh en 
Faisel Alqasim interviewed Chavez in December of 2004. Furthermore, Alqasim's 
opening remarks offer a flattering picture of the popularity of Chavez among Arabs: 
Mf. President ... undeniably, you know that you have vast 
popularity among millions of Arabs, and personally 1 have 
read a remark stating that if President Chavez were to 
nominate his candidacy in any Arab elections, he would 
secure ninety percent of the vote, which is a token of real 
esteem. The Arab's street's adulation of your personality is 
due to your concem for po or people in your country, and 
your bold challenge to the United States, the only 
superpower in the World (Alqasim, 2004, December). 
In reply, Hugo Chavez explains that the view of Washington as imperialistic reflects 
the liberal view of the Latin American people, which originated over two hundred years 
ago (Alqasim, 2004, December), and he further states that: 
We [the Venezuelans] do not occupy the defensive 
position, but rather we assume a position of attack ... What 
makes me admire the Arab public is its power to unite. Yet, 
1 want to explain that this power should not be limited to 
the military, but rather, it should be vested in spiritual 
power; the power of one united and aware public; and this 
is one of the missions that Aljazeera is currently interested 
in perforrning (Alqasim, 2004, December). 
Now, in scrutinizing the main details of the image Aljazeera Net is attempting to 
portray of the Other, particularly in using 'hate' as a label, which frequently appears 
in Aljazeera' s content to contextualize the relationship between Arab countries and 
the West it is c1ear that this hatred facilitates 'enmity' toward the Other. Moreover, 
such enmity toward the Other is especially pronounced in the view that Aljazeera Net 
takes towards both the United States and Israel. 
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Strikingly, enmity towards the United States was already part of Aljazeera's image 
of America even before the attacks on September lllh. In June 2001, Aljazeera Net 
programmed 'The opposite Direction' (Alitejah Aalmoakes), which devoted a discussion 
to "The American enemy" (Alqasim, 2001, June). In his introductory statement, Faisel 
Alqasim, the program' s host, stated: 
For Arabs, is there any difference between Zionist and 
American perspectives? Does not Israel stand for America, 
and America for Israel? Aren't the two theories in fact 
identical, and therefore our first enemy is America even 
though we try to get around this fact? (Alqasim, 2001, 
June). 
Aljazeera Net's image concerning the United States and Israel stresses the alliance 
between them. Aljazeera Net cartoons contain abundant illustrations of the relationship 
between the United States and Israel, portraying it as a 'true alliance' , a coalition against 
Arabs, particularly Palestinians, who are not able to break through the United States-
Israel power alignment, regardless of the scale of the power they, the Palestinians, have 
(See figures 3-28). Aljazeera cartoons commonly conceive American and Israeli 
personnel as symbols of the ongoing conflict with the United State and Israel. Thus, 
President George Bush is described as the 'coach' for the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon, who is trained to strike out at certain Arab countries, such as Syria (See figures 
3-29). Condoleezza Rice is seen as the main representative of the double standard 
implicit in the United States' perspective on the Arab World, because she refused to 
countenance what she considered as the Syrian "occupation" of the Lebanon, which 
apparently took place against the will of the Lebanese people, and she explained how this 
incursion played a decisive part in bringing pro-Syrian officials into the Lebanese 
government and thereby affected the outcome of the elections. Aljazeera cartoonists 
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Figure 3-28. Aljazeera Net cartoon about 
the alliance between The United States 
and Israel against The Palestinians 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
30-05-2003 
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Figure 3-29. Aljazeera Net cartoon 
portraying the US President as a 
'coach' for the Israeli Prime Minister 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
06-10-2003 
2- ... and 
staying in it 
(Lebanon) 
despite 
strong 
opposition ... 
4-.. all these 
things make 
the Syrian 
pressure in 
Lebanon 
unacceptable! ! 
Figure 3-30. An Aljazeera Net cartoon depicting 
Condoleezza Rice as a typical representative for 
the double standard informing The United 
States' foreign policy in the Arab World 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 18-02-2005 
1- Occupying 
a country 
(Lebanon) to 
rescue it... 
3- ... and 
appointing pro-
leaders (Syrian) , 
and conducting 
unrepresentati ve 
elections ... 
invite its users to consider how Condoleezza Rice is hypocritically prepared to 
countenance the same kind of raid as the United States, which, in the view of Aljazeera, 
is currently undertaking an illegal occupation of Iraq (See figures 3-30). 
As caricatured by Aljazeera cartoonists, the United States is additionally seen as the 
'cooker' that prepares the meal for Arabs, using Palestinians as fuel. Moreover, the US is 
also seen as a 'baker' who se job is to divide up the Arab World, or as a muscle man who 
is pictured destroying the Arab World's 'pyramids' by brute force in order to impose 
democracy (See figures 3-31, & 3-32, and 3-33). In accord with such Aljazeera Net 
cartoons, Kamal Habib, an Aljazeera Net writer, believes: "that the modemization 
imposed by gun-power, human indignity and national honor will not lead to development, 
reform, or construction, but to resistance and rebellion, and perhaps, to even more deadly 
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Figure 3-31. Aljazeera Net cartoon 
portraying the US President as a cook who 
uses Palestinians to feed the flames 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 05-05-2002 
Figure 3-32. An Aljazeera Net cartoon 
showing how the United States acts as 
baker who aims to divide the Arab World 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
13-08-2002 
Figure 3-33. An Aljazeera Net 
cartoon showing how the United 
States conceives democracy in the 
Arab World 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
09-06-2003 
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What is the greatest danger currently 
threatening Arabs? 
Figure 3-34. 44.7% of Aljazeera Net 
respondents saw the United States as 
the biggest danger that Arabs currently 
face, folIowed by Israel (34.4%). 
Fundamentalism and poverty are 
considered less dangerous threats 
(10.1 % and 10.8%) respectively. 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
09-11-2003 
networks than Alqaeda" (Habib, 2005). In a similar vein, Kamal Habib offers a critical 
summary of current views of American identity, stating that 
America has arrogantly devised an agenda to transform the 
Arab world, not merely at the geo-strategic level, but also 
at the cultural, civil and religious levels, in order to create a 
new identity for the Arab and Islarnic worlds according to 
which the American agenda is set by an extremist Christian 
wing, represented by the current administration, which is 
presently engaged in a crusade-like confrontation with the 
Islamic World (Habib, 2005). 
Aljazeera Net depends on the perceptions and attitudes of its users to account for the 
increasing feeling of 'hate' toward the United States. For instance, in response to an 
Aljazeera Net polI about "the most dangerous threat" for Arabs, 44.7% of respondents 
pointed to America, and 34.4% to Israel" (Large, 2003). Aljazeera Net explained that the 
results of this polI could reflect the tendency of the United States to impose a central 
unilateral global system, through which it controls the domestic affairs of aIl Others, 
albeit under the umbrelIa of the United Nations (Large, 2003). (See figure 3-34). 
Conceiving Israel as the second greatest danger threatening Arabs may explain the 
quantity of images related to Israel and its key personalities. Aljazeera Net cartoons 
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describe the Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, as a 'murderer', who has killed 
Palestinians in Genin, whereas the former US secretary Colin L. Powell is caricatured 
acting as conjurer who uses the magic of American foreign policy to tum Palestinian 
deaths into the (ever illusionary) birds of peace. Moreover, the Israeli Prime Minister is 
portrayed as someone who tries to deceive the Palestinian authority, and to blind it by 
giving Mr. Mahmoud Abbas, the former Prime Minister of Palestine and currently the 
Palestinian President, black glasses, thus using Abbas as the strategie armor that helps 
Sharon to vanquish any remaining Palestinian resistance (See figures, 3-35, & 3-36, & 3-
37). The content of Aljazeera Net echoes the images portrayed in its cartoons and 
emphasizes the enmity of Israel toward Arabs. In October 1999 Aljazeera' s host, Faisel 
Alqasim repeatedly raised questions that are charged with enmity towards Israel: 
Wasn't Israel, and isn't it still, the cancer that infects the 
body of Arab nations? Isn't Israel responsible for the 
failure of all Arab development projects? Hasn't the Arab 
struggle, in the wake of Zionism, tumed from striving 
toward democracy into a struggle for survival before a 
savage barbarian enemy? Why, then, do sorne people 
applaud Israeli democracy so much? (Alqasim, 1999, 
October). 
One month afterwards, namely in November 1999, Alqasim's program raised even 
more questions about Israel, inc1uding questions about the peace negotiations with Israel: 
Will the so-called peace process with the Hebrew State 
offer a salutary treatment that heals Arab problems or will 
it be administered as a deadly poison? No wonder sorne 
people describe it as a poisoned peace! Didn't the wife of 
the Palestinian President shout out loudly a few days ago, 
criticizing Israel for poisoning the water resources of 
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Figure 3-35. An 
Aljazeera Net 
cartoon about the 
conjuring acts of 
US foreign 
policy that tum 
the Palestinians 
who are killed by 
the Israeli Prime 
Minister into a 
bird of peace. 
Published in 
Aljazeera Net on 
17-04-2002 
Figure 3-37. The 
Israeli Prime 
Minister is 
portrayed as using 
the Palestinian 
Prime Minister to 
crush resistance 
groups. Published 
in Aljazeera Net on 
11-06-2003 
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Figure 3-36. The Palestinian 
Prime Minister is portrayed as a 
patient who looks at the future of 
Palestinians through dark glasses 
given to him by the Israeli Prime 
Minister. Published in Aljazeera 
Net on 15-06-2003 
Palestinians in an aim to kill Palestinians with poison? 
According to Israeli sources haven't the numbers of 
Palestinian children infected with cancer and fatal diseases 
reached exceptionally high levels, while the Palestinian 
regions have been reduced to rubble? Will, then, the 
Palestinian region be a tomb for the Palestinian people, 
albeit developed under the auspices of peace? (Alqasim, 
1999, November). 
Seeing peace, no matter what shape it assumes, as a poison, can tell us much about 
the manner in which Aljazeera Net vehemently sustains theories of conspiracies. 
Evidently, the cartoons published by Aljazeera Net, and Alqasim's questions, as recorded 
above, support the idea that Arabs have been subject to conspiracies launched by the 
United States in order to attain Israel's objectives. However, Aljazeera Net appears very 
professional when it passes on its own views in the guise of its users' perceptions. Thus, 
in August 2005, prior to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, Aljazeera Net reflected on the 
refusal of its users to condone any normal relations between Israel and Arab countries, 
since 84.4% of the participants in the polI expressed their rejection of the idea of 
reconciliation with Israel (Aljazeera Net, 2005, August). (See figure 3-38). 
Before moving on to examine the second frame of Arab identity, it is helpful to shed 
light on the American and Israeli voices63 that appear on Aljazeera Net. American and 
Israeli guests and writers, who are present in Aljazeera Net as part of its 'fair-minded' 
policy to expose its users to the voices of these Others, do not seem to have an 
appreciable impact on the cumulative image of hostility to the United States and Israel. 
63 Many American speakers are invited regularly as guests on Aljazeera programs. Similarly, sorne Israeli 
guests have appeared on Aljazeera. Among the Israeli officiaIs interviewed by Aljazeera were Amnon 
Shahak, the leader of the Center Party in Israel, who appeared on Aljazeera in February 1999, Ehud Barak, 
the former Prime Minister oflsrael (January 2001), and Moshe Ketsaf, the Israeli president (August 2002). 
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Do you support the reconciliation of 
Arab Israeli relations in he wake of 
Gaza withdrawal? 
Figure 3-38. 84.4% of Aljazeera Net 
users do not favor the reconciliation of 
Arab-Israeli relations after the Israeli 
withdrawal from Gaza 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
23-08-2005 
Sorne of the American voices to appear on Aljazeera cOIToborate its image of the 
United States. Among these voices is that of Francis Boyle, a professor of International 
law at minois, who appeared in one of Aljazeera's programs in April 2005. In an 
interview with Francis Boyle, whose views seem to accord with the Aljazeera Net polI 
just mentioned above, the latter agrees that the CUITent ruling administration in the United 
States threatens the global system and undermines the United Nations (Mansour, 2005). 
He adds that: "the eleventh of September has been used as a pretext for hegemony all 
over the world, to control the oïl and gas reserves of the world, which are, in part, the 
resources of Arab and Islamic countries, and to eliminate any resistance (Mansour, 2005). 
An essay written by Sandy Shanks (2005), American columnist and Aljazeera Net 
freelancer, puts more stress on the conflicts Arabs have endured throughout their history. 
Answering a question about 'why Arabs hate the United Sates', he writes: 
The vast majority of Americans are clueless regarding the 
past of faraway lands as weIl as their own. This is highly 
dangerous in so much as we share this planet with other 
ethnicities and historical illiteracy begets misunderstanding 
(Shanks, 2005). 
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In detailing the historical events that may have led to Arab resentment toward the 
West, he states: "centuries of Western domination are kind of hard to forget and this will 
remove any holier-than-thou attitude American negotiators may have" (Shanks, 2005). 
3.3.2.3. Confirming the Arab reference: Islam as a frame for Aljazeera. 
A brief recall of the argument made in the first chapter about religion will serve to 
launch the discussion that follows about Aljazeera Net' s representation of religion. The 
discussion in the first chapter explained that while Islam and Christianity are the two 
principal religions in the Arab World, Arab scholars have nonetheless chosen to focus on 
Islam. This section begins with an examination of how Christianity and Christians are 
represented. The second part of this section explains how Aljazeera Net re-mediates 
Islam in relation to the argument made in the first chapter. In observing the image it 
portrays of Islam it will be necessary to discern whether the representation of Islamic 
voices is substantive and authoritative enough to constitute an adequate reflection of 
views about Islam in Aljazeera Net, especially as noted in terms of its breadth and depth 
of coverage. 
The Aljazeera Net archive seems a reliable reference to gauge the quantity and 
significance of the content registered concerning Christianity. Thus, only 28 headlines 
were found in response to a se arch for the term 'Christianity' versus 253 headlines for the 
term 'Islam'. Similarly, when searching for the term 'Christians', 19 headIines came up 
versus 425 headlines in response to a search for the term 'Muslims'. Aljazeera Net does 
not appear to focus sufficiently on issues of concern to Arab Christians. Among the few 
issues relating to Christians, only three television programs of Aljazeera discuss issues 
pertaining to Christians. One of the se programs, entitled 'Christians in the Arab World', 
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features a discussion between Ghassan Ben-Gedo, an Aljazeera host, and one of his 
programs guests, Elie Ferzli, the Lebanese Information Minister, and the ensuing 
conversation reveals just how marginalized Christians feel in Aljazeera (Ben-Gedo, 2004, 
December 18): 
Ghassan Ben-Gedo: Do Christi ans constitute a major part 
of the general social weaving of Arabs, or rather, do they 
have another culture and different civilization? Does the 
geographic formation bring them into the same sphere as 
the Muslims of this region? 
Elie Ferzli: first of all, 1 think your question is somewhat 
bizarre since Christians are the original population of these 
countries. 
Ghassan Ben-Gedo: sorne people say that the Christian 
sectors, especially here in Lebanon, reside here, but their 
culture is different... they live in the Arab World, but they 
are more attached to Westem culture. 
Elie Ferzli: 1 believe that there is a major historical 
misunderstanding here ... (Ben-Gedo, 2004, December 18). 
A glance at one of the headlines of Aljazeera's satellite programs indicates the 
spectrum of users Aljazeera Net has chosen to disseminate its views about Islam, and to 
alter its users and viewers' perception about how and what Arabs should think about their 
daily life and affairs. When Khadija Ben-Qenna, Aljazeera Net's host, asked her guest to 
respond to the title of the pro gram, "The comprehensiveness of Islam ... The conception 
of the idea and its future," Sheikh Yousef Alqaradawi64, explained that: 
What we understand by the 'comprehensiveness' of Islam 
is that Islam is an inclusive message, expressed through a 
thoroughly comprehensive system; that those who are 
willing to undo this message, and therefore, to segregate 
Islam - are those who would be willing to wipe out a great 
64 Sheikh Yousef Alqaradawi: Born in Egypt in 1926, Sheikh Alqaradawi is one of the weIl known 
followers of the Muslim Brotherhood, an academic and a Muslim scholar who obtained his doctoral degree 
from the faculty ofIslamic Studies in 1973. He has worked in Qatar since 1961, and has written more than 
120 titles. Al-qaradawi established the faculty of Islamic Laws at Qatar University in 1977, and then 
worked as a dean in the same faculty until 1990. A search for the name of Sheikh Yousef Alqaradawi in 
Aljazeera Net archive will reveal that Sheikh Alqaradawi has been called upon as the main speaker of 
Aljazeera programs at least 273 times between November 3, 1996 and November 6,2005. 
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many of its principles, to make peace without jihad, 
marri age with divorce, moral principles without laws, 
worship without action, truth without power, the Quran 
[Moshaf] without the sword - that is, they want to infer 
what they like about Islam and to dispense with what they 
dislike. The religion of Islam that accords with Allah' s will, 
as revealed in his book, and as shown by the Prophet 
Mohamed (May the prayers of Allah be upon him!) [Sala 
Allah Alyeh wa Salam] .. .is a message that blends the 
demands of the present with the other life, spirituality and 
materiality, idealism and realism; moreover, it embraces aIl 
individual, family, social and national concerns, that is, 
Umma as weIl as international affairs ... It is not a 
theological message restricted to the individu al 
consciousness, nor is it limited to the mosque; rather, it is a 
message that includes all aspects of life (Ben-Qenna, 2005, 
February). 
Following the same line of argument, Aljazeera Net has discussed many Islamic 
issues65, among them, the rotation of power in Islam and the question of its political 
diversity. Aljazeera's main guest, Sheikh Yousef Alqaradawi, stresses the 
'indispensability of the Umma' as the basis for a political system based on multi-parties. 
He widely agrees that Islam endorses a democratic political system, who se scope is 
limited to the bases of the Umma and the Islamic state (Alsheikh, 1997, & Mansour, 
1999, April). Other Muslim scholars, such as Fahmy Hewaidy, and Mohamed Said 
Alawa, support the views of Alqaradawi as to the sources of authority in Islam. Hewaidy 
and Alawa believe that Islam is the essential reference for the state; that both the state and 
its democratic formations are just tools through which to achieve the Islamic project, or, 
to solve any political problems whatsoever, such as those inherent in dictatorship 
(Mansour, 1997, August 24 & Alansari, 1999, May). 
65 The following issues are also broadly covered: 'The status of woman in Islam', 'The rights of youths in 
Islam', 'Sports and Islam', 'Love in Islam"', 'The view ofIslam in the media', 'The Islamic way ofusing 
the Internet', 'The child's rights in Islam', 'MoraIs and Islam', 'Islam and the arts', 'Individual 
responsibility in Islam', 'The family in Islam', 'Leadership in Islam', 'Islam and poverty'. 
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Debate about the relevancy of Islam to politics and democracy has hardly been 
broached at Aljazeera Net. However, such a debate did occur once on Faisel Alqasim's 
controversial program, 'The opposite Direction', when he invited the leader of the 
Nationalist Unionist Convening Party in Egypt, who debated the idea that neither the 
Quran nor the Prophet indicate that Islam is the way to govem the people, nor does it 
dec1are the essentiality of a 'religious state' (Alqasim, 1999, January). 
Generally speaking, Aljazeera does not contest Islamic views in its daily affairs; on 
the contrary, it attempts to tutor its users and viewers about Islam, thereby elucidating the 
Islamic view about a variety of daily issues that occur in reallife, and more importantly, 
by talking about the subject of Islam as a life goveming theory and methodology. In 
different interventions on Aljazeera Net, Sheikh Yousef Alqaradawi explains that Islam is 
not just a theory; rather, Islamic laws are formulated by way of accretion over time, and 
inform its theoretical elaborations (Ben-Qenna, 2005, February). Therefore, Muslims are 
not free to adopt the Others' way of life, nor are they free to do whatever they like, since 
they are committed to established principals, regulating lawful and righteous conduct 
(Abd-Allah, 2002, January). 
Given this absolute prohibition on the 'right' to follow the Other's way of life, this 
is an opportune moment to discuss how Aljazeera represents the Islamic view about 
certain global and regional issues and, more particularly, globalization and conflict. In 
response to how Islam can be linked to globalization, Sheikh Mohamed Hussein Fadl-
Allah and Alqaradawi argue that globalization falls within the comprehensive orbit of 
Islam; since Muslims respond to a global calI whose inc1usiveness is not limited to a 
specifie place or temporal dimension - past, present, or future - since Islam is ubiquitous 
222 
in time and space (Abd-Allah, 1999, July & Ben-Qenna, 2005, February). The effect of 
globalization as a major phenomenon is also broached by Ghazy Altawbeh, an Islamic 
writer and researcher, who believes that despite the benefits that Muslims have gained 
from globalization, su ch as satellite communication and the Internet, its concomitant risks 
are notably harmful, especially in view of the threats posed by the banking interest 
system and worldwide American supremacy, as reflected in the imposition of global 
capitalism and the monopoly system created by international corporations (Abd-Allah, 
2001, August). 
In the preceding discussion about Arab conflict with Others, one can hardly 
overlook the influence of Islamic voices, which shape the ongoing argument about 
conflict. Obviously, Aljazeera Net off ers space for Muslim scholars to explain their views 
about conflict in Palestine and Iraq. Indeed, appearing in different interviews on 
Aljazeera Net, Sheikh Alqaradawi criticizes the attempts of those who seek a peaceful 
dialogue with Israel, because Israel is "a brutal Zionist power that ultimately depends on 
the power of the gun" (Alsheikh, 1997, June). Arab and Muslim regimes, Alqaradawi's 
argument goes, should show solidarity with the Palestinians and use their military arsenal 
to fight Israel (Abd-Allah, 2002, April). When Sheikh Alqaradawi is asked about 
Muslims who support the process of peaceful negotiation with Israel, he states: "The 
invitation of peace at this time is a betrayal, because it is we who are attacked, and whose 
homes are destroyed, our blood is shed, our privacies are violated, our sacred places are 
trampled down, and even the AI-Aqessa mosque is considered to be under threat" (Abd-
Allah, 2002, April). Alqaradawi summarized his position thus: "as l've said before we 
have no choice but 'Aljihad'" (Abd-Allah, 2002, April). Evidently, Sheikh Alqaradawi 
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does not support the argument for establishing normal relations with Israel; his reason is 
that the boycott with Israel is not a governmental request, but a public demand (Abd-
Allah, 2002, June). 
Yet, despite his rejection of the idea of peaceful negotiations with Israel, 
Alqaradawi supports the idea stated above that Muslims should not deal with the West as 
an absolute; hence, there should be a dialogue between Muslims and certain countries in 
the West, at least those that are not engaged in a war with Muslims (Alsheikh, 1997, June 
& Abd-Allah, 2000, February & Abd-Allah, 2001, September). Thus, prior to the 
September Il th attacks, and in response to a question about the relationship between 
Islamic extremists and the West, Alqaradawi expressed the view that Islamic extremism 
is not just dangerous for the West, but for aIl Muslims (Abd-Allah, 2000, February). 
In the wake of the September Il th attacks, a number of Aljazeera programs invited 
experts to talk about how the image of Islam and Muslims had been affected. Muslim 
scholars appeared on Aljazeera to condemn the terror attacks of September Il th against 
the United States, and they entertained broadly similar views about the increased 
vulnerability of the image of Islam and Muslims as a result of these attacks (Rayan, 2001, 
& Nour, 2002, February, & Nour, 2002, October). 
At the beginning of the war against Afghanistan ln October 2001, Aljazeera 
commenced a debate about the public demand for the 're-introduction of Islam'. The idea 
of reformulating Islam was applauded by Mohamed Omara, an Egyptian Islamic scholar, 
and Ahmed Alsarraf, an Arab journalist. Omara believes that Muslim countries have not 
directed sufficient efforts toward the appropriate enlightenment possible through the 
translation of the key texts of Islam, and in any case, this would be very difficult, given 
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that seminal Islamic books still await translation (Abd-Allah, 2002, August). In a rather 
more challenging extension of this idea, Ahmed Alsarraf indicated the need to 
"humanize" Islam (Alqasim, 2001, December). Aisarraf then added: 
We failed III our Islam. We failed 
resoundingly ... Newspapers, books, magazines, messages, 
studies and school education, as well as government 
speeches ... prove that we have failed. We remain 
fragmented and combat each other to the extent that we 
have proven ready to practice violence, killing and 
assassination and merely because we disagree with each 
other. If this is the way we express our disagreements with 
each other, then what can be expected from other countries, 
other religions, and other groups (Alqasim, 200 1, 
December). 
By contrast, Ahmed Nofal, a Jordanian Islamic scholar, Zyad Abou Ghenirnh, an 
Arab journalist, and Abd-Alwahab Almiseeri and Yasser Alzatrah, Aljazeera Net 
freelancers, have severely criticized the West, particularly the United States. Zyad Abou 
Ghenirnh believes that the United States aims to create a new Islam, an Islam that equates 
resistance with terror (Alqasim, 2001, December). Similarly, Ahmed Nofal expressed his 
resentment against the war in Afghanistan, c1aiming that the United States chose to deal 
in an unthreatening manner with any country that was content with its policy, and that 
was ready to lower its sights in face of the United States' aggression (Abd-Allah, 2002, 
June 16). Nofal was ostensibly stunned by the United States' persistence in redefining its 
terms, and urged that the United States aims to make people more aware of the difference 
between resistance and terrorism, albeit conceived in its own terms (Abd-Allah, 2002, 
June 16). Following the same line of argument, Yasser Alaztrah believes that the United 
States uses the concept of 'normative Islam' as a tool to contest political Islam and Jihadi 
Islam (Alzatrah, 2005). In echoing the same c1uster of views, Abd-Alwahab Almissiri 
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explains that the failure of Arab Nationalist thought has led to the emergence of Western 
enmity toward Islam, yet, in Almissiri's eyes, this Western enmity for Islam is not 
conceived as absolute; rather, it is hostility for an Islam that resists, and for any aspect of 
resistance that defies the attempts of the West to turn the World into a fabric ripe for 
exploitation (Almissiri, 2004). 
The occupation of Iraq in March 2003 has widened the debate about Islam and the 
West, particularly in the aftermath of the decision of the Shiites in Iraq to combat the 
resistance of the military militias, and to join in the political process that aims to build a 
new democratic political system in Iraq. On the one hand, the representative of the 
Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Saad Jawad Qandil, explained to 
Aljazeera that Shiite Muslims in Iraq are committed to the basic tenets of Islam and the 
Islamic identity of Iraq, yet they also agree that Islam should be a key point of reference, 
alongside other considerations (Hadad, 2005). The view of the Iraqi Shiite, which appears 
to invite a compromise with the reality of occupation while offering a 
new federate evaluation of the nature of Iraq, finds an echo in the recommendations of 
the Global Anti-Aggression Conference, which was held in Qatar in February 2005. At 
its close, this conference called for alternative and peaceful ways to confront aggression 
against Muslims (Alkhtab, 2005). 
On the other hand, the views of Aljazeera guests and freelancers, such as the 
Sudanese scholar, Hassen Altorabi, also an Iraqi Sunni scholar, and Mothana Harth 
Aldari, an Islamic scholar, support the dominant refrain of overt 
hostility toward the United States on the score of Islam, stating that the United States 
wages war against Islam in the guise of attacking 'terrorism' (Abd-Allah, 2003, May & 
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Abd-Alhamid, 2003). Their views found support in the decree of the Association of 
Muslim Scholars that Aljazeera Net published, about the right and obligation to resist the 
occupation in Iraq (The association, 2004). 
Now, in tuming to the discussion about Islam in relation to the debate set out in the 
first chapter, that is, the argument in the first chapter between Arab nationalists and 
Islamists about whether Islam is in fact a constituent of Arab identity, this issue has been 
exc1uded from consideration at Aljazeera Net. In fact, Aljazeera does not provide a space 
for prospective argument about the contribution of Islam to Arab nations; rather, the 
voices found at Aljazeera criticize Arab nationalist thought, and denounce the calI for an 
Arab nation. Among the Aljazeera guests who have attacked the Arab nationalists is 
Ghazy AItawbeh. Altawbeh, who seeks to undermine the reasons for the existence of an 
Arab nation, believes that: 
The fauIt does not reside in the endeavors of Arab 
nationalist thinkers to reform and solve the problems of the 
Umma, since it presents unreal resolutions, improper 
solutions ... These thinkers construct an Umma based on 
two main sources: language and history. 1 think that what 
they [Arab nationalists] say is incorrect, unscientific, and 
pointless. It is no more than a fantasy in the minds of those 
who concoct it... Their mistake perhaps bound up with 
their attempts to learn more, but they should nonetheless 
acquaint themselves with the reality of the situation ... 
What are the factors that people collectively agree upon in 
these countries? ... Whatever the answer they appear to rely 
on language and history, which is the wrong approach 
(Abd-Allah, 2001, August). 
Thus, Aljazeera Net does not prognosticate, nor does it speak unambiguously about 
the need for an Arab nation, as seen in its attitude toward the Islamic concept of Umma. 
Initially, Umma entailed a community of individuals bound together by religious ties 
based on the community, people and nation of Arabs and, as such, it was founded on the 
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Umma that the prophet Mohamed originally created at Medina. Aljazeera talks repeatedly 
about the weaknesses of the Islamic concept of Umma, describing the challenges facing 
it, and the factors that may lead to its rise and development. In an attempt to minimize 
the cri sis the Islamic concept of Umma is going through, Mohamed Omara informs 
Aljazeera that such crises are part of any valid conception of Umma. In talking about the 
crises in the development of Umma blame is laid on conspiracies, which are seen as a 
major factor in the undermining of Umma (Abd-Allah, 2003, July). Sheikh Alqaradawi 
offers a similar view when he paradoxically states: "1 do not support the conspiratorial 
interpretation of history, but 1 cannot den y it; there are conspiracies for sure" (Abd-Allah, 
2003, March). The scenario of conspiracy that the Umma of Muslims is said to have 
undergone is perhaps best explained by Mamoun Feraz Jarar, a Jordanian Islamic scholar, 
who explains that Islam became a subject for conspiracies a long time ago (Abd-Allah, 
2002, July 14). He instances how Great Britain and France dramatically attempted to 
dismantle the Islamic Umma and to undermine its identity after the Islamic struggle for 
Umma had reached a critical impasse during the nineteenth century (Abd-Allah, 2002, 
July 14). 
In addition to such conspiratorial factors, Islamic scholars point to a second regional 
factor. Recalling the arguments presented by the Arab nationalists in the first chapter, 
Islamic scholars wam against the upheavals occasioned by localism. Sheikh Yousef 
Alqaradawi and Mamoun Feraz Jarar, for example, point to the dangers inherent in a lack 
of unit y and are consequently concemed about the increased tendency towards localism 
(Abd-Allah, 2001, May, & Abd-Allah, 2002, July 14). Alqaradawi believes that the 
Umma of Allah should encompass everything, since it is only by being united with all 
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things that the debilitating tendencies of localism and tribalism can be overcome (Abd-
Allah, 2001, May). Taking up the ideas of Alqaradawi, Mamoun Jarar deplores the 
territorial nature of localism, which he considers as a means of compromising Islamic 
identity (Abd-Allah, 2002, July 14). Whereas conspiracy theories and localism are seen 
to depend on foreign and regional factors, Muslim scholars, such as Mohamed Omara 
and Y ousef Alqaradawi, believe that ignorance, despotism, and the corruption of Arab 
leaders are the result of domestic factors and, as such, they are conducive to the further 
debilitation of the concept of Umma (Abd-Allah, 2003, March, & Abd-Allah, 2003, 
July). 
Turning now to the challenges facing the Islamic concept of Umma, Ghassan 
Hasanain, an Aljazeera Net editor, specifies two major tasks; first, to seek an end to the 
ongoing dec1ine of the spirit of Umma that continues to destabilize Muslims, especially 
as a consequence of the relentless aggression against Muslims in Iraq and in occupied 
Palestine, and secondly, to challenge Western endeavors to make people skeptical about 
Islam, and thereby to stereotype it through associations with terrorism and violence 
(Hasanain, 2004). 
Aljazeera Net adduces several reasons for the rise of the Islamic concept of Umma. 
For instance, Yousef Alqaradawi envisions the rich abundance of an Islamic community, 
or people united in the spirit of Umma, and puts forward four factors to account for its 
development: (1) the large populations the Islamic Umma comprises, (2) its rich natural 
resources, (3) the civillegacy, and (4) the Islamic message intrinsic to Umma, su ch as the 
establishment of the rights that Islam has enjoyed in every Muslim country (Abd-Allah, 
2001, May, & Abd-Allah, 2003, March). In addition to Alqaradawi, Kamal Alhelbawi 
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formulates what he sees as two compulsory proposaIs: firstly, to rationally re-read the 
legacy of conflicts and crises, and secondly, to become more committed to the Quran and 
Sunna (Alhelbawi, 2002, & Abd-Allah, 2002, November). However, Mamoun Jarar -
who believes that Islamic movements have accomplished many great things, even if 
many others await them, contests the proposaIs embodied in the Islamic Umma, 
describing the endeavors of Islamic movements to establish the Umma as more 
imaginative than real (Abd-Allah, 2002, July 14). 
Briefly, Aljazeera Net does not appear to re-mediate the discussion about Islam; 
rather, Islam is introduced as an implicit frame for Aljazeera, and as a legitimate 
reference for 'Umma'. The voices that speak for Islam in Aljazeera echo four 'key' ideas, 
initiaIly discussed in the first chapter; first, concerning the 'essentiaIism' of Islam as a 
governing theory and the guiding methodology for Muslims; secondly, the 'essentialism' 
of Umma as the presiding political form and spirituaI entity for Muslims; thirdly, the 
ongoing enmity on the part of the other that engages with Muslims in conflict or supports 
aggression against them in the form of the occupation of Muslim territories; fourthly, the 
imperative of armed resistance, conceived as an absolute means for resolving conflicts. 
These four 'key' ideas additionally invite visitors of Aljazeera Net to believe in Western 
conspiracies as the basis for a historie interpretation for the weaknesses of the Islamic 
Umma. 
3.3.2.4. Re-empowering roots: The Classieal Arabie language as a frame 
The Arab scholars' views cited in the first chapter collectively attest to the fact that 
the Arabic language is a stable and reliable source of Arab identity. Aljazeera Net does 
not veer from the line of argument made in the first chapter about the significance of the 
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Arabic language for Arabness; rather, it accentuates the solid bond between the Arabic 
language and the intrinsic identity of Arabness. This section will begin with a brief 
discussion of the convention al relationship between the Arabic language and Arab 
identity as it appears in Aljazeera. Additionally, it reveals the challenges awaiting the 
Arabic language and its prospective uses that are in faet in tune with Aljazeera's view of 
Arabness. 
Apparently, the Islamic voices in Aljazeera indieate the innate roots between Islam 
and the classical Arabie language, partieularly as it is the language that Allah 'selected' 
to be the language of the Quran and Sunna. Y ousef Alqaradawi and Enayat Allah Eblagh, 
an Islamic scholar, argue that the Arabic language is at the root of Islamic identity, since 
every Muslim must learn sorne Arabic intonations to perform his prayers (Mansour, 
1998, July, & Abd-Allah, 2001, April 29). 
The classieal Arabie language appears to enjoy more privileges than the colloquial 
language in the eyes of sorne Arab scholars. One of these scholars, whose holistic 
conception of the Arabie language encompasses something more than linguistie 
attributes, is Nasser Eldin Alassed, the former Minister of Education in Jordan, who 
believes that Arabic language and identity are symmetrieal aspects of one overriding 
phenomenon (Mansour, 2004, April). When Aljazeera asked him about the relationship 
between the Arabie language and identity, Nasser Eldin Alassed explained that language 
and identity are inextricable; that "language is identity; and reciproeally, the identity of 
the Umma resides in the Arabie language, whieh embraces the values, ideals, 
experienees, expertise, and knowledge of Umma" (Mansour, 2004, April). Conceiving 
the classical Arabic language and identity as one overarehing entity allows Alassed to 
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reiterate the argument of Arab Nationalists that affirms that the Arabie language is 
ineluctably tied to Umma's thought and culture (Mansour, 2004, April). 
The assertion that the Arabic language expresses the thought of Umma explains 
why Arab and Muslim scholars associate the vulnerable state of the classieal Arabic 
language with the challenges posed by Umma. Scholars identify two fundamental 
challenges currently facing the classieal Arabie language, and consequently, two threats 
to Umma; firstly, the penetration of English and French terms, which have saturated 
people's daily discourse, and secondly, the influence of the colloquial Arabic language. 
y ousef Alqaradawi denounces the spread of sorne foreign terms, and notes their 
rapid diffusion among young people. In Alqaradawi's opinion, the decline of the classieal 
Arabic language is due to the Arabs' diminished pride in using their national language, 
and the increasing tendency of sorne Arabs to employ English or French terms in their 
daily discourse in an attempt to show off their ability to speak English or French (Abd-
Allah, 2001, April 29). Additionally, the rapid expansion in the sector of foreign 
education in the Arab region is seen as a threat to the survival of the classieal Arabic 
language (Abd-Allah, 2001, April 29). Alqaradawi praises the Syrian higher education 
system for assigning the classical Arabic language for use in the study of science and 
medieine (Abd-Allah, 2004, April 4). 
The colloquial Arabic language is considered no less harmful than the penetration of 
foreign languages (Abd-Allah, 2001, April 29). Yet, colloquial Arabic is a subject for 
ongoing debate among Arab scholars. On the one hand, sorne scholars, such as Y ousef 
Alqaradawi, and Nassr Eldin Albahrah, a Syrian scholar, and Shawki Daif, the president 
of the Academy of the Arabic language point to the menace that faces the classical 
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Arabic language as a result of the spread of colloquialisms and slang words. The latter, 
Shawki Daif, blames the mass media in the Arab world for augmenting and expanding 
the colloquial uses of Arabie, proving once again that the classical Arabic language is the 
language of Umma, whereas colloquial Arabie is a local language that belongs to the 
public of one country (At the opening, 2001). Daif, who calls upon the mass media and 
Arab governments to use the classieal Arabic language, believes that colloquial Arabie 
will spell the ruin of Arab identity (At the opening, 200 1, & Egypt, 200 1). 
One the other hand, Abd-Allah Altatawi, a professor of Arabic literature, and Rafik 
Rohanh, a Lebanese poet, believe that colloquial Arabic represents a transformation in 
the constitution of the language, and has been the language for a considerable proportion 
of the cultural production that exists in the Arab World; therefore, it represents the 
various Arab publics who express themselves through it (Alqasim, 2001, August, & 
Arabic, 2005). A more tempered view, expressed by Enayat Allah Eblagh, asses ses the 
importance of colloquial Arabic and takes note of its immense cultural heritage, yet he 
bestows greater accolades on classical Arabie, albeit sounding a cautionary note in stating 
that colloquial Arabic should not be used as a tool to diminish classical Arabic (Mansour, 
1998, July). 
Aljazeera Net has artieulated its views on the relationship between language and 
Arab conflict. Aljazeera Net explores the use of language as a tool for resisting 
occupation. It points to the war of words in Iraq, since Iraqis have tenaciously used 
Arabic words to write statements urging resistance on their walls. According to Aljazeera 
Net, Ameriean troops were ordered to eradicate such provocations to resistance, which 
Iraqis made to support Saddam and the cause of resistance, however, once the American 
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troops decided to abandon a certain spot, Iraqis would come back in force to write new 
statements that called for resistance (Walls, 2003). 
Aljazeera Net was quick to stake its own position in the battle over the Arabic 
language, reaffirming the traditional emphasis on the use of classical Arabie. Aljazeera' s 
guide for professional behavior states that: 
the language of the channel is classical Arabic, which is 
free from needless complexity and exaggeration; it is 
recognized as a suitable language for joumalism, since its 
classical simplicity means that it is not susceptible to the 
same errors that are to be found in colloquial Arabic and, as 
such, it will be used on condition that classical Arabic 
fulfills the requirements of reporting (Aljazeera satellite, 
2005). 
The instructions included in Aljazeera' s guide for professional behavior require the 
joumalists at Aljazeera to display their professionalism in editing headlines and images, 
and to avoid any form of exaggeration, simplification, and linguistic presumption 
(Aljazeera Satellite, 2005). More important to the argument elaborated here, Aljazeera 
calls on its joumalists not to use descriptive and oversimplifying vocabulary, singling out 
such terms as 'shameful behaviour', 'savageness', and 'brutality' for special disapproval, 
since they negatively influence the faimess and reliability of its coverage (Aljazeera 
Satellite, 2005). The language that the Aljazeera team is urged to use in order to achieve 
credibility and objectivity, should be free from what Aljazeera's guide defines as 
recurring rhetorieal 'tricks', convoluted sentences and expressions that might be 
construed as unduly ambiguous or judgmental (Aljazeera Satellite, 2005). 
Reminding us about the debate launched in the second chapter about the 
discrepancy between the rules and practices that govem objectivity, the language that 
Aljazeera Net uses is not merely formulaic, descriptive, and judgmental, but almost 
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exclusively based on rhetoric and exaggeration. Examples66 detailing the quality of 
language Aljazeera expects its journalists to adopt are ample, though they are far 
exceeded by counter examples that breech its stylistic protocols. The following two 
examples exemplify the rhetorical excesses of Aljazeera. Indeed, in two questions raised 
by Aljazeera's anchors, Faisel Alqasim and Ghassan Ben-Gedo, it becomes apparent how 
rhetoric and exaggeration are used to regulate the language of Aljazeera. In one of 'The 
Opposite Direction' (Alitejah Aalmoakes) television programs, entitled, "The possibility 
of resisting America," Alqasim (2003) questions: "whether the lraqi swamp will be the 
straw that breaks the back of American imperialism." Likewise, at the beginning of a 
discussion between Ghassan Ben-Gedo and his guests about the reality of change in Arab 
countries, Ben-Gedo (2004, December 4) raised a question, repeatedly posed by his 
fellow journalist, Faisel Alqasim, and amply documented above, inquiring "whether 
Arabs have really become the stock joke and butt of the World?" The dialogue between 
Ben-Gedo and his guest, Rayat Rowyek, an Arab researcher and writer, explains how an 
anchor, such as Ben-Gedo, can force the gue st to further his line of argument in order to 
consolidate a point (Ben-Gedo, 2004, December 4): 
Ghassan Ben-Gedo: A warm welcome to our viewers. Miss 
Rayat Rowyek ... Ras the Arab world - that is, the poli tic al 
life and poli tic al reality of the Arab World - become the 
stock joke of the world? 
Rayat Rowyek: WeIl, surely your question begs its own 
answer? It's a weighted question! 
Ghassan Ben-Gedo: You think l'm exaggerating? 
Rayat Rowyek: WeIl, perhaps not~ after all, it is not 
comedy, but tragicomedy that provokes ridicule, yet pain, 
as weIl. 
66 The expressions and vocabulary italicized throughout this chapter are examples of the kind of overly 
emotive lexicon Aljazeera Net commonly employs. 
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3.3.2.5. Media battle frame: entertainment, censorship and the imposition of 
watchdog-underdog roles for Aljazeera 
Aljazeera positions itself as a Pan-Arab media, whose message outruns the 
dominant discourses, found in other local Arabic media, or even in Arab media that have 
a comparable scope to that of Aljazeera. As shown above in the second chapter, Aljazeera 
has been a subject of harassment in many Arab regimes, and it has even drawn the 
criticism of United States' officials. This section discusses how Aljazeera positions itself 
in a 'media battle frame', whereby Aljazeera casts itself in two respective roles: as 
watchdog, or underdog67• 
The representations of Arab media and other media are verbally and pictorially 
graphie in Aljazeera Net, and mostly, this is due to Aljazeera's animated cartoons. For 
instance, Shujaat Ali describes the cameraman of the Arab amusement media as "a clown 
walking on stilts, oblivious to those who die in Iraq and Palestine by US bombs, and 
barely paying attention to a child who asks for help" (See figure 3-39). In a similar vein, 
in plumbing the surface of another image, appearing in figure 3-40, the seemingly 
objective image of a horse appears, however it has been intentionally shot by an Arab, 
who is probably emblematic of Arab regimes. Other Arab media that appear outside the 
ostensibly objective neutrality of Aljazeera' s gaze are not seen as being objective. 
Somewhat surprisingly, but nevertheless reflecting the freedom enjoyed by Aljazeera 
anchors, Mohamed Krishan, Aljazeera' s anchor, practices a limited degree of self-
criticism in accord with the image, if not the guidelines, that Aljazeera provides. He 
therefore disclaims the idea of partaking in the panic of those who scream in the face of 
entertainment in Arab media, and he do es not agree with those who charge Arabic 
67 The term 'underdog' is proposed in a conversation with Adel Iskandar about Aljazeera (Iskandar, 2004). 
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Arab 
media 
Figure 3-39. An Aljazeera Net cartoon 
portraying an Arab media cameraman 
as a clown whose concem is 
entertainment. 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
20-07-2003 
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Figure 3-40. Aljazeera Net cartoon 
about the murdering of 'objective 
media' by Arab govemments. 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
10-08-2002 
satellite news media with a conspiracy to 'put poison in the honey'. Rather, he believes 
that Arabs should embrace both the entertainment media and news media as part of the 
reality they live in (Albashrawi, 2002, January 4). 
Aljazeera Net often refers to these concems on the part of its guests, who attribute 
the lack of objectivity of Arab media to the lack of democracy found in other Arab 
countries. Recalling the censorship imposed on Arab media, Salah Eldin Hafez, former 
president of the Federation of Arab Joumalists (FAJ), told Aljazeera in 2000: 
There is no space to talk about press freedom in the Arab 
World ... because the environment in Arab society 
historically, and contemporaneously, has been 
undemocratic. Currently, govemments do not accept 
criticism, and in sorne cases, leaders are given cult-like 
status as semi-Gods ... We do not yet enjoy the culture of 
freedom, nor do we enjoy an openly democratic culture 
(Mansour, 2000, September). 
Aljazeera's anchor, Faisel Alqasim, tells Kawther Albashrawi, another Aljazeera 
anchor, that "we [Arabs] are living in conditions of political, social, and cultural 
repression ... if someone closes your lips, forcing you to be speechless for fifty years, 
what will you say to him, when you are eventually allowed to speak?" (Albashrawi, 
2002, January 11). The investigation undertaken by the Reporters without Borders' 
organization that Aljazeera Net recently published about Arab media seems to support 
both Salah Eldin Hafez and Faisel Alqasim' s views, since it strongly emphasizes the lack 
of press freedom found in Arab countries (Temlali, 2005). 
The lack of press freedom in the Arab World is not however sufficient to thwart the 
efforts of Aljazeera to report views that are critical of, or at least unpleasant for, Arab 
govemments, nor is its critical agenda likely to be put into a revers al mode through fear 
of intimidation. Certain Arab regimes have been irritated because of the 'watchdog' role 
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Aljazeera plays, however, as shown in the second chapter, certain Arab regimes have 
exerted considerable pressure68 on Aljazeera. Preventive measures have been repeatedly 
taken against Aljazeera, ranging from the withdrawal of a correspondent's license, to 
detaining reporters69, to shutting down Aljazeera's bureaus. Nonetheless, the aggressive 
measures Arab govemments apply to throttle Aljazeera are considerably less deadly than 
the offensive measures taken by the United States, which bombarded Aljazeera's bureaus 
in Afghanistan in November 1999, and in Baghdad in February 20037°. 
Since considerable pressure has been placed on Aljazeera, especially in attacking its 
bureaus, which strategically permit Aljazeera to put itself in an underdog position, 
Aljazeera has responded by altemating its watchdog and underdog personas. This latter 
underdog niche that Aljazeera has assigned for itself operates as both a protective and 
mythologizing artifice through which Aljazeera can be seen to fight for freedom of 
information and the right of Arabs to know the truth. However, Aljazeera's typical 
68 Aljazeera Net lists at least 20 aggressive acts of harassment on the part of both Arab and Western 
countries against the network (See Appendix T). Aggressive actions taken against Aljazeera's crew seem to 
be part of a calculated ongoing process of attrition. Aljazeera recently reported that the network was 
exposed to two punitive actions during July 2005; once, in Yemen, where two of its crews were detained 
(Sanaa, 2005), and again in Morocco, which decided to withdraw the license of the Aljazeera 
correspondent, Abd-Alsalam Razak (Morocco, 2005). 
69 Detention of Aljazeera's correspondents and cameramen is one of the measures both Arab and Western 
governments have applied. Tayseer Allouni, for instance, Aljazeera Net's former correspondent in 
Afghanistan, received an indictment from the Spanish authorities, which claim that Allouni formed a 
connection with sorne suspects who are currently facing charges for their connection to Alqaeda (Tayseer, 
2005). However, though Allouni appears to be charged with the same allegations as a cameraman from 
Aljazeera, this man, Sami Alhaj, does not enjoy the same privileges as Allouni, since Alhaj has been 
detained in a prison in Guantanamo Bay for three years and, half of that time, without specified criminal 
charges having been brought against him (Alkartit, 2005). 
70 Two of AIjazeera's correspondents died in Iraq during the invasion and occupation of that country. The 
US attack on an Aljazeera crew in Baghdad, in February 2003, caused the death of an Aljazeera 
correspondent in Baghdad, named Tarek Ayoub. Aljazeera also lost another correspondent, Rashid Hamid 
Waly, who died in Karbela during a confrontation in May 2004. 
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strategy of adopting an underdog position can also be interpreted as a legitimate response 
to the pressures imposed upon it from both Arab govemments and the United States. 
Aljazeera has repeatedly dec1ared that, "it will remain tolerant, despite the 
pressures" (Alzoghby, 2004, August, & Despite, 2005). In keeping with this declaration, 
in response to the decision of the temporary govemment in Iraq to shut down the 
Aljazeera Bureau in Baghdad, Aljazeera Net's editor, Ranya Alzoghby, wrote on the 8th 
of August 2004 about the refusal of Aljazeera to negotiate its professional media-
principals, which seemingly angered both the Iraqi authorities and Washington 
(Alzoghby, 2004, August). A few months later, Aljazeera inaugurated its ninth year with 
a press statement, issued on the 6th of January, 2005, which assured its users and viewers 
that it would adhere to an editorial policy based on professionalism and credibility. 
(Despite, 2005). The statement explained that Aljazeera has been subject to severe 
harassment from various different 'fascist' regimes in the Arab region, and from foreign 
states that do not condone the strategy of Aljazeera, which is based on representing 'both 
sides of the coin', or, "our view and the opposing view," in the words of its editorial 
motto (Despite, 2005). Whenever the pressures on Aljazeera are intensified, the 
statement conc1uded, Aljazeera could always be relied upon to stand firm in its principles 
(Despite, 2005). 
Clearly, Aljazeera has an obligation to respond to the destructive and deadly attacks 
launched against its bureaus in Afghanistan and Iraq. Irnpressively enough, Aljazeera has 
sought to continue its editorialline despite the intolerable nature of these incidents, yet it 
c1early remains in ablatant underdog position vis-à-vis the United States. Thus, 
Aljazeera' s strategy has been to send a message to its viewers and users, informing them 
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that the war in the United States that is currently being waged against Iraq is not only 
illegal, but also, in the words of Joanne Tucker, Aljazeera Nefs director, an "unclean 
war, a messy war, and it will continue to get messier" (Mansour, 2004, December, & 
O'Regan, 2005). As if in accordance with the line of argument highlighted here and the 
explanations set out in the first chapter conceming the emotionalism of Arabs and the 
high-flown rhetoric of the Arabic language, Aljazeera Net has indicted the occupation 
troops for transforming the media field in Iraq to 'a daily death-for-free scene' 
(Aljazeera, 2004, May). 
However, the underdog position of Aljazeera became even clearer wh en sorne of 
Aljazeera Nefs editors, such as Okbah Alahmed and Mohamed Dawood, began to accuse 
the Anglo-American troops in Iraq of intentionally targeting the eyewitnesses of the war, 
namely, the joumalists, who aimed to report truthfully the events of the invasion and the 
occupation of Iraq (Alahmed, 2003, & Dawood, 2003). Okbah Alahmed and Mohamed 
Dawood rhetorically describe the killing of Aljazeera joumalists as a murder staged to 
silence observers and to put blinkers over their eyes in an attempt to consolidate the 
criminal invasion and occupation of Iraq while remaining unobserved (Alahmed, 2003, & 
Dawood, 2003). Appropriately, Aljazeera Net cartoonist, Shujaat Ali, ironically depicts 
how the fighter planes of Tony Blair, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, target media 
men, engaged in reporting the civilian causalities in Iraq, with their deadly missiles (See 
figure 3-41). Aljazeera Net often chooses to focus on the murder of Tarek Ayoub, 
Aljazeera's correspondent in Baghdad, who is portrayed in hyperbolic rhetoric as a 
symbol of "flesh-and-blood credibility," the "messenger of truth," "whose only weapons 
were two eyes, a tongue, and a pen" (Abd-Alhady, 2004). 
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Aljazeera Net prompts its users that the battlefield in Iraq is not sufficient to whet 
the war-appetite of the United States and Britain. Questioning whether it could tolerate 
yet more pressure, Aljazeera Net' s statement goes on to explain that "the war has reached 
the realm of the Internet, and Aljazeera's website is one of the fields that has received 
sorne of the splinters of this war" (Could, 2003, & Another, 2003). That is, just a few 
days after Aljazeera broadcast images of dead and captured American soldiers in Iraq, 
particularly on Thursday 27 of March 2003, Aljazeera's English website was hacked71 
(See figure 3-42). Adopting once more a conspiratorial interpretation of events, Ahmed 
Farouk, Aljazeera Net's editor, writes about the "electronic attack on Aljazeera" (Farouq, 
2003), continuing thus: 
The constant incursions against Aljazeera from disgruntled 
Americans are not limited to bombarding its bureaus in 
time of war, nor to the intimidation of its journalists, but 
the attack has been extended to undermine the network's 
website on the Internet ... It is not surprising that the first 
attack that targeted Aljazeera in the early days of the war 
was staged at the same time as the extraordinary electronic 
hacking directed against Aljazeera Net. Though the website 
of Aljazeera has been designed to resist the sabotage of 
individual hackers, it has nonetheless been subject to 
planned, costly and extensive attacks from technologically 
advanced organizations or associations (Farouq, 2003). 
71 As reported by Aljazeera Net, the English website of the network experienced constant attacks from 
hackers on the same day that Aljazeera broadcast live images of dead and captured American soldiers 
(Could, 2003). The hackers managed to take over the website of Aljazeera Net, and to redirect Aljazeera's 
users to a different web page, where users found the United States flag along with a message proclaiming: 
"Let Freedom Ring." The hackers called themselves the "Freedom Cyber Force Militia" (See figure 3-42). 
Aljazeera Net states that the attack against its electronic website was not the first incident of this kind. It 
daims that the agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (PBI) raided the office of InfoCom, the host of 
the Aljazeera server, and gained access to information about Aljazeera on the 6th of September 2001 
(Farouq, 2003). This allegation on the part of Aljazeera was denied by the FBI spokesman, Lori Bailey, 
who stated that "they were executing a search warrant as part of a crirninal investigation and the action had 
nothing to do with Middle East issues" (PBI, 2001). 
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Figure 3-41. An Aljazeera Net 
cartoon describing how British 
Air fighters intentionally target 
media reporting civilian 
casualties in Iraq. 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
08-04-2003 
Figure 3-42. The image hijackers posted 
to replace the Aljazeera Net website on 
Thursday, March 27,2003. 
Figure 3-43. An Aljazeera Net cartoon explaining 
that the hacking of the Aljazeera Net server was at 
the instigation of the United States to prevent people 
from knowing the truth 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 29-03-2003 
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Chiming in with Ahmed Farouq's allegations, an Aljazeera cartoonist described the 
hijacking of the Aljazeera Net server as being aimed at preventing people from different 
cultures from knowing the truth (See figure 3-43). Yet, the Internet is not the only field 
of operation in which Aljazeera's activities are targeted. Another battlefront where war is 
being waged is the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq Stock market, which 
barred Aljazeera's financial analysts, Amar Alsankary and Ramzy Shber, from the floor, 
immediately after Aljazeera broadcast news footage of dead and captured American 
soldiers. 
A year after the occupation of Iraq Aljazeera Net conducted a polI, apparently to 
bolster the underdog position it had chosen to take. Aljazeera Net' s polI, which was 
carried out over a period of three days, beginning on April 30, 2004, appealed to its users 
as to whether Aljazeera should change its editorial policies in response to American 
pressures. Reflecting the trust Aljazeera enjoys among its viewers and users, 90.9 % of 
participants, who represent 94,563 users, did not support a change in Aljazeera's editorial 
policy (The majority, 2004) (See figure 3-44). Aljazeera Net's comments on the results of 
the polI explain that the attitude of its users are in accord with the opinion of media 
analysts, who believe that Aljazeera is more accurate than American media outlets (The 
majority, 2004). 
Regularly, Aljazeera articulates its stance on the differences between various 
Western media and the policies adopted in their respective countries, describing the 
Western cameraman, the 'CMM' in figure 3-45, as someone who not only averts his gaze 
from the murder of Palestinians by an Israeli soldier, but also uses his camera as a missile 
in order to attack a Palestinian family. This literalizing of a metaphor - the camera as 
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Yes 
(9.1 %) 
No 
(90.9%) 
Do you support a change in 
the editorial policy of 
Aljazeera as a response to 
American pressure? 
Total number of 
participants: 94,563 
Figure 3-44. Aljazeera Net polI about 
the editorial policy of Aljazeera. 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
04-05-2004 
weapon - is clearly meant to point to the deadly consequences of biased (CNN) 
reporting. Likewise, Western media were also depicted as the front line forces in the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, and as agents propagating the double standards of the West, 
particularly on behalf of the United States, which criticized Aljazeera for broadcasting 
images of dead American soldiers, while itself choosing to show the dead bodies of 
Qasey and Addey Saddam Hussein (See figures 3-45, & 3-46 & 3-47). In reinforcing the 
message of the Aljazeera Net cartoons, Mohamed Dawood, Aljazeera Net's editor, 
emphasized that: 
Analysts believe that military troops attempted forcibly to 
take over and monopolize the audio and visual resources 
needed to coyer this war. Many of them point out that 
American and British media were quick to follow the first 
gun shot fired in Iraq, and conceived the War against Iraq 
as a patriotic dut Y that could only be upheld by producing 
suitable rhetoric and images, evidently to the detriment of 
disclosing the real facts conceming the unfolding of the 
war (Dawood, 2003). 
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Figure 3-45. An Aljazeera Net 
cartoon about how 'CMM', 
shares responsibilities for the 
murdering of Palestinians. 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 
26-07-2002. 
Figure 3-46. An Aljazeera Net cartoon describing 
how the American media was used as the front line 
of troops during the invasion of Iraq in March of 
2003. Published in Aljazeera Net on 21-03-2003. 
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Figure 3-47. An 
Aljazeera Net 
cartoon indicating 
the double 
standard of the 
American media, 
which crÎtiCÎzed 
Aljazeera for 
showing graphie 
images of the dead 
American soldiers, 
while going on to 
depict the dead 
bodies of Addey 
and Qasey Saddam 
in graphie details. 
Published in 
Aljazeera Net on 
29-03-2003 
3.3.2.6. Framed gender: Islam, male superiority and cultural dominance, 
versus the postcolonial myth of innocent masculinity 
Islam shapes the argument about Arab gender at Aljazeera Net, either as a frame 
determining that Arab issues related to women should not be amenable to interpretation 
out si de this given frame, or, at least, utilized as the basis for an argument that aims to 
negotiate a different set of codes and practices. That the Islamic frame is preeminent at 
Aljazeera Net indicates the prevalence of Islamic voices. In order to examine the image 
of Arab women within the Islamic frame it will be necessary to explore how the Muslim 
scholars presented on Aljazeera Net conduct their talks about women's rights. 
The Muslim scholars interviewed at Aljazeera Net are still prone to debate whether 
or not women have the right to work and to take on a job. Hassen Issa, a professor at the 
faculty of Islamic law in Qatar, asserts that women's work should not be put at the top of 
the list of the family's priorities; rather, the family itself, conceived strictly as a collective 
entity, and the husband should enjoy more privileges (Alsheikh, 1997, April). Therefore, 
women's work is conditioned by the family's need for her work, and her husband's 
perceived right to take care of her. For instance, by inferring that the workforce has 
already reached a point of saturation with men and youths alone, Hassen Issa does not 
deem it an urgent matter to consider women's reasons for choosing to work (Alsheikh, 
1997, April). Moreover, Sheikh Yousef Alqaradawi approves of Hassen Issa's views, 
merely adding that the kind and quality of the job should be one of the determining 
factors in women's work. Thus, they are not permitted to work as dancers or bartenders, 
nor are they allowed to work in nightclubs (Alansari, 1999, June). Additionally, they are 
urged not to work in a space where they have opportunities to be alone with single men, 
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or in places where work is particularly strenuous, such as in mining, or construction work 
(Alansari, 1999, June). 
Nonetheless, the conditions specified by Hassen Issa and Y ousef Alqaradawi do not 
appear to be sufficiently exclusive and rigorous for a scholar, such as Abd-Alrazak 
Alshaygi72, the Dean of the faculty of Islamic law at Kuwait University, who believes 
that women should not be allowed to ho Id official positions, nor to be go vern ors or 
parliament members (Hadad, 1999). The position he sets out is centered on one of the 
Prophet Mohamed's 'Hadith' (Statement in the Sunna), which states that: "those who put 
women in positions of governance will not succeed" (Hadad, 1999). 
In response to Abd-Alrazak Alshaygi's opinion, Sami Hadad, Aljazeera's anchor, 
implied that scholars who do not entertain Abd-Alrazak Alshaygi's view are inexcusable: 
So ... tell me doctor, in the United States, Miss Madeline 
Albright is a Jew who adheres to the Bible [The Torah], 
yet, her opinion influences the entire Gulf region, 
particularly Kuwait, but you forbid your Kuwaiti sister to 
express her opinion in Parliament? (Hadad, 1999). 
However, the point of view put forward by Abd-Alrazak Alshaygi has been rejected 
by many other scholars, such as Yousef Alqaradawi, Abd-Alhamid Alansari, the Dean of 
the faculty of Islamic Law in Qatar, who believe that the Quran provides a significant 
counterexample in the queen of Sabb'a, who governed her people well (Mansour, 1998, 
September & Hadad, 1999). Yet, sorne Muslim scholars, such as Alqaradawi and Ali 
Alqoreh Daghy, a professor of Islarnic law at the University of Qatar, who might condone 
the rights of woman to vote in parliamentary elections, are yet very conservative in 
72 Abd-Alrazak Alshaygi considers that his view of preventing woman from holding any general governing 
position is merely a moderate alternative to the 'harmful' views of the liberals and extrernists (Hadad, 
1999). 
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regard to women's rights that might permit them to hold certain sorts of sensitive position 
in the state, such as those in the judiciary. When Ahmed Mansour, Aljazeera's anchor, 
asked Sheikh Yousef Alqaradawi73 about whether Islamic law warrants restrictions for 
women's work as judges, Alqaradawi answered: "Brother Ahmed, 1 do not know why 
you wish to raise problematic and argumentative issues that merely create opportunities 
for titde-tattle" (Mansour, 1998, September). 
The following conversation between Ahmed Masnour, Aljazeera's anchor, and 
Yousef Alqaradawi, not only summarizes how those who are described as 'moderate' 
Islamists problematize the 'issue of woman', but invites the consent of Aljazeera's 
anchor, who either endorses Alqaradawi's answers, or uses the words of his guest as a 
constant refrain. For instance, Alqaradawi74 remarks: 
In fact, the most serious problem with regard to women that 
we [Muslims] experience is the tendency to veer between 
the extremes of immoderation and inattentiveness. Sorne 
people want to forbid women from doing anything, forcing 
them to remain at home, and not to leave their homes more 
than twice: one time to go to her husband's home when she 
gets married, and the other time, to attend her own funeraI. 
Of course, this is an extreme view. On the contrary, there 
are those who want woman to do more or less what they 
want and to go with the flow. 
Ahmed Mansour: Yes. 
Dr. Y ousef Alqaradawi: Nothing prevents her, or restricts 
her; no tie can fasten her, and no deterrent can correct her. 
We faIl somewhere between these two positions and, 
frankly, both of them are to be deplored. That's why we 
73 Alqaradawi posits three statutory conditions for women who wish to work in the judiciary. In 
Alqaradawi's words, women can work as judges at an age when their menstrual cycles stop, and her 
children are grown up, yet women in their thirties should still not be legible to judge. Besides being 
qualified, which is the second condition that Alqaradawi lays down, women should wait until society is 
developed enough to accept women as judges, and until such a time when there is a societal need for 
women to hold these positions (Mansour, 1998, September). 
74 The words that are italicized in Alqaradawi's answer to the delegation, are those wherein Alqaradawi 
appears to speak on behalf of Islam. 
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seek a more moderate position at the center. 
Dr. Yousef Alqaradawi: We permit women to obtain an 
education ... we even allow women to work, but with certain 
conducts and what? Conditions. 
Ahmed Mansour: And conditions (Mansour, 1998, 
September). 
Nonetheless, Aljazeera's apparent wish to honor its maxim, 'our view and the 
opposing view', has opened the way for women to speak for themselves. Moreover, in 
response to the allegations of certain Muslim scholars, Eisha Alghabashawi, professor of 
Islamic law at Umdurman Islamic University, and Omaymah Abu-Baker, professor of 
comparative literature at Cairo University, as weIl as Narjes Ahmed Omar75, a judge at 
the appellate court in Yemen, have each given their view that banning women from 
delivering le gal opinions on matters pertaining to Islam, or from working in courts, will 
retard the prospects of Umma as a whole, and they emphasize that working as a judge or 
as a Mufti is not something that should be exclusive to men (Alshayeb, 2003). 
Aljazeera has debated two key concepts that Arab culture has not hitherto 
embraced: that is, it has attempted to address the theoretical and practical challenges 
posed by feminism and gender. In response to a question about the prospects of tailoring 
the concept of feminism and gender to Islamic culture the voiees that adopt Islam as the 
starting point for an argument agree that feminism is an unusual term, a concept that 
merely reflects Western liberal movements without any specifie attempt to understand the 
claims of Arab women. Instead, they emphasize that Islam pro vides women with a rich 
body of knowledge about women, justice and freedom (Ben-Qenna, 2005, May). 
Recalling the argument made in the first chapter by Nouha AI-Hegelan about the 
specificity of Arab women, Amani Abu-Alfadl, professor of English literature at Cairo 
75 Narjes Ahmed Omar notes that Yemen has at least thirty female judges. 
250 
University, believes that women's Islamic movements should not defend themselves 
when they refuse to admit the relevance of western values and policies due to their 
opposition to fundamental Islamic tenets (Ben-Qenna, 2005, May). Talking on behalf of 
Muslim women, Amani Abu-Alfadl states: 
1 [a Muslim woman] should be free to maintain my own 
identity and beliefs, when they [Westerners] inflict their 
very different beliefs upon me, and even obligate me to 
adopt their own moral system ... 1 am not obliged to keep an 
eye on them all the time in order to transform, or to 
criticize their system; rather, 1 have my own concerns. The 
women's Islamic movement has achieved many goals, and 
many more await completion (Ben-Qenna, 2005, May). 
Adopting a rather more secular view of the matter, Nawal Alsadawi, an Arab 
woman activist, explains that: "the concept of feminism differs from one society to 
another" (Alqasim, 1998, May). She believes that Arab feminism refers to a societal 
notion whose aim is to achieve egalitarian ends for both men and women; and in this 
view biological differences are seen as irrelevant (Alqasim, 1998, May). 
The debate about gender rests on eliding the biological differences between men 
and women. In this scenario, the concept of gender is not less sensitive than the concept 
of feminism for Arab Muslim women. Thus Aljazeera's anchor, Laila Alshayeb (2003, 
February 17) initiates a discussion about whether the concept of gender calls for equality 
or similarity between the sexes. Following the same line of argument about feminism, 
Omaymah Kamel, a researcher in the field of gender, warns that gender is a broad c1uster 
of values, and any philosophy that purports to narrow the field of enquiry to the matter of 
removing all sexual boundaries or differences between a man and a woman, inc1uding the 
biological ones, is doomed to failure (Alshayeb, 2003, February 17). However, a 
comment from the Aljazeera Net freelancer, Adel Latify, expresses an opposing view, 
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which criticizes the c1aim that equality between Arab men and women is necessarily a 
caU for the erosion of biological differences (Latify, 2005). 
Although Aljazeera gives equal opportunities to other women activists, su ch as 
Zaineb Mady, a professor of sociology at the University of King Alhassen Althani in 
Morocco, and Lina Abu-Habib, a researcher in the field of gender, to express their views 
about gender, which means that a more balanced approach to the examination of the 
relationships and roles between women and men becomes possible (Alshayeb, 2003, 
February 17) the sheer strength of representation of Islam voices at Aljazeera, often has 
the effect of weakening the oppositional force of secular voices, and construes women 
activists as voices that circulate in the Western vacuum. 
In contrast to the more affirmative and idealistic view of women that Islamic voices 
portray, the image of Arab women that Aljazeera puts forth is one of marginalization and 
victimization by male Arabs, yet the detailed construction of this image depends on the 
appropriation of problematic issues within Islam, and using these as a decisive point of 
reference. Four specific issues contributing to the image of Arab women can be c1early 
discerned: namely, the socio-economic status of women, women's relationship with men 
within the family and the public, the agenda of Arab women in relation to their 
occupation, and the commodification of Arab women versus the myth of the innocence of 
masculinity. 
Socially, Arab scholars, inc1uding sorne Islamists, widely agree that women are not 
equally treated in laws that determine the state of politics in Arab countries, since women 
are banned from voting in parliamentary elections, exc1uded from being parliamentary 
candidates, and assigned to secondary roles in government, or merely nominal positions. 
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The implications of this absence of women from Arab parliaments is explained by Nehad 
Abu-Alqemsan76, the director of the Egyptian Center for Women's Rights, who argues 
that the nonattendance of women in parliament may lead to an expensive financial bill for 
those governments involved in development projects (Alramhy, 2002, April 22). 
Blame for the absence of Arab women from parliament and from important 
positions of power has rarely been attributed to Islam. Of the few opinions that criticize 
the orientation of the Islamic framework are Nawal Alsadawi and Fardia Alnaqash, 
women activists and Egyptian writers, who believe that Arab women's rights should be 
established through a necessary separation between Islam and the state, bec au se, they 
argue, women are seen as the victims of political Islam (Alsadawi, 2004, & Egyptian, 
2003). 
The Muslim scholars who participate in Aljazeera's programs, while tending to find 
fault with the traditional approach, nonetheless frame their arguments within the 
traditional parameters deemed appropriate for such debates. Y ousef Alqaradawi, Eisha 
Almana'ey, the professor of Islamic laws in Qatar, Rashida Ben-Masoud, a Moroccan 
parliament member, and Zaki Badawi, the dean of the Islamic college in Britain, believe 
that a misconception of Islamic rules77, its cultural mindset78 (Alshayeb, 2003, May), and 
76 Nehad Abu-Alqemsan says that if women were to have been present in parliament, Arab govemments 
would have saved a lot of the money spent to develop rural areas. A telling example offered by Nehad Abu-
Alqemsan reveals that women did not use sorne clean water stations built to help them in the villages, 
because the locations of these stations had been chosen by men, who did not realize that women would be 
wary of passing by these public locations (Alrarnhy, 2002, April 22). 
77 One of the rules that have increasingly received criticism is the concept of the husband's guardianship. 
Ahmed Alraysouni, a Moroccan writer and Aljazeera Net freelancer, explains that while Arab ferninists 
believe that guardianship is a form of repression, it is nonetheless a form of partnership through which the 
husband can come to hold more responsibility for the support of the family (Alraysouni, 2005). However, 
many women activists believe that guardianship should not apply, because wives equally support their 
families, and in many cases, wives are the prime economic sponsors of their families, and not their 
husbands. However, this view is discarded by sorne Arab sociologists, such as Sarnia Aisaaty, the chair of 
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the maintenance of its traditional power base have led to an ongoing lack of equality 
between women and men (Nour, 1999, & Ben-Qenna, 2002, February, & Abd-Allah, 
2003, March). 
Arwa Alkilani, a member of the Islamic Front Action Party in Jordan, argues that 
the disorder that is widespread in Arab countries empowers traditions (Alshayeb, 2002, 
December). Zaki Badawi, who applauds the same view, criticizes the rules that govern 
the Arab family, which in Badawi's opinion, do not accord with Islamic legislation, but 
with traditions that look down on Arab women, and undermine their rights (Nour, 1999). 
In the eyes of Zaki Badawi, when Arab families come to treat them with respect, Arab 
women willlikewise have more success in gaining access to political and social positions 
(Nour, 1999). Similarly, a brief look at how men treat women in their family can go a 
long way in exemplifying how sorne Arab women are treated. Rashida Ben-Masoud, a 
member of the Women's Creativity Association and a Moroccan member of parliament, 
when interviewed by Aljazeera, considered that the attitude, on the part of the male head 
of the family, of considering the women in one's family as constituting a personal 
'harem', is rooted in the idea that women are a property that none should touch, nor 
should they even come near to doing so. She further asserts that this behavior is 
emblematic of the violation of the human rights of Arab women within their families 
(Alshebl, 2004, October). 
the Sociology Department at Ain Shams University. Samia Aisaaty argues that the mere offer of tinancial 
support should not, in itself, permit a wife to lead the family (Ben-Qenna, 2002, January). 
78 Rashida Ben-Masoud, a Moroccan parliament member states that the cultural mindset makes it hard for 
women to be elected. She accordingly suggests that appointing women to formal positions, and securing 
their entry into parliament, might be considered an alternative way to represent Arab women. 
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When looking at the effects of the lack of equal social and economic justice 
between Arab men and Arab women, as reported in Aljazeera Net, the inequality Arab 
women encounter is seen to influence their performance as businesswomen. Rahjeah 
Mahmoud, the spokeswoman for the council of Arab Businesswomen argues that the fear 
of failure in the market negatively influences women's confidence in competing with 
men (Alrarnhy, 2002, May 13). The circumstances of women living in rural areas in Arab 
countries are even worse, since the majority of Arabs living in rural areas remain 
uneducated, and they do not receive adequate salaries to compensate them for their 
contributions to the rural workforce. Additionally, Arab women do not enjoy equal 
rights, nor can they authorize citizenship for their children (Alrarnhy, 2002, December). 
Turning to a more strictly secondary issue, the relationship between women and 
men in the family and in public, Aljazeera has focused considerable attention on 
matrimonial relationships and on the problem of violence against women. The key 
marital issues, in Aljazeera Net's estimation, judging by what it has chosen to highlight, 
are marri age and polygamy, divorce and disavowal (khul'a), where the issue of violence 
against women is principally focused on sexual harassment toward Arab women. 
Generally speaking, women are seen as the victims of male sexual desire, since men 
exercise control in determining the quality of marriage, and they can decide whether the 
marri age is to be temporary (Muttah), to remain unregistered (Orfy), or to be formally 
registered (Rasmy) (Alshebl, 2003, October). The attempts of sorne Muslim Muftis to 
issue decree (fatwa) that decree the marri age of men and women are seen by other 
Islamists as being a depreciation of the rights of women in Islam. They are also seen as 
an imitation of Western relationships that oppose the essence of marri age in Islam 
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(Alshebl, 2003, August), since these decrees suggest that women can be obliged to 
relinquish sorne of their rights. Two alternative forms of marriage are suggested: first, the 
'walk-in-marriage' (The Misyar), through which the wife is obliged to put aside sorne of 
her rights, such as the husband's financial support, the accommodation that should be 
provided by her husband, and the number of nights he should sleep over if he is married 
to another woman (Mansour, 1998, May). Secondly, the 'friendship-marriage' (Zawaj 
Friend), which permits the man and woman to get married, but to live separately, and to 
meet at the man/woman family's apartment (Alshebl, 2003, August). 
Inside the marri age relationship, sexual satisfaction is reported as being more or less 
absent between husband and wives in Arab countries (Alrarnhy, 2002, June). Women 
interviewed at Aljazeera, Anisah Almaray, Altaf Aleisy, and Khadija Ragheb, and 
psychologists from the Lebanon, Kuwait and Egypt, all agree that Arab husbands and 
wives lack sexual knowledge. The socialization of women is partly responsible, since 
they grow up with the idea that sex is something monstrous, nasty and shameful 
(Alrarnhy, 2002, June). 
Parallel to marri age is the complex issue of polygamy. Polygamy is represented in 
Aljazeera as an essential component of Arab and Muslim society, since it is seen as 
Allah's law, and women have no choice but to accept it (Abd-Allah, 2001, December). 
Aljazeera sometimes brings in women experts to talk about polygamy. Moreover, the 
voices of secular women seem marginal and almost absent before the governing frame of 
Islam. Khadija Mofid, the president of the Alhoden (The Hug) association in Morocco, 
strongly underestimates the risks of applauding polygamy, which, in the eyes of women 
secularists is the main cause of the growing selfishness of Arab men. Likewise, Khadija 
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Mofid believes that polygamy is part of the biologicaI nature of man (Alrarnhy, 2002, 
October). Khadija Mofid further explains that resisting polygamy will disenfranchise 
those women who are not given the chance to get married from one of their essentiaI 
rights in Islam; namely, motherhood (Alrarnhy, 2002, October). Therefore, polygamy, or 
so the argument of Khadija Mofid goes, is a privilege for women, as it is for men 
(Alrarnhy, 2002, October). Nevertheless, the caU for polygamy often cornes from non-
religious activist women. A notable example of this occurred in Egypt, when Rayam 
Darbek, an undisclosed joumalist, established an association caIled 'One Wife is not 
Sufficient' (Alrarnhy, 2002, October). 
The image of divorce in Arab family is not less problematic than the debate 
surrounding polygamy. Divorced women are invariably disrespected by people in society, 
who look at them as failed wives who cannot establish a family; or altematively, they are 
seen as rebellious, sinful and eager for free sex (Alshebl, 2004, February). Roda Rzeq, a 
professor of sociology at Lebanon University, and Mokram Odah, the director of the 
Family Guide Pro gram in Jordan, relate that the threats posed by unbridled masculinity 
and the underestimation of the views of divorced women do not apply to ail women, but 
rather, exclusively to divorced Arab women (Alshebl, 2004, February). Roda Rzeq, and 
Mokram Odah claim that the superiority complex of Arab men explains why an Arab 
man "proudly prefers to get married to a foreign woman, who se number of sexuaI 
relationships is unknown, than to get married to a divorced Arab woman, who was 
married to only one man" (Alshebl, 2004, February). Although women activists in sorne 
Arab countries, such as Egypt, have managed to pass legislation that enables women to 
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extricate themselves from marri age (Khul'a)79, others are still struggling to pass the same 
law of annulment in Jordan80• 
The struggle of women to obtain more legisiative rights is apparent in their efforts 
to prevent violence and sexual harassment toward them. A conference about 'violence 
and discrimination against women in the Gulf states' recently called on the Gulf 
govemments to criminalize violence against women (Calls, 2005). Reporting violence 
conceming Arab women has been placed at the top of the agenda of Arab women 
activists, who conducted a workshop in Jordan that sought to publish a comprehensive 
report about violence against Arab women (Atiq, 2004). Kamilia Helmy, Aza Suleiman, 
Vaiolet Dagher, and Rasha Awad, women experts81 interviewed by Aljazeera, describe 
violence as a 'masculine Arab legacy', as a reflection of the domination of men, and as a 
response to the absence of democracy in Arab countries (Ben-Qenna, 2002, January 28, 
& Aishebl, 2003, December, & Aishebl, 2004, January). 
Adel Latify, an Aljazeera Net freelancer, unwittingly reinforces the claims made 
about violence against women in his manner of responding to them. Reminding us, as in 
the debate outlined in the first chapter, about how women are responsible for the 
reputation and honor of the Arab famiIy, Latify ascribes the murdering crimes that aim to 
'cleanse a famiIy's honor' to what he calis the 'comfortable masculine niche ascribed to 
79 The annulment (Khul'a) law gives women the right to obtain a divorce, even if her husband is not willing 
to divorce her. In return, she is required to give back the dowry and gifts her husband gave her at the 
beginning of their marriage. 
80 Aljazeera Net reported the ongoing struggle of lordanian women to pass the al-Khul'a law, and the 
debate surrounding the issue. 
81 Kamilia Helmy is the director of the Global Islamic Committee for W omen and Childhood. Aza 
Suleiman is the director of the Organization for Egyptian Women's Issues. Vaiolet Dagher is an Arab 
psychologist, working in France. Rasha Awad is a member of the center of Bab Babaker Badry for 
Research about Women. 
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Arab man' (Latify, 2005). He incriminates Arab society for being often silent on these 
crimes, and for its lenient verdicts towards criminals (Latify, 2005). However, the 
implication of his paternalistic argument is nonetheless to uphold the superiority of Arab 
men when women go public with their grievances. Mary Khouri, an expert in sexual 
education, and Zainb Radwan, an Egyptian member of parliament, both agree that the 
potential social shame women face makes them loathe to report the incidents of sexual 
harassment they are exposed to in daily life (Ben-Qenna, 2002, March). 
However, there is a broad and ongoing consensus among women voices that daims 
that unchecked Arab masculinity is responsible for their superiority complex toward Arab 
women, albeit, other women activists continue to challenge this consensus. In line with 
the postcolonial approach, many women activists believe that Arab women are used as 
pretexts to embody ideas that serve imperial objectives. Alert to this danger, Aljazeera 
has consistently drawn upon women activists to wam about the hidden agendas that 
activate the calI for unfettering Arab women. Tujan Faisel, a 10rdanian writer, who wams 
women about the dangers of being the "Trojan horse" that the enemy will exploit as the 
traitor within the gaits, writes: 
What we shouid be aware of and refuse is the conspiracy 
between governments, America and the West in general, 
that aims to replace the rights of Umma and human rights 
in general with the minimal privileges that depressed and 
aggrieved fathers, sons, wives and husbands may be said to 
enjoy (Faisel, 2004). 
Likewise, Ahmed Alkabeesy, a professor at Baghdad University, believes that the 
demand for improving the conditions of Muslim women is permeated by Western 
imperatives that have penetrated most of the women's associations in the Arab and 
Islamic World (Abd-Allah, 1999, September). Ahmed Alkabeesy's remarks about the 
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incursions of Western feminist agendas are positively appraised by Amani Abu-Alfadl, a 
professor of English literature at Cairo University, who is also skeptical about embracing 
the 'United Nations' hodgepodge' to address Arab Women's agendas (Alshayeb, 2002, 
December 23). Yet, other scholars, such as Sohair Slty, the representative of Arab 
women's organizations, explains that while Arab women's associations and organizations 
seem to have collective agendas that range in content from the calI for equality between 
men and women to the liberation of Palestine, their agendas are ideologically and 
politically fragmented (Alshayeb, 2002, December 23). 
In tune with the first chapter's argument about the expansion of the Arab women's 
agenda to inc1ude the issue of enforced occupation and employment, the women who 
talked at Aljazeera emphasized how the occupation of Palestine and Iraq continues to 
victimize women, since 40% of all Palestinian families are supported by women, whose 
husbands have either been killed or detained (Alramhy, 2002, September). Maryam Abu-
Daqa, the General Secretary of the Palestinian Women's Union, adds that their 
association has had to additionally pro vide treatment therapies for trauma victims, which 
are highly in demand among Palestinian women (Mansour, 2001, May). Maryam spells 
out that many Palestinian women, especially those who have been detained, lack an 
education, and consequently loose any prospect of finding a good job when they finally 
secure their freedom (Mansour, 2001, May). The women experts interviewed by 
Aljazeera Net also express their concern over the situation in Iraq, and they point to the 
causal relationship between the occupation of Iraq and the insecurity of Iraqi women, and 
likewise, the violation of their privacy and the absence of rights to protect them that 
pertain under normal living conditions (Alshebl, 2004, April). 
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Discussions at Aljazeera sometimes seek to go beyond the 'normative' implications 
of life under occupation. Appealing to Arab men to cast off their derogatory view of 
women, women scholars82 appeal to Aljazeera to invite Arab women to take on three 
related roles to confront occupation, and to resist what they term "Americanism and 
Zionism',' (Alrarnhy, 2002, April 15), which can be set out as follows: (1) an economic 
role that aims to increase the amount of farnily-made products, (2) a role of resistance 
through participation in demonstrations against occupation, and (3) a military role to 
defend "their honor, and that of their homelands" (Alshayeb, 2002, January ,& Alrarnhy, 
2002, April 15 & Alshebl, 2004, March). 
The dominant view that prevails at Aljazeera conceming Arab women is that 
acculturated Arab masculinity is responsible for the state of inequality women are obliged 
to endure, and for forcing women to be housewives and to wear the veil. However, such a 
view is insufficient to account for Aljazeera's discordant overall perspective that actually 
tends to leave Arab men assured and impregnable in their roles vis-à-vis Arab women. 
On the one hand, Arab men are further indicted for being accountable conceming the use 
of media to commodify women in commercials, or at least pressuring women to represent 
a feminine image that appeals to their sense of masculinity in video clips (Alshebl, 2004, 
May, & Alshebl, 2004, August Il). On the other hand, Arab men are seen as blameless, 
and are ultimately let off the hook. 
82 Among the scholars who talked to Aljazeera about Arab women and military occupation are: Hoda 
Zakareya, professor of sociology at Zagzig University, Egypt; Bothaynah Shaban, the Minister of 
Immigration in Syria; Afaf Abd-Alrahman, the director of the Center of Women for Peace and 
Development; Amal Almamaljy, activist in the Iraqi Feminist Movement; Eman Ahmed, the director of the 
International Center for Monitoring Occupation; Mozah Ghobashy, the Director of Alqodos University in 
United Arab Emirates, and Amel Mahmoud, a member of the Committee for Resisting Reconciliation. 
261 
Many of the voices that are heard at Aljazeera tend to free Arab men from more 
formal charges, since it is repeatedly emphasized that sorne media outlets, actually owned 
by women, are jointly responsible for commodifying women, since they reflect the liberal 
ideology of Western feminist organizations (Alshebl, 2004, August Il, & Ben-Qenna, 
2005, June). Another group of scholars believes that Arab men's view of women is one 
that reflects the alienation and subjugation of men in Arab societies. Hayat Howyek, a 
Jordanian writer, and Hoda Rzeq, a professor of sociology at Lebanon University, take up 
the notion of 'oppressed societies', where both men and women are defeated by Arab 
regimes, and live without dignity (Alrarnhy, 2002, May 6, & Alshebl, 2005, February). 
A third group of scholars focus on socialization, education, and culture in order to 
account for Arab perspectives on the relations between men and women (Alshebl, 2004, 
August 30). Interestingly, Elweyah Sobeh, an Arab novelist, informed Aljazeera that 
women are the mouthpieces for the cultural idioms that men produce (Alrarnhy, 2002, 
November). Imprisoned by society, Hessah Alawady, a Qatari woman wearing the veil, 
called on Qatari women to abandon the Niqab83, explaining to Aljazeera that Qatari 
women wear the Niqab, because they are too shy to face men in public. Misk Aljaneed, a 
Yememi writer and researcher, who wears the Niqab, further applauds the c1aim of 
Hessah Alawady, revealing that no one forced her to wear the Niqab; rather, her choice to 
be Mounaqbah (wear the Niqab), is an affirmative response to her social and cultural 
milieu (Alshebl, 2004, September). 
Finally, Arab gender is barely reflected in Aljazeera's cartoons. However, one of 
Shujaat Ali's cartoons c1early reflects the vulnerable situation of Arab women in his 
portrayal of a pregnant veiled woman questioning the values of the Arab world (See 
83 The Niqab is a dress that covers women's hair and face. 
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Figure 3-48). The significance of this Aljazeera Net cartoon is that it seems to 
summarize, through its mute appeal and poignancy, the essence of the above discussion. 
Moreover, it implicitly expresses a dominant perspective found among Arab men, who 
are acculturated to Islamic views in regard to Arab women, since the veiled woman' s 
pregnancy is emblematic of her status as the sexual property of the Arab man, just as 
represents the maintenance and continuation of Arab identity in embryo, so to speak. 
Additionally, the cartoon situates the Arab woman in relation to women from different 
ethnicities, where European women have a sport Y allure, and African women are victims 
of famine. Finally, the cartoon includes a caricature of Miss Condoleeza Rice, the 
American Secretary of State, who in deftly ironic strokes of the brush symbolically 
represents what strong American women can aspire to achieve in politics (See figure 3-
48). 
3.3.2.7. Arab cultural traits frame: Arabic traditional food and music versus 
the globalization of McDonalds Hamburgers and Kentucky Fried Chicken 
One cannot claim that the content and discussions found at Aljazeera Net 
exclusively focus on Arab perspectives on culture, since the 'Culture and Arts' web 
forum in Aljazeera Net is a space for global cultural and art movements, but it would not 
be correct to as sert that Aljazeera Net has abandoned its Pan-Arab perspective entirely. 
However, whenever Aljazeera Net goes beyond its regular reporting agenda to 
problematize the collective features of Arab culture, an arbitrary relationship between 
cultural traits and Arab patriotism on the one hand, and between the resistance of cultural 
imperialism and occupation, on the other, informs the image that Aljazeera wishes to 
project. This section sheds light on two prominent features of Arab culture: namely, 
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You are the 
World 
Figure 3-48. An 
Aljazeera Net cartoon 
about Women, 
wherein Arab women 
continue to question 
the Arab World. 
Published in Aljazeera 
Net on 9-03-2005 
This cartoon was published as part of Aljazeera Net's observations on International Women's Day 
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music and food. It demonstrates how Arab music constitutes a mere fraction of the 
postcolonial discussions staged at Aljazeera Net, and how food icons and symbols 
mediate the ongoing conflicts in the Arab region. 
Pan-Arabi st songs are not a new cultural form. In fact, they date back to the 1930s, 
when Moharnmad & Ahmad Flayfel composed 'Arab Lands' and 'Bilad al-Orb'. In 1958, 
six Arab singers sang an operetta to exalt the glory of the Arab nation, singing on behalf 
of the beloved homeland (Watani Habibi). In the wake of the October war of 1973 when 
Egypt and Syria launched a joint strike against Israel, the poets Ahmed Fouad Nejm and 
Sheikh Imam, composed a duet. Sheikh Imam sang "Y a Arab" to express his feelings, as 
follows: "those who betray the ties between us, desecrate everything, despise Arabism, 
and merely acquiesce to foreigners, who can never truly belong to us" (Ya Arab). Two 
decades later, in 1998, twenty-three singers from across the Arab World performed a 
group song called 'The Arab Dream' (Alhelm Alarabi), reflecting the unbroken circle of 
Arab aspirations across the decades. 
Aljazeera Net occasionally reflects on the import and lyric intent of Pan-Arabi st 
songs. For instance, Ahmed Mansour, Aljazeera's anchor, concisely describes patriotic 
song as "a salient form of expression of Arab public impulses and concems during the 
period of colonialization" (Mansour, 1999, August). A parallel view is once again 
reported in Aljazeera, this time stating how the Palestinian Intifada inspires the political 
songs in Egypt (The Intifada, 2001). Reciprocally, Arab music seems to register, in 
lyrical and harmonious forms, what Pan-Arabism has failed to achieve. The clash 
between Saudi Arabia and Libya is a case in point84 here. Sidi Mohamed, an Aljazeera 
84 In November 2003, Saudi Arabia accused Libya of devising a plan to assassinate Crown Prince Abd-
Allah. A few months later, in August 2003, a further charge was directed at the Libyan President for what 
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Net correspondent, made political capital of the decision of the organizers of the Doha 
Sixth Festival in Music, who se motto was 'Back to the Roots', to devote the last night of 
the festival to two singers; one, Libyan, and the other, Saudi (Mohamed, 2005). 
Lotfi Boushnaq, a Tunisian singer interviewed by Aljazeera, stresses the strong 
bond between politics and song, when he correlates musicians with politicians, stating 
that both of them are history makers and mirrors of reality (Krishan, 1999). A significant 
example of the engagement between politics and music can be found in the songs of 
Shaban Abd-Alrahim85, an Egyptian vocalist. At least two of Shaban Abd-Alrahim songs 
have found popularity in the Arab world: '1 hate Israel', and 'Leave Iraq alone ... watch 
out for Israel' (Shaban, 2003, & Egyptian, 2001). Shaban performed the latter song prior 
to the invasion of Iraq by the American coalition in March 2003. 
A further example of the links between politics and music occurred when the 
organizers of the Arab Summit, held in March 2005, in Aigeria, launched a convoy on 
behalf of Arab Art and folklore that passed through the Aigerian capital, chanting music 
that characterizes the respective contributions of each Arab country. The Aljazeera Net 
Saudi Arabia called the destabilization of Arab collaboration. The div ide between Saudi Arabia and Libya 
has grown in recent years, particularly after a controversial exchange between Crown Prince Abd-Allah and 
President Gaddati at an Arab League Summit in March 2003. In its turn, in February 2005, Libya accused 
Saudi Arabia of organizing a conference on behalf of Libyan opposition in London, which called on the 
Libyan President to quit ruling. The recent apologies made by King Abd-Allah, who now rules Saudi 
Arabia after the death of his predecessor, King Fahad, are seen as acceptable overtures for cooling the clash 
(Saudi, 2003, & The Arab, 2004, & The Saudi, 2005, Libya, 2005). 
85 Shaban Abd-Alrahim, whose songs appeal to the grassroots elements in Egypt, has occasioned a debate 
about the quality of his songs, since he makes one melody serve for aIl his songs. According to Aljazeera, 
sorne of the lyrics of Shaban Abd-Alrahim's songs about the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, have 
been censored. However, he gained even more fame in Egypt when McDonalds in Egypt canceled a 
contract for a commercial with Shaban Abd-Alrahim, whose popularity was a potential asset for 
McDonalds, since it wished to promote its products among the Egyptian grassroots. Aljazeera Net reported 
the feedback of the Arab Nasserist newspaper, which criticized the censorship of sorne of the words of 
Shaban's songs, and in so doing, had called for 'saving Shaban' (Egyptian, 2001). 
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correspondent, Ahmed Rawbah, quotes the comments of an organizer of the Arab 
Summit, who states that "art and folklore is the cement that bonds publics, and seals the 
spiritual relations among the members of the Arab Nation, which presently faces grave 
challenges to its integrity and identity" (Rawbah, 2005). 
Obviously, such a characterization as the one made above underscores the peculiar 
niche in music that Arab identity enjoys, however it also hints at threats posed towards 
that identity. Saher Taha, an Iraqi singer, has emphatically stated the risks confronting the 
Arab region. Saher believes that the music should retain the identity of the Arab nation, 
which has been targeted and desecrated by a conspirator, who now wants to destabilize it 
(Saher, 2004). Hybrid music characteristics, including fast rhythms and foreign melodies, 
which have quickly bec orne a dominant feature of Arabie music, are deemed an 
aggressive attack on Arab culture as a whole (Alqasim, 2000, June). Mohamed Abdoh, a 
Saudi singer, who slams the companies at the head of the musical production in the Arab 
world for what he terms "the tawdry aspects of the temptation to sellout," further warns 
against the globalization package, which imposes the culture and legacy of the Other on 
the Arab nation" (Mohamed, 2005, January). 
Despite the challenges now facing Arabic song, its innate cultural roots are 
perceived as a determining factor in the cultural rivalry between Arabs and Israelis. Saleh 
Alnaami, a Palestinian writer and an Aljazeera Net freelancer, emphasizes that Israel's 
failure to blend the various ethnicities into one combined cultural melting pot weakens 
the attempts of Israel to celebrate its nationhood through song (Alnaami, 2004). The 
absence of a collective 'cultural' identity in Israel, or so the argument of Saleh Alnaami 
goes, has conferred on Arabic song a greater capacity to prevail in the music market, and 
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has led sorne Israeli singers to duplicate Arab melodies (Alnaami, 2004). Additional 
evidence attesting to the strength of Arab musical culture, as adduced by Alnaami, 
demonstrates that many Jewish associations continue to pay attention to the revival of 
oriental culture in Israel (Alnaami, 2004). The activities of certain Jewish musical 
ensembles are considered as an example of the upsurge in this kind of oriental music, 
especially as they take advantage of the Arabic poems composed during a period when 
the Jews were living in Andalusia. Other musical groups perform Andalusian terza rima 
composed by Arab poets during that era (Alnaami, 2004). 
Aljazeera's attempt to assign a protective role to Arab music in order to maintain 
Arab identity and to keep it cohesive in the face of globalization and cultural imperialism, 
as weIl as to demonstrate the strength of Arabic songs and lyrics in resisting occupation 
seems more successful than the rather less challenging position it has assumed in regard 
to the role of food in preserving identity. Indeed the question of how Arabs could 
advance the symbolic significance of their food to uphold their Arab identity is barely 
highlighted at Aljazeera Net. Nonetheless, Arab food is seen as a means of resistance 
against Israel and its alliances, and as an ingredient in a more comprehensive strategy to 
boycott86 Israeli and American products. 
86 The repetition of the discourse about Arab boycotts in Aljazeera Net represents the boycott of Israeli 
products as an ongoing Arab and Islamic strategy. The general delegate of Arab boycotts of Israeli 
products, Ahmed Khoza' ah, estimates that the Israeli deficit resulting from the sanctions imposed on its 
products is estimated as being at least 95 billion dollars, in the period since 1950 (Arab, 2003, December). 
The discussions centered on boycotts, as examined by Aljazeera Net, began as early as February 2001, 
when the Arab bureau of the Arab Boycott Commission conceived a plan to ban Israeli products from 
entering Arab countries (A plan, 2001). In May 2001, the Arab Bathist conference in Baghdad asked Arabs 
to cease aIl deals with Israel (Arab, May 2001). The calI for boycotting Israel was followed by a request in 
June 2001 from the government of Saudi Arabia that urged Arabs to revitalize their economic boycott of 
Israel, if the peace process did not show any signs of moving forward (Saudi, 2001). Additionally, Sudan 
reacted positively to the demands made above by taking precautions in July 2002 to stem the flood of 
products coming from Israel (Sudan, 2002). Just two months before these Sudanese precautions had been 
announced, in May 2002, A1jazeera invited Abd-Alrahman AIsehibani, the deputy General Secretary of the 
Arab League of States for Economic Affairs, to be its guest, and he emphasized that the formaI position of 
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Aljazeera Net does indeed follow sorne of the arguments made in the first chapter 
about how the other' s food icons and symbols have become a staple Arab poli tic al target 
in their "conflict with America and Israel" (Alteriki, 2002), and Aljazeera anchors often 
cheer the manifestations of Arab boycotts. In 2002, in his introductory statement about 
the boycott of American and Israeli products, Alteriki observed that: "Arab publics have 
made their attitude c1ear toward the hamburger and other American products, through 
their participation in spontaneous campaigns conducted throughout the Lebanon, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain" (Alteriki, 2002). 
Other anchors at Aljazeera, such as Faisel Alqasim, often impose their opinions in 
the debate about the boycott. Commenting on one of the opponents of the boycotting of 
products, Alqasim dec1ared: "Now 1 can assure you that if aIl the members of the Arab 
public stopped drinking Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola, you can be sure that aIl the American 
ambassadors would start complaining. They would create an uproar." (Alqasim, 1999, 
September). Thus, in hypothetically representing the enforced absence of American icons 
and commodities from the Arab market as a definite cause for conflict, the idea that 
economic power can achieve the military goals of imperialism by other means, gains a 
new lease of life. Likewise, Aljazeera's anchor, Mallek Alteriki, draws on the comments 
of Thomas Friedman, a columnist at the New York Times, who has stated that countries 
with McDonald' s do not wage wars against each other (Alteriki, 2002). 
the Arab League was to boycott ail Israeli products (Alteriki, 2002). In order to keep the strategy 
operational, the Arab bureau of the Arab Boycott repeated the calI for the boycott insiistently (The bureau, 
2002). Islamic congregations participated in the strategy also. For example, the Tenth Islamic Summit, held 
in Malaysia in October 2003, assured Muslims of its commitment to maintain the economic restrictions on 
Israeli products (The Islamic, 2003). 
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The attempt to localize and assimilate American icons and symbols has engendered 
a debate about Hamburgers, McDonalds, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Coca-Cola. 
Hence, opponents of the boycotts of American products emphasize the means by which 
these products can gain a grassroots allegiance. For instance, Wahid Abd-Almajid, the 
editor in chief of the Arab Strategie Report, and Abd-Alhamid Alansari, the dean of the 
Faculty of Islamic Laws in Qatar, believes that Hamburgers, McDonalds, Kentucky Fried 
Chicken and Coca-Cola are Arab enterprises, and that "Kentucky Fried Chicken was bom 
and raised in Arabie culture" (Alqasim, 1999, September, & Alqasim, 2002, May 21). 
Yet, in a more critical analysis of how American products, such as hamburgers, can 
violate Arab culture, while yet symbolizing American food, Abd-Alwahab Almiseeri, an 
Egyptian writer and Aljazeera Net freelancer, describes the hamburger as the symbol of a 
culture that does not consider the specificities of place (Almiseeri, 2005). Almiseeri 
explains that the invasion of the Burger is something that transcends the dimensions of 
time and place; however, anywhere one goes, the dimensions of a hamburger will be 
uniformly the same, the support staff will be wearing identical uniforms, and even the 
priees will be comparable in any restaurant, regardless of considerations of time or place 
(Almiseeri, 2005). 
3.3.3 Aljazeera and the Arabs in the North America Diaspora: Representing 
Islamic and Arab identities 
This section examines how Aljazeera represents Arabs in North America, sheds 
light on how Aljazeera blurs the boundaries between the local and the global, and finally 
examines how Arabs reciprocally represent Aljazeera as weIl as their own identities. 
When looking into the image Aljazeera Net portrays of Arabs in North America, two 
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notable observations can be made. Firstly, Aljazeera87 focuses on the Arab-American 
community through examining the issues that may affect Islamic identity, but it does not 
necessarily reflect the experience and opinions of the various members of the Arab 
diasporic community. Secondly, Aljazeera represents Arab Americans, and ignores Arab 
Canadians88, despite the support that Aljazeera receives through Arab Canadians. 
As explained in the first part of this chapter, Aljazeera conflates Arabs with 
Muslims when it talks about Arabs in North America. Rather than speak on behalf of an 
Arab identity, it highlights the challenges facing the maintenance of Islamic identity. That 
is to say, Arabs are seen as part of the general population of the Muslim community. 
Aljazeera Net's archive provides evidence in support of the argument that AIjazeera blurs 
the distinction between Muslims and Arabs. When conducting a search for 'Arab 
Americans' through the Aljazeera Net archive, only nine headlines were identified. 
Khaled Safouri, the president of the American Islamic Institute, problematizes the Arab 
community, claiming that a great many Arab Americans do not consider themselves as 
Arabs (Almarazi, 2002, June). Although Arab Americans number as many three million 
people, Khaled Safouri explains that many Arabs live and work outside the Arab 
American community, and identify themselves as either Copts or Pharos (Almarazi, 
2002, June). Moreover, two sources related to Arab identity are approached from a 
strictly Islamic perspective: namely, Islam and Women. 
87 Since December 2002, Aljazeera Net has begun to add one of the programs of its sister channel, called 
'The news from Washington,' to the list of its available programs. 'The news from Washington' is 
Aljazeera's debating program, and it is screened on location from AIjazeera bureau in Washington. 
Aljazeera Net' s archive now records 173 editions of 'The news from Washington' since December 2002. 
88 The only news story found about Arab Canadians was a short news item about Maher Arar in October 
2003. AIjazeera Net reported that Amer Mousa, the General Secretary of the Arab League of States 
approached the Syrians to initiate talks about Arar's case (The Arab, 2003, October). 
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Initially, Aljazeera portrays a gloomy picture of Muslims and Arabs in the United 
States, describing them as victims of discrimination and as living targets of the Zionist 
lobby in North America. Likewise, those Muslims and Arabs who approach Aljazeera 
with their own evaluations of their situation depict how the United States administration 
and its media attempt to portray them. For instance, Nehad Awed, the executive director 
of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), says that the image of Muslims in 
America is very complicated, and though it appears to be positive overall, he reports that 
Muslims have been the subject of constant and systematic distortion over many decades 
(Nour, 2002, October). 
Ala' a Bayoumi, the director of Arab affairs at CAIR, identifies two factors to 
account for the pressure exerted on Islamic Identity; namely, the attempts of what he 
terms 'an extremist American minority', to distort the image of Muslims in the United 
States, and the opposition of sorne Muslims, who seem disturbed by the increasing 
manifestations of Islamic identity (Bayoumi, 2004, April). Ala'a Bayoumi89 concisely 
summarizes sorne of the conflicts launched by what he termed "the pro-Israel Lobbyist 
organizations" against Muslims (Bayoumi, 2004. June). Bayoumi alleges that the pro-
Israel lobby has adopted conflicting positions against Muslim organizations that have 
89 Ala'a Bayoumi critiques sorne American writers such as William Lind and Paul Weyrich, which last, 
stated that American Muslims: "should be encouraged to leave the United States. They are like a fifth 
column in this country" (Bayoumi, 2004, April). In Bayoumi's words, "such invitations are propagated by 
right-wing extremists, such as Daniel Pipes" (Bayoumi, 2004, April). Bayoumi relates that Daniel Pipes 
was widely criticized because of his calI for the supervision of professors and academic institutes 
(Bayoumi, 2004, June). Similarly, in August 2003, when President Bush decided to appoint Daniel Pipes as 
a member of the Board of Directors of the United States Institute of Peace, Aljazeera Net responded by 
describing Pipes as an extremist and, yet nonetheless, as a challenging researcher (Bush, 2003). Daniel 
Pipes, himself, who seemed annoyed by the accusation made against the Israeli Lobby in the United States, 
defended himself in one of Aljazeera's debates about the American Presidential Election in 2004, by 
observing that: "1 am not an officiallobbyist, and 1 write and publish my ideas openly. AlI of us do the 
same because we perceive this as a legitimate matter. If the Israeli lobby is now stronger than the Arab 
lobby, weIl then, 1 can only say to Arabs, create a stronger lobby, after aIl, this is [the United States] a free 
country in the last resort" (Alqasim, 2004, November). 
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achieved sorne success and have gained in popularity among Muslims (Bayoumi, 2004. 
June). Bayoumi states: "If these organizations had not been capable of reaching the 
American media and its political platforms, these organizations would not have been 
targeted by the pro-Israel Lobby" (Bayoumi, 2004. June). Aljazeera Net relies on the 
reports of American media such as the Los Angeles Times, which states that many 
American Jewish organizations are behind the campaign to distort the image of Arabs 
and their organizations (Report, 2001). However, sorne Arabs and Muslims are not 
satisfied with the performance of Arab and Muslim organizations in America, since they 
believe that sorne of the organizations that appear to be popular among Muslims do not in 
fact represent aIl Muslims and Arabs. Others criticize these organizations for formulating 
an American agenda, while they are supposed to adopt an agenda to meet the needs of 
Arabs and Muslims (Almarazi, 2004, October). 
The September Il th attacks have had a profound impact on Arabs and Muslims. 
Almost two years after the attacks, particularly in July 2003, Aljazeera Net published a 
report on the "Anathema of September Il that pursues American Muslims," indicating 
that "seven million Muslims in the United States are having to keep up a rosy front in a 
society that considers Muslims a threat to their security" (The anathema, 2003). Ala'a 
Bayoumi, the director of Arab affairs at the Council on American-Islamic Relations 
(CAIR), speIls out three key implications of the attacks for Muslims: firstly, it puts 
pressure on Muslim forces to leave the United States; secondly, it exerts pressure on 
others to withdraw from public life, and thirdly, another minority are tempted to redouble 
the effort of assimilation to a hostile environment, even seeking to change their Islamic 
names in so doing (Bayoumi, 2004, April). Yet, Bayoumi, who describes the efforts made 
273 
by this latter grouping of Muslims, who prefer to live and work under a hidden identity, 
as awkward and largely unsuccessful, emphasizes that the majority of Muslims are 
working diligently to express their connection with their Islamic identity (Bayoumi, 
2004, April). Ala'a Bayoumi's highlighting of the present dilemmas of American 
Muslims is based on the study of Zahid H. Bukhari, the founder of Muslims in the 
American Public Forum, which notes that the September Il th attacks have speeded up the 
process of integration of Muslims in American society (Bayoumi, 2004, April). Bayoumi 
also refers to a survey, conducted by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), 
whose results indicate renewed manifestations of what Ala' a Bayoumi terms, the 
development of Islamic identity. This survey, conducted two years after the attacks of 
September l1 th , conc1udes that 58% of Muslims have increased their level of social 
activities, while 45% of them have bec orne more concemed with politics, and another 
52% of them have begun to engage in discussions about the dialogue between religions 
(Bayoumi, 2004, April). 
While the freedom of Muslims to practice their religious rituals has not been unduly 
influenced by the September Il th attacks, the director of CAIR, and other Arab scholars, 
such as Jamal Badawi, the President of the Fiqh (Jurisprudence) Council in North 
America, assign positive reactions to the September attacks; that is, they point out that the 
discrimination shown toward sorne Muslims has increased their solidarity, and motivates 
them to be more open to non-Muslims, or has even afforded opportunities to provide a 
corrective image about Islam (Almarazi, 2002, August). 
The comments made by Aljazeera's anchors, Hafez Almarazi and Mohmaed Ben-
Almokhtar Mohamed, seem to offer an overly reductive image about the discrimination 
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directed against Arabs and Muslims. Hafez Almarazi and Mohmaed Ben-Almokhtar both 
agree that innocent Arabs and Muslims in the United States are usually accused of being 
terrorists, or at least suspects, until they have otherwise proved their innocence 
(Almarazi, 2001, November & Ben-Almokhtar, 2003). Indeed, Aljazeera Net highlights 
sorne of the reports about discrimination against Arabs and Muslims, indicating that at 
least one fifth of Arab Americans undergo discrimination90; that many Arab Students are 
planning to leave the United States; and that the United States is going to deport at least 
6,000 Arabs and Muslims in the aftermath of September Il (One, 2001, & Arab, 2001, 
September, & America, 2002). Shujaat Ali, an Aljazeera Net cartoonist, portrays an 
image that reaffirms the former view of the persistence of discrimination and suspicion, 
since his cartoon features American media and national security organizations, which are 
seen intently monitoring the activities of a praying Muslim (See figure 3-49). 
In a similar vein, Nehad Awed, the executive director of CAIR, warns against the 
increase in various aspects of discrimination, which jumped by 70% percent in 2003. 
Recently, in May 2005, Awed pointed out a disturbing tendency in the proliferation of 
media discourses disseminating hatred against Islam and Muslims (CAIR, 2004). Khaled 
Abu-Alfadel, a member of the International Association of Religious Freedom, also mulls 
over what he calls the explosion of Islam-phobia, an unreasonable fear of Islam that has 
90 At least one in five Arabs have informed the American Arab Institute that they have experienced many 
different aspects of discrimination. Possible acts of discrimination against Arabs and Muslims, as reported 
by Aljazeera Net, range from the detention of thousands of Arabs and Muslims to investigate their 
ideological and religious affiliations, to the increase in pressure on Arab and Muslim males who request 
entry visas, and even, the exclusion of job applications because of the provenance of their names 
(Almarazi, 2001, November, & One, 2001, & Almarazi, 2002, September). 
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Figure 3-49. An Aljazeera Net cartoon about 
scrutiny of Muslim Americans on the part of the 
American media, the FBI, and the CIA. 
Published in Aljazeera Net on 3-07-2002 
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lead to an alarming increase in the number of books, movies91 and radio programs that 
violate Islam (Almarazi, 2005, May 12). 
Hope for a better future for Muslims and Arabs in North America is seemingly 
unattainable, yet Aljazeera Net often focuses on the personal achievements of Arabs and 
Muslims in America. Devoting one of its programs to talks about "stories of Arab success 
in America," Aljazeera introduced two stories: one about Abu-Baker Aljame'i, a 
Moroccan journalist, who won a Press Freedom award, and another story by Abdul 
Haidous, the first mayor of Wayne, Michigan, to be elected directly by the city's 
residents (Almarazi, 2003, November). 
Now, tuming to women, Aljazeera rarely represents an Arab view of issues related 
to Arab American women; rather, it continues to enmesh Arab American women within 
the frame of Islam. Nonetheless, Aljazeera has conducted debates about Arab and 
Muslim women in the West, often examining their life from an Islamic perspective. One 
of Aljazeera' s debates about Arab women who migrated to France sought to ask why 
Arab women often migrate to Western countries. 
Recalling the postcolonial framework of debate, Sawsan Sadafi, the educational 
director of the Future Institute in Paris, explains that the first waves of Arab women's 
migration to the West were due to colonialism, while the waves that followed in the 
1960s and 1970s were owing to the motivation of Arab families to secure a better level of 
91 One of the movies that create outrage among Muslims is "The Siege." Directed by 
Edward Zwick, the movie describes the fictionallives of Arabs who come to North America to study, and 
end up, particularly if they come from Palestine, as terrorists. Nehad Awed explains that the movie's 
objective is to negatively influence Muslim's participation in social and politicallife in the United States, 
thereby isolating them further and distorting their public image (Mansour, 1998, November). Muslims in 
the United States responded to the movie by protesting in a number of different American states (Mansour, 
1998, November). Nehad Awed told Aljazeera that there are at least 700 movies that provide negative 
images about Islam (Mansour, 1998, November). 
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economic life (Alrarnhy, 2002, July). A similar view is offered by Suad Alwahidi, the 
editor in chief of Oriental Studies magazine, in responding to a question regarding the 
dreams of the first waves of Arab women in regard to immigration, and the retention of 
Arab identity. Suad believes that Arab women were, first and foremost, companions and 
mothers (Alrarnhy, 2002, July). That is, Arab women of the first waves of migration were 
companions for their husbands, who were forced to leave their homelands because of 
social injustice and sufferings, and as mothers, they held the prime responsibility for 
Arab identity and Arab heritage (Alrarnhy, 2002, July). Suad Alwahidi further adds that 
"the next generation of Arab women immigrants, who did not choose their place of birth, 
were French in every social, economic, and political meaning of the term, because they 
were educated in French schools and speak the French language" (Alrarnhy, 2002, July). 
In a different vein, Safa'a Aisawi, a spokeswoman for the Arab Women's Association in 
London, explains that Arab women in Britain are less likely to face the same amount of 
discrimination they face in Belgium and France, but she agrees that Arab women are 
stereotyped as either ignorant or as terrorists (Alshebl, 2003, October 20). 
Positioning herself within the Islamic framework, Suad Alwahidi, in reply to a 
question about the integration of Arab women in countries with an extensive immigrant 
presence, indicates that it is more accurate to speak of an Islamic identity in France, given 
that the number of Muslims there exceeds six million (Alrarnhy, 2002, July). Raghed 
Altakriti, the spokeswoman for the Islamic Society in London, puts the matter in other 
words. She states: 
We should be aware that in any war against Islam and the 
Islamic identity, Muslim women are always in the front 
line, because people will not necessarily recognize a 
Muslim man, but women wearing the veil are the first 
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victims in any attack against Muslims and Islam (Alshebl, 
2003, October 20). 
Aljazeera practically ignores Arab women in the United States, since it prefers to 
speak of issues concerning Muslim women in America, or as part of a given issue, such 
as the dilemma of Muslim women in the West, as explained above. One of the more 
heated issues that Aljazeera has debated is the call of Muslim woman in the United States 
to lead Muslim prayers at mass. Aljazeera interviewed two Muslim women imams: Asra 
Noumani and Amina Wadoud. Asra Nomani, a Muslim American, a former Wall Street 
journalist, and the author of "Standing Alone by Mecca," believes that gender relations 
are employed to prevent women from enjoying their rights in public places. Asra, who 
has twice led mixed-gender Friday mass prayers, emphasizes that women' s rights in the 
mosque should be on a par with her rights in the bedroom (Almarazi, 2005, March). 
Likewise, Amina Wadoud, a professor of Islamic Studies at the Virginia Commonwealth 
University, who led a Friday prayer assembly of over 100 men and women in the 
Episcopal Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York on March 18,2005, believes that 
the Quran gives equal rights to men and women in prayer (Almarazi, 2005, March). 
The relative indifference on the part of Aljazeera to Arab women in the United 
States is part of its tendency to overlook the Arab community, since Aljazeera often 
prefers to approach Arab Americans as a political entity rather than as a community. 
Accordingly, it prefers to discuss the views of Arab Americans at Presidential elections 
(Almarazi, 2004, September, & Alqasim, 2004, November). Another example of the 
politicization of Arab communities in the Diaspora is offered by Hafez Almarazi, the 
chief of the Aljazeera bureau in Washington: When Hafez Almarazi devoted a sequence 
of programS to the inauguration of the Arab museum in Detroit (Almarazi, 2005, May 5), 
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he did not invite leaders of the Arab community to talk about the museum, but 
surprisingly, he invited Amer Moussa, the General Secretary of the Arab League of 
States, and three Arab ambassadors to the United States, in order to underline how the 
Arab museum is a powerful cultural symbol, and represents the poli tic al agenda of Arabs 
(Almarazi, 2005, May 5). 
3.3.3.1. Aljazeera and the purity of representation: The local and the global 
among Arabs and Muslims 
Aljazeera Net blurs the boundaries between the local and the global, so that in 
localizing the global, and globalizing the local, Aljazeera can proceed with its strategy to 
remediate and de-territorialize the various Arab publics in Arab countries and, more 
particularly, Arabs and Muslims in North America. That is to say, when Aljazeera brings 
in local writers and speakers from the entire range of Arab countries to discuss global 
issues related to Arabs, Aljazeera globalizes these speakers and writers, so that the 
specifie and local experience of Arabs and Muslims living in North America is 
reconstructed through a globalizing frame that may or may not yield up its 'local' 
significance through the remediation prism. Examples supporting the notion of how 
Aljazeera globalizes the local, and then re-Iocalizes the global are numerous. For 
instance, Sheikh y ousef Alqaradawi was invited to talk about the image of Arabs in 
American cinema and to discuss the position of Muslim women in the West without it 
being thought necessary to question the ethics of who can properly speak for whom and, 
more particularly, whether global intellectuals can be thought to speak to, or on behalf of, 
'local' communities (Mansour, 1997, August 31, & Mansour, 1998, November). The 
same concems are relevant to Aljazeera' s invitation to Milad Hana, a Copt who lives in 
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Egypt and a member of the Supreme Council of Culture in Egypt, to talk about the 
impact of the September Il th attacks on Arab Christians living in the United States 
(Mansour, 2002, August). Likewise, when Aljazeera invites Arab scholars, who live in 
the United States, Great Britain, and France, such as Ala'a Bayoumi and Nehad Awed, 
the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), to talk about Muslim Americans, or 
invites Zaki Badawi, the dean of the Islamic faculty in London, and Nahlah Alshal, a 
professor of sociology at the University of Paris, to debate issues concerning the Arab 
women in the Arab World (Nour, 1999, & Alramhy, 2002, September), or Borhan 
Ghalyoon, an Aljazeera Net freelancer and a professor of sociology at Sorbonne 
University (Ghalyoon, 2002, & Ghalyoon, 2004), to write about wide-ranging issues 
related to the entire spectrum of Arab countries, not to mention the many other writers 
and speakers cited in this chapter, Aljazeera, in effect, localizes these scholars for an 
Arab reader or viewer who lives in any other Arab country or Arab Diaspora. Moreover, 
a transnational media, such as Aljazeera, has become a local media for Arab communities 
in the United States and Canada. As will be seen in the upcoming section, Aljazeera has 
become almost a requirement for Arab Canadians, especially as it is now the voice of 
Muslims and Arabs in the United States. 
More significantly, when scrutinizing the process of localizing the global, and/or 
globalizing the local from the representational point of the view, the reciprocal shi ft 
between the local and the global seems very problematic. Could the representation of 
Arabs around the globe, and Arabs in Arab countries, ostensibly as a representation of the 
local, be in any way consonant with Aljazeera' s daims conceming the purity of 
representation? Additionally, in localizing Arab Americans and their issues to viewers 
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and users from Arab countries, and in globalizing Arabs living in the Arab World, then 
surely, from the standpoint of Arab Americans confronted with these remediated issues, 
what we have here, in so far as it is anything, is a pure representation of dislocation? 
Might, then, Aljazeera be a forum for pure representation? 
The two following responses to such questions seem to support the standpoint of the 
purity of representation, given that the represented is conceived in terms of location or 
dislocation. Clive Barnett (2003), who attempts to discuss what is entailed by purity of 
representation, supposes that purity requires a restoration of full presence (p. 14). In his 
book, The Ring of Representation, Stephen Ross (1992) provides yet another response to 
the questions posed above. Ross (1992) posits that pure representation is possible if 
representation exceeds itself, and is "freed from its classical bonds to subject and object" 
(p. 62). Stating the matter even more categorically, Stephen 
Ross, who bases his argument upon Michel Foucault' s The Order of Things, states that: 
"[I]n the invisibles that surround representation dwell the "only" representation we may 
find of pure representation as dislocation" (p. 62). Therefore, the nature of pure 
representation may not be equated with the origin of representation, but as the ring of 
transcendence, "where representation represents itself by dislocating itself' (Ross, 1992, 
p.62). 
3.3.3.2. Representing Aljazeera and Arab identity: Media experts, academics, 
and community leaders speak out 
Throughout this chapter, 1 have discussed the representation of Arab identity at 
Aljazeera Net. This section shifts the discussion to examine how Arab media experts, 
academics, and community leaders in North America respond to Aljazeera and reflect 
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upon the daims of Arab identity. The representation of Aljazeera and Arab identity that 
follows will draw on the contributions of ten North American scholars: six Arab 
Americans; Jehane Noujaim, a film director; Diana Abu Jaber, an Arab novelist; 
Mamoun Fandy, JamaI Nassar, Fouad Ajami and Margaret Nydell, academics and media 
critics; and four Arab Canadians: Hassan Isidean, the owner of the Middle East Book 
Store; Baha Abu-Laban92, an Emeritus professor of Sociology at the University of 
Alberta; Mazen Chouaib, the executive director of the Nation Council on Canadian-Arab 
Relations (NCCAR); and finaIly, Omar Aighabra, the president of the Canadian Arab 
Federation (CAF). 
This section will begin with the thoughts and reflections of Jehane Noujaim, a 
Harvard-educated Egyptian-American, who expresses her frustrations as an Arab 
regarding the "American ignorance of the Middle East," and relates the general lack of 
awareness of Arab affairs to her tenuous sense of identity, formed in a relative vacuum: 
l'm trying to figure out: why do 1 feellike l'm in a bubble 
in the United States? And this has to do with the fact that 
when you tum on the television, you see a very small part 
of what is actuaIly happening in the world (Schechter, 
2004). 
Trying to figure out the reason for her frustration, she adds that perhaps it is 
attributable to the fact that she is not obliged to look beyond the borders of the United 
States, or, in any case, she is isolated from the countries around her by big oceans 
(Schechter, 2004). Given her relative sense of isolation, Jehane, the director of a 
documentary about Aljazeera caIled the 'Control Room', shares the views of many other 
92 Dr. Abu-Laban is Director of the Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and 
Integration. 
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Arab Americans when she defines Aljazeera as the first free global Arab news network 
(Schechter, 2004). 
Fouad Ajarni, the director of the Middle East Studies Pro gram at Johns Hopkins 
University, shares Jehane's views about Aljazeera, describing Aljazeera as a more 
independent media than any other Arab media (Ajarni, 2002). Yet, when he broaches the 
subject of the relation between Aljazeera and identity, Ajarni is pointedly critical of the 
collective identity Aljazeera would appear to represent. Repeating a cornrnon charge laid 
at Aljazeera's door, he believes that the "network deliberately fans the flames of Muslim 
outrage," and describes the collective identity of Aljazeera as follows: 
A fiercely opinionated group, most are either pan-Arabist-
nationalists of a leftist bent cornrnitted to the idea of a 
single nation built across the many frontiers of the Arab 
world, or Islarnists, who draw their inspiration from the 
primacy of the Muslim faith in politicallife (Ajarni, 2002). 
Marnoun Fandy, a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, and former 
professor of Politics at Georgetown University, agrees that Aljazeera represents the 
identity of Arabs as 'We versus the Other', and in this reductive scenario, Americans are 
conceived as barbaric, and Arabs are presented as heroic (Fandy, 2003). As an Egyptian 
who has lived in the United States for over 20 years, Fandy's broad lines of analysis are 
generally sirnilar, at least in relation to his references to the sources of Arab identity, to 
the analysis set out above in the first chapter. That is, he believes that the collective 
identities Aljazeera represents "span historical events from the Crusades to the Mongol 
invasions of Baghdad to the colonial experience and the recent Arab-Israeli wars" 
(Fandy, 2003). 
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Dwelling on what he caUs the "mutual need in the United States and in the Muslim 
world for a greater knowledge of each other" (Fandy, 2002), Mamoun Fandy caUs on 
young Muslims who come to study in America to engage with the problematic issue of 
the representation of the other, and to help bridge this divide (Fandy, 2002). Moreover, he 
sets an inspiring example for Arabs in America, through capitalizing on his capacity to 
create a third space for the emergence of a new identity, free from the trammels of 
preconceptions, ossified views and rigid ideological barriers. Mamoun observes: 
When 1 arrived in Washington, 1 was lucky to meet people 
who helped me to be successful. 1 came from an old and 
homogeneous society. Thus questions of multiculturalism 
and race relations did not occur to me -- until 1 came here. 1 
saw things in this country that did not match what 1 had 
read in the Arab press about the imperialist American view. 
1 saw a society in the making. America sees itself as a 
human project to which anyone can contribute. 1 jumped at 
the chance (Fandy, 2002). 
The c10sing of the cultural gap between the Arab world and the United States, or 
with the West in general, necessitates more direct media participation. Jamal Nassar, the 
chair of the department of Politics and Govemment at Illinois State University, agrees 
that the Arab media, inc1uding Aljazeera, should be more hybrid, attributing less blame to 
the other, since this is more likely to help Arab societies to face up to their own 
responsibilities, and resist a facile recourse to scapegoats (Nassar, 2004). Additionally, he 
believes that the image of Arabs in the West is characterized by the predominance of 
ignorance and violence, and unless this image is corrected, Arabs will not gain the respect 
they merit for their aspirations and rights (Nassar, 2004). 
Generally speaking, Nassar refuses to overestimate the construction of common 
enemies, since this kind of projection always seems to function as a willed constituent of 
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one's own sense of identity and belonging (Nassar, 2004). Jamal Nassar explains that the 
tendency of media to construct the other is global in scope, and warns against a 
disproportionate critique of Arab media, since Arabs have go ne through many colonial 
experiences and conflicts, and suffer at the hands of those who wield incommensurate 
power in the media, and can therefore control news representations to protect their own, 
predominantly Western interests (Nassar, 2004). In terms of their subjective, or even, 
affective identity, the influence of the Arab sense of victimization by the other, or so the 
argument of Jamal Nasser goes, can make Arabs more emotional, and more motivated 
concerning patriotism and nationalism than other less vulnerable populations (N assar, 
2004). Conversely, Nassar indicates that Arab identity contributes to the fervor of 
nationalism, and helps Arabs to keep their spirit of resistance against colonialism intact 
(Nassar, 2004). 
Margaret Nydell, a professor of Arabie at Georgetown University, identifies a 
further motivation for resistance. In taking up the argument made by Jamal Nassar to 
question whether Arab identity is a resistant identity, Nydell acknowledges that it is 
possibly resistant to the process of wholesale Westernization as an ingredient of 
modernization, and it is further informed by the inevitable traumas and challenges posed 
by competing ideologies, such as 'individual freedom' versus 'social morality' (Nydell, 
2004). She further emphasizes that increasing the level of awareness about these 
developments could contribute to a stronger conception of Arab identity (Nydell, 2004). 
Nevertheless, Margaret Nydell seems to contest the allegations made about Aljazeera as 
being a manifestation of the higher profile of Arab identity; rather, she believes that there 
is an increasing demand for a specifically Islamic identity, especially, it would appear, in 
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response to the more directly manifest threats made against Muslims in the West (Nydell, 
2004). 
In tackling the issue of the media representation of Arab identity more directly, 
Margaret Nydell argues that Arab media are influentiaI enough to shape Arab identity 
(NydeIl, 2004). Yet, she tends to believe that Arab identity is not weIl presented, because 
Arab media do not focus on the positive and objective components of Arabness (NydeIl, 
2004). Representation might be more effective, the argument of Nydell runs, if the media 
were to put more stress on the social vaIues of Arabs (Nydell, 2004). 
When asked about the construction of Arab identity in the Diaspora, Nydell points 
to the misrepresentation of Arabs and Muslims, stating that Arabs in the Diaspora are 
shaped by the sense of being besieged and misconstrued, and by the excessive stress on 
militant Islam (NydeIl, 2004). She explains that Arabs will be more likely to form their 
relationships and identify themselves in accordance with their affiliation to religious 
sectors (Shia, Sunni Druze, Ismailis, Christians, Copts), or to regional sub-groups 
(Egyptians, Maghrebians, Peninsular Arabs) (NydeIl, 2004). 
The Arab identity of first generation immigrants has essentiaIly been retained. What 
most concerns Margaret Nydell is the graduaI erosion of Arab attributes among members 
of the second generation. She additionaIly laments the inability of Westerners to 
distinguish between Muslims and Arabs (NydeIl, 2004). Since they are the constant 
recipients of disapprovaI and eritieism, Nydell claims that Arab Muslims respond to su eh 
negative images by attempting to assimilate, and they are, eorrespondingly, less expeeted 
to maintain their identity compared with other ethnie groups. She aIso warns that the 
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constant pressure exerted on Arabs has meant that identity is now de-emphasized 
(N ydell, 2004). 
This de-emphasizing of identity that Margaret Nydell is at pains to stress tells us 
much about the frustrations of Arabs over their own identity, especially where religion is 
concemed. A signifieant instance of the challenges that can be expected, according to 
Nydell's analysis of the problem, may be found in the case of Diana Abu Jaber, an Arab 
novelist who has lived in America since her childhood. 
The daughter of a Christian Jordanian father, who converted to Islam, and an Irish 
Catholic mother, Diana Abu-Jaber states that "her father told her she was absolutely 
Arab." She adds: 
1 had my father, who said, [T]his is absolutely who you are. 
Then 1 had all these other people who were extended family 
-- and also in the Arab community -- saying, No, no, no. 
This is much better. You want to look American; you want 
to be American. It was very confusing. 
My dad is quite secular, even though he has a religious soul 
-- and he does pray in times of stress, which is not the same 
thing as five times a day. He observes Islam in a kind of 
social way. What he used to tell me and my sisters growing 
up is that it was important for us to have sorne kind of faith. 
He didn't Care what it was. 1 went through aIl sorts of stuff. 
1 did the bom-again Christian thing. 1 studied Islam and the 
Koran. 1 got confirmed as a Catholic. A lot of Muslims 1 
grew up with in Syracuse went to the Greek Orthodox 
functions, because that was the great social c1earinghouse 
for the Arab community. So 1 was very comfortable in that 
setting. But 1 don't know what (religion) 1 am now (Curiel, 
2004). 
As an Arab writer concemed with Arab American life, Diana Abu-Jaber expresses 
two compelling views about Arabs and Arabie language. She agrees that "there are so 
few representations of Arabs in America" (Curiel, 2004). Diana further embodies a verbal 
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image of the Arabie language in comparison with the English language. She describes 
English as an "automatic car" and Arabic as a "stiek-shift car" (Curiel, 2004). She 
furthers remarks: "When you speak Arabic, it engages your whole body -- the diaphragm, 
the spine, the pelvis" (Curiel, 2004). 
Turning now to the comments of Arab Canadians, Hassan Isidean, the owner of the 
Middle East Book Store in Montreal, provides a pro-Arabist view of Arab identity. He 
believes that there is no association between being an Arab and being religious, since 
there are Arab-Christians, and Arab-Jews as weIl (Isidean, 2004). Problematically, 
Hassan Isidean believes that Arabness is not weIl defined, even though it is easier to 
define and more cohesive than other identities. Reinforcing the views of Margaret Nydell 
concerning the spread of sub-group identities within Arab global media, Isidean reveals 
that Arab media stand for local identities and, as such, appeal to Saudis, Lebanese and 
Egyptians (Isidean, 2004). He suggests that Arab media in the Diaspora is too remote 
from the real concerns and needs of the diasporic audience, since they are generally in 
Arabie. Unless Arabs in the Diaspora have media that operate with languages other than 
Arabie, Hassan Isidean warns that the Arab voice will simply not be heard (lsidean, 
2004). 
In contrast to Hassan Isidean's view, Baba Abu-Laban, a professor Emeritus of 
Sociology at the University of Alberta, supposes that Arab identity is conditioned by 
childhood, language and religion. However, he shares the view expressed above about the 
importance of operating Arab Canadian media that address Canadians in their own 
languages. Abu-Laban blames Arab Canadian media for not being sufficiently influential 
and for their failure to reach Arabs on a mass scale (Abu-Laban, 2004). He points out 
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that the Arab community in Canada has become more conscious in the wake of the 
September Il th attacks, and he further refers to the efforts of Arab Canadian 
organizations to mobilize their resources to counteract prejudice against Arabs and 
Muslims (Abu-Laban, 2004). 
Mazen Chouaib, the executive director of the National Council on Canadian-Arab 
Relations (NCCAR), expresses concems that appear to challenge sorne of Abu-Laban's 
views. Mazen explains that the Arab community is currently weak and, while it has 
considerable potential, it must be alerted to the real nature of the challenges and 
opportunities before it. Tackling the issue of the representation of Arabs from a different 
perspective, the director of NCCAR criticizes the Arab community for being too 
defensive. Instead of representing the values of the Canadian community in general, and 
stressing its role as one of the main groupings in Canada, Mazen explains that Arab 
Canadians tend to defend themselves and their values (Chouaib, 2004). Corroborating 
sorne of the views of Arab scholars expressed above, such as those of Margaret N ydell 
and Hassan Isidean, Mazen Chouaib additionally emphasizes that the Arab community is 
fragmented into segments (Lebanese, Egyptian, Moroccan), yet he stresses the NCCAR's 
efforts to address the commonalities to be found among Arabs at cultural, social, and 
politicallevels (Chouaib, 2004). 
Mazen sheds further light on more problematic issues facing the Arab community in 
Canada, such as the generational differences among Arabs, and the construction of the 
Other. Mazen explains that the older generations of Arab immigrants to Canada have 
contested political bias and fought against the negative images that bring their community 
into disrepute (Chouaib, 2004). Yet, little by little, these older generations have become 
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well integrated into Canadian society, thereby losing their interest in sustaining Arab 
issues (Chouaib, 2004). The new generations of Arab immigrants, according to Mazen 
Chouaib, face more formidable economic challenges (Chouaib, 2004). 
Evidently more critical than many Arab scholars, Mazen Chouaib blames Arabs for 
their tendency to construct unfair images of the other. Mazen explains that Arabs often 
refuse to take responsibility for their actions and inherit cultural dogmas that forbid them 
to engage in self-criticism (Chouaib, 2004). Reinforcing the notion of a culture of self-
justification and excuse, the director of NCCAR criticizes what he terms the "Arab's 
intellectual ghettoization," and the Arab's fear of being honest with themselves (Chouaib, 
2004). Mazen provides examples of this lack of Arab self-criticism, stating that Arabs 
always fear speaking from a human rights perspective, because if they do so, they confer 
on the other, a justification and excuse to attack them (Chouaib, 2004). 
While Arab scholars in Canada are inclined to provide incoherent views of Arab 
identity and the Arab community, their views concerning Aljazeera are more .consistent. 
These scholars have reached a consensus about the unprecedented role of Aljazeera. 
Baha Abu-Laban explains that Aljazeera is trying to promote a different approach 
towards culture and religion, thereby opening more spaces for interpretation, and 
permitting people to become more critical (Abu-Laban, 2004). Mazen Chouaib applauds 
this view, describing Aljazeera as a revolutionary media that reflects the reality of Arabs 
by exposing the contradictions among Arabs (Chouaib, 2004). Omar Aighabra, the 
President of the Canadian Arab Federation (CAF), takes up a positive view of Aljazeera, 
characterizing it as "one of the most recognizable news organizations in the world" 
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(Alghabra, 2004), and "the most progressive civic institution III the Arab World" 
(Alghabra, 2004). 
Since its inauguration, Aljazeera has not been visible on the map of Canadian cable 
channels. When the debate about allowing Aljazeera to operate through Canada cable 
companies first began, Arab scholars, particularly those at the head of Arab 
organizations, advocated Aljazeera. However, a more attentive focus on the debate 
reveals the discrepancies in opinion found within Arab Canadian organizations toward 
Aljazeera. For fear of banning Aljazeera93 from operating in the Canadian zone, Mazen 
Chouaib, the director of the National Council on Canada-Arab Relations, wrote to the 
Montreal Gazette, in May 2003, acknowledging the negative and hateful messages 
Aljazeera often spreads, but also making it clear that "barring it from cable services 
violates Canadian core values of freedom of thought and speech" (Chouaib, 2003). Going 
straight to the heart of the matter, Mazen stated that: 
He added: 
No sensible Canadian agrees with any form of hate 
dissemination aimed at any group. We will not accept it 
from anyone, and it should be condemned in the strongest 
terms. However, Canadians have the right to information 
(Chouaib, 2003). 
It is insulting to our intelligence to propose banning AI-
Jazeera because it broadcasts tapes and videos attributed to 
Osama bin Laden. How else can we start to learn the truth 
about these terrorists and criminals, who refuse to reach out 
to other media? How else are experts expected to continue 
examining the threat they pose to peaceful societies? 
(Chouaib, 2003). 
93 The Canadian Jewish Congress caUs for banning Aljazeera from the Canadian market, and indicates that 
Aljazeera's "programming content contains hate propaganda, in contravention of Canadian Iaws and 
broadcast standards" (Landy, 2003). 
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When the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunication Commission issued a 
conditional approval in July 2004, indicating that cable companies "alter or curtail" the 
programming of Aljazeera to forbid any "abusive comments" from being broadcast 
(Alghabra, 2004), Omar Alghabra, the president of the Canadian Arab Federation (CAF), 
wrote to the Globe and Mail on September 15,2004, defending Aljazeera. He noted that: 
Considering that AI-Jazeera has never been viewed by most 
Canadians and regulatory bodies, daims against it have 
never been proven. In their daims, advocates of censoring 
AI-Jazeera failed to make a distinction between news 
reporting and editorial positions. They also faHed to 
differentiate between politically controversial discussions 
or racial/religious hate propaganda (Alghabra, 2004). 
Regardless of the assessment implicit in the decision of the Canadian Radio-
Television and Telecommunication Commission toward Aljazeera, which in the eyes of 
Omar Alghabra, allows distributors of cable companies to act as censors, the view set out 
above about Aljazeera, as well as the analysis conducted throughout this chapter, reveals 
that the content of Aljazeera is beset with hateful speeches about the other. 
Briefly, Aljazeera Net represents Arab identity in North America as being polarized. 
Either it has been retained or it is lost. Additionally, Aljazeera Net portrays a postcolonial 
image of this dual identity, based on presence or loss, wherein Arab and Muslim 
immigrants in North America, and everywhere else for that matter, struggle to retain any 
one of these two opposed identities, thereby keeping these identities preserved from the 
violation of the other. The views of Arab scholars expressed in the last section attempt to 
engage and debate the former representation. Yet, coherent views about Arabness in 
relation to Aljazeera are difficult to identify. Though Arab scholars have reached a 
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consensus on the unprecedented role and impact of Aljazeera, their views on the nature of 
Aljazeera' s mediation of Arab identity are as fragmented as the identity itself. 
3.4 Conclusion: Aljazeera's perspective and framing revisited 
Throughout this chapter 1 have examined the proposals 1 made in the first chapter 
about the nature and sources of Arab identity. The image Aljazeera Net has attempted to 
portray conceming the sources of Arab identity is fairly striking to the observer. Clearly, 
Aljazeera Net reflects a Pan-Arab perspective, which poses a peculiar challenge for the 
whole Arab region. Aljazeera Net is fairly pessimistic about the potential of Arab leaders, 
regimes and publics to live up to its Pan-Arab ideals. The lexical and cognitive terms 
employed in the content of Aljazeera Net are decidedly negative, descriptive, and often, 
hateful. Even more stunningly, while Aljazeera has adopted the Pan-Arab approach as a 
touchstone for the issues that Aljazeera has chosen to take up, and it constantly talks 
about Arabs as a collective entity, it employs Islam as the all-pervasive frame and 
reference that govems the content, tone and approach of the entire network. Islamic 
voices in Aljazeera Net are not merely loud and dominant, but are construed as the 
legitimate voices of the network, constituting a means of making an appeal to the 
perceptions of Aljazeera Net users that implicitly expects them to fall into line. 
The Islamic perspective of Aljazeera Net can be seen as the foundational prop for 
the frames that govem the representation of Arab identity in Aljazeera Net. Pan-Arabi sm 
and Arab nationalism are construed as the uncertain reality of Arabs, the two bases that 
Aljazeera Net stands for, yet the network is at pains to remind Arabs that both these goals 
have proven to be elusive, equivocal, and even unreal. The hesitant and grudging quality 
of Aljazeera' s representation of Arab leaders, regimes and publics accounts for why it 
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tends to reflect on, and even orchestrate, the crisis of Arab identity, while yet cheering on 
its own dominant representations of Islamic identity. 
In discussing Arab conflicts armed resistance is portrayed as an imperative, but not 
as a practical or an effective choice for Arabs, and although Aljazeera Net questions the 
rationality of military resistance, such a strategy nonetheless seems to be entertained as 
an option, even when Aljazeera itself has spelled out the reasons for the inefficacy of 
such a militant posture. The 'Other', particularly those who are perceived as being in 
conflict with Arabs, are declared as hated 'enemies', the fabricators of conspiracies 
against Arabs, and therefore, negotiating peace with them is seen as 'poison'. Non-Arab 
leaders, who resist the United States' policies, such as Hugo Chavez, are portrayed as the 
missing charismatic leaders Arabs are looking for. 
Looking at the image Aljazeera Net portrays of Islam, it is obvious that Islam has 
not been represented as an actual source of Arab identity, but rather as a theory, and a 
cultural entity per se. This conclusion supports the Islamists' claim made in the first 
chapter that Islamic identity is a much more comprehensive entity than Arab identity, and 
furthermore, it supports a calI for Islamic Umma, but not Arab nationhood. Because 
Aljazeera serves as an agent, or even sometimes, a mouthpiece of Islam, there is no real 
possibility of the issues it discusses being contested. Moreover, it can be seen as the 
representative of certain Islamic voices, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood and Sunni. 
Further evidence of it being an agent for Islam can be found in Aljazeera Net's precise 
monitoring of those who convert to Islam. In keeping with the above, Aljazeera Net has 
published news stories about the conversion of 37 members from South Korea' s army to 
Islam, the conversion of two Jews in Palestine and that of a number of US army officers 
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in the Guantanamo base to Islam (American, 2003, & Gobran, 2004, & Before, 2004, & 
A Jew, 2005). 
Arab women are seen as the victims of Arab masculine superiority, Arab culture, 
occupation and colonialism, and they are always seen from within the parameters of the 
Islamic reference. The image of Arab women in Aljazeera has been drawn by Islamic 
voices, which, echoing the debate in the first chapter about Arab gender, emphasize that 
the freedom of Arab women is compromised by the fear of their being a political target of 
Western 'feminist' impositions, and the threats incurred by 'liberal' ideologicàl 
aspersions cast on their Islamic identity. Arab gender is represented as imprisoned and 
curtailed by societal and cultural impediments and, as such, has become, in its turn, a 
symbol of the fragmentation of Arab identity. 
Arab media, other than Aljazeera, are depicted as the tools of corrupt regimes, as 
media entertainment, tranquilizing disseminators of placebos that contribute nothing to 
the mission to educate Arabs concerning their democratic responsibilities, in a word, 
media that distort the Arab reality. AIjazeera constructs itself as a postcolonial subject, a 
symbol for Arab resistance against occupation and colonialism. However, it serves as the 
unreconstructed model of a media that is both radical and repressed, albeit resilient 
enough at the same time to persist in its agenda. While being on the offensive in both its 
Internet and screen incarnations, Aljazeera chooses to position itself in an underdog 
niche, particularly in the field of battle, where the crews and bureaus of Aljazeera are 
almost routinely bombed, and where it would appear that its operation over the Internet is 
subject to persistent hacking. Unless, or so it is implied, Aljazeera joins the herd of other 
Arab media, and becomes more lenient with regard to issues concerning corruption, 
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occupation and colonialism, Aljazeera stresses the need for continu al vigilance, and cues 
in its users and viewers to the likelihood that it will continue to be the constant target of 
Arab regimes, as weIl as the United States, thereby reaffirming its heroic underdog status. 
Aljazeera Net is dedicated to the classical Arabic language, which is seen as the 
comerstone of Arab identity, since classical Arabic and Arabness are, if not identical, 
inextricably bound up with each other. Aljazeera takes full advantage of the stylistic 
features of the Arabic language, and employs rhetoric and repetition in a way that even 
violates the professional and behavioral guide Aljazeera assigns for its own use. Foreign 
language terms and contemporary Arabic colloquialisms and slang words are seen to pose 
a threat to the classical Arabic language, and consequently, to Arab identity itself. 
Similarly, Arab music and Arab food are represented as being subject to violation by fast-
beat rhythmic music, and by fast American food products. 
When examining the image Aljazeera Net portrays of Arabs in North America, 
Aljazeera talk more about American Muslims than Arab Muslims. It tirelessly repeats the 
same refrain about discrimination, and rehearses a litany of negative images perpetrated 
against Arabs and Muslims. Issues conceming Arab American women are disregarded, 
since Muslim women are represented as a symbol of all Arab women, and the distinction 
between 'Arab' and 'Muslim' is almost entire1y elided in discussions of gender. Finally, 
Arab scholars in North America reflect and reproduce the confusion surrounding issues 
of Arab identity, and given the fragmentation of this identity, it is hardly surprising that 
Islarnic voices are more salient. Likewise, the very prominence given to religious 
explanations of identity account for why the issue of religion, and notably, the Islarnic 
religion, is often seen as the most confusing factor of all in coming to terms with one's 
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identity. Arabs, then, in the North American Diaspora, are confused and fragmented, and 
often put on the defensive, even to the extent of expressing contradictory and 
controversial views about the Arab community, and these tendencies are even more 
pronounced in Canada, where markedly more divisive views about the identity and role 
of Aljazeera are commonly expressed. However, despite the foregoing discussion about 
the precarious and vulnerable nature of both Arab and Muslim identity, there is a strong 
consensus on the revolutionary character of Aljazeera that enables it to remediate the 
Arab 'reality' on many different levels and to thus exert a reciprocal impact on that 
reality. 
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CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Any close examination of Arab identity must not only set out to discuss the debates 
centered around its sources, as interpreted in the period of post-colonialism, but must 
hope to verify or challenge the claim proposing that Arabness emerged to resist 
colonialism and imperialism. Beginning with the 'Arab RevoIt,' which was waged by 
Sherif Hussein in June 1916 against the Ottoman empire, and followed by the growth of 
three powerful political movements - those of the Bathists (1947), the Arab Nationalists 
(1951), and the Nasserists (1970) - the formidable resistance to the major colonial 
powers, particularly the Great Britain and France of that time, marked the emergence of a 
new sense of Arab identity. This ongoing sense of resistance has not fundamentally 
changed over time, yet it surfaces anew whenever Arabs encounter colonial or imperial 
threats to their identity. 
Therefore, Arab scholars repeatedly argue that Arabs should protect the key 
attributes of their identity, especially through protecting the classical Arabie language 
from the excessive interpenetration of foreign languages - notably, French and English-
and through being alert to the imposition of Western ideas or agendas that tacitly 
continue the colonial and imperial mission, however unwittingly, for example, through 
targeting Arab women. Further tasks of defence and resistance might include campaigns 
waged against the boycotting of fast food monopolies and unwarrantable intrusions into 
Arab economies, especially where resources, products and occupations become stakes in 
pursuit of imperialist agendas, secured through ostensibly non-violent means. 
However, the postcolonial history of Arabs has created new exigencies, notably in 
terms of devising strategies of resistance that nonetheless remain in accord with the need 
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to achieve a more collective orientation and identity among Arabs, thereby meeting their 
common needs, interests and objectives in regard to joint Arab actions and initiatives 
(Barakat, 1993). Moreover, these collective goals should not be striven for at the cost of 
securing a renewed commitment to plurality and cultural diversity. In other words, the 
sense of resistance, while aiming to 'protect' Arabs from the usurpations of colonialism 
or imperialism, should not hinder a thoroughgoing engagement with, and openness to, 
new ideas, irrespective of their American or European provenance, since it is clear that 
the touchstone of a strong identity will never be found in an overly cloistered or exclusive 
mentality, that is, one that resists the new or innovative just because it is so. However, the 
keynote to be struck is a strategy of resistance that is able to negotiate, and even to 
assimilate the new on its own terms. It is certainly not to be found in an unbridled and 
undifferentiated we1coming of alterity and innovation for their own sake. 
Thus, if, as sorne argue, Arabs accept technological innovations, such as satellites, 
computers and telecommunications products, while resisting McDonalds, Kentucky Fried 
Chicken, Burger products, or the fast rhythms of Western music, what can be said to 
motivate their choices? Such a query inevitably begs the question of identity, and if this 
identity is, as conceived above, a resistant identity, then a close reading of Arab history 
will reveal that Arabs are far from accepting what is imposed upon them in its entirety. 
Indeed, Arabs continue to negotiate and transform the ideas and commodities that the 
realities of their world make them ultimately powerless to resist. Arab Satellites, Mecca 
Cola and Arab fast food are ex amples of the kinds of products and services that are 
amenable to this kind of ongoing process of negotiation, as 1 indicate in my first chapter. 
Negotiation, in this sense, is a sort of enforced hybridity, or more precisely, the 
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reprocessing of ideas and commodities in order to make them one's own, either by 
reconstructing them, or by adapting them to one's own reality. The concept of 'enforced 
hybridity' has recently found a new application in Arab social relationships. Among the 
examples of imitating or reprocessing ideas that Arabs had previously resisted for years is 
the adaptation of new models of marri age, such as 'walk-in marriages' (Misyar marriage) 
and 'friend marri ages , (Zawaj friend), whieh are perceived by many scholars as 
imitations of the pre-marri age relationships to be found in the West, wherein 
boyfriends/girlfriends are not able to live together under one roof at the beginning of a 
relationship. 
From an ethnie perspective, Arabness is not only marked by difference from others, 
and by conflicts with others, but rather, by conflicts among Arabs themselves. To state 
this more categorically, when theorizing the postcolonial history of Arabs, the image that 
often appears on the surface prompts, and even warns us, that Arabs are to be found in a 
more or less constant state of conflict with others. Yet, investigations of Arab history in 
the era that followed the national liberation movements reveal that Arabs have 
progressively weakened themselves, and even provoked conflicts among themselves. As 1 
explained in the first chapter, Arabs have given cause for many manifestations of 
disunity, border conflict, and war, as in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. 
Thus, tuming to the communication of a sense of identity, one should look at the 
cultural productions of Arabs to explore how Arab identity mediates issues that reflect 
the postcolonial condition of Arabs. Arabness, construed as a source of meaning and 
identity, is made manifest when Arabie poems, idioms, and songs transmitted by the 
media operate as signifiers for charisma, Arabism, patriotism, and enmity. Arab poems, 
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for example, can be seen to embody the charisma of Jamal Abd-Alnasser, as it is 
recreated through such poems94 as 'the martyr of Arabism' and 'the horseman of 
Arabism.' Likewise, Arab songs can be seen as repositories of Arab patriotism, as it has 
been refigured over the decades, beginning with the song 'The Arab Countries' (Bilad al-
Orb) in the 1930s to the 'Arab Dream' concert, a performance featuring 23 Arab singers, 
held in 1998. Throughout the postcolonial history of Arabs, a large body of songs can be 
said to have kept the vision of Arab nationalism and Arab unit y alive. Furthermore, many 
Arabie proverbs warn that: 'those who are not for us are against us.' For ex ample , two 
similar maxims state that: 'An enemy can be a lover when a donkey becomes a doctor,' 
and 'Enemies cannot be loved, even if the asp can be domesticated.' 
Correspondingly, Aljazeera Net echoes the image of Arab identity that the 
postcolonial history of Arabs presents. It insists on the differences between Arabs and 
others. The representation of Arabs, conveyed through 'we,' 'us,' or 'our,' occurs in 
Aljazeera through a 'Pan-Arab' perspective, which operates, or so the team of Aljazeera 
argue, to reflect much of the reality of Arabs. The reflection of reality at Aljazeera 
systematically takes place through the coverage and reporting of news events. Ultimately, 
Aljazeera seeks to obtain accurate information about events at the time of their 
occurrence. It is more balanced in its coverage than many other Pan-Arab or Western 
media, and it can legitimately daim that its coverage of news events is generally 
transparent, or even hyper-transparent, when informed by a Pan-Arab perspective. 
Obviously, if Aljazeera's content had been less reflexive of news events, or less 
balanced in its coverage, it would have received inconsequential or innocuous criticism. 
94 'Words to the horseman of Arabism' is a poem composed by Raja'a Eid, published in 1973. Two 
different poems, published in 1973 and composed by Mohamed Altohamy and Abd Elrahman Sedqi, 
describe Nasser as 'the martyr of Arabism.' 
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In other words, Aljazeera's refusal to reproduce, or to parallel the hegemonic discourses 
prevailing in the Arab World is an attempt to reveal much of the 'unreal' that envelops 
the Arab region. That is to say, the Aljazeera editorial line seeks to break through the 
mythic discourses the various Arab governments disseminate through their own media, 
which gild the pill of the Arab governments' endeavours to accomplish what they 
consider 'real' political and social reforms. 
When reporting about the 'Other,' Aljazeera does not hide its Pan-Arab perspective. 
Strikingly, Aljazeera has become a model for the myth of media objectivity, in spite of 
the fact that it aggressively violates the behavioural and professional guide it assigns for 
its own journalists and reporters. Aljazeera' s anchors, journalists, and reporters often use 
the descriptive, rhetorical, and even derogatory words that they are explicitly urged to 
avoid. Consequently, 1 propose a new model in regard to the kind of objectivity that 
Aljazeera purports to practice. Aljazeera' s coverage can be more accurately defined as 
'neo-objective,' and such a model of reporting is better able to accommodate the different 
'subjectivities' of its journalists. This model of neo-objectivity suggests that Aljazeera's 
coverage of events is balanced, fair, and accurate, yet consistently informed by its own 
unique 'take' or perspective. 
Indeed, Aljazeera's agenda is not limited to the reflection of Arab reality. Rather, it 
alters and constructs that reality. In the first place, Aljazeera seems to have altered the 
reality of Arab media. The emergence of new Pan-Arab media has been almost directly in 
response to Aljazeera's fame, but not merely because it has its own unique agenda. Yosri 
Fouda, an Aljazeera investigative correspondent and London bureau chief, describes how 
Aljazeera has induced a sort of 'media transformation' in the Arab World. In the eyes of 
303 
Fouda, when the United States and the various Arab govemments could not beat 
Aljazeera, they did not exactly try to join Aljazeera, but they were nonetheless put into 
the position of trying to pro vide the various Arab publics with symmetrical media outlets 
that sought to emulate Aljazeera's overall strategy of news presentation (Miles, 2005, p. 
334). Therefore, news channels, such as Abu Dhabi TV, Alarabiya and Alhora, have been 
launched to imitate AIjazeera, each one aspiring to achieve the renown and significance 
of Aljazeera (Miles, 2005, p. 335). 
In its reflection and alteration of reality the frame of news presentation Aljazeera 
has worked to construct is emphatically informed by its Pan-Arab outlook. However, the 
reflection of reality at Aljazeera is never wholly transparent, nor can it be absolute. 
Aljazeera Net strives to present a more humanitarian face in regard to the Arab situation 
as a whole, but Aljazeera Net's representation of Arabs, highlighted in the third chapter, 
reflects a decidedly discouraging perspective conceming their present plight. 
Surprisingly, Aljazeera's characterization of Arabs, with its 'corrupted leaders' and 
'oppressed and furious Arab public,' does not exactly encourage Arabs to go beyond an 
open avowal of their flaws to explore the more radical potential of Arabs as the active 
agents of a civil society that they can recognize as their own. 
In order to take my argument further, 1 now wish to reconsider Aljazeera's cartoons 
and images. As represented in Aljazeera Net, Arab poli tic al parties and oppositional 
forces are insignificant, and if corruption and oppression are a matter of fate, how then 
can Arabs hope to avoid a predestined and undemocratic future? Indeed, Aljazeera Net 
does highlight the views of Arab dissenting voices. However, as noted in my third 
chapter, Aljazeera's anchors are always ready to push the argument to make it fit a pre-
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existing frame or to endorse sorne of the views expressed by one or another of the guests. 
Therefore, dissenting voices are all too often co-opted, however unwittingly, to further 
the frames of corruption and oppression, and to lead Arabs to believe that 'revolution' 
against Arab govemments - rather than the 'evolution' of Arab political parties, and the 
long struggle for political, economic and social reform - will grant Arabs the capacity to 
create their own reality and future. 
Furthermore, though odd television episodes of Aljazeera, or single essays 
providing in-depth coverage of a certain issue at Aljazeera Net, do not offer a 
discouraging view of their prospects to Arabs, these are simply not abundant or 
substantive enough to offset the major frames of reference, which reiterate the message of 
an unbreakable cycle of corruption and oppression, or offer hope only through 
proclaiming the panacea of revolution. More importantly, Aljazeera's assumed role of 
educating Arabs about democracy is paradoxically at odds with Aljazeera Net' s 
ambivalence about standing up for Arabs and its incapacity to adopt frames that reflect 
the actual potential of Arab development in light of the frequently intractable and 
problematic aspects of Arab political and social life. Another related problem concems 
Aljazeera's inability to adopt sober, precise and clearheaded arguments, which, although 
certainly present in the odd interview, essay or analysis, are generally lost within the 
controlling frames of conflict, anger and strident rhetoric. 
Aljazeera anchors, reporters, and freelancers are insistent in propelling their 
arguments through the use of misleading descriptions, hyperbole and rhetoric that are 
invariably calculated to make an emotional appeal to Aljazeera television viewers and 
website visitors. This means that its dominant frames of representation, centered on 
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frames depicting anger, oppression and corruption have, in their tum, played a significant 
role in constructing the Arab reality. Engaging with these aspects of the construction of 
reality in Aljazeera satellite channels and in Aljazeera Net necessitates a reconsideration 
of the representation of Aljazeera's main perspectives, especially in relation to Arab 
conflicts, Arab women, the Arabie language and Aljazeera' s remediation of the 
components of Multimedia design. 
In the first stage of the construction of reality media perspectives can be concretized 
and remediated as a sort of identity enactment. Any media that has a 'Pan' perspective 
can mediate the collective identity of its audiences, and provide them with the referents 
of connotations that reflect their identities. But in the case of Aljazeera, Aljazeera 
positions itself at the center of the process of the formation of Arab identity. As media 
scholars wam us, it is often rnisleading to position media at the center of the process of 
identity formation, because media, as institutions, are subject to a wide range of political, 
cultural and econornic pressures (Kosebalaban, 2004, p. 50). Arab identity, as represented 
at Aljazeera Net, is therefore not mediated, but rather, remediated into the perspective of 
Aljazeera, and then reflected back in the shape of an enhanced identity. 
The emergence of Aljazeera caused a sudden transformation in Arab media, since it 
escaped or avoided the censorship that had hitherto constrained Arab media. This entailed 
a much greater degree of freedom of expression than Arabs, for decades, had been used 
to. In other words, Aljazeera ushered in a new sense of liberty and irnrnediacy so that the 
prospect of greater transparency, or objectivity, in news representation was no longer an 
idle drearn. In part, the gap between the perception of its viewers, or visitors, and its own 
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perception of its ends, was closed. Aljazeera thereby filled an essential niche III 
inaugurating a radically critical, oppositional and 'free' conception of Arab media. 
Indeed, Aljazeera' s stress on its distinct conception of 'We-ness,' since it is this 
sense of communality of being and identity that distinguishes Arabs from all others, has 
made it alert to the collective responsibilities of the 'one true self.' This authentic 
selfhood is constructed through the classic Arabic language and through highlighting the 
tenets of Islam that match the principles of Arab identity intrinsic to the Arab inheritance 
and cultural tradition. Likewise, Aljazeera has also adopted a resistant 'underdog' 
position in its opposition to the West, particularly the United States, through adhering to a 
stridently anti-American editorialline. 
Aljazeera's ability to capitalize on the sources of Arab identity has strengthened the 
Arabs' sense that Aljazeera not only speaks for them, but fights for them. Aljazeera, in 
the above-mentioned contexts, has thus established itself as an inspiring entity, or 
charismatic force that Arabs had previously lacked. Moreover, as a Pan-Arab media that 
appeared committed to fulfill a uniquely Arab destiny, to 'wake up Arabs,' 'educate them 
about democracy,' and to guide them about the kind and quality of resistance Arabs 
should draw on when dealing with conflict, it has seemingly lived up to its proclaimed 
mission. 
Evidence conceming the reflection of Aljazeera's identity, as a sort of identity 
enactment that makes tangible the collective sense of Arabness, appears in Michael 
Wolff's article, entitled "Al Jazeera Edge." Wolff, who comments on Aljazeera and its 
joumalists at the media center of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) in Doha has the 
following to say about them: 
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Al Jazeerians didn't really seem like Arabs, even -
at least not like the Qatarians in white dishdashas. 
The Al Jazeera guys (and even sometimes women) 
were polyglot, urbane, sexy in a radical-chic sort of 
way ... The way the network speaks to its audience is 
evidently pitch-perfect. Al Jazeera has become, 
practieally, the Arab street. In my brief attempt to 
locate this fabled boulevard, 1 ended up, one 
afternoon, in a Doha teahouse with a water pipe and a 
few dozen coach-potato Arab men looking 
wordlessly at the Al Jazeera evening news (Wolff, 
2003). 
The ironic image Michael Wolff provides of Aljazeera is striking to the observer, 
since it reflects on how the news media has successfully simulated the representation of 
Arabs. In Wolff's view, Aljazeera has become a different media, since Aljazeerian guys 
do not look like the rest of Arabs, and the 'dozen couch-potato' Arabs in a Doha café 
match the image of the fabled Arab street that Aljazeera wishes to target. In an ironie 
transposition, the Arabs that repeatedly appear in the cartoons of Aljazeera that 1 feature 
in my third chapter, that is, the Arabs who either inattentively smoke the Shisha, or who 
are impressively captivated by the facts and information Aljazeera provides, are now the 
couch potatoes who pro vide Aljazeera with the audience it would appear to seek. 
ln removing 'the perspectival Pan-Arab mask,' Aljazeera's identity can be seen to 
contribute to a second aspect of the construction of Arab reality, notably, the construction 
of Islam as a textual society. However, before moving on to explain how Aljazeera Net 
goes beyond the representation of Islam to form a textual Muslim society, 1 wish to 
briefly re-evaluate the identity of Aljazeera. From its inception, Aljazeera's identity has 
been a heated subject of debate among media scholars and political analysts. Whereas 
many scholars tend to believe that Aljazeera propagates Arab nationalism, the framing 
analysis conducted in this study reveals that Aljazeera does not represent the views of all 
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Arabs. Rather, it reproduces the marginalization of Arab-Christians, while for the most 
part, expressing the views of Arab-Muslims. This investigation of the frames governing 
Arab identity at Aljazeera Net emphasizes the fact that Aljazeera Net is more or less 'pro-
Islarnist,' even though it claims to have a Pan-Arab perspective. 
An Arab scholar, Kia Hafez, reached parallel conclusions, in her brief study of 
Aljazeera Net. In an article entitled, "Arab Satellite Broadcasting: An Alternative to 
Political Parties?" Kia Hafez conducted a lirnited investigation of the political bias of 
Aljazeera Net, and found that there is no 'real' Pan-Arab line of argument: 
Honestly, 1 was a bit disappointed because for the 
year 2004 1 could only find about ten articles dealing 
with democracy in the Arab world, most of them 
polernics against American plans to democratize the 
area.. .. There was an interview with the US 
government, and the moderate Islarnist viewpoint 
was weIl represented ... My impression is that 
democracy at Aljazeera.net currently tends to be 
pushed aside by international political problems with 
American and Israeli policy (Hafez, 2004, FaIl) 
Kia Hafez does not fail to note that the viewpoint of moderate Islam is weIl 
presented, but fails to recognize that Aljazeera Net does not represent a significant Arab 
viewpoint. In order to take stock of what Kia Hafez fails to notice there must be a 
reconsideration of the distinction between the perspective and identity of Aljazeera and 
how Aljazeera re-accommodates the Pan Arab perspective. 
To distinguish between the Pan-Arab perspective of Aljazeera and its 'pro-Islarnic' 
identity the differences between Aljazeera's 'coverage' of news events and its 
'interpretation' of occurrences and issues must be noted. Certainly, when Aljazeera 
covers news events, it reports from a Pan-Arab perspective, but when Aljazeera cornes to 
the issue of interpretation, the question of Islarnic voices becomes more pressing, since 
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they are inescapable. The domination of the Islamists takes place through the privileges 
of representation they enjoy. In most debates about Arab issues, Islamic voices have 
more legitimacy in the dialogue, and they often enjoy the endorsement of the Aljazeera 
anchors. Since both those who speak from a Pan-Arab perspective, and Islamists, have 
matching views as to the corruption and despotism of Arab leaders, and similar anti-
American attitudes, the distinction between the perspective of Aljazeera and its frame of 
identity becomes more blurred, and is even sometimes unseen. 
However, the identity of Aljazeera, as a source of meanings, surfaces when it 
represents how Arabs should handle issues of daily life. At this juncture, the Islamic 
voices become more visible, especially through their representation in solitary interviews, 
wherein Islarnic scholars express their views in discussions with Aljazeera anchors, but 
not through debates. Sorne Islarnic voices, particularly that of Sheikh y ousef Alqaradawi, 
have never been contested in Aljazeera. The sheer representation of Islam, particularly 
the voice of the Muslim Brotherhood, explains why Aljazeera does not feel obliged to 
debate Alqaradawi's views. Additionally, Qatar has been a site of operation for the 
Muslim Brotherhood and for Alqaradawi himself, who runs an Islarnic website, 
IslamOnline.net, which has become very prominent among Arabs. IslamOnline.net is a 
global Islamic site for Muslims and non-Muslims in the Arabic and English languages, 
and "a reference for everything that deals with Islam, its sciences, civilization and nation" 
(About Us). 
In accord with the objectives of IslamOnline.net, Aljazeera devotes a weekly 
episode to 'discussing' daily life issues in the light of Islarnic law. Muslim scholars, who 
appear at Aljazeera, utilize texts from the Quran and the Sunna. However, while drawing 
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on different sorts of texts from the Quran and the Sunna is only to be expected from a 
Pan-Arab media, and not merely from Aljazeera Net, let alone Aljazeera, what is most 
revealingly significant about Aljazeera Net is how it engages in a discourse about the 
Muslim Umma in a way that constructs Islam as a textual society. 
To explain how Islam has become a sort of textual society, it is important to 
emphasize the common features between a given society and its textual construction. Any 
society has its own unique history, and its own select points of reference. It distinguishes 
its members from other societies, actualizes the issues of its people, unites them, and 
integrates the individual within the group through dialogue and persuasion. The group 
then grows by adding more members to its structure, and society vindicates its dominant 
voices through investing its leaders with charisma (Taborsky, 1997, pp. 193-194, & Said, 
1983, p. 34). 
Tuming now to Aljazeera Net, it is clear that its textual expression could not be 
more complete, since it transforms every single word aired on television into both audio 
and printed texts, including complete scripts of its television programs. Once it arrives at 
the website of Aljazeera, the text gains yet more power through its very means of 
representation, since Aljazeera adds by-lines to divide up the text and to categorize it 
through introducing certain ideas, and also through the interpretation of certain sentences 
included within the texts. Aljazeera Net, at this level, operates not merely as a mediator, 
but also as the 'moderator' of the presumed textual society. 
In accordance with the particular features of a given society, the texts representing 
Islam in Aljazeera echo the history of identity it represents; significantly, the Quran and 
Sunna, which have been followed for nearly fourteen hundred years ago since their 
311 
sanctification in the name of the prophet Mohamed, as the essential Muslim reference, 
always differentiate between Muslims and non-Muslims. In a parallel activity, the texts of 
Aljazeera Net implicitly make their own authoritative claims vis-à-vis the faithful 
community of readers and viewers they represent. The conversations that appear in the 
original classic or colloquial language that the anchors of Aljazeera and the invited 
Muslim scholar(s) tend to use are reproduced in such a way as to enliven the issues they 
represent. Muslim scholar(s) are thus enshrined as the leaders of both the 'real' and 
textual society they represent. 
More importantly, the notion of textual society becomes even clearer when certain 
members of the 'real' Muslim society express their views and share sorne of their 
problems through phone calls that cite the se documents, hoping to find responses from 
the scholars represented by the texts. To briefly summarize this argument about society as 
text, the texts found at Aljazeera Net embody the social realm of Muslims in a 
generalized, or even universalized, form of expression (Said, 1983, p. 4). Likewise, the 
texts purporting to represent Arab Muslims in the Diaspora do not appear as distinct from 
their society, but rather, they have merely become an additional structure in the entire 
global Muslim textual society. In reading texts about Muslims in North America, for 
example, the texts clearly pay more attention to how to secure members of this part of 
Muslim society from being assimilated into North American society rather than to the 
process of understanding the choices made by those who, alone, have to make them. 
Likewise, they monitor and counteract discrimination against Muslims without taking 
note of their own prescriptive and discriminatory frame of reference. In other words, they 
are texts without contexts. 
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Significantly, where as the construction of textual society can apply to the 
representation of Arabs, it is more related to the representation of Islam, because Arabs 
seem to fluctuate between many frames of reference, whereas Muslims do not, even 
though Arabs share the same history and have witnessed, or participated in, the same 
conflicts. Moreover, the Arabs scholars who appear in Aljazeera do not enjoy the same 
authority as the sheikhs and Muslim scholars interviewed in Aljazeera. That is to say, the 
fragmentation of Arab identity is such as to make Arabs powerless to construct a coherent 
textual society, as in the case of the representation of Islam. 
The representation of Arab conflicts contributes to a third aspect of the construction 
of reality. Herein, 1 will consider the conflict in its broader sense, both in terms of 
domestic Arab conflicts in Arab countries, and conflicts between Arabs and the other. 
Whenever domestic or inter-Arab conflicts occur, Aljazeera positions itself as a political 
constituency and as a symbolic space for 'diplomacy,' 'politics,' and 'virtual politics.' 
Indeed, Aljazeera has become a place where politics and diplomacy can in fact be 
practiced. The quality of coverage of events of Aljazeera creates waves of diplomatic 
trouble for the government of Qatar, and the government of the United States and many 
other Arab governments have requested the Qatari government to intervene in 
Aljazeera's activities. Similarly, Aljazeera has become a space for all the political actors 
in the Arab region, for dissenting groups in Arab countries, and for Arab groups living in 
exile. Once they appear in Aljazeera, certain political actors are even subject to torture 
from their respective Arab governments, while sorne political parties can easily become 
subject to government harassment. 
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However, at what might be tenned a 'meta-constructive' level, Aljazeera can be 
seen as a symbol, even the symbol, of 'virtual politics' in the Arab world since Aljazeera 
emerges as a field where Arabs can practice politics, but not true politics (Miles, 2005, p. 
328). In practice, the work of the poli tic al actors who appear in Aljazeera has not led to 
any serious political changes in the reality of Arab politics, despite the fact of its 
undoubted impact on the political landscape or c1imate of thought. Likewise, Arab 
governments often issue statements to condemn the views of those who appear in 
Aljazeera, and they criticize Aljazeera for being politically alienating through the agency 
of its 'undesirable' political actors. However, while Aljazeera is certainly not 'alienating' 
in this sense, and although it can only be perceived as a political institution at a symbolic 
level, it is in fact a media with its own agenda. 
Turning now to Arab conflicts with others, and bearing in mind that the rhetorical 
structure of the Arab language tends to essentialize the enmity of others through the 
idioms it employs, the representation of Arab conflicts with others creates an impression 
among Arabs that 'military resistance' is to be privileged over other aspects of resistance. 
Crucially, Aljazeera Net has ushered in a new era in media-war relationships. The 
offensive attacks against Aljazeera's bureaus in Afghanistan and Iraq have helped 
Aljazeera to construct itself as a heroic institution in the Arab world. To put the matter 
simply, Aljazeera Net repeatedly imbues its audience with the idea that it symbolically 
fights on behalf of Arabs in their conflict with the United States, and indeed, sorne of its 
journalists have sacrificed their lives to confinn Arabs in their right to know the truth. 
The representation of Arab wornen is a fourth aspect of the construction of Arab 
reality. The image Aljazeera Net depicts of Arab wornen reflects the arnbiguity about the 
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status of Arab women in the Arab World. Aljazeera Net does however share in the new 
frontiers the Arab media has opened for the discussion of issues regarding the situation of 
Arab women, and more particularly, in regard to their rights. Sensitive issues concerning 
Arab women, such as sexuality and abuse, whieh were untouched just two decades ago, 
have become a subject for debate in Aljazeera and in other Arab media. However, 
Aljazeera Net continues to mediate the voices of Arab women in such a way as to 
construct Arab women as a 'national property' that Arabs should defend, in order to 
prevent Arab women from, what Yousef Alqaradawi terrns 'going with the flow.' The 
'flow' here is clearly the tide of new ideas that Arab women may choose to adopt. 
A fifth aspect of the construction of reality is at stake when Aljazeera Net utilizes 
the power of rhetoric of the Arab language in the Arab World. In exarnining the kind of 
language Aljazeera's journalists and anchors use, certain features of Arabie rhetorie, 
notably metaphoric and descriptive expressions, seem to be used in an uncontrolled and 
seerningly endless mode of repetition, regardless of the linguistic rules that Aljazeera has 
assigned for the observation of the whole network. These linguistic rules of Aljazeera calI 
on journalists and reporters not to use descriptive and rhetorieal language. Obviously, 
such rhetoric has become the nOrrn at Aljazeera Net, and is the standardized linguistic 
fare for visitors at Aljazeera's online news, and for the viewers of Aljazeera's satellite 
channel. Metaphorical and descriptive language tends to distort the conversation between 
Aljazeera' s guests and anchors, and in so doing incurs the risk, already present, of 
exaggeration in evaluating news events. 
Through the overuse of rhetoric, the Arabie language has become a less than 
transparent medium for ideological invective and, as such, Aljazeera's language seems to 
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condone the disturbing growth of irrationality among the various Arab publics. Building 
upon the argument made in the first chapter, the dynamic nature of the Arabie language 
and its rhetorieal power to touch off the emotions makes it amenable to an undue 
influence on the Arabs publics' interpretation of events. Clearly, if they continue to be 
exposed to such rhetorical excesses, this will inevitably lead the Arab publics to make 
irrational judgments that, in tum, lead them to take irresponsible actions. 
Aljazeera Net and Multimedia Design: Constructing a Meta-Reality 
Aljazeera Net utilizes multimedia features to dynamically mediate its construction 
of reality. Multimedia features at Aljazeera Net contribute to the construction of hyper-
reality, impose adynamie meaning on the spectacle, and in sert a master narrative. 
Whereas media scholars argue that the construction of reality can be attributed to the 
deviees that emphasize certain news values, such as conflict and drama, Aljazeera Net 
tends to use hyperlinks to augment its news values, thereby incorporating additional 
ideologieal values within the texts of its news stories. For example, the representation of 
sorne parts of the audio/video tapes of the second leader of Alqaeda, Ayman Alzawahri, 
adds certain ideological values to the news story, whieh a visitor at Aljazeera's online 
news site may read, such as the values of 'reciting' and 'textual justification.' 
Multimedia herein facilitates the fusion between two different sorts of texts, printed text 
and audio/visual text, to create a new hyper-reality supplemented by two different sorts of 
textual representation of ideology. Hyper-reality is thus a kind of additional ideological 
validation, whieh not only highlights the realm of the Jahdis and how they address 
Muslims and Arabs, but also compensates for the absence of certain ideological codes so 
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that Aljazeera may choose to abandon a related news story in the body of the text for the 
sake of pursuing its editorialline. 
Animated cartoons and hypertext at Aljazeera Net are inscribed in the creation of 
two levels of the construction of reality. Firstly, animated cartoons are used to transform 
the single representation of one drawing to transform it into a dynamic spectacle, through 
which Aljazeera Net cartoonists can utilize the separate drawings about different events 
and issues, and then unite them again to form one animated cartoon. The 'cartoonic' 
spectacle can thus pro vide visitors to Aljazeera Net with a newly integrated meaning. 
Resembling a chain that contains many circles, the spectacle may further influence the 
perception of Aljazeera Net's visitors, thereby informing them as to how to relate 
unconnected events or issues to one another. More importantly, the spectacle, as it 
appears in Aljazeera Net, creates political relationships that do not exist in reality. For 
example, when representing a spectacle conceming how the former Pope, John Paul II, 
responded to world events, Aljazeera Net portrayed the Pope as someone who greeted the 
Israeli occupation of Palestine. The fictional world conjured up by the animated spectacle 
was clearly at odds with the appeals John Paul II had actually made on behalf of the 
peace of the Palestinian people, and his grief at acts of destruction, no matter where they 
were committed, as in the war in Iraq. 
Hypertextuality, in the case of Aljazeera Net, functions as an innovative technique 
to construct a 'reality' based on a master narrative. A master narrative, as shown in the 
second chapter, is a redeemable narrative, since it enables the visitors of a site to read the 
entire story conceming a given event. The retrospective reading of an event makes 
Aljazeera Net more capable of shifting, and thereby determining, the construction of 
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meaning through the insertion of reports, analyses and video clips at any point in a series 
of narrative linkages concerning the event. 'Flashbacks' are thus available as and when 
they are needed. Indeed, reality in such a context is metaphysic al , since the entire 
interpretation of an event is subject to the influence of the time of its reading and of the 
discursive context that establishes its meaning. The metaphysical meaning consequently 
creates a corresponding reality through the multiple levels of the hypertext. That is to say, 
the various levels of hypertext generate a reality based on a chain of texts according to 
the analogy of a palimpsest, a reality that would be radically other, were it to be based on 
the reading of a single text, which would necessarily fail to attend to sorne of its contexts. 
Discussion: Arabs in Diaspora, Arab identity and Postcolonialism revisited. 
There are parallel lines of argument between how Aljazeera Net represents the 
'reality' of Arab-Muslims in Diaspora, and how Arab scholars in North America describe 
Arab identity. Obviously, Aljazeera Net chooses to put more stress on the religious 
identity of Arabs, thereby highlighting the voices of Muslim organizations in North 
America, while describing the reality of negative images and discriminations with which 
Arab-Muslims have to cope. In corroboration, the Arab Canadian Federation's report of 
2002 concludes that although Arab Canadians are weIl integrated, they feel marginalized 
as a consequence of the discrimination and stereotypes directed against them (The 
Knowledge, 2002). 
The image of Arabs, as represented by Arabs in North America and at Aljazeera 
Net, indicates that whenever identity enters the ethnical and religious dimension, 
particularly in regard to Islam, then the feeling of living in exile gradually increases. That 
is to say that Arabs, who approach their identity from a cultural perspective and express 
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only shared representations of Arab culture and tradition, are not likely to feel that they 
live in exile. 
ln examining the sources of Arab identity, Arab gender and religion are clearly the 
most confusing sources in the composition of that identity in the Arab Diaspora. For 
instance, sorne Arab families send their daughters back to Arab countries when they have 
reached the ages of 15-18, hoping to get them married off, which means they cannot be 
included within this study of the North American Diaspora, except through noting their 
absence. It is likewise difficult to determine the contribution of religion - particularly 
Islam - to the issue of identity in the Diaspora. On the one hand, it is the most stable 
factor in the retention of identity of Arab-Muslims, especially as it is represented at 
Aljazeera Net. On the other hand, it is felt to be a confusing factor among sorne Arabs, 
who fee! that any sign referring to their Islamic identity may have a negative impact in 
regard to their assimilation in North American society at large. As evidence of the 
confusion that religion can create, sorne Arab Canadians actually prefer to change their 
first names if they have patent Islamic connotations. For instance, sorne Arabs, who se 
first name is 'Mohamed,' tend to change it to 'Mike,' 'Mac,' or 'Michael.' 
1 now wish to bring my personal experience to bear on sorne of the issues discussed 
above. As an Arab who has lived in Canada for five years 1 have come to realize that a 
certain illusion is created, not necessarily disclosed in the results of academic studies and 
the reports of Muslim and Arab organizations, about the degree of discrimination and 
negative images perpetrated in the Diaspora. Whereas the results of academic studies are 
generally premised on the assumption that the amount of discrimination and negative 
images are responsible for marginalization of Arabs in Diaspora, 1 come to realize that 
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Arabs often tend to marginalize themselves, because they do not represent their Arab or 
Islamic identities at a culturallevel, but at an ethnie or a religious level. However, there is 
a circular logie at play here. On the one hand, it is argued that unless Arabs adopt the 
social values of Canadian society, they are not likely to experience full integration within 
this society. On the other hand, if Arabs in Canada, at least first generation Arab 
immigrants, should endeavour to make their hybrid designations yet more hybrid at the 
culturallevel, then their sought for assimilation as Canadian-Arabs, through adopting the 
social values of Canadian society, can only be achieved at the co st of sacrificing sorne of 
the most important aspects of their identity, namely, the religious aspects. 
Resisting the Other: Rereading Aljazeera through the lens of Edward Said 
1 now wish to relate the image of the other to sorne of the positions taken up by 
Edward Said, especially as the representation of Arab identity at Aljazeera seems to 
accord with the views of Said. Edward Said tends to problematize the relationship of 
Arabs versus the Other, particularly in the United States, in a reductive form of argument. 
ln the estimation of Said, the United States is decidedly an empire (Said, 2003), and 
further we, as Arabs, "are bombarded with images that ask us to submit to them and in 
the end to buy them, whether through news commodities or travel or whatever" (Said, 
2003, pp. 98-99). Looking at Arab-US relationships from within the spectrum of 
imperialism and colonialism, Said, as an Arab Nationalist enthusiast, criticizes the West 
for being responsible for the ills of the Arabs, and accordingly, his binary logic too easily 
conceives Arab stagnation as part and parcel of the imperatives of global capitalism and 
globalization. 
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Though Said avoids objectifying Arabs for cultural and social interrogations, he 
tends to ignore the Arabs' relegation, from a Western perspective, within what has 
become the prison-hou se of the Arabic language, since the translation of Arab cultural 
productions into European languages is commonly undertaken in such a way as to li mit 
the potential of, say, literature or cinema, to address the West in the spirit of its own 
language or culture. This insensitivity to language means, practically speaking, that Arabs 
are relatively unknown to others, especially in the West. Another dimension of Arab self-
critique that Said's binary conception of the Other will seemingly not allow him to 
acknowledge, or at least, obliges him to disregard, is the way in which the socialization 
and education of Arabs in the recent history of Arab countries has led to a new generation 
of Arabs who believe in the evolution of the Arab World into a group of closely related 
civil democratic societies. This admittedly slow evolution, brought about by listening to, 
and evaluating their own experiences, needs and expectations, does not owe its origin and 
impetus to sorne mirrored or mimetic version of Western societies or ideologies, since 
Arabs know what they stand to gain through greater cooperation among each other, and 
they also know this might exceed what their present imaginations can grasp. Of course, 
this vision goes against the grain of a society bound by a caste of rulers and an Arab 
public subjugated to its command, but that has never been the 'only' history of the Arab 
world. If this study teaches anything, it is that identity is an extraordinarily complex and 
dynamic historical entity, and if an Arab identity is to flourish in the future we cannot 
predict what form it will take. 
Aljazeera Net treats the notion of Arabs and the 'Other' from the same perspective 
as Edward Said, since it depicts the West, particularly the United States, as hostile, and 
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locked into permanent enmity against Arabs. It remediates Arabs through an Islamic 
identity, and then constructs Arabs and the Other through a reductive binary system, 
conferring on its would-be audience, a conception of the essentiality of a 'sinister West,' 
which continues to forge conspiracies against Arabs, colonizes them, and then leaves 
them in ignorance and poverty. Aljazeera, in this sense, appears as a postcolonial subject; 
a media that represents the ambivalence and fragmentation of Arab identity, and in tum, 
the starkly contrasting substantiality of Islamic identity. Though it is conceived as a 
disobedient subject in the gaze of the colonizer, in its own heroic conception of itself it is 
a charismatic subject that has the capacity to monopolize the attention of Arabs and 
Muslims, and in so doing, to universalize their multiple subjectivities. 
However, it is helpful to define the parameters of Aljazeera's contribution to the 
notion of a present day engagement with Arab identity in the Arab World and in the Arab 
Diasporas. Ostensibly, where postcolonialism often aims to overtake the normative 
relationship between the colonizer and colonized to create a more complex hybrid space, 
Aljazeera does not offer spaces for the fluid construction of identities. Aljazeera is a neo-
hybrid media. It does not go beyond adumbrating the idea of the ' sinister West', nor does 
its editorialline attempt to make distinctions between Arab and Islamic perspectives in 
opposing foreign views. What Aljazeera does, in effect, is to introduce guests from the 
United States and Israel, and then proceeds to challenge them through its anchors, or by 
simply giving the Arab scholars who appear at Aljazeera Net the opportunity to challenge 
any pro-American views. Both implicitly and explicitly, Arabs are informed that if Arab 
leaders and regimes have not been able to accomplish what is necessary for the sake of 
their publics then Aljazeera is there to assume the hero's mantle and to take responsibility 
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for that mission. Nonetheless, AIjazeera remains a revolutionary media in terms of its 
perspective, its editorial line and its agenda, since it is the first Arab media to have 
penetrated the Western hemisphere, and to thereby begin to reverse the flow of 
information, obliging Western media to lend an ear to Aljazeera's editorialline, and to 
listen to the views of Arabs who only a few decades ago, were unknown and 
unrepresented. 
Suggestions for future research on postcolonialism, Arab identity and media 
representations 
The postcolonial approach has undoubtedly been useful in examining the socio-
cultural and economic relationships between Arab countries and Western countries, and it 
has created at least the potential to construct a hybrid cultural space that goes beyond the 
logic of binary oppositions, and the almost Manichean tactics of exclusion implicit in cut 
and dried position taking. Clearly, there has been a resurgence of Arab-American 
organizations that do not necessarily have the organizational and communicational profile 
to have hitherto merited examination. However, it might prove possible to examine how 
Arab-Americans and Arab-Canadian organizations can and do venture beyond their 
American or Canadian contexts to initiate a dialogue between Arabs and the West. 
Additionally, since the postcolonial approach is historical in scope and emphasis, it 
might prove helpful to investigate the changing conception of media in attempting to go 
beyond its traditional propaganda and counter-propaganda roles, and to become more 
self-reflexive in examining competing ideologies in the construction of the media. This 
study of Aljazeera Net has informed me about the more subtle and insidious dimensions 
of propaganda since a significant part of what Aljazeera is attempting to do in fixing and 
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immobilizing the perceptions of Arabs conceming their identity crosses the boundaries 
between truth telling and propaganda. 
After five years of living in Canada my attention has been drawn to the rapid 
increase in popular cultural productions that have drawn on the relationship between 
Arab countries and the West, such as audiotapes, posters, and individu al or sub-group 
websites. It has been my experience that while scholars tend to focus on the newly 
emerging technologies in the Diaspora, Arab Canadians, particularly Arab-Muslims, still 
communicate through cultural productions that are very traditional in scope. In a different 
vein, this study has prompted ideas about future research in the further examination of 
sorne of the key sources of Arab identity in relationship to the postcolonial approach. 
This examination might take the form of a more thoroughgoing investigation into the 
following in relation to Arabs living in the Diaspora: Arabic language, Arab media in 
relation to cinema and music, theatrical plays and documentaries. 1 would attempt to 
identify spaces to articulate the impact of the history of colonialism on these cultural 
productions, paying particular attention to the intersection of past and present in the way 
Arabs negotiate their identity. 
Finally, in talking about media images, it seems more important to focus on the 
study of spectacles, since when we come to examine collective identities in all their 
complexity, we can see how such representations mediate social relationships, and both 
solicit and implicate a certain audience, thus enabling Arab scholars to address how 
various artistic media can forge potentialities for responsible social relationships. 
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APPENDIXES 
Appendix A. Internet access within the Middle East 
Internet access within the Middle East 
COUNTRY DATE NllMBER % POP 
UA.E. DeœIDber 2001 900,000 36,79 
Deœmber 2000 735,000 31.02 
Babrain Deœmber 2001 140,200 21.36 
Deœmber 2000 40,(0) 6.3J 
Israel My2oo! 1.940,,000 21.39 
January 2001 1.210,000 17.12 
Qatar Marcli2001 75.(0) 9.15 
Marclt2000 45,(0) 6.22 
Kllwuit Deœmber 2001 200.000 9 • .fl 
Deœ:mber 2000 150.000 7.6 
Lehnnon Deœmber 2000 300,000 8.38 
March2000 227,500 6.39 
Oman DeœIDber 2001 120.000 4.42 
DeœIDber 2000 9(),00) 3.55 
Jordan Deœmber 2001 212,000 3.99 
Deœmber 2000 127,300 2.55 
Sandi Arabia March2001 570.000 2.5 
Marcli2000 300.000 1.4 
Syria Deœmber 2001 6(),00) 0.35 
Deœ:mber 2000 30.(0) 0.18 
Yemen Marclt2001 14,(0) 0.08 
March2000 12,ŒX:l OJ11 
lraq Deœmber 2000 12,500 QOS 
Palestine March200l 6(),1lll -
October 1999 23,520 -
, . Source: (Madar Resear:ch Group) and (Arab AdvISOl"S Group) and (Enlirales In1ernet &; Multimedia 
(EIM) and (Ajeeb.rom). 
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Appendix B. Arab population in Ontario, Canada 2001 Census (1-3). 
Source: 
African, n.j.e. 
Arab origins 
Iraqi 
L-_~~~~~i~ __ .. ~. ___ ...... ; .. __ .. __ ,,"_", 
1 Kuwaiti 
1 Leba;e::"s-e ---. r: ~~~~ __ -_.-_.-_-_-.. := .... ~-+----------~.}---~~+-----~l 
i Maghreb! origins r-----.~...,.. ;....:..;::,. 
Algerien 
West Asian origins 
Afghan 
Armenian 
........ ,,~~~, ... -_.~,-,_ .. _,,~ .. ~~. 
Assyrlan 
Azerbaijani 
Georgian 
Iranlan 
http://www12.statcan.ca/english/censusO l/products/standardithemes/RetrieveProductTable.cfm ?Tempo 
ral=2001&PID=62911&APATH=11&GID=431515&METH=1&PTYPE=55440&THEME=44&FOCU 
S=O&AID=O&PLACENAME=O&PROVINCE=O&SEARCH=O&GC=99&GK=NA&VID=O&FL=O& 
RL=5&FREE=O 
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Appendix B. Arab population in Quebec, Canada 2001 Census (2-3). 
Source: 
26,680 7,445 
115 
310 
55 20 
_7...:.;e,:","e_0!-_~6,.:.,1 __ 05_} 1 ,885 
"1Rn .j "R" r------;;;:;;:; 
http://www12.statcan.ca/englishicensusO l/products/standardithemes/RetrieveProductTable.cfm ?Tempo 
ral=2001&PID=62911&APATH=11&GID=431515&METH=1&PTYPE=55440&THEME=44&FOCU 
S=O&AID=O&PLACENAME=O&PROVINCE=O&SEARCH=O&GC=99&GK=NA& VID=O&FL=O& 
RL=5&FREE=O 
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Appendix B. Arab population in Canada 2001 Census (3-3). 
Ivoirean 
Zairian 
Zimbabwean 
African (Black), nie. 
AfrÎcani nie. 
Araborigins 
Egyptlan 
Iraqi 
Jordanian 
Kuwaiti 585 275 
Lebanese 93,895 49,740 
Ubyan 795 390 
15,990 
4,260 
Source: 
http://www 12.statcan.caJenglish/censusO l/products/standardithemes/RetrieveProductTable.cfm ?Tempo 
ral=2001&PID=62911&APATH=11&GID=431515&METH=1&PTYPE=55440&THEME=44&FOCU 
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Appendix C. An example of Arab Americans counter-image (1-2). 
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